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Earth Matters examines the relationships between alternative religion in North 
America and the natural world through the twin lenses of the history of religions and 
cultural anthropology. Throughout, nature remains a contested ground, defined 
simultaneously the limits of cultural activity and by an increasing expansion of claims to 
knowledge by scientific discourses. Less a historical review than a series of fugues of 
thought, Earth Matters engages with figures like the French vitalist, Georges Canguilhem, 
the American environmentalist, John Muir; the founder of Deep Ecology, Arne Næss; the 
collaborators on Gaia Theory, James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis; the physicist and New 
Age scientist, Fritjof Capra; and the Wiccan writer and activist, Starhawk. 
These subjects move in spirals throughout the thesis: Canguilhem opens the 
question of vitalism, the search for a source of being beyond the explanations of the 
emerging sciences. As rationalism expands its dominance across the scientific landscape, 
this animating force moves into the natural world, to that protean space between the city 
and the wild and in the environmental thinkers who initially moved along those 
boundaries. As the twentieth century moves towards a close, mechanistic thinking 
simultaneously reaches heights of success previously unimagined and collapses under the 
demand for complexity posed by quantum physics, by research in genetic interactions, by 
the continued elusive relationship of mind to health. This allows the wild to return inside 
through the internalization of consciousness sparked by the American New Age, but also 
provides a new model to understand the natural world as complex zone open to a wide 
variety of strategies, including the multiplicities of understanding offered through 
contemporary neopaganisms. 
Earth Matters argues for the necessity of the notion of ecology, both as an 
environmental concern but also as an organizing principle for human thought and behavior. 
Ecologies are by their nature complex and multi-variegated things dependent upon the 
surprising and unpredictable interaction of radically different organisms, and it is through 
this model that we are best able to understand not only ourselves but also our communities 
and our efforts to make sense of the external world. 
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This grand show is eternal. It is always sunrise somewhere; the dew is 
never all dried at once; a shower is forever falling; vapor is ever rising. 
Eternal sunrise, eternal sunset, eternal dawn and gloaming, on sea and 
continents and islands, each in its turn, as the round earth rolls. 
John Muir, The Philosophy of John Muir in The Wilderness 
World of John Muir 
Earthrise 
We might point to our contemporary society with its growing reinterest 
in community and in rediscovery of one’s roots in the earth, on the one 
hand, and its fascination with space exploration, on the other. 
Jonathan Z. Smith, The Influence of Symbols on Social 
Change 
Christmas Eve, 1968. The upper right of the front page of the New York Times is 
dominated by a grainy, blurry photo beneath the headline “APOLLO NEARS MOON ON 
COURSE, TURNS AROUND TO GO INTO ORBIT; CREW SENDS PICTURES OF 
EARTH.” (Wilford 1968) Apollo 8 was a mission of firsts: the first entrance into the 
moon’s gravitational field by humans, the first lunar orbits, the first live transmissions of 
images from a manned space flight to an international television audience, as well as a host 
of other accomplishments surpassed by later programs (speed records, distances covered, 
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and so on). It was also the source of the first images of the earth from space taken by 
humans. 
If there is a point around which the explorations of this thesis are tethered, it is 
these iconic images of an earth, partially shrouded in shadow, rising into the absolute and 
inky darkness of space. Apart from their purely aesthetic beauty, they provide a moment 
symbolic of a much larger series of global transformations. Part of their gravitational 
attraction is the complexity that lurks in their contemplation—not least from the role 
gravitational attraction itself plays in their existence. That complexity begins in the act of 
seeing them as a watershed moment at all: in doing so, I am clearly engaged in creating a 
fiction: the images that came from Apollo 8 (and future space missions) gained their 
cultural presence only in the future that unfolds following the actual events of 1968, and 
only as they participated in the ebb and flow of history. 
The caption below the front page photo of that Christmas Eve’s New York Times 
reads “Earth, as seen from the Apollo spacecraft during the astronauts’ live television 
broadcast yesterday afternoon. Features on earth are obscured by a heavy cloud cover. The 
North Pole is at the lower left.” This first image is an inverted earth, presented upside-
down and off its axis. The Times is singularly unimpressed with Apollo’s photographic 
prowess, noting that the earth “looked like a sort of large misshapen basketball,” and 
paying more attention to the lunar craters that would be photographed subsequently during 
the ten orbits around the moon: “since the moon has no distorting atmosphere and will be 
only 69 miles or so away, the television pictures were expected to be much sharper and 
more detailed than the astronauts’ earth pictures.” Surpassed by later images, these pictures 
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of the moon—while vital to the planning of the lunar landings—remain consigned to the 
historical archive. This is the first part of the fiction: the creation of a false history of the 
moment itself, where what is later received is seen as present from the very beginning: far 
from being harbingers of a new age in any sense, these initial photographs were largely 
passed over with little impact. 
The second set of fictions is more easily clarified: in what follows, I do not mean to 
imply a strongly causal relationship in either direction between the earthrise image and the 
various socio-cultural/religious movements I discuss. Initially coming from NASA, but 
later both emanating from and being incorporated into numerous sources, from the cover of 
The Whole Earth Catalog to the opening sequence of the 1970s PBS show The Big Blue 
Marble, these images did not cause globalization, although they are clearly entangled in 
that process in, I would claim, non-spurious, non-accidental ways. The wanderings of John 
Muir were only in the most loosely metaphorical way related to the romantic notion of 
exploring outer space, but the quick acceptance by various environmental groups of those 
images as providing supporting evidence for claims towards the earthly universality of 
nature firmly draws its roots through Muir’s fertile soil. 
While the space program itself, with its connections to global competition and its 
reliance on an ever-expanding industrial complex, was a key cog in the emerging global 
machine, the lunar missions may also be seen as a final triumph of older knowledge. There 
is a direct line between Newton’s contributions to the blossoming of insights into the 
physical world and the calculations required in NASA’s operations, and the latter may be 
seen in one sense as the zenith of the former. Clearly Newtonian physics isn’t 
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“disappearing” or becoming less relevant; it has, however, been displaced from its position 
as the sole descriptor of reality recognized by “rational science.” As such, the images from 
Apollo 8 offer a useful moment, a historical pivot around which we can see conceptions 
shift. In short, my claim is that the view from space signifies a movement in cultural 
locations from the local to the global, from particularism to holism, and that this shift may 
be traced across many disciplines as a series of upheavals and struggles centered around 
this relationship. 
Cartography 
Absurd premises, in excluding nothing, do have the advantage of 
minimizing the chance of error. 
Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference 
Three dominant concepts weave their way through this thesis: vitality, nature, and 
ecology. I will not be presenting an archeology of these concepts, although they are each 
well deserving of a own full-length treatment. Instead, I am using each of them, and often 
their points of intersection, as the vantage points from which I try to make some sense of a 
series of questions that have emerged as I have spent the better part of a decade working 
with, through, and around these dominant concepts. In this time, it has become clear to me 
that I have willfully and joyfully inherited two different modes of interpretation that are 
ever present in my academic work. What follows intentionally forages along an uneasy 
border, caught between history of religions, the umbrella concept given to the comparative 
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study of religious phenomenon (a discipline that will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
two), and cultural anthropology, a more philosophically inclined set of analyses rooted 
(for me) in a mix of postmodernism, feminist theory, and late-twentieth century 
movements in anthropology. The first two chapters attempt to ground each of these modes 
of thought in turn. 
THIS VITAL LIFE 
Chapter one, This Vital Life, focuses on the concept of vitalism, using Georges 
Canguilhem’s writings as its primary focus. Philosopher, doctor, and longtime director of 
the Institut d’histoire des sciences at the Sorbonne, Canguilhem (1904-1995) joins together 
a sophisticated presentation of vitalism with another core focus of this thesis, science, or 
more properly, scientific discourse. In a stance not always echoed by proponents of 
vitalism, Canguilhem always writes with a specific horizon in mind, that of identifying 
what it means to be alive in a sense that will pass scientific muster. That, to this day, no 
such definition exists is more a tribute to the complexity of the question than to any 
underlying accuracy of vitalism itself, which remains more compelling as a metaphysical 
explanation than a medical one. Even Canguilhem is forced to admit that, in spite of his 
conviction of there being a truth to vitalist phenomenon, the identification of that truth 
remains firmly in the province of theory, not experimentally confirmable fact. 
This opens up the second doorway: if to the left we find science; to the right, 
religion. The searchings for meaning about the relationship between the structures through 
which we understand the world and the world itself that will be examined over the next 
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five chapters are, when seen through the combination of lenses that reveal the world to me, 
religious searchings. For the most part, they are not churched, and many of them are 
cloaked implicitly or explicitly in anti-religious language. To open up this question, we 
turn in This Vital Life briefly, and not for the last time, to both Georges Bataille and Mircea 
Eliade. Here, I use Bataille and Eliade as warning signs: each of them has a particular 
understanding of what could be called religious time, and in the material we encounter, 
questions of temporality, those moments when a discourse seems to separate itself from 
history and enter some isolated, theoretical zone that exists before all else, will often serve 
to raise a flag, a symbolic indicator that that we have moved towards, if not into, a zone 
that is best understood as containing religious behavior. 
This provides the first moment where I am able to emphasize that, just because the 
phenomenon under consideration does not appear to be congruent with notions of 
traditional religious expression does not mean it is not religious in nature or in form. 
Perhaps even more importantly, this holds true even when the subjects under consideration 
themselves would protest loudly against such a category being applied to their behavior or 
thoughts or writings. In one sense, this is the anthropological turn: your subjects always 
remains experts on their own experience. That does not make them accurate judges of the 
same, especially if the question (and here we veer away from the anthropological back 
towards the history of religions) is comparative in nature. This debate about the relative 
merits of the emic and the etic, of the insider and the outsider, of the practitioner and the 
observer, the believer and the critic, is a long-standing debate on both sides of my 
academic work, and one that is likely never to be satisfactorily resolved. The important 
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thing, I would claim, is the tension between the two sets of perspectives, a hermeneutics 
that is in no way original, but that I hope to demonstrate with both integrity and empathy. 
This Vital Life returns to the question of contextualizing Canguilhem within a 
longer view of scientific discourse by turning to both Jean-François Lyotard and Michel 
Foucault, Lyotard for his help in unpacking what we mean by discourse and Foucault for 
his more specific work on situating Western knowledge as a practice with a particular form 
as it moved into and through modernity. This is not at all a steady, stable progression: 
scientific understanding (and while our focus is often more tightly restricted to medical 
concerns, we will regularly move back and forth between that specific realm and the 
structure of science as a whole) must be seen as a three-dimensional shape, a river that 
flows slower at points and faster at others, that rushes forwards in great leaps only to sit 
suddenly stagnant until something breaks further upstream, allowing the current to pick up 
momentum once again. The metaphor as conceived lacks a key component: as both the 
collaborations between Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as the work of Luce 
Irigaray, show, scientific progress is not merely the result of a momentum that carries 
forward arbitrarily. There is, if not control, influence: dams are built, tributaries blocked 
off, paths of understanding declared forbidden despite the presence of crystal clear water 
and dependable tides. The question then becomes what it means to swim in those waters: 
what is contained within the practice of “doing science,” by which I refer more to the 
cultural practice than specific activities in (for example) a laboratory? Perhaps 
unsurprising, given my claims above with regard to the particular interpretive lenses 
through which I perceive the world, it turns out that, especially in its margins, doing 
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science remains suspiciously similar to doing religion, especially as both move into the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century. 
Thus grounded, we are able to dive more deeply into vitalism itself, encountering 
what I see as two forms although, of course, nothing is ever truly isolated, and there are 
overlaps and blurred zones in any analysis. I dub these “Bodily” and “Worldly” vitalism, 
and their differentium lies in where the vital force, that which animates us and that which 
is seen as being essential to life, is ultimately located. Bodily vitalism points to something 
internal, something contained within each individual, something that for centuries of 
Christianity was neatly captured in the notion of a soul (and, of course, for centuries of 
other religious structures in other loosely cognate notions). We are, however, focused both 
temporally and in terms of the specific manifestations under consideration at a point where 
such a notion proves unsatisfactory, and are forced to spend some time considering the 
notion of secularism, both definitionally and in terms of what transformations it may hold 
for bodily vitalism. This is an important moment: any comparative discussion of 
contemporary religion must grapple with secularism, and the conclusions drawn from that 
encounter will dictate much of what follows from that point. If the world is seen as literally 
less religious—that is, if secularism refers to a disappearance of religious content from the 
world—much of this thesis (and much of the field of study) is increasingly irrelevant 
outside of quaint notions of how foolishly we all used to spend our time. If instead 
secularism refers to a formal transformation, a morphological alteration in cultural 
behavior where prior classifications into religious and non-religious categories no longer 
hold true, then what we have to say continues to have meaning, and even potential impact 
14 
 
beyond the ivory walls. 
The idea of worldly vitalism provides a bridge to chapter two and beyond. Here, 
the focus is external, with a belief that there is a substance that exists out there of which we 
partake, and by doing so, remain vibrantly alive. While the specific permutations of this 
are almost infinite in their variety, the general movement takes us, well, outside and into 
the natural world. But, what exactly is that? When we wander across the world, what is 
that we wander in, and how is that space constructed both through our perceptions and our 
cultural behavior? The palace is clearly unnatural, but what about the wagon track or the 
planted field? Building largely on Roderick Frazier Nash’s work, we are able to draw a 
distinction between the natural, which only exists at the margins of the culturally created, 
at the intersection of garden and jungle, settlement and wilderness, and the wild itself. 
This Vital Life serves two purposes simultaneously. In terms of content, it 
introduces several areas that will recur later (science, medicine, time, life); in terms of 
form, it provides an exemplar of a certain mode of analysis and critique, one that attempts 
to draw disparate strands of conversation into engagement with each other, one that looks 
for areas of congruence and overlap, that listens as much to the echo as to the initial roar in 
trying to unpack meaning and draw conclusions. The chapter ends, appropriately enough, 
outside, gazing at the spaces marked by cultural settlement—colonialism, even—in 
contrast to those seen as natural or wild. 
RELIGION, NATURAL AND OTHERWISE 
The second chapter extends that gaze across the early history of the United States, 
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drawing extraordinarily heavily upon the magisterial work of Catherine Albanese, who has 
for decades studied what she first terms “nature religion” and later “American 
metaphysics.” Her work is critical to this dissertation: without it, what I am doing is not 
possible. I say that not only in terms of the voluminous nature of her scholarship, but also 
because her work allows us to move much more quickly and much more flittingly across 
the landscape she has already mapped: it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that nature 
religion has existed and has been an important part of almost every significant 
manifestation of North American religion, on both sides of the colonial encounter. 
Religion, Natural and Otherwise opens, however, not with Albanese, but with the 
tradition in which she was trained and continues to work. The notion of comparative 
religion is not an easy one, and the field itself remains conflicted about what it means to 
work within its boundaries. If I am going to examine what “doing science” entails, it seems 
reasonable to also spend some time looking at what “doing comparative religious studies” 
might mean. The answer for me is bound up in the aforementioned history of religions, an 
academic tradition with its roots in the University of Chicago in the first part of the 
twentieth century and its branches, well, everywhere, including Albanese’s department at 
the University of California at Santa Barbara. The history of religions is highly 
problematized as an area of study. Questions of authority loom large, as do issues related 
to how, and on what basis, objects (behaviors, truth-claims, accounts of experience, 
cultural products) from dramatically different contexts can be joined together. While the 
history of religions itself provides some answers, and we look to both its “founding 
fathers” in Eliade and Joseph Kitagawa as well as to generations of their academic 
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descendants represented by Wendy Doniger and David Gordon White, these questions 
seem to me ultimately to be anthropologically based. This leaves us with a point of 
interaction between perhaps the pre-eminent emic examiner of the field, Jonathan Z. 
Smith, and Clifford Geertz, whose oft-cited and admittedly slightly dated notion of “thick 
engagement” offers a path forward through the morass. In the end, for both Smith and 
Geertz—and for the history of religions as a whole—comparison remains valid and 
integral; albeit with serious concerns about competency, about integrity, and about the care 
with which such academic explorations must be undertaken. 
With that, we turn more directly to Albanese’s work and especially to 2007’s A 
Republic of Mind and Spirit, which I use in two ways. First, Albanese’s notion of an 
American metaphysic gives us something to push against, something against which to gain 
traction in our own understanding of American religion—a question complicated by the 
very real possibility that, in fact, there is no such thing, that instead there are just American 
religions in the plural, and that no amount of creative abstraction can provide a common 
ground amongst them. Indeed, writ large, this is likely the case. However, if—as both I and 
Albanese do—we limit our scope considerably, patterns and themes do emerge and while 
my understanding of the religious notions we will examine in more depth in the rest of the 
thesis differs from Albanese’s, she provides a very nuanced and intriguing starting point. 
Second, I use her work as a set of exemplars from which I select a few for more detailed 
focus. So, the aboriginal tribes of the states bordering the North Atlantic; so, Thomas 




Our discussion of the aboriginal people of North America becomes, very quickly, 
quite complicated and allows a diversion into the twin notions of authority and authenticity 
that are core to my understanding of religion. At stake is the question of what actually 
constitutes an authentic religious tradition—if the term has any meaning at all—and what 
relevance historical truth has on the matter. The specifics under consideration concern Sam 
Gill’s work with the idea of an Earth Mother or Corn Mother in native American 
traditions, a concept so endemic to many understandings as to be unquestioned, located 
within religious traditions that are often almost reflexively assumed to be exemplars of 
sacred interactions with nature. The difficulty is that the notion of an Earth Mother or any 
of its close cognates—at least in terms of the commonly held contemporary associations—
seems, as far as Gill is able to ascertain, to be incredibly recent, growing quite rapidly from 
the bare seeds of a small handful of statements, some apocryphal, made within the last two 
centuries and made, exclusively, as a product of interactions between native and white 
communities. This is dangerous, threatening scholarship: what does it mean to claim that 
religious truth is invented? Especially when that truth has been embraced and imbued with 
meaning by both emic and etic communities? These questions will plague us again in our 
considerations of Wicca and neopaganism in the fifth chapter, with a very different twist to 
them. 
Religion, Natural and Otherwise also allows me to foreshadow two other ideas that 
will return: first, Albanese’s treatment of the figure of Davy Crockett opens the door to 
explorations of race and racism in America. I meet these topics at a very specific angle, 
attempting to extend their role in this story well beyond the brutalities of slavery and the 
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contributions of Afro-Caribbean practices to the religious melting pot, to pick two highly 
available tropes among many. Race in America is not the focus of this thesis, but nor can it 
be—as it is all too often—wholly ignored, allowing North American cultural behavior to 
collapse into an assumed whiteness. Second, many of the practices we will encounter later, 
especially as we dive more fully into the New Age itself (whatever, at the end of the day, 
that may be), include within them a concept of magic and magical practice, and our 
discussion of both aboriginal religion and the metaphysical traditions that are carried into 
the New World from the Old offer an opening to consider what these terms mean. 
The chapter closes with an extended consideration of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
whose Nature is taken as a key moment, joining together the concepts under consideration 
at the end of the first chapter with what has immediately preceded here. Emerson’s writing 
is looked at through the lens of Émile Durkheim, something that, in the end, does the poet 
few favors: we are left with Emerson having ceded authority away from the natural world 
and back into culturally constructed domains, having settled for a sense of being “in touch” 
with nature as sufficing as a proxy for direct and unmediated contact with it. 
WALKING THE WORLD 
This position would be anathema to John Muir, who serves as the primary subject 
of the third chapter, Walking the World. The nuanced and sophisticated biographical 
treatment of a single subject is something I admire, but at which I am not skilled. Still, 
Muir remains deeply compelling and, as such, receives the most in-depth biographical 
treatment of any of the subjects of this thesis. This seems appropriate not only for his 
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historical role—part of the founding group of The Sierra Club, a highly recognizable 
public figure in the early moments of American environmentalism, a prolific and widely-
read writer—but also for the ways in which many of the things that interest me most about 
the questions related to religion and nature in America emerge in his life. Foremost among 
these is his demand for direct experience, his unfettered exuberance at being in the wild, 
and his lifelong use of encounters with the natural world as a healing balm. While this can 
be traced to boyhood romps along the Scottish coast, the key moment instead finds Muir in 
his early 30s, on the verge of settling into a career somewhere between academia and 
mechanical engineering, nearly losing his sight in a workshop accident. Convalescing in a 
darkened room, he has an epiphany and realizes that he cannot bear the thought of never 
again being able to gaze upon the natural world. 
Once able, he decides he will travel to South America to see the Amazon, a journey 
he begins with a three thousand mile walk, from central Indiana to the Florida panhandle. 
Three thousand miles—no real provisions, no itinerary, a map, a couple of books. Muir’s 
walk to Florida takes him through much of emerging rural America, but he didn’t reach the 
Brazilian jungles until an around the world voyage much later in his life. At this time, 
coming out of the woods and swamps of southern Georgia, he contracts malaria, recovers 
in Florida, and finds his way to northern California, which would serve as his home base 
for the rest of his life. This is the most outwardly dramatic of several such moments in 
Muir’s life: wracked with guilt over the proper response to the Civil War, he vanishes into 
the Canadian wilderness; later in life, suffering from a weary depression spawned by over-
extending himself in the social and political realms, he voyages to Alaska for several 
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months, traipsing over the glacier eventually named in his honor. 
After arriving in California, Muir would spend many years in the Yosemite valley 
and the Sierra Nevada mountains and would become a primary figure in two heavily 
entwined activities. The first was the nascent movement encouraging the government of 
the United States to form national parks. Depending on how you count, Yosemite was 
either the second or third, but certainly in the top ten: the formal designation of “national 
park” took a while to settle, and distinctions between Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the 
Adirondacks of upstate New York can be made in various ways, depending on who is 
angling for the top spots on the list. The second was the growing role that geology began to 
play in our understanding of the world around us. Here, Muir’s contributions were those of 
the skilled amateur, enhanced by his wide ranging explorations where theories born of his 
observations of Yosemite were confirmed by what he saw of Alaskan glaciers. In many 
ways, geology provides a model for various other instances of secularization: what 
emerged as a series of explanations for that which God hath wrought gradually turned to a 
vast field of inquiry that provided direct evidence against religiously-based cosmological 
explanations. 
This movement—while clearly relevant to this thesis—was not Muir’s direct 
concern at all: he had shrugged off the somewhat brutal Protestantism enforced by his 
father throughout his youth and replaced it with what could be termed a hyper-expansive 
panentheism, where God’s grandeur is expressed precisely through the majesty of glacial 
movements, regardless of their impact on a strictly interpreted biblical timeline. Muir’s 
God was a god of science, and both scientific data and the wonder of direct observation of 
21 
 
his works both big and small, from the mountains to detailed field work on butterflies and 
birds, trumped any written legacy. 
There is a tendency in working with Muir to become slightly untethered: his prose 
is soaring, often well beyond the point of excess, and his life put him in moments of such 
severe isolation that, surrounded by the blinking lights and digital hum of the early twenty-
first century, he seems to be almost a mythic figure, John of the Woods come to preach the 
Redwood Gospel. Certainly, that is a large part of how he has been received through the 
past century or so. 
Partially as a counterweight to this, partially as a continuation of the brief 
discussion of race in America in Religion, Natural and Otherwise, and partially as 
foreshadowing for some of our discussion of Aldo Leopold, I use the encounters on his 
long walk between Muir and African-Americans, largely poor farmers, as a way to ground 
his writings. Muir was no more a racist than a huge number of other well-intentioned 
early-generation European settlers in the United States but also no less, and the effacement 
of those inheritances marks a blind spot not only in the work of Muir’s biographers, but in 
many of the environmental and New Age movements that draw occasional inspiration 
from his life and work. 
This notion of inheritance proves thorny as we look at Aldo Leopold, whose Sand 
County Almanac is often hailed as an exemplar of early American environmentalism, and 
the “land ethic” it proposes is probably the most cited initial expression of a truly 
ecological concern by European descendants on these shores. For the page and a half or so 
that is usually quoted, this is all quite fine, but it ignores the rest of the text, which presents 
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an ideological framework that is troubling at the very least. That these things can be 
ignored is, I argue, a product of their whiteness, a cultural attribute that allows them to 
fade, unnoticed, into the background. This critique becomes clearest through an 
engagement with Carl Anthony, who provides a wonderfully cogent analysis of the social 
and human cost of these blind spots in an ecological narrative. 
These issues seem to expand theoretically the more I think on them, providing an 
opportunity to leave the realm of biographical interpretation for an exploration of some of 
the key surrounding issues. The first is the sheer complexity of the landscape that stretches 
before us: an ecology is, almost by definition, overwhelming. Ecologies emerge out of the 
multiplicities of interactions between already significant zones of behavior: they lack 
internal boundaries, and attempts to simply control them almost always crash upon the 
reefs of unpredictable outcomes and unexpected results. The challenge to engage with 
them, in Donna Haraway’s words, to “become worldly,” is a significant, difficult one and 
one that is worth attention at both the theoretical and physical level. This is a key moment 
of disclosure: in my thinking, ecologies exist out there in the natural world, in the marshes 
and swamps, the mountains and the open plains, but also in the narrative world: the 
overlapping, changing world of theory may also be seen as an ecology, and when I write of 
one of these planes, I am also always already writing about and of the other. 
The question is how can we cross between these? What is the relationship between 
the mountain itself and Leopold’s call to think like such a thing, even with Anthony’s 
sophisticated critique? What could that possibly mean, to think like a mountain? Zones, 
planes, boundaries, moments of interaction. These are the tropes that lead me towards 
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Haraway and, immediately, to her prolonged meditation on human/canine interaction, 
When Species Meet. This may seem an odd part of Haraway’s corpus to focus on—and we 
will return in a later chapter to her own considerations of humanity in relation with 
technology—but her prescient and probing questioning of what it means to reach across a 
chasm beyond true understanding, what is actually required of us to engage deeply with 
another species, another way of communicating, seems to speak to the heart of the issue. It 
also allows an opportunity to push back against some of the excesses of Deleuze and 
Guattari, who—in an odd sense, like Muir—seem at times to be so caught up in the 
narrative momentum of their own writing that they end up in unexpected locales with 
perhaps unintended consequences: Muir, clinging quite comfortably to branches at the top 
of a pine tree during a massive storm; Deleuze and Guattari insisting that only the 
exceptional animal is worthy of attention and all others, explicitly including humans who 
find themselves with domesticated companions, are deserving of mocking scorn and 
dismissal. Haraway insists otherwise, and while her conclusions remain muffled, her 
demand for the possibility and her willingness to engage fully with the broad demands of 
the question remain a guide. 
Walking the World closes with the third member of its triumvirate of subjects, 
Norwegian philosopher and activist Arne Næss, best known for being the originator of 
what came to be termed deep ecology. Næss is joined to Muir in his general engagement 
with nature (including the notes of isolation and of finding solace through direct 
experience) and to Leopold in his concern for a land ethic, a concern that Næss is able to 
formulate with less additional baggage than Leopold’s oddly nostalgic masculinity allows. 
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Less, but not none. Næss is a highly trained and rigorous philosopher, and his notion of 
ecosophies as individual philosophical frameworks that allow for disparate groups to 
combine their efforts on issues (for him, environmental, but in no way is the application of 
an ecosophy limited to matters of the environment) remains both useful and wide-ranging. 
His influence on contemporary ecological movements cannot be underestimated and my 
assumption is that, with his death in early 2009, we will see more and more academic work 
devoted to his archives. While the introduction of rigor is a welcome corrective to Muir’s 
more ethereally connected musings, Næss also carries with him a very large helping of 
anthropocentrism, a tension which continues to plague environmental activism and policy-
making. 
AS ABOVE, SO BELOW 
We leave Walking the World having considered half of our equation: in Muir, 
Leopold, and Næss we find figures deeply engaged in questions of what our relationship is, 
could be, and should be towards our natural surroundings, considerations that have been 
enhanced by the contributions of other thinkers as well (Anthony, Haraway, Deleuze and 
Guattari). The other half requires a return to the notion of science: what is this world of 
which we speak? This is really only ever a half-turn, of course, as we cannot discuss the 
earth from the perspective of the earth, but are left with either the all-too-human voices of 
science on the one hand, or thinkers thinking about science on the other. Chapter four, As 
Above, So Below, traces a voyage from the former to the latter, beginning with James 
Lovelock and Lynn Margulis’ Gaia Theory and ending with Mary Midgley’s musings on 
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the relationship between scientists and science, specifically evolution. In between, we 
spend quite some time in the company of complexity, used both in its usual sense but also 
referring to a specific mode of analysis developed in the latter third of the twentieth 
century. The title of the chapter is consciously heavy-handed, not only foreshadowing 
chapter five’s treatment of Wicca and neopaganism, but also reflecting both the voyage 
from Gaia Theory to Margulis’ later work on bacterial lives and the larger sense that this 
has all happened before, that for all the apocalyptic trappings, the cultural movements we 
are tracing are all echoes of interactions in the past and hints of what is yet to come. 
As Above, So Below opens with a brief biography of James Lovelock with the hope 
of providing some insight into the iconoclastic career of this self-described “independent 
scientist.” The greatest influence on Lovelock’s career was his invention of a small device 
that came to be known as the ECD, or Electron Capture Device. The ECD could fit in the 
palm of your hand, and could determine—with a level of sensitivity and precision that was 
deemed physically impossible at first—the presence of various forms of chemicals in the 
atmosphere. In a turn of events that echoes some of Muir’s brushes with prosperity, 
Lovelock did not become rich off the invention: the rights were ceded to the government of 
the United States long before the value of the device was apparent. Without the ECD, 
much of the research that fueled the early environmental research movement would have 
been delayed at least a decade: it made it possible not only to prove that chemical 
contaminants were present in the atmosphere, but to track their spread across the globe. 
It also formed both the practical relationships and the theoretical leanings that 
would position Lovelock for his later work. The notion of Gaia grew out of consulting 
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done with NASA in preparation for the Viking mission to Mars, and here emerges the true 
zone of overlap between Lovelock’s work and other thinkers we have encountered. 
Lovelock realized there was no purpose in looking for life on Mars because of the extreme 
stability, the utter inertness, of its atmosphere. Mars was dead, and we could tell that 
because entropy had won: nothing was generating change at the chemical level in the 
Martian “air.” This formed an absolute contrast to the earth, where the atmosphere is 
riotously alive, where a constant state of chemical imbalance exists, an incredibly complex 
cycle of transformations that seem to never end, flowing into each other in ways only 
dimly understood. Lovelock realized that the cause of this difference was, ultimately, life. 
Living things, by virtue of their very existence, take in a wide variety of inputs and 
transform them into an equally wide variety of products. We’re not talking about tools but 
rather chemical compositions: the transformation of oxygen into carbon dioxide, the slow 
movement of sunlight into waste. 
Ultimately, this was the insight from which Gaia Theory—the notion that the earth 
could be seen as a giant, self-regulating system that preserved a certain set of almost 
overwhelmingly complex environmental conditions—was born. By now, Margulis had 
joined Lovelock as an academic partner (each of them make slightly puzzled references to 
their never being entwined romantically, with a notion that for their friendship and 
collaboration to survive, their relationship would have to remain platonic), and the two of 
them began writing about Gaia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, positing that the earth 
contains a complex network of interrelated, self-regulating systems. This much was 
relatively uncontroversial although, of course, there was both the predictable resistance to a 
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new, big idea and, as always, the serious potential for heated dispute in the scientific 
details. The real question, and the one that made Gaia so unpalatable for the first few 
decades of its existence, was why? The answer seems to be—and here Gaia is finally 
joined, albeit in a hidden way, to notions of worldly vitalism—in order to preserve the 
conditions (chemical, bacterial, geological) necessary for a flourishing of life. This is 
problematic within the world of secular science (that concept, again) for many reasons, 
most of all because of the dramatic opening it allows for a return of an ultimate being, in 
this case a Goddess, that has set it all up just so. 
This interpretation of Gaia is both overly simplistic and the one that dominated its 
initial reception by the wider public (and continues to be found throughout large swathes 
of the New Age). The actual claims are much more difficult to grasp, and invoke a much 
more sophisticated understanding of evolution and complexity itself than is usually found. 
Evolutionary scientists, led by Richard Dawkins, then at the height of his influence, 
provided the initial bulwark of the resistance to Gaia, heaping scorn upon it and claiming 
that Lovelock (and Margulis, but at this point Lovelock was really the “face” of the theory) 
was operating under a romanticized and naïve understanding of evolution. There is an 
irony here: in the end, Gaia was accepted not because of its simplicity, but for its comfort 
with, indeed, its dependence upon, complexity. 
To understand complexity better, especially in its more recent theoretical usages, 
we turn to Fritjof Capra and, through him, to the work of Francisco Varela and Humberto 
Maturana. There are many possible guides to complexity, and the choice of Capra is quite 
intentional: The Tao of Physics places Capra both as a scientist and a major contributor to 
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the early American New Age; the controversies surrounding that text problematize both of 
those positions; and his later writings provide a wonderfully lucid path through often 
difficult terrain. Capra’s work helps us understand what is meant when we speak of 
interrelated systems, and how we can trace something as seemingly incomprehensible as 
the evolution of single cells into the human (or canine or feline or bovine) eye back 
through reproducible, mathematical models. As part of this, several notions that are held 
dear begin to show signs of tension, most notably through the emergence of a scientific 
middle ground that sits somewhere between some variant on intelligent design and a cold, 
lifeless universe, devoid of purpose. But, whose purpose? Cui bono? 
With that question, Lynn Margulis, heretofore an acknowledged partner in the 
creation of Gaia, but a figure largely obscured by Lovelock’s shadow, steps into the light. 
Margulis is a hugely influential biologist, a figure whose work on bacteria and its varieties 
of form and function was largely (although certainly not at all single-handedly) responsible 
for a total rewrite of biology textbooks across the world. When a twelve year old insists 
that there are six animal kingdoms, stretching their mouths around terms like 
“archaebacteria” and “eukaryote,” Margulis is partially responsible. 
For our purposes, Margulis’ greatest contribution (often made in collaboration with 
her son, Dorion Sagan—her first husband was the astronomer Carl Sagan, to whom we 
shall turn at the beginning of chapter five) is to batter at our notion of a biological self until 
we are forced to admit its total defeat. This ties directly into the notion of evolution: if 
animals cannot be said to be whole selves, what is it that evolves? What is the appropriate 
unit between the gene (already proven as being far too limited in scope) and the furry 
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beast? Margulis insists that we are asking the wrong question, and that as long as we 
remain fixated on ideas that revolve around the individual, the singular, we will never 
arrive at an acceptable destination. Life—literally—for Margulis (and, I would argue, for 
Haraway, for Joan Roughgarden who we also meet briefly in this chapter, and for many 
others) depends on large communities acting together, which is quite distinct from acting 
in harmony, or acting in a coordinated, mutually beneficial way. 
Margulis’ professional career (she died in 2011) was one of twin paths of rejection, 
dogged persistence, and ultimate acceptance, a situation certainly hardened by her being a 
woman in a scientific field that was (and, many would claim, remains) unused to powerful 
women advocating major changes to well-established modes of thought. Both her work on 
Gaia and her bacterial-focused theories of evolution were ridiculed, and yet both are 
currently accepted, at least in their wider formulations. In both cases, the most virulent 
resistance came from scientists whose primary domain was evolution itself, regardless of 
the specifics of their specialties. The question of why the scientists in this field—
presumably a domain focused explicitly on the naturalness and ubiquitous nature of 
change—would be so resistant plagued me until I encountered Mary Midgley’s work, 
which offers a useful way to think through the issues. 
Midgley writes in a different key than any of the philosophers we have worked 
with so far: her sentences are often declarative and efficient, even simple. Her thinking, 
however, is nuanced and deep, and it is a tribute to her skills as a writer that her work 
remains so accessible. What Midgley offers are thoughts on the relationship between 
science and religion that help to clarify what is at stake in these discussions. In doing so, 
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she is able to clearly highlight just how the boundaries between claims of science and 
claims of ultimate meaning and purpose are effaced beyond the point of recognition, 
trodden over in both directions time and time again, usually in service of a larger, 
ideological project that remains obscured behind appeals to scientific impartiality. Life 
lurks behind every turn of this chapter: it is life that fuels the chaotic systems of Gaia, life 
that drives Margulis to her microbial explorations, and life in the end that Midgley posits 
as being the contemporary replacement for any sort of deity that might lurk behind the 
systems under examination. She leave us once again in conversation with Canguilhem, but 
several turns of the spiral further along. 
Speaking of spirals … 
PAGANISMS, NEO AND NEW 
Paganisms, Neo and New opens by attempting to retrace our steps so far, with a 
stress on the notion of ecology itself. This is followed by a fairly lengthy engagement with 
Carl Sagan, who is used as a stand-in for hundreds of scientific books that do odd things 
with religious content, often in service of discrediting religion entirely. In Sagan’s case, we 
examine The Demon-Haunted-World: Science As A Candle in the Dark and, more 
specifically, Sagan’s invoking of two seventeenth century figures, Thomas Ady of England 
and the German Friedrich Spee, both of whom are recast as arguing against what Sagan 
sees as the irrational intrusion of faith into matters of scientific law. Sagan is 
unapologetically looking for allies in his fight against the use of religion as a weapon 
against humanity—the specifics here are the persecution of suspected witches in Europe. 
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The difficulty is that both Ady and Spee believe firmly and fervently in witches: they just 
think the wrong people are being imprisoned, tortured, hung, or burned at the stake. For 
Ady especially, this is explicitly a matter of theological consideration and import. In his 
literal reading of the Bible, God has already provided clear instructions on how to identify 
and punish witches, and if we use any other metric whatsoever, it is an affront to the Holy 
word and writ. I have no quibble with Sagan: like many of my generation, part of my 
fascination with the stars stems from the enthusiasm that drove his PBS series Cosmos, but 
I am drawn to the constant overlapping of science and religion, and to the remarkable 
levels of misunderstanding and misuse that all too often ensues, and Sagan’s example 
allows us to consider the roots of these issues in a bit more depth. 
The religious content that interests me most emerges through, out of, and in 
reaction against that amorphous and ill-understood construct of the New Age. Albanese 
leaves us with a clear methodology to trace its roots throughout the religious history of 
post-colonial North America, but its current manifestations aggregate to form far more 
than a contemporary American metaphysic, combining questions of authenticity, of 
engagements and complicity with post-capital globalization, and of how to evaluate the 
value of individual claims of experience within a society whose appetite for increased 
narcissism seems endless. It is here—in the New Age—that, for my purposes, we 
encounter the most interesting examples of these contested boundaries between domains of 
knowledge and domains of faith. 
The definition of the New Age is a well-argued subject, and—much like the 
definition of religion treated earlier—while I try to provide some of the more influential 
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perspectives, the act of rigorously defining a sphere of understanding has never seemed, 
for a variety of reasons ranging from the personal to the political to the theoretical, 
particularly compelling. Still, some consistent themes do emerge, and some of these are 
quite problematic, most notably the narcissism and the relationship to the engines of 
marketing and commodification mentioned above. The problem is ultimately unresolvable: 
the New Age refers to multiplicities, and out of that many there are always movements that 
are more or less aligned with various positions, more or less easily dismissed on a variety 
of grounds. That also means that there should be—and I would say there clearly are—
locations within the New Age that are both aware of the complexity of their own position 
and are struggling to find a coherent response and consistent path forward. 
This may be seen quite clearly in, as a single example, neopaganism’s tangled 
relationship with appropriation and authenticity. Here we find a movement with a 
voracious appetite, a seeming unending tolerance, for swallowing anything attractive into 
its belly, a movement whose founding claims are, again and again, proven to be more myth 
than fact. We also find a movement—or, more accurately, significant sections of a 
movement—that is acutely aware of these truths, and that is actively engaged with trying 
to build an ontological space where more than one thing can be true at the same time. 
Wiccan practitioners can both know that Gerald Gardner essentially invented their 
religious practice under a century ago and feel a deep connection to an image of pre-
technological Britain that leads them to insist they are carrying forth an ancient tradition 
into the digital world, using iPhones to capture century-old rites performed with a mixture 
of implements uniquely hand-crafted and mass produced in the factories of the Far East. 
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This is not easy to do, and a deeper engagement with how such tolerance for both/and can 
be created is worthwhile. 
For that, we turn to Starhawk, whose The Spiral Dance is, to borrow a term from 
Olav Hammer (whose impact is explicitly felt multiple times throughout this thesis), a 
primary “movement text” for neopaganism in the United States. After examining the 
structure of the religious system Starhawk offers (first as witchcraft, later as Wicca), I 
attempt to present a sense of Starhawk’s progression, from the romantic notions of the late 
1970s through decades spent on the front lines of protest movements against globalization 
to her attempts to distill those social engagements into methodologies for group 
performance within more secular cultural spaces. Throughout all of that, she remains, 
without reservation, a witch, and her struggles to integrate these different components—
artifacts from the New Age, an ever-changing sense of what Wicca is and should be, a 
deep commitment to social justice that leads her into dangerous situations and moments of 
witnessing great violence, a similar dedication to local activism and to the inevitable 
organizational instability that accompanies it—into a coherent practice are what draw most 
of my focus. 
The thesis closes with two thoughts, less conclusions than momentary reflections 
caught on the surface as I look back over the work so far. The first is a claim that nature 
itself is the secret ingredient added by the New World as the syncretic process unfolded, 
bringing together strands of early European occult movements, the transformed versions of 
mystery cults that survived the crossing, the bloodied contributions of Africans forced 
westwards, and the violently uprooted offerings of the indigenous people of this land. The 
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natural world—seen differently, seen through a variety of theoretical and practical lenses, 
but always seen—was added to the mix, shaken and stirred, and poured back out into the 
increasingly global trade in religious notions that emerged at the end of the nineteenth 
century and exploded throughout the twentieth. 
The second is an insistence on the importance of the notion of ecology as a cultural 
metaphor. Ecologies of thought, ecologies of action, ecologies of belief: none of these can 
exist independently, and their interdependence is fractal: no matter at what scale they are 
examined, ecologies are plural things, compositions of multitudes locked in complex 
interactions and occasionally springing free in innovative ways. Not only do they offer a 
corrective to our treasured and destructive notions of individuality and exceptionalism, 
they have the advantage of, if we are to learn anything from the subjects examined in the 
five following chapters, being true as well. 
Technical Notes 
Jazz … has progressed in its fits and starts of sudden discoveries and 
startled reactions. New principles, new sounds, new rhythms and 
harmonies have been advanced with unusual frequency. 
Not surprisingly, many of the younger musicians have been quietly 
digesting this information almost as quickly as it has appeared. 
As a result, they've acquired a degree of musical sophistication which 
supersedes many of the previous standards of excellence. So it's no longer 
especially relevant to ask the young saxophone player, for example, to 
demonstrate his ability by running through all the Charlie Parker licks. 
Digable Planets, Appointment at the Fat Clinic 
There are, as always, a series of clarifications that are required surrounding certain 
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choices of form within the text. The most immediately obvious to academic readers is 
probably the absence throughout of footnotes, an intentional choice to enforce a sense that, 
if something is worth saying, it is worth disclaiming in the body of the work and not in a 
labyrinthine and covert series of comments. This has several implications: first, there some 
detours that are probably better suited to the marginalia that remain in the main text, for 
which I can only ask indulgence; second, I have in general refrained from long lists of 
citations, preferring to let direct quotations speak more fully. This has an additional effect 
of creating some very long block quotes. My concern for context and my sensitivity to the 
potential harm that comes from its loss has led me to err on the side of expansiveness here. 
I want the authors voices that I bring into conversation to be full and present, not subsumed 
beneath or into my own. If successful, this will allow an even greater differentiation to 
emerge between theirs and mine; if unsuccessful, it will give the appearance of relying too 
heavily on the material of others at the expense of my own incorporative critique. 
As part of this I have, as much as possible, left the quotes alone: British spellings 
remain, as do whatever guiding light was followed in the original regarding capitalization, 
placement of quotation marks vis-à-vis punctuation, and the like. Any added emphases 
have been explicitly noted. In my own text, I have strived for consistency, and to land on 
the side of caution. The temptation to turn everything into a proper noun seems one born of 
a desire to isolate and elevate, and in a paper fascinated with zones of ecology and overlap, 
counter-intuitive. Hence, earth is used more than Earth, neopagan is preferred to Neo-
Pagan, etc. There are exceptions of course, the largest of which being the term New Age, 
which I capitalize mostly as an aid to clarification: the confusion entailed by asking the 
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reader to constantly decipher whether what is intended refers to a generic adjective or a 
proper noun seemed unfair. Other retentions of capitalization are mostly a product of 
accepted usage in the communities to which the terms belong (Wiccan instead of wiccan, 
as an example). When the same citation would be repeated consecutively within a single 
paragraph, I have only included it once. 
Finally, a note on the epigraphical quotes. Not all of the sections have them, but 
many do, and their purpose is twofold. First, they serve as a way to extend the conversation 
between the subjects of the thesis itself, allowing me, for example, to place words by 
Starhawk—who is not dealt with in depth until the final chapter—into the exploration of 
vitalism with which I open. They also allow a way for the dissertation to break free in a 
limited way, bringing in various bits of inspiration that have over the past decade felt 
relevant as moments of insight or interesting commentary on these topics, whether the 
source qualifies as suitably academic or, in many cases, falls into the nebulous realm of 
somewhat popular culture. 
Giving Thanks 
It takes a village. 
Apocryphal “African” Proverb 
When I first walked into the office of the Department of Religious Studies at Rice 
University, I was equally parts naïve and lucky. Naïve to the intricacies and seriousness of 
graduate school, and lucky that, despite that, I was taken seriously enough to be 
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considered. And rejected. And then, gloriously and after a year’s hard effort, accepted. 
Doubly lucky perhaps in that Rice, chosen because of its geography, proved to be a 
department that aligned very neatly with my own academic leanings. I thought this would 
be common, but the more I learned of the academic landscape, the clearer my good fortune 
became. 
There are many people who deeply influenced my work over the past decade who 
will never read this thesis; still, I am thankful for my interactions with David Cook, Claire 
Fanger, David Gray, Cathy Gutierrez, Hugh Urban, and Philip Wood. And, one person 
who I never thought would read the dissertation, but did: my immense thanks to Julia 
Hardy for her proofreading and encouragement. It was unexpected, and all the more 
valuable and appreciated for that. 
The warmth and generosity of spirit shown by James Faubion were surpassed only 
(and barely) by his willingness to share his brilliance. At several key points—more than, I 
am positive, he knows—a discussion proved invaluable in helping me along this path, 
often revealing a way forward that I had missed entirely. During one of those discussions, 
my daughter asked him, “Why do you always use such complicated words?” I am thankful 
he does: much of this world deserves more complexity than it is given. 
Jeffrey Kripal has proven to be the most supportive mentor imaginable, from 
encouraging me to (re)apply to the department all those years ago through gently 
shepherding me away from several intriguing but ultimately impossible thesis topics to 
patiently trusting that progress on this manuscript was, indeed, continuing apace. His 
willingness to invite me into his own work and his innate kindness have been consistent 
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and dependable, and for that he will always have my gratitude. 
My wife was asked by a family member what one says when someone completes a 
doctoral thesis. Her answer was, “Thank God!” The arc of the last decade, from 
understanding why I felt the need to go to graduate school to my changing sense of what it 
means to have done so to the sacrifices made along the way in terms of time and 
availability have at times caused difficulties for a wide range of people. A few stand out in 
need of special recognition: David and Judith, for their unflagging commitment to lovingly 
helping us lead the lives we want; Nancy, for a yeoman’s effort in proofreading an oft-




This Vital Life 
In the extreme, life is what is capable of error. 
(Michel Foucault, Introduction to Georges Canguilhem’s The 
Normal and the Pathological) 
All of life is, in a sense, a transformation of energy into form. We are 
sunlight at a vast costume party, dressing itself up in one form after 
another, discarding one outfit to pick up a different one. 
Starhawk, The Earth Path 
This opening chapter provides half of the context for what follows, containing both 
background for several key concepts that are carried throughout this thesis and insight into 
a certain mode of critique that I both inherit and hope to emulate. Starting with the material 
most distant from my training may seem strange, but the ideas are such that it seemed best 
to work from the outside in, if you will, building from more general, anthropological 
considerations to the more overtly religious. 
In its simplest formulation, vitalism refers to the belief that there is a source, 
usually described in terms of energy, that animates all life. It is the focus on this last term, 
life, that differentiates vitalism from its closest relatives: similar claims are made by 
monism, animism, pantheism, and even panentheism, but none of them center upon the 
question of life itself, of what separates the living from the dead, of how we identify the 
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characteristics that allow us to recognize life as a category of being. The modern usage of 
the term vitalism—considered as spanning perhaps two centuries—is explicitly post-
scientific; that is, it is a reaction to the vacuum left by the retreat of religious answers from 
similar questions: if the defining mark of life is no longer a soul, what is it? If our spirit is 
not animated by God’s breath, what provides what we perceive as the underlying spark of 
consciousness? This framing is explicitly and intentionally Western, but the question is by 
no means limited by that geopolitical scope; indeed, with the late nineteenth century 
beginnings of globalization, notions of chi and prana (among other related categories) 
found their ways to the exploding populace of North America, offering additional 
multiplicities of possible answers to the core vitalistic concerns. To introduce a concept 
and metaphor that will dominate what follows, these Eastern notions (and others from 
South and Central America, from Africa, from Oceania) found fertile soil on the shores of 
the New World, and whether directly or through the impact of being “in the air,” added 
their notional substance, if not their actual presence, to the conversations. Other than the 
mechanics by which this happened—the voracious appetites of what emerges into the 
contemporary New Age, the ways in which early movements towards a blossoming 
globalization enable the process, the challenges these alternate modes of knowledge and 
authority pose to the rapid rise towards dominance of science itself—the details of these 
systems, their variants and their inner workings, fall beyond the realm of this thesis. 
We are focused on the vitalist tradition that traces its roots to the weakening of the 
Medieval church, at the moment when the answer to queries about the forces that enable 
life could be sought beyond the restrictive confines of Catholic theology. Since then the 
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domain of vitalism has shifted, sometimes being found within the realm of religious 
explorations (both mainstream and alternative), more recently being seen as a concern of 
science and scientists, and often being relegated to a set of unquestioned assumptions that 
lie very close to the heart of our cultural world view. Even with this meandering, once life 
began to be considered as an entity separate and isolated from God’s will, vitalism 
develops along two paths which will be detailed further below, but bear mentioning at the 
outset: there is a strain I will call bodily vitalism, locating this energy in the physical body 
itself and becoming most prominent in the historical twin emergence of medicine and 
biology, as well as in ongoing movements concerning health, diet, and sexuality; alongside 
this is a tradition I term worldly vitalism that turns outward, locating the vital force 
externally, in the geography and geology of the external world. Here, what nourishes our 
beings, what provides us with the substance of our lives is something present in the natural 
world, eventually (especially in recent history) culminating in its being located in the 
biosphere itself. 
Having created a definitional duality, it is necessary to immediately destroy any 
sense of inflexible permanence: even if the categories are accepted, they are my invention 
and the vitalist tradition certainly doesn’t see itself as participating in an oppositional 
binary. Worldly and bodily vitalism must be conceived as points on a spectrum where 
individual movements and practices may move freely back and forth, often combining 
elements both at will and unconsciously. This last point is actually key, I would claim, to 
understanding the phenomenon in totality, as the final question we will take up concerns 
what links the bodily to the worldly; that is, what mechanisms are offered either to 
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internalize the vital presence available in the external world, or to project outwards the 
energy that lies dormant inside of each of us. 
There is an immediate tension between thinking about vitalism and thinking about 
philosophy in general, a tension that grows out of more than a desire to resist certain forms 
of intellectual temptation. Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995), who will serve as our 
primary voice for vitalism in what follows, sums this up nicely in a passage worth keeping 
in mind for the entirety of the chapter. 
Philosophy can succeed in its intention—to recover the unity of effort behind 
disparate acts of spontaneous creation—only by relating the various elements of 
culture and civilization: science, ethics, religion, technology, fine arts. To establish 
such relations is to choose among values. Criticism and hierarchy are therefore 
essential. Philosophy cannot adopt anything but a critical attitude toward various 
human functions that it proposes to judge. Its goal is to discover the meaning of 
those functions by determining how they fit together, by restoring the unity of 
consciousness. The business of philosophy is therefore not so much to solve 
problems as to create them. In Léon Brunschvicg’s words, philosophy is the 
“science of solved problems,” that is, the questioning of received solutions. Now 
we can understand why philosophy has attracted hostile reactions through the ages: 
philosophy is a questioning of life and therefore a threat to the idea that everything 
necessary to life is already in our possession. The goal of philosophy is to search 
for reasons to live by seeking the end for which life is supposed to be the means. 
But to pursue such a goal is also to discover reasons not to live. Nothing is more at 
odds with life than the idea that an end to life may be a value not simply an 




Beginnings, and Beginnings 
Spinoza does not write about the beauty of wild nature. Perhaps he never 
talked about it. Not about the coastline of the Netherlands, the storms, 
the variety of light and darkness, the seabirds. There were people around 
him, Dutch landscape painters, who appreciated all this. Maybe he did 
also, but it scarcely influenced what he says in the Ethics. What he says 
about animals does not suggest he had any wide or deep sense of 
identification with any of them. Nevertheless, his kind of philosophy of 
life, its structure, is such that he inspires many supporters of the deep 
ecology movement. 
Arne Næss, Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement 
A history of ideas is not enough to explain human behavior. 
Paul Shepard, Nature and Madness 
We are, of course, joining a story already in progress at a completely arbitrary 
point. We could start tracing the history of vitalism with the rise of worldly mysticism in 
the west and figures like St. Francis of Assisi (1181-1226), or we could start with the early 
separations from the church, with either of the formidable figures of Baruch Spinoza 
(1632-1677) or Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716). The temptation to neatly align Spinoza and 
Leibniz with the two forms of vitalism, with Spinoza’s nature providing the original 
inspiration for worldly vitalism and Leibniz’ monadic explorations allowing for the 
development of a tie between vitalism and the body itself, should be noted. There are two 
reasons for not doing so: first, it would take us too far afield and delay our examination of 
the more contemporary areas of focus that will follow; secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, such a simple division of the work of these two thinkers would inevitably 
prove unsatisfactory: both Spinoza and Leibniz deserve better. 
Canguilhem—probably the most important theorist of vitalism of the last century, 
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especially as regards its relationship with medicine and biology—notes that there is 
something about vitalism itself that historically insists on its own reaching back to a prior 
moment. 
Vitalism’s fecundity appears at first glance to be all the more contestable in that … 
it always presents itself as a return to antiquity. The vitalism of the Renaissance is 
a return to Plato against an overly rationalized Aristotle. The vitalism of Jan 
Baptist van Helmont, Georg Ernst Stahl, and Paul-Joseph Barthez is, as has been 
said, a return, beyond Descartes, to the Aristotle of De anima. … But what is the 
meaning of this return to antiquity? Is it a revalorization of concepts that are 
chronologically older and consequently more worn out, or a nostalgia for intuitions 
ontologically more original and closer to their object? … Was Aristotle’s vitalism 
not already a reaction against Democritus’s mechanism, as Plato’s finalism in the 
Phaedo was a reaction against Anaxagoras’s mechanism? It is certain, in any case, 
that the vitalist’s eye seeks a certain naïve version of things, a pretechnological and 
prelogical vision, a vision of life anterior to tools and language, that is, to 
instruments created by man to extend and consolidate life. (Canguilhem 2008, 66–
67) 
I want to pay special attention to the very end of this passage, where Canguilhem speaks of 
vitalism as requiring a conception of life somehow separated from current reality, a space 
created not only outside of time, but also outside of history, lacking tools, lacking the 
engagement between the human and the creations of humanity. This structure is a flag, an 
indicator that, in addition to whatever else vitalism may entail, there is something religious 
going on here. This is not to say that vitalism is itself a religion, or that Canguilhem is 
consciously making religious claims; rather, it is explicitly taking the position that vitalist 
claims can (and, I would say, should) be read as disclosing a religious dimension, and that 
reading this way—which also implies reading them in conjunction with and against other 
religious texts and practices—allows the history of vitalism to be seen more clearly. 
In this case, it also echoes a specific religious theory so strongly as to warrant a 
slight digression concerning a thinker to whom we will return later in this chapter, Georges 
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Bataille (1897-1962). In Theory of Religion, Bataille opens with his famous description of 
early humanity as being “in the world like water in water,” (Bataille 1992, 19) that is, 
dwelling in an undifferentiated environment where no separation between subject and 
object is possible. Irrevocable change is brought to the situation through technology in the 
form of the first tools. 
The positing of the object, which is not given in animality, is in the human use of 
tools; that is, if the tools as middle terms are adapted to the intended result—if 
their users perfect them. Insofar as the tools are developed with their end in view, 
consciousness posits them as objects, as interruptions in the indistinct continuity. 
The developed tool is the nascent form of the non-I. (Bataille 1992, 27) 
A tool—a chipped adz, a digging stick, a pouch sewn from the carcass of last week’s 
feast—is, for Bataille, an object that forces us to confront the independent components of 
reality and which leaves trailing behind in its wake the question of what, exactly, were we 
perceiving before? 
With the positing of a thing, an object, a tool, an implement, or of a domain of 
objects (where the various coequals of the subject itself assume an objective 
value), the world in which men move about is still, in a fundamental way, a 
continuity form the subject’s point of view. Bu the unreal world of sovereign spirit 
or gods establishes reality, which it is not, as its contrary. The reality of a profane 
world, of a world of things and bodies, is established opposite a holy and mythical 
world. (Bataille 1992, 37) 
This division of the world provides the basis for Bataille’s later analysis, which carries on 
into The Accursed Share. If accepted, it also opens almost irresistibly into a sense of 
longing as the primary characteristic of the relationship between our mundane and profane 
quotidian world and the “other,” regardless of how that alternative space is conceived. 
This brings a structural condition of vitalism into clearer focus, namely that in its 
stronger forms, vitalism requires a return, a recapturing of a former state where we and/or 
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the world itself were, if not perfected, closer to an ideal state. Importantly, at the present 
moment we also contain the possibility of that return, the potential of recapturing that 
original moment and, of course, we are possessed by something far stronger than simple 
nostalgia in our motivation to do so. Bataille’s presence here is clear, but so is that of 
Mircea Eliade and especially his notion of illud tempus. Longing may be seen as a 
religious act when the desired object is removed from its historical context and placed in a 
separate space, when it is no longer part of “the time constituted by the sum total of 
profane personal and intrapersonal events,” but is instead moved into what Eliade calls 
“primordial time, which is always the same, which belongs to eternity.” (Eliade 1959, 88) 
We will return to Eliade several times in this thesis; as such, a single disclaimer 
should suffice: the ongoing critiques—some might term them “witch hunts”—of Eliade 
notwithstanding, his eye for patterns in religious behavior remains important to this day. 
Making use of what he saw does not imply agreement with him across the board, and most 
importantly, is done with full recognition that the patterns recognized by Eliade remain 
merely a set of patterns available for recognition: they neither define nor delimit the 
possibilities of religious expression. That said, Eliade continues to offer a standard for 
comparative work when examining how patterns of religious expression relate to each 
other. “Eliade has shown us the patterns and systems of these interrelationships (and thus 
differs, despite superficial similarities, from older catalogs of ‘objects’ such as The Golden 
Bough). It is for us, his students, only to bring forth the questions, blurrings, and shadows 
which result from our more peripheral vision.” (Smith 1978, 90) 
Throughout the history of vitalist thought a single theme dominates: nearly all 
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claims regarding vitalism have as a primary concern the question of health, despite a 
variety of constructions of that term itself. For our purposes, the specific meanings of 
health, illness, and healing may change dramatically, without altering the underlying 
assumptions: whether health is seen primarily as an issue of internally balancing various 
forces; or if health is seen as a state of relative completeness from which we may depart 
through our behaviors and our beliefs; or if health is seen as a state of “good working 
order,” where occasional repairs—some minor, some major—are required as part of an 
ongoing maintenance program, the underlying organization (the humors themselves, or the 
soul, or whatever construct is posited as uniting the machine) is often ascribed to a form of 
vital energy. This has demanded a strong interaction between vitalism and the discourses 
of medicine, interactions which are highly complex, as they always occur over contested 
terrain. If there are competing claims regarding how to be healthy, there will be constant 
pressure—at least from the point of view of the claimants—to establish a superiority for 
one over the other (the perspective of the sick is often far more open to simultaneously 
engaging in competing, and even contradictory, remedies). As Fuller notes, “healing is a 
profoundly cultural activity,” (Fuller 1989, 5) one which engages many different 
components of the social milieu, and one that may never be reduced to a simple narrative 
of correction or cure. As such, before considering vitalism proper in some depth, a short 
detour to consider the role of science, and specifically the rise of allopathic medical 
practice, is in order. 
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Science and Science’s 
Discourse 
What constantly reaffirms the opposition of science to all religion and, at 
the same time, happily makes the unification of science impossible is the 
substitution of reference for all transcendence. It is the functional 
correspondence of the paradigm with a system of reference that, by 
determining an exclusively scientific way in which the figure must be 
constructed, seen, and read through functives, prohibits any infinite 
religious utilization of the figure. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 
Science remains an important genre of Western exploration and travel 
literature. 
Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women 
The first turn in this detour is to address the relationship between religion and 
science at a very general level, identifying two dominant modes of thought that inform 
what will follow. The groundwork is laid out quite nicely by Gary Ferngren in his 
introduction to Science & Religion: A Historical Introduction, one of dozens and dozens of 
compilations that examine this issue. He writes: 
Andrew Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in 
Christendom (1896) was published more than a century ago. In it White argued 
that Christian theologians had a long history of opposing scientific progress in the 
interest of dogmatic theology. The charge was not new. It grew, in fact, out of the 
view of the eighteenth-century philosophes that the charge was an institution 
whose ignorance and intolerance had hindered human progress, while science was 
a force of cultural liberation. An argument similar to that of White had been made 
by John William Draper in his History of the Conflict between Religion and 
Science (1874), and it struck a responsive chord in American thought, which was 
at the turn of the century adopting an increasing secular outlook as it came to 
recognize the central role that science played in modern society. The Draper-White 
thesis, as it has come to be known, was enormously influential. For the past 
century it has been the predominant view of the relationship of science and religion 
among scientists and laymen alike. It wedded a triumphalist view of science with a 
patronizing view of religion. Popular misconceptions doubtless underlay the 
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widespread presumption that religion was opposed to science. Grounded in faith, 
religion seemed bound to suffer when confronted by science, which was, of course, 
based on fact. (Ferngren 2002, ix) 
The contrapuntal melody to this argument, that science and religion are fully unified, is of 
course the opposite face of the same discourse, one based on a binary relationship between 
two isolated spheres. A third position focuses on that isolation, claiming that science and 
religion occupy essentially “separate but equal” footing, their focuses aimed at different 
planes of inquiry (a weakened form of this argument results in a “God of the Gaps,” where 
religion is only authoritative on the ever-reducing ground that science can not—yet, scream 
the scientists—adequately explain). This last position has been most recently popularized 
by Stephen Jay Gould’s discussion of the acrimonious interactions 
between science and religion. No such conflict should exist because each subject 
has a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority—and these 
magisteria do not overlap (the principle that I would like to designate as NOMA, 
or “nonoverlapping magisteria”). The net of science covers the empirical realm: 
what is the universe made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net 
of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value. These two 
magesteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider, for 
starters, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty). To cite the usual 
clichés, we get the age of rocks, and religion retains the rock of ages; we study 
how the heavens go, and they determine how to go to heaven. (Gould 2003, 195) 
Gould’s argument can be—and was—attacked from many sides (and it held enough 
attention that he dedicated an entire volume, 1999’s Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion 
in the Fullness of Life to its defense), but it is fairly representative of the attempts to forge 
a “separate but equal” type of solution. 
In a volume cut of the same cloth as Ferngren’s, Paul Kurtz’s introduction to 
Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? provides a strong example of the classic 
formulations of these ideas: 
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Historically, to question sacred doctrine was to shake the foundations of the social 
order. Thus religions have persisted because they were indoctrinated by custom 
and habit, sustained by law and rooted in faith and feeling; unexamined, they were 
simply assumed to be true, and defended as encompassing Absolute Truth and 
Virtue. Blasphemy and iconoclasm, even religions dissent, during the long history 
of humankind were considered to be both sinful and subversive and were 
punishable by excommunication, ostracism, or death. In theocratic societies, the 
power of secular rulers is invoked to enforce religious dominance. 
 
There is a profound difference between science and religion in this conception of 
truth. Science requires an open mind, free inquiry, critical thinking, the willingness 
to question assumptions, and peer review. The test of a theory or hypothesis is 
independent (at least one would hope) of bias, prejudice, faith, or tradition; and it 
is justified by the evidence, logical consistency, and mathematical coherence. 
Science claims to be universal (though postmodern critics deny this), transcending 
specific cultures and replicable in any and every laboratory in the world. Although 
religions claim to be universal, they have split into contending factions concerning 
hegemony: they rely on the acceptance of faith in specific revelations and their 
interpretations by differing prophets, priests, ministers, rabbis, monks, or mullahs. 
(Kurtz 2003, 13) 
Above all, however, note the parenthetical remarks in the second paragraph. These all-too-
typical formulations ignore the possibility of boundaries, the potential of the areas of 
intersection and overlap: either science is true and religion is false, or they both are the 
same, or they both are totally and entirely distinct. This would, especially as the twentieth 
century wore on, prove an inadequate framework for a world that more and more struggled 
to comprehend the meaning of contemporary science (both literally in terms of the 
mathematics and theoretical knowledge required and more generally in terms of the 
burgeoning knowledge of the cost—to the environment, in terms of human life, to the 
global economy—science bears along with its discoveries). 
But each of these examples trend in the same direction: they are written from the 
assumed solidity of a scientific perspective, gazing outwards towards the humanities. The 
intellectual traffic, however, moves both ways: just limiting ourselves to the body of 
modern French thought, we find, from Saussure and Lacan’s vaguely mathematical 
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diagrams to Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s invocations of modern physics and systems 
theories to Kristeva’s essay on set theory and Irigaray’s work on fluid versus solid state 
mechanics, a very strong tendency for writers to look to modern science as a discursive 
resource for their work. From one side, the occasional uproar about this phenomenon 
seems nothing more than the manifestation of what anthropologist David Hess, building on 
the work in sociology of Thomas Gieryn, terms “boundary-work,” that is “efforts to 
distinguish one discursive domain, such as science, from competitors, such as religion.” 
Hess goes on to write that he does not see 
the boundary between the scientific and the nonscientific to be a monolithic one, 
nor … [that] science can be defined on purely intellectual grounds by a 
philosophical argument based on abstract demarcation criteria. Instead, … [he 
interprets] the boundary culturally as scientists and nonscientists construct it in 
specific contexts … In practice the boundary between science and nonscience is 
recursive, multiple, and changing. (Hess 1993, 17) 
This is, of course, a discursive definition and as such one that is likely to be rejected out of 
hand by much of the scientific orthodoxy, who subscribe precisely to the idea of science 
being recognized through its inherent difference—its “demarcation criteria”—from other 
fields. They will point to “verification” or “falsification” as the marks of science, insisting 
that these characteristics are not discursive, but rather somehow “real” and intrinsic to 
admittance to the discipline. Both of these claims—which undergird respectively much of 
nineteenth and twentieth century science—aid in the creation of limits to the plane within 
which the discipline functions, providing “a horizon of consensus to be brought to the 
debate,” (Lyotard 1984, 24) and, implicitly if not explicitly, likewise excluding from that 
horizon assertions that fail to meet this burden of proof. 
Lyotard sees this notion of proof as itself problematic, essentially because it 
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attempts to forge an unacknowledged identity between a model and its reality. “Not: I can 
prove something because reality is the way I say it is. But: as long as I can produce proof, 
it is permissible to think that reality is the way I say it is.” (Lyotard 1984, 24) This creates 
both the freedom and the restraint of the sciences: “the knowledge that has accumulated in 
the form of already accepted statements can always be challenged. But conversely, any 
new statement that contradicts a previously approved statement … can be accepted as valid 
only if it refutes the previous statement by producing arguments and proofs.” (Lyotard 
1984, 25) These observations occur in the context of an examination of the “rules” of 
scientific discourse, a process that leads to the conclusion that “it is therefore impossible to 
judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge 
and vice versa: the relevant criteria are different.” (Lyotard 1984, 26) 
Zeroing in on the crux of the issue with regards to the interface between science 
and the humanities, Lyotard notes that theorists in the humanities—that is, those aligned in 
his dichotomy with narrative knowledge—look upon this difficulty in comprehending 
scientific discourse with “a certain tolerance,” approaching it 
primarily as a variant in the family of narrative cultures. The opposite is not true. 
The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and concludes that they 
are never subject to argumentation or proof. He classifies them as belonging to a 
different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, 
composed of opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology. 
Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and children. At best, 
attempts are made to throw some rays of light into this obscurantism, to civilize, 
educate, develop. (Lyotard 1984, 27) 
The boundary under contention here is that of acceptability, and, at least to Lyotard’s 
analysis, it is an unequal division, where while not necessarily being subsumed under it, 
scientific discourse is seen from the narrative perspective as merely another morphological 
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type; while from its own side of the divide, it is seen as a defining template, a requirement 
for admission. “But what never fails to come and come again, with every new theory, new 
hypothesis, new statement, or new observation, is the question of legitimacy. For it is not 
philosophy that asks this question of science, but science that asks it of itself.” (Lyotard 
1984, 54) I would claim that this concept of legitimacy requires a refinement in Hess’ 
observation: boundary-work and gatekeeping are related, but not identical activities, and 
the issue of legitimacy implies that, at the very least, discursive boundaries of any nature 
are destined to be porous, not rigid, and that language itself—even the hallowed language 
of formal mathematics—is subject to analysis along the axes of interpretation, symbolic 
formation, constructed meaning. 
Not for the last time, we have gotten far ahead of ourselves, finding ourselves 
gazing at science in the twenty-first century before examining just how we arrived at that 
particular precipice. Even as we retreat, though, we will struggle against the pull of the 
present, moving perhaps far too quickly from antiquity into the nineteenth century before 
returning to the twenty-first. Even if we are able to keep the general form of the 
interactions between religion and science in mind, this pattern of movement will invariably 
weaken some of our groundwork; however it will allow us to more deeply explore the 
specific bindings between modern notions of vitalism and modern science. These 
interactions emerge with the ascent of science, specifically medical science, and by starting 
there we may obtain the clearest view of vitalism’s recent history. This places our 
discursive beginning immediately after an almost incomprehensible explosion of medical 
knowledge in the west: 
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in a quarter of a century, from 1790 to 1815, medical discourse changed more 
profoundly than since the seventeenth century, probably than since the Middle 
Ages, and perhaps even since Greek medicine: a change that revealed new objects 
(organic lesions, deep sites, tissular alterations, ways and forms of inter-organic 
diffusion, anatomo-clinical signs and correlations), techniques of observation, of 
detection of the pathological site, recording; a new perceptual grid, and on almost 
entirely new descriptive vocabulary; new sets of concepts and nosographical 
distributions (century-old, sometimes age-old categories such as fever or 
constitution disappeared, and diseases that are perhaps as old as the world—like 
tuberculosis—were at last isolated and named). (Foucault 1972, 170) 
Importantly, our journey will take us from this beginning—when everything 
seemed possible beneath the expanding canopy of an increasingly dominant tree of 
knowledge—to a state that Giddens, with typical understated density, summarizes as one 
where “science has lost a good deal of the aura of authority it once had.” (Beck, Giddens, 
and Lash 1994, 87) Giddens’ claim that “two world wars, the invention of horrifically 
destructive weaponry, the global ecological crisis, and other developments in the present 
century, might cool the ardour of even the most optimistic advocates of progress through 
untrammeled scientific enquiry” (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 88) may hold true for 
some segments of society, the continued strength of what we may term scientism (a 
concept to which we will return in later chapters) suggests that an earlier observation of his 
may, in fact, be more powerful in aiding our analysis of the present. He writes 
Living in a world of multiple authorities, a circumstance sometimes mistakenly 
referred to as postmodernity, is very consequential … For since there are no super-
experts to turn to, risk calculation has to include the risk of which experts are 
consulted, or whose authority is to be taken as binding. The debate over global 
warming is one among an indefinite range of examples that could be quoted. The 
very skepticism that is the driving force of expert knowledge might lead, in some 
contexts, or among some groups, to a disenchantment with all experts; this is one 
of the lines of tension between expertise and tradition (also habit and compulsion). 
(Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 87) 
The applicability of his observation to the nightly cable parade of talking heads with 
highlighted titles next to the corporate logo beneath their faces cannot be overstated. 
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The entire effort requires some care as we are mixing what to some are seen as 
separate and conceptually isolated discourses: science on the one hand and a theoretical 
exploration of vitalism falling somewhere between philosophy and cultural history on the 
other. This is largely due to a slippage of language: I am not interested, strictly speaking, in 
science itself, instead, it is scientific discourse that is under consideration here. The most 
common conflation of these two occurs in defense of science, where the object of 
science—an ever-increasing understanding of phenomena resulting from objective, 
historically immutable truths—is proffered as a defense against any possible critique of its 
role in and impact upon lived history. This itself is a discursive move, one related more to 
politics and the creation of cultural hegemonies than the exploration of knowledge, but it 
also brings into stark relief a tendency that stretches across most genealogical explorations 
which Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge calls the “law of coherence.” 
This rule exists at the formation of the discourse itself, guiding and shaping it, defining 
“the terminal unities that complete the analysis.” Speaking in general terms of this law, 
Foucault writes: 
The history of ideas usually credits the discourse that it analyses with coherence. If 
it happens to notice an irregularity in the use of words, several incompatible 
propositions, a set of meanings that do not adjust to one another, concepts that 
cannot be systematized together, then it regards it as its duty to find, at a deeper 
level, a principle of cohesion that organizes the discourse and restores to it its 
hidden unity. This law of coherence is a heuristic rule, a procedural obligation, 
almost a moral constraint of research: not to multiply contradictions uselessly, not 
to be taken in by small differences; not to give too much weight to changes, 
disavowals, returns to the past, and polemics; not to suppose that men’s discourse 
is perpetually undermined from within by the contradiction of their desires, the 
influences that they have been subjected to, or the conditions in which they live; 
but to admit that if they speak, and if they speak among themselves, it is rather to 
overcome these contradictions and to find the point from which they will be able to 
be mastered. (Foucault 1972, 149) 
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Foucault’s positioning here is quite intentional, even ironic, as the various conditions of 
discursive formation are later seen as requiring “archaeological work,” which is by its very 
nature quite comfortable with the discontinuous, the ruptured, the diverse: 
the horizon of archaeology, therefore, is not a science, a rationality, a mentality, a 
culture; it is a tangle of interpositivities whose limits and points of intersection 
cannot be fixed in a single operation. Archaeology is a comparative analysis that is 
not intended to reduce the diversity of discourses … Archaeological comparison 
does not have a unifying, but a diversifying effect. (Foucault 1972, 159–160) 
I would suggest that this tendency grows stronger as the discourse under 
consideration considers itself more “scientific,” a problematic and inconsistent appellate to 
be sure, but one whose common usage should suffice at this point. There is an important 
distinction to make here, however: in one sense, the history of science is, by its very 
nature, a history of ruptures and discontinuities: it is a history of new “truths” emerging 
that supplant, extend, invalidate, or reverse existing “truths.” How, then, can the law of 
coherence obtain? There are two responses that merit our attention. First, the law of 
coherence is clearly in effect when specific narrative threads of the history of science are 
examined: as a single example, the importance attributed to Robert Hooke in the history of 
microscopic observation should suffice, where, as Canguilhem notes, 
too much credit is generally given to Robert Hooke. True, he discovered the thing, 
a bit by chance and a bit by playful curiosity, amused by the microscope’s first 
revelations. … It was also he who, under the influence of an image, invented the 
word cell, comparing the plant object to a honeycomb—the work of an animal—
and the honeycomb to a human creation—a cell is a small room. Still, Hooke’s 
discovery did not initiate anything—it was not a point of departure. The word itself 
was lost and would be found only a century later. (Canguilhem 2008, 30) 
Indeed, other scientists—notably Marcello Malpighi and Nehemiah Grew—would in the 
interim independently repeat Hooke’s discovery, using different language and 
metaphorical structures for their observations. Here, it is the law of coherence which takes 
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the word “cell,” and reaches back across a century to Hooke’s work, creating an inference 
of relation between the two, and placing Hooke at (or, at least, towards) the beginning of 
the lists of certain scientific lineages. Hooke’s “cell” is a discursive unit more than a 
technical one, a phoneme in the grammar of the history of biology. 
Science, Truth, Time 
In the case of the physical sciences, we already know that Enlightenment 
ideas have been much too naive and dramatic. They suggested that 
physics could expect to reveal a far simpler kind of order in the world 
than has turned out to be available. Of course this simplification played a 
great part in making possible the astonishing success of the physical 
sciences. It gave western civilisation an understanding of natural 
“mechanisms” (as we still call them) far beyond that of any other culture, 
and a wealth of technology that other cultures have never dreamed of. 
And it is right to celebrate this tremendous achievement. But we, the 
heirs of this great intellectual empire, don’t actually need to come 
together simply to praise it. 
 
We don’t now need to tell each other that science is good any more than 
we need to say that freedom is good or democracy is good. As ideals, those 
things are established in our society. But when particular ideals are 
established and are supposed to be working, we have to deal with the 
institutions that are invented to express them. 
Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By 
The second response opens our explorations to the larger important issue of the 
relationship between science and “truth.” While we will later encounter at length the 
impact of quantum physics and notions of probability and uncertainty, my concern here is 
on a less traveled examination of the notion of truth and fact within scientific discourse. I 
would claim that it is truth itself that becomes the organizing discursive object of science; 
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that is, truth—seen as rational, objective, even eternal— (and, perhaps more importantly, 
the assumption that “doing science” is equivalent to its pursuit) provides the coherence 
necessary for the discourse to organize and extend itself through history. Importantly, if 
“the true—the goal of scientific research—is exempt from historical transformation, then is 
the history of science anything more than a museum of errors of human reason?” 
(Canguilhem 2008, 26) As Canguilhem shows through examples ranging from his 
discussion of Hooke and the development of cell theory to various moments in medical 
research to the history of optics, the history of science encompasses more than just its 
results, which “can never be anything more than a chronicle. The history of science 
concerns an axiological activity, the search for truth.” (Canguilhem 1994, 30) This activity 
is confounding, largely because of the uncertainty of the interdependence between factual 
data and the theoretical frameworks required for its interpretation: 
It is easy to be ironic about the importance attached to concepts, but more difficult 
to understand why, without concepts, there is no science. The history of science is 
interested in, say, the history of instruments or of academies only insofar as they 
are related, in both their uses and their intentions, to theories. Descartes needed 
David Ferrier to grind optical glass, but it was he who provided the theory of the 
curves to be obtained by grinding. (Canguilhem 1994, 30) 
The focus is, then, not on the accuracy or truth of science—those are the domain of 
the scientists themselves, and areas where I am woefully inadequately qualified to 
comment. Instead, it is on the history of science, the discourse of science, the way both 
science talks about itself and, more centrally, the way science is talked about by 
individuals and groups outside of its well monitored boundaries. These two responses—
one at the level of an individual life, an individual discovery, and the other at the meta-
discursive level of “truth itself”—mirror to some degree Canguilhem’s distinction between 
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the microscopic and macroscopic scales in the history of science. Summarizing these, 
Foucault reminds us that “events and their consequences are not arranged in the same way” 
between these two, “thus a discovery, the development of a method, the achievements, and 
the failures, of a particular scientist, do not have the same incidence, and cannot be 
described in the same way at both levels; on each of the two levels, a different history is 
being written.” (Foucault 1972, 5) I would add, both as disclosure and preface, that this 
work is complicated by my essential sympathy towards the scientific projects under 
examination: that is, it is relatively common (and, indeed, pervasive in much of the 
material that comprises my “data”) to take either a negative, skeptical position towards 
science or a naïve, unquestioning acceptance of it. My goal is to do neither, but that goal 
implicitly accepts that, regardless of how distant from current practice it may be, the 
underlying desire to discover, to understand, and to do so “scientifically,” whatever that 
may mean in the end, is a worthwhile effort. That said, Luce Irigaray’s questions loom 
large: 
How does one talk with scientists? Moreover, with scientists from different 
disciplines? Each constituting a world, and every system of each one of these 
worlds striving to be global at any given point in time. At any moment, then, each 
one of these worlds is organized in a totalized way, closed off. How can one 
reopen these universes so that they may encounter each other, talk with each other? 
In what language? According to what mode of discourse? (Irigaray 1985a, 73) 
This may be clarified by again turning to Foucault, who claims in The Order of 
Things that the history of science, to the degree it looks beyond “the progress of discovery, 
the formulation of problems, and the clash of controversy” focuses on what he terms “the 
processes and products of the scientific consciousness.” In doing so, it also ventures into 
the hidden spaces of the unconscious of science: “the implicit philosophies that were 
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subjacent to it, the unformulated thematic, the unseen obstacles.” However, this 
unconscious is usually formulated as a negative, a lack, something that reveals a weakness 
in the scientific enterprise. While much of this work will range far afield of what can be 
strictly termed scientific, to the degree that it does focus on those activities and, to the 
degree I am able to, I would attempt to follow Foucault in hoping “to reveal a positive 
unconscious of knowledge, a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is 
part of scientific discourse, instead of disrupting its validity and seeking to diminish its 
scientific nature.” (Foucault 1970, xi) 
If we accept this bifurcation between the object of science and its discourse, we 
clear a space to explore the relationships between science, power, and discursive operation 
in a little more depth, explorations that should serve us well as we move from this 
theoretical beginning through the exemplar materials presented in further chapters. As part 
of this, and in support of Canguilhem’s constant efforts to reveal the more complex and 
conflicted parts of scientific development, I will use the initial section of Irigaray’s essay, 
The “Mechanics” of Fluid as a starting point. While Irigaray’s primary concern centers 
around psychoanalysis and the issue of vision (arguing—as much of This Sex Which Is Not 
One does—against Lacan), she opens with a discussion of cultural metaphor and the 
strategies of power, and how these behaviors echo across disciplines in potentially 
illuminating ways.  
In the first footnote to the piece, Irigaray notes that “the reader is advised to consult 
some texts on solid and fluid mechanics,” an intriguing request: clearly, “consulting some 
texts” would be woefully inadequate preparation for even a brilliant reader to become 
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skilled at the concepts (let alone the higher level mathematics) involved in both of these 
fields. It would, however, suffice to familiarize oneself with the particular developments of 
the fields, one that begins with Newtonian mechanics, which quickly develops a hidden 
underside, a silent zone. From the very beginning, the flow of fluids—most commonly, the 
phenomenon of flowing water—were a confounding issue for physicists and physics itself, 
one that was not ignored, but rather put off, a delay creating what Irigaray terms “a 
historical ‘inattention’ to fluids.” (Irigaray 1985a, 107) Questions of the interactions of 
solids—objects on inclined planes, gears, weights and pulleys, even the basic mechanics of 
flight—were answerable: you formed the query, found the equations, plugged in your 
numbers, and got a result that was verifiable through experimentation. (In saying this, of 
course, I am ignoring the fact that these answers and experiments quite often produced 
answers that were incorrect, but were also either within an acceptable range of error or 
incorrect only beyond the range of human perception. The most obvious example of this is 
the inadequate accounting for friction in most Newtonian models of objects moving in the 
physical world.) However, while Newtonian equations could be constructed for complex 
phenomenon like the behavior of fluids in states of turbulence or gas under pressure, they 
were initially virtually impossible to actually solve. We turn to another figure who will 
recur in later chapters, Fritjof Capra: 
Exact solutions were restricted to a few simple and regular phenomena, while the 
complexity of vast areas of nature seemed to elude all mechanistic modeling. For 
example, the relative motion of two bodies under the force of gravity could be 
calculated precisely; that of three bodies was already too difficult for an exact 
solution; and when it came to gases with millions of particles, the situation seemed 
hopeless. (Capra 1996, 121) 
The solution to this difficulty was a long sequence of strategies designed to approximate, 
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always conducted with the belief that solving such issues was merely a function of 
increased intellectual power, of better technology, of more horsepower. None of this is 
meant to impugn those developments, or to somehow imply they are “false,” although, as 
we shall see, the exact nature of their “truth” is precisely what is being discussed. Still, it is 
vital to remember—as many of the critics seem not to—that there is no attempt in the 
discussion of science by philosophy to somehow discredit or cast dispersion upon 
Maxwell’s insight into using statistical averages to determine the properties of gases, or of 
differential equations in general (which are, after all, just a way of producing 
approximations to an accepted level). These advances of knowledge are not judged as 
being somehow “bad” in themselves; at the same time, however, neither are they pure, 
residing in some pristine realm that exists in isolation from the cultural structures and 
historical moments from which they emerge. 
A very short detour into her larger project on gender may help, as Irigaray sees 
much that echoes between her observations about women in general and her assessment of 
scientific discourse. Most importantly, there is a pattern of a recognized reality exceeding 
the possibilities of current understanding, responded to by the creation of a representation, 
a stand-in, an approximation of that reality from which truth can be modeled, with the 
eventual result that the original reality is totally elided in favor of the representation itself. 
The key issue in physics was the ultimate nonlinearity of the behavior of complex systems, 
that is, their refusal to obey the predictions of traditional Newtonian models. 
Whenever nonlinear equations appeared, they were immediately “linearized”—in 
other words, replaced by linear approximations. Thus instead of describing the 
phenomena in their full complexity, the equations of classical science deal with 
small oscillations, shallow waves, small changes of temperature, and so forth. … 
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[T]his habit became so ingrained that many equations were linearized while they 
were being setup, so that the science textbooks did not even include the full 
nonlinear versions. Consequently most scientists and engineers came to believe 
that virtually all natural phenomenon could be described by linear equations. 
(Capra 1996, 122) 
Compare this to Irigaray: 
Considerations of pure mathematics have precluded the analysis of fluids except in 
terms of laminated planes, solenoid movements (of a current privileging the 
relation to an axis), spring-points, well-points, whirlwind-points, which have only 
an approximate relation to reality. Leaving some remainder. Up to infinity: the 
center of these “movements” corresponding to zero supposed in them an infinite 
speed, which is physically unacceptable. Certainly these “theoretical” fluids have 
enabled the technical—also mathematical—form of analysis to progress, while 
losing a certain relationship to the reality of bodies in the process. 
 
What consequences does this have for “science” and psychoanalytic practice? 
(Irigaray 1985a, 109) 
There are two streams, if you will, in this argument. The first is purely 
metaphorical, and uses the tropes of fluidity to build a sense of the fleeting and elusive 
identity of women. Women speak in the “paralytic undersides” of the phallic economy, 
filling the hidden spaces; women are “continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, 
conductible, diffusible, … resistant to the countable;” women also share a tendency to 
interact with other women—other fluids—in ways that “sometimes dilute … [themselves] 
in them in an almost homogeneous manner, which makes the distinction between the one 
and the other problematical.” (Irigaray 1985a, 111) This is clearly familiar ground for 
readers of Irigaray, and may be read as (yet) an(other) echo of patriarchy in the cultural 
fabric. However, her overall argument is not simply metaphorical; instead—and this is the 
second stream—it is about discursive construction, about the ease with which 
representations are conflated with their object, and about what may be created in the blind 
spot cast by the shadow of the representation itself. There are two dimensions to this 
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second argument, one specific to the engagement with science, the other reflective of a 
larger issue within Western philosophy in the twentieth century. 
Let X = X 
He said: Isn't it / Isn't it just / Isn't it just like a woman? 
She said: It's hard / It's just hard / It's just kind of hard to say. 
He said: Isn't it / Isn't it just / Isn't it just like a woman? 
She said: It goes / That's the way it goes / It goes that way. 
He said: Isn't it / Isn't it just like a woman? 
She said: It takes / It takes one / It takes one t(w)o / It takes one to know 
one. 
He said: Isn't it just like a woman? 
She said: She said it / She said it to k(no)w / She said it to no one. 
Laurie Anderson, The It Tango 
The factors introduced in abstract analysis should not, as is usually done, 
be identified with objects in the world. They do not belong to the content 
of the world we are genuinely part of. Abstract structures are structures 
of the world, not in the world. 
Arne Næss, The World of Concrete Contents 
Science, for Irigaray—and also for Deleuze and Guattari—is dependent as a 
discourse on the concept of the variable operating as a type of decoupled signifier, 
referring neither to an identifiable object in the actual world nor directly to other variables 
or variable groupings. Variables are 
symbols or letters that can be substituted for proper nouns referring only to an 
object within theory. Therefore no reference to any actual person or object, or any 
person or object in reality. The scientist enters into a universe of fiction which is 
incomprehensible to all those who do not participate in it. (Irigaray 1985b, 79) 
The variable becomes the essential creative act that structures the discursive universe of 
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science, providing stillness and stability in the face of the task of describing the external 
world. It is this reduction in speed that is distinctive for Deleuze and Guattari: 
The scientist brings back from the chaos variables that have become independent 
by slowing down, that is to say, by the elimination of whatever other variabilities 
are liable to interfere, so that the variables that are retained enter into determinable 
relations in a function: they are no longer links of properties in things, but finite 
coordinates on a secant plane of reference that go from local probabilities to a 
global cosmology. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 202) 
Unsurprising given the authors, this requires some unpacking before we proceed, first 
chaos here is a total, simultaneous realm of possibility. “It is a void that is not a 
nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible 
forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, 
without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance.” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 118) It is the well from which any object of thought is drawn—indeed, 
What Is Philosophy? is a summary of sorts of Chaos’ offspring: “chaos has three 
daughters, depending on the plane that cuts through it: these are the Chaoids—art, science, 
and philosophy—as forms of thought or creation.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 208) Each 
mode of thought interacts with chaos differently, attuned to different operations of 
manifesting elements from the chaotic sea onto planes of existence. Variables—the 
singularities that science extracts from chaos—are used in the construction of functions 
and propositions, and it is from this that the discourse of science is made possible. “It is the 
idea of the function which enables the sciences to reflect and communicate. Science does 
not need philosophy for these tasks.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 117) 
Notice that for both Irigaray and Deleuze and Guattari, the result of the variable is 
the creation of a plane of discourse that is separated from any specific referent—either to 
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people and bodies (Irigaray’s concern) or to concepts and planes of thought (Deleuze and 
Guattari’s). This is what creates the chasm between the discourses described by Lyotard 
above (I would suggest that proofs themselves may be seen, pace Deleuze and Guattari, as 
variables in motion across a plane, but they remain subject to the limits of the scientific) 
yet its impact runs even deeper. The cordoning off of scientific discourse through this 
structure of representation serves to create two islands, one of data, research, and 
experiments, and the other of the scientific observer, with both being constructed as if they 
were independent and objective entities. The former is required to have no intrinsic 
relationship to the world as it is experienced by the multitude: the classic experiment in 
quantum physics begins, “so you have an atom in a box,” a situation that is possible only in 
the laboratory or as a thought experiment; the latter is reinforced through the discursive 
demands of “the voice from nowhere,” which enforces the same structure of scientific 
practice onto scientific discourse. This voice is possible because science—long before and 
without the aid of postmodern theories or deconstruction—has already removed the subject 
itself from the realm of its discourse: it is not the scientist that speaks, 
rather, facts speak for themselves. These mute entities are thus capable of 
speaking, writing, signifying within the artificial chamber of the laboratory or 
inside the even more rarefied chamber of the vacuum pump. Little groups of 
gentlemen take testimony from natural forces, and they testify to each other that 
they are not betraying but translating the silent behaviour of objects. (Latour 1993, 
29) 
Latour here is perhaps overly snide, but the point stands: scientific discourse is caught 
between the knowledge that “in themselves, facts are mute; natural forces are brute 
mechanisms,” and the insistence that “scientists are scrupulous representatives of the facts. 
Who is speaking when they speak? The facts themselves, beyond all question.” (Latour 
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1993, 28–9) For Irigaray, this isolationism is the source of anxiety, of her inability to 
envision a discourse that reaches across to her audience: “If I were to meet each and every 
one of you, individually, it seems as though I would find a way to say you, I, we. But here, 
in the name of science?” (Irigaray 1985b, 75) 
This issue goes to the heart of Western philosophy in the twentieth century, and is 
summarized by Irigaray by the recognition that 
every scientific universe seems to have its own world view, its stakes, its protocols 
of experimentation, its technology, its syntax: isolated, cut-off from the others. 
From what point of view, then, can one span these different horizons, seeking out 
their meeting grounds, workable intersections, possible cross-overs. By what right 
can one assume a stance outside? How does one arrive at it? (Irigaray 1985b, 73) 
If anything can be concluded from the arc of Western thought over the previous century, it 
is that subjectivity itself is quite elusive, let alone objectivity. In the end, there is no place 
to stand which is not always already embroiled in questions of identity and reference and 
engaged in the process of life itself. Science may indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, 
aim at freezing a slice of chaos, but scientists cannot be likewise isolated and slowed 
down. The issue, of course, is that this is a complicated and technical line of thought within 
the philosophical tradition, and reaching even a limited point of understanding of just how 
desperate our machinations of clinging to the illusion of an objective existence remain 
takes time, the study of difficult texts, and the unraveling of often tangled and convoluted 
reasoning. This is where the formal language of philosophy approaches the same difficulty 
as higher mathematics, where the appearance of a closed language game interrupts what 
appears to be an opening for communication. 
These waters become muddied even further by the fact that there are actually three 
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separate arguments—one concerning philosophy, one quantum physics (or, better, the 
narrative of quantum physics), and one anthropology–that often get conflated or, worse, 
spliced into each other, creating neither apple nor pear tree in the process, but some 
inedible hybrid that often looks appealing but is empty of content. We have made reference 
already to the philosophical dismissal of the objective view, a cursory treatment that must 
suffice in this context. The quantum narrative turns to the revelation that the observer 
impacts the system, and claims in the name of Heisenberg or Schrödinger that science has 
in fact confirmed the philosophic point of view. This is, however, an overly simplistic 
understanding of the quantum phenomenon, and illustrates the dangers of moving too 
quickly between discursive schemes. The impact of the observer at the quantum level is 
precisely an “atom in a box” scenario: Schrödinger never had an actual cat. Instead, the 
quantum narrative is too often being used to make an anthropological argument about the 
impact on the participant system of any observer. The difference between the quantum and 
the anthropological positions is nicely summarized (although with their usual obliqueness) 
by Deleuze and Guattari: 
As a general rule, the observer is neither inadequate nor subjective: even in 
quantum physics, Heisenberg’s demon does not express the impossibility of 
measuring both the speed and the position of a particle on the grounds of a 
subjective interference of the measure with the measured, but it measures exactly 
an objective state of affairs that leaves the respective position of two of its particles 
outside of the field of its actualization, the number of independent variables being 
reduced and the values of the coordinates having the same probability. Subjectivist 
interpretations of thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum physics manifest the 
same inadequacies. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 129–30) 
In something that would be a surprise to many of their critics in the scientific 
establishment, Deleuze and Guattari are arguing here against the sloppy assimilation of the 
scientific argument into the anthropological: they understand fully that Heisenberg is not 
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referring to the “interference of the measure with the measured,” and insist that other 
attempts at “subjectivist” readings of science remain equally problematic. Their 
terminology is revealing: the problem is the attempt to introject a subject into science, 
which has neither space nor the capacity to accommodate it. At the same time, though, the 
attraction of the parallelism remains, and the temptation to confuse parallel arguments 
(both do in fact concern the relationship between the observer and the observed system) 
with equivalencies (where they are made to somehow reveal that those relationships are 
alike) must be resisted. 
The arguments are seductive because this parallelism is exactly what is of interest 
to the philosopher: 
What the philosopher brings back from the chaos are variations that are still 
infinite but that have become inseparable on the absolute surfaces or in the 
absolute volumes that lay out a secant plane of immanence: these are not 
associations of distinct ideas, but reconnections through a zone of indistinction in a 
concept. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 202) 
Whereas science extracts individualities from the chaos, philosophy discovers patterns that 
emerge from territories partially obscured from each other by folds in the landscape of the 
plane. This topology refuses the possibility of parallelism: instead, philosophy sees the 
promise of intersection and convergence, of variations that would indicate a commonality, 
another zone to be explored and elucidated. This quite admittedly highly theoretical 
conceptualization has very practical implications as it offers an elucidation of the different 
purposes of the two fields; in this view, they remain 
inseparable but independent, each complete in itself: it is like the envelopes of two 
very different planes. Philosophy can speak of science only by allusion, and 
science can speak of philosophy only as of a cloud. If the two lines are inseparable 
it is in their respective sufficiency, and philosophical concepts act no more in the 
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constitution of scientific functions than do functions in the constitution of 
concepts. It is in their full maturity, and not in the process of their constitution, that 
concepts and functions necessarily intersect, each being created only by their 
specific means—a plane, elements, and agents in each case. That is why it is 
always unfortunate when scientists do philosophy without really philosophical 
means or when philosophers do science without real scientific means. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 161) 
Since they are philosophers—and not scientists—Deleuze and Guattari’s writing is always 
subject to the charge of being biased towards that field; however note again their insistence 
on the equality of the two realms at the level of structural construction, and the recognition 
of the inevitability of their separate development. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari seem to be 
hinting here that science and philosophy can only communicate in hindsight, after their 
creative processes have matured and after the planes have stabilized. 
On the one hand, this seems practically and intuitively correct, especially with 
regards to technology—seen here as the historical manifestation of certain types of 
science—which can only be evaluated in its application and distribution strategies (the 
classic example is the splitting of an atom, the knowledge of which must be separated in 
evaluation from its application; the current example looming on our horizon is 
nanotechnology, with its promise of eternal youth through the regeneration of “perfect, 
new” organs and its apocalyptic threat of voracious nano-machines running amok, 
consuming everything on the planet). On the other hand this would seem to invalidate the 
exact questions that Irigaray wishes science to confront when she asks 
If I were to tell you that two ovaries can engender a new living being, would this 
discovery seem possible, probable, or true? Would it merely be a genetic fact? Or 
would it also be considered social, economic, cultural, political? Would it be 
considered part of the exact sciences? … Would this type of discovery be 
promoted, even by those who extend credit? Would it be disseminated by the 
media? (Irigaray 1985b, 76) 
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Irigaray here is gesturing back towards the issues raised by Hess at the start of the essay, 
and reminding us that, once we look beyond the isolation of the laboratory, boundaries are 
never as easy to identify as we might hope, and the two islands described above emerge as 
connected to the surrounding land as the tides recede. One could say that Irigaray’s 
questions are only possible if posed from a (hypothetically) mature science, and therefore 
they accord fully with Deleuze and Guattari’s position above, but Irigaray’s emphasis on 
process, on communication, and on the politics of the development of discourse would 
always remain uncomfortable with such a situation. Indeed, the demand of completeness, 
of maturity, of a vantage point allowing the retrospective perception of a singular object 
would be seen, I would claim, as merely another turn of the current discursive structure, 
one where science still “strives to stand before the world: naming it, legislating it, reducing 
it to axioms.” (Irigaray 1985b, 83) This is, of course, the exact structure Irigaray has 
devoted her scholarship to exposing and rejecting, and opposed (she proposes the term 
subjacent in one of the essays under consideration here, which offers a more nuanced view 
than mere opposition) to which she offers throughout her work concepts extended from a 
deep belief in the possibility of another way forward, another way of communicating and 
being which she subsumes under the rubric of parler femme. In language that nicely 
contrasts with Deleuze and Guattari, she writes 
Woman never speaks the same way. What she emits is flowing, fluctuating. 
Blurring. And she is not listened to, unless proper meaning (meaning of the 
proper) is lost. Whence the resistances to that voice that overflows the “subject.” 
Which the “subject” then congeals, freezes, in its categories until it paralyzes the 
voice in its flow. (Irigaray 1985a, 112) 
If Deleuze and Guattari are correct in their analysis of scientific discourse—especially with 
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regards to the freezing and slowing of variables—then Irigaray is necessarily correct in 
wondering if science can hold a space for women’s voices, and, if so, what the impact of 
such a verbal irruption might be. She is, in the end, unable to answer this question for the 
“hard” sciences (a distinction that merits attention in and of itself), although the questions 
she raises for the theoretical wings of biology, physics, and mathematics are all reasonable 
avenues of inquiry. (Irigaray 1985b, 81–2) More importantly, Irigaray reminds us of the 
vital necessity of maintaining awareness of the connections between science and politics, 
not just in the manifestations of science, the byproducts and commodities and their global 
impact, but also in its structure and its patterns of coherence. In this, there is an implicit 
movement in her analysis towards holism, even if its definition can never be fully 
articulated: this movement, I would claim, resonates with the increased attention paid by 
contemporary science to systems thinking, not in its “organizational management” 
incarnation, but rather in its inheritance from the initial work in cybernetics of the 
mathematical basis for working with complexity, with organic systems that exist within 
vast and complex self-regulating and self-correcting environments. 
These developments highlight a weakness in Deleuze and Guattari’s overall model, 
where science is bound inextricable with linearity, with Newtonian equations and 
differential calculus; indeed, it is the clarity and depth of their recognition of the structures 
of linearity that lend force to their analysis. However, they are largely silent on the 
emergence over the last century of non-linear scientific models and, indeed, it is here that 
they themselves stumble in an attempt to convert scientific language to narrative argument. 
Deleuze and Guattari do recognize that  
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one of the most important aspects of modern mathematical physics appears in the 
action of “strange” or chaotic attractors: two neighboring trajectories in a 
determinate system of coordinates do not remain so and diverge in an exponential 
manner before coming together through operations of stretching and folding that 
are repeated and intersect with chaos. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 206) 
There are some issues with understanding their presentation of strange attractors. It’s not 
clear how to interpret “exponential manner;” more importantly, the stretching and folding 
involved here is a mathematical process by which a pattern of transformations is repeated 
recursively, something that must exist outside of chaos itself and not “intersect” with it as 
it is the components—functions, their elements (which Deleuze and Guattari designate as 
functives), variables—that make up the formal mathematical operation that were originally 
extracted from the waters of chaos and brought back into the scientific plane. Still, the real 
fault is in what follows where this mathematical model is held to reveal science’s 
“profound attraction to chaos,” and an argument is made regarding the interrelationship of 
science, art, and opinion. 
Given their warning above about “subjectivist” readings, it is unfortunate to see the 
conflation of the formal and the metaphorical usage of “strange attractors” in their 
conclusion, especially since the science based on chaos theory (which is profoundly and 
formally distinct from Chaos as Deleuze and Guattari use it) is representative of what is 
generally seen as a profound transformation across scientific disciplines, one that Lyotard 
terms (quite problematically, to be blunt) “Postmodern science,” and where 
the continuous differentiable function is losing its preeminence as a paradigm of 
knowledge and prediction Postmodern science—by concerning itself with such 
things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by 
incomplete information, “fracta,” catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes—is 
theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and 
paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing 
how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. 
74 
 
And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized 
performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy. (Lyotard 1984, 
60) 
This is not parler femme, but the tropes are at least more similar here: we have 
multiplicity, uncertainty, fluidity, and a comfort with not-knowing as the basis for 
scientific progress. These directions are new, and while it is unfair—and unwise—to 
demand too much from them in their infancy (and here Deleuze and Guattari’s insight 
about the need for science to reach maturity before interaction with philosophy is possible 
resurfaces), there does seem to be the potential to reach, in Lyotard’s terms again, a science 
that can be the foundation for “a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and 
the desire for the unknown.” (Lyotard 1984, 67) 
Another issue emerges here, one that hearkens back to the earlier discussion of 
Eliade: there is something quite odd about the relationship between science and time. 
Lyotard—whose analysis of the interactions between scientific and other forms of 
knowledge (which he denotes as narrative) at the level of a language-game lurks in the 
shadows of much of this analysis as well—points towards this when he writes that “the 
game of science thus implies a diachronic temporality, that is, a memory and a project. The 
current sender of a scientific statement is supposed to be acquainted with previous 
statements concerning its referent (bibliography) and only proposes a new statement on the 
subject if it differs from the previous ones.” (Lyotard 1984, 26) The scientific object itself 
remains outside of time, outside of history; yet scientific discourse—and, more 
importantly—scientific happenings occur as very much part and parcel of a historical 
moment, often providing part of the determinative impulse that shapes the political and 
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social milieu. In simpler and starker terms, the “truth” of nuclear fission exists at a remove 
from the history of atomic warfare. 
There is more here than the creation of a perfect temporal interval, more than the 
earlier discussed longing towards Eliade’s illud tempus. In a passage worth considering in 
depth, Canguilhem writes 
When a scientific proposition is judged to be true, it takes on a retroactive validity. 
It ceases to be part of the endless stream of forgotten dreams, discarded projects, 
failed procedures and erroneous conclusions—things, in short, for which someone 
must shoulder the responsibility. The elimination of the false by the true—that is, 
the verified—appears, once it is accomplished, to be the quasi-mechanical effect of 
ineluctable, impersonal necessity. Importing such norms of judgment into the 
historical domain is, therefore, an inevitable source of misunderstanding. The 
retroactive effect of the truth influences even one’s assessment of the respective 
contributions of various investigators to a scientific discovery (an assessment that 
only a specialist is competent to make), because the tendency is to see the history 
of a subject in the light of today’s truth, which is easily confused with eternal truth. 
But if truth is eternal, if it never changes, then there is no history: the historical 
content of science is reduced to zero. … Over time, a research laboratory’s library 
tends to divide into two parts: a museum and a working reference library. The 
museum section contains books whose pages one turns as one might examine a 
flint ax, whereas the reference section contains books that one explores in minute 
detail. (Canguilhem 1994, 41–42) 
We have, then, two sorts of times: historical time, in which our lives unfold, engaged with 
innumerable other historical processes, and a scientific time, the time that tracks the 
irregular revelation of truth, following “a different timetable in each discipline; the 
chronology of verification has its own viscosity, incompatible with ordinary history.” 
(Canguilhem 1994, 30) This second time is discontinuous, ruptured, irregular: it speeds up 
and slows down and doubles back on itself in reaction to periods of intense activity and 
slow hibernation. A single event—say Mendeleyev’s particular formulation of the periodic 
table—can lead to an accelerated pace in one field; another—say the gradual unraveling of 
the tangled roots of the theory of heredity—can, through its emergence, wipe away entire 
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generations of prior knowledge, supplanting them with a newly current authority. This is 
where we return to the realm of discursive activity, as this instability of object also leads to 
an instability of theory. “The history of science is therefore always in flux. It must correct 
itself constantly.” (Canguilhem 1994, 31) 
Doing Science 
What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive unconscious of 
knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is 
part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking 
to diminish its scientific nature. 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 
Note that the scientists themselves do not exist outside of this practice: the very act 
of “doing science” requires an integration into a network of social and historical milieus, 
each of which have their own particular impact upon the practitioner. While Canguilhem 
sees this from what might be termed a “hard position,” insisting that as the common 
technology used for scientific work grows more and more specialized and standardized, “it 
is true to say that science shapes scientists just as much as scientists shape science;” 
(Canguilhem 1994, 107) more recent writers have, perhaps in an attempt to soften the 
resistance from within the scientific community to such notions, written about “styles of 
thought.” As summarized by Nikolas Rose,  
a style of thought is a particular way of thinking, seeing, and practicing. It involves 
formulating statements that are only possible and intelligible within that way of 
thinking. Elements—terms, concepts, assertions, references, relations—are 
organized into configurations of a certain form that count as arguments and 
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explanations. Phenomena are classified and sorted according to criteria of 
significance. Certain things are designated as evidence and gathered and used in 
certain ways. Subjects are chosen and recruited. Model systems are imagined and 
assembled. Machines are invented and later commodified to make measures and 
inscriptions such as graphs, charts, and tables. All this is linked up within complex 
practical arrangements such as experiments and clinical trials. A style of thought 
also involves membership of a “thought community” in a discipline or 
subdiscipline, and an intimate knowledge of its relations of power and status. And, 
of course, a style of thought in an area of science also embodies a way of 
identifying difficulties, questioning arguments, identifying explanatory failures—a 
mode of criticism, of error seeking and error correction.(Rose 2007, 12) 
Rose here is extending earlier work; for example, speaking of an archaeology of sexuality 
specifically, but of discursive practice generally, Foucault writes: 
Such an archaeology would show, if it succeeded in its task, how the prohibitions, 
exclusions, limitations, values, freedoms, and transgressions of sexuality, all its 
manifestations, verbal or otherwise, are linked to a particular discursive practice. It 
would reveal, not of course as the ultimate truth of sexuality, but as one of the 
dimensions in accordance with which one can describe it, a certain ‘way of 
speaking’; and one would show how this way of speaking is invested not in 
scientific discourses, but in a system of prohibitions and values. An analysis that 
would be carried out not in the direction of the episteme, but in that of what we 
might call the ethical. (Foucault 1972, 193) 
These styles of thought mirror Canguilhem’s comments on the malleability of scientific 
discourse, changing themselves in a reflexive response to alterations in their content, in 
their truth and their relationship to that truth. 
The brain, for the contemporary sciences of the brain, is not what it was in the 
1950s; the cell, in cellular biology, is not what it was in the 1960s; “the gene”—if 
it still makes sense to call it that—is not what it was before genomes were 
sequenced, and so on. The new style of thought that has taken shape in the life 
sciences has so modified each of its objects that they appear in a new way, with 
new properties, and new relations and distinctions with other objects. (Rose 2007, 
12) 
Importantly, this observation does not require any reduction of science: rather, it 
notes that there are interactions between science and larger cultural systems and that the 
sites of these interactions are often highly contested. Importantly, the nature of these 
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contests and both their zones of focus and their intensity vary historically: “if we accept 
that science’s potential conflict with religion varies according to the nature of the religion 
concerned then it could well be the case that science is less likely to come into conflict 
with some of the religious systems prevailing in the cultic milieu than with the prevailing 
religious orthodoxy.” (Campbell 1972, 22) Campbell’s use of the term cultic milieu is 
jarring, but it reflects the context of his historical moment more than anything else: 
Campbell defines the cultic milieu as 
the cultural underground of society. Much broader, deeper and historically based 
than the contemporary movement known as the underground, it includes all 
deviant belief systems and their associated practices. Unorthodox science, alien 
and heretical religion, deviant medicine, all comprise elements of such an 
underground. In addition, it includes the collectivities, institutions, individuals, and 
media of communication associated with these beliefs. Substantively, it includes 
the worlds of the occult and the magical, of spiritualism and psychic phenomena, 
of mysticism and new thought, of alien intelligences and lost civilizations, of faith 
healing and nature cure. This heterogeneous assortment of cultural items can be 
regarded despite its apparent diversity as constituting a single unity—the entity of 
the cultic milieu. (Campbell 1972, 14) 
Campbell is referring, in broad strokes, to the counterculture of the 1960s and early 
1970s, but his work has been applied to the New Age (which is generally seen as a 
movement as only in its infancy at this time) and his definition hints at what emerges in the 
work of David Hess cited earlier, which provides a useful set of observations as we 
proceed. 
While Hess’ work focuses explicitly and specifically on what he calls paraculture, 
comprised of a set of actors engaged in activities related to the paranormal, spanning the 
continuum between “true believers,” those engaged in open-ended research, or the 
sometimes rabid debunkers of such phenomena. Hess’ recognition of the shared complicity 
between all of these groups in the creation, maintenance, and constant shifting of a cultural 
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space is quite applicable to our studies, especially at those moments where we will focus 
on the reception of either a scientific idea in the wider culture, or on the impact of wider 
cultural movements on contemporary science. The key observation is that these things do 
not exist independently, but rather inform and shape each other, creating a mutually 
negotiated cultural space where the boundaries between what are often seen as exclusive 
communities (for Hess, described at the largest level as the scientific and the non-
scientific) are in fact “recursive, multiple, and changing.” (Hess 1993, 17) Hess’ focus on 
the twentieth century New Age also prepares us well for the later chapters of this thesis, 
where the problematic definition of that term will be explored in more depth. At this 
juncture, what is important about Hess is his structural outlook, how he offers a 
perspective that spans what are often seen as irreconcilable differences. As part of this, 
Hess views “the New Age movement … not as an irrational reaction to rationalization, but 
an attempt to build an alternative rationality in a world perceived to consist of irrational 
and unjust orthodoxies,” (Hess 1993, 14) This allows him to engage with individuals and 
theoretical concerns within both the scientific and the paranormal communities with a 
focus on how they are engaged in the same project of exposing the “truth” of the natural 
world, even if their methods and conclusions differ radically. Indeed, it may in the end be 
this commonality of effort that explains some of the vitriol with which these enmeshed 
communities treat each other, as there is often a highly contested object—science itself—
caught between them (this would, for example, account for the energy behind accusations 
of “good” versus “bad” science). Moreover, by complicating and problematizing their 
relationships, Hess’ work helps deepen the understanding offered by Campbell on how 
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science fails to become a simple arbiter of truth. 
The demonstrable superiority of science is in many cases just not demonstrable or 
in other cases only demonstrable to other scientists. … there is no guarantee that 
even those people who are impressed by the demonstrable superiority of science 
and as a consequence desire to hold a scientific outlook will in fact be in a position 
to distinguish between what are orthodox and what are heterodox scientific views. 
They may, as a consequence, end up believing in flying saucers and ESP because 
of the convincing scientific “evidence.” (Campbell 1972, 23) 
Campbell’s simple binary relationship is challenged and complicated by Hess’ 
revealing that there are (at least) three potentially overlapping communities engaged in the 
shifting boundary-work described above: the believers, the parapsychologists (loosely, 
those engaged in removing the extraneous, false claims of certain believers in order to 
reveal the underlying truth, or, at least, the possibility of such a truth), and the skeptics 
(whose primary concern is to disprove the claims of the believers, often from an a priori 
set of assumptions about the nature of reality). Instead of simple opposition, these groups 
interact in an endless variety of ways, attacking or supporting each other, forming 
alliances, rejecting each others’ work, etc. As a single example, the work at Duke 
University by J.B. and Louisa Rhine in the middle of the twentieth century, which focused 
on the existence of various forms of what they termed parapsychology (largely varieties of 
telepathy), remains of critical importance to all three communities: the question is “what to 
make” of Rhine’s work. It is this process of “making” that will recur in our later 
discussions of the relationship between science and various forms of vitalism, and we will 
again revisit Hess’ tripartite model at that time. We are at this point able to look more 
closely at vitalism itself, beginning with the linked questions of what it means to be alive 
and what it means to be human. 
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The Living and the Human 
A vitalist, I would venture to suggest, is a person who is more likely to 
ponder the problems of life by contemplating an egg than by turning a 
winch or operating the bellows of a forge. 
Georges Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist 
“To understand the vitality of vitalism is to engage in the search for the meaning of 
the relationship between life and science in general, life and the science of life more 
specifically.” (Canguilhem 2008, 61) It is this relationship that concerns us most, between 
a methodology of inquiry and an object itself, neither of which are easily corralled into 
definitions. At the crudest level, this is apparent in the core term itself: even a decade into 
the twenty-first century, we lack a clear definition of “life,” despite over two hundred years 
of its study in the guise of modern biology. This problem is more than just the challenge of 
handling the fascinating and seemingly endless occupants of the fringes, although these 
often receive undue attention; it is instead central to the question. We do not know what it 
is that qualifies us as being alive: the best we can do is describe the condition, accept it as a 
shared universal among a recognizable group of species, and quickly move on, hoping that 
nobody presses us too deeply on the answers. 
There are two issues in play here. The first is how we recognize life outside of 
ourselves; and the second is what meaning is ascribed to that recognized life. These are 
tightly intertwined, and are perhaps best seen as inseparable—while it is certainly 
theoretically possible to isolate the biological question of life as an independent, detached 
inquiry, doing so removes it from engagement with the wider cultural work that forms our 
focus. More importantly, the question unravels into an undisciplined mess as soon as it is 
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examined: we lack a satisfactory definition of life from a scientific point of view and so are 
left only with the culturally created criteria for judging and interpreting it. Once these 
additional concerns are admitted, we are faced with qualities of life, with different strata 
among the living: the question of what is alive has turned to what does it mean to be alive, 
a question that ultimately becomes closely intermeshed with decisions regarding what 
boundaries are placed around the category of human.  
Both of these—the living and the human—have, after a period of tightly controlled 
restriction, seen their boundaries expand. This is easily seen in the matter of life: as a basic 
rule, the more we learn about the non-human, the less trustworthy our traditional biological 
categories prove to be. From the movement of crystals to the development of fungal 
colonies covering thousands of square miles to the symbiotic presence of thousands of 
micro-organisms in your gut, many of the qualities heretofore used to identify the living 
(movement, directed growth, the presence of clearly delineated bodily boundaries) leave us 
with the option of either abandoning their use or expanding the domain of the animate. 
This proves confusing in many ways: we intuitively insist that we are different from 
mushrooms and crystals, but it is very hard to pinpoint exactly what that difference could 
possibly entail, let alone what meaning could be derived from it. 
We will spend quite some time in chapter four with James Lovelock, but his 
observations on the meaning of life bear strongly enough on this question to warrant their 
inclusion here. Lovelock’s interest comes from his constant use of the adjective “alive” 
with regard to our small blue planet. 
Friendly scientists often ask me: Why do you keep on talking about the Earth as 
alive? This is a good question, and there is no rational answer; indeed to some of 
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my friends my suggestion that the whole planet is alive is not only “scientifically 
incorrect,” it is absurd. In reply I say that science has not yet formulated a full 
definition of life. Physicists and chemists have one definition, biologists another, 




Thus the physicist, Schrödinger, in his remarkable small book What Is Life? 
suggested that a long-sustained dynamic reduction of internal entropy distinguishes 
life from its inorganic environment; and this thought has been echoed by other 
physicists, especially Bernal and Denbigh. Biologists simply say a living thing is 
one that reproduces, and the errors of reproduction are corrected by natural 
selection. Neither of these definitions is helpful. The physicist’s answer is too 
broad and would mean that I, a grandmother, or a Lombardy poplar tree were dead, 
since we cannot reproduce. (Lovelock 2009, 192–3) 
More on life, biology, and Lovelock’s ability to reproduce later. For now, this is merely a 
succinct summary of the difficulties in what initially appears a simple query. 
The history of defining the human is marked by extraordinary violence and 
aggression: a constant rationale for slavery and slaughter is that they do not qualify for 
membership in the ranks of humanity, and therefore our behavior towards them is not 
constrained by the same ethics as towards members of our own community. This attitude 
surfaces in less obviously bloody registers as well, for example in the paternalism shown in 
international development efforts through much of the latter half of the twentieth century. 
While these claims are harder to make on a global scale now than as recently as a few 
centuries ago, it is important to recognize that they are still being made and they do still 
serve as motivation for much oppression and bloodshed. Even for people who accord all 
homo sapiens a similar status, however, the boundary between the human and the non-
human has become harder and harder to maintain, both biologically and culturally. While it 
seems that genetic determinism—and here I am referring not to the cultural phenomenon 
but rather to the claim that all biology is reducible to identifiable genetic behavior—is, at 
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the very least, under attack even in biological communities, the importance of DNA as a 
tool for biological classification remains quite strong. The difficulty is that species 
previously held separate are now being found to share huge amounts of genetic code, 
including recent arguments that chimpanzees are actually closer to humans genetically than 
they are to other primates and are, in fact, close enough to warrant biological classification 
as human. We are left in a position where the biological answer to what is human depends 
on a fraction of a percent of genetic code, which seems intuitively insufficient, hence 
forcing a turn to behavior and culture, choices of action and social organization, for an 
answer. 
We have moved now to the second register, but here the going is no easier: our 
primate brethren clearly participate in cultural ritual and clearly possess both their own 
language and the ability to learn others. Even religion, once seen as the highest proof of a 
truly human culture, has lost its hard boundary as primates have been seen celebrating the 
appearance and disappearance of the sun in what can only be seen as a mysterious 
forbearer of human proto-religious behavior: even with all of the distance inserted by the 
chronologically qualifying phrases, the notion of a fixed boundary necessarily begins to 
fade in the pre-dawn mist. These discoveries hit home in a peculiar way, and highlight 
common cultural misconceptions to which we will return in later chapters: first, their 
inherent fascination is proven by their constant appearance in various media (that is, 
animal shows edit and select content subject to all the pressure of any capitalist enterprise, 
and the recurrence of certain themes signifies both the ongoing presence of that material in 
the natural world, but also its anticipated interest to the viewers). Secondly, and more 
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importantly for our purposes, the reaction to this information is often, in slightly overstated 
terms, tinged with an evolutionary apocalypticism of differing degrees, reflecting a 
perceived threat to either human culture (“let’s see apes produce Shakespeare”) or 
humanity itself (“the dolphins are going to take over”). The mistake I want to highlight 
here centers on the term evolution. The growing acceptance of evolution as a scientific 
truth has done little to address its understanding, especially with regards to evolutionary 
time. The human brain is woefully ill equipped to deal with the very large or the very 
small, a flaw that seems compounded when time itself is concerned, leading us to project 
evolutionary change into a near future instead of a far-flung one. This tendency is perhaps 
most dramatically revealed in the New Age of the late twentieth century, with its constant 
predictions of a watershed moment in human history being driven by an evolutionary 
change, a topic that will be treated in more depth in later chapters. 
We are left, then, a bit adrift, in a common situation where the general contours of 
defined cultural spaces are clear, yet their exact shape and boundaries blur out of existence 
the harder we try to bring them into focus, leaving us in an apophatic realm where to live is 
merely not to be dead. Historically, this proves unsatisfactory: rightly or wrongly, we insist 
that there is more than that, that there are qualities of life and ways to engage with the 
world that require the presence of an operative lurking somewhere behind the curtain of 
our bodies. This is the touchstone of vitalism, and whether these impulses form its source 
or not, they certainly are an identifiable spring from which its waters run. In the last few 
centuries, vitalism has emerged in two somewhat distinct forms, one focused on the 
individual and one focused on the natural world. The former provides the foundation for 
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the convoluted and often tense relationship between vitalism and science, while the latter 
allows vitalism to survive as a backdrop to a wide variety of philosophical and political 
moments. Ultimately, the joining of these two strands forms a key trope for understanding 
many religious movements in the west from the middle of the twentieth century onwards. 
Bodily Vitalism and the 
Secularization of Health 
I think brain is mind and mind is brain, and that science, broadly 
conceived, is the most effective method for learning about mind-body-
brain. 
Lynn Margulis, Speculation on Speculation 
Modern Western medicine, with its focus on cadavers and diagrams, on visual 
structures and mechanical arrangements, has been in conflict with vitalism from the early 
days. Western medical practices, of course, existed in prolific variety long before what I 
am terming “modern Western medicine” emerges. Even anatomy, the basis for so much of 
the mechanistic medical model, emerges before this moment, with what we now see as 
proof of evolution (say, Pierre Belon’s comparative studies of the skeletons of birds and 
humans) being interpreted instead, in another example of science reclaiming the errors of 
the past as proof of present truth, as part the construction of the human body as “possible 
half of a universal atlas.” (Foucault 1970, 22) This mechanistic history reveals itself 
something like this: the body is seen as a machine, and its secrets are those of a craftsman, 
of the intricate details that allow for the slow unraveling of mechanical mystery. The 
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soul—severed entirely from the flesh—may animate the body, but increasingly the 
relationship between the two becomes more and more distant. This is accomplished 
through experimentation, through the steady proliferation of mechanical—indeed, 
scientific—explanations for what had previously been attributed to an unseen vital force 
that inhabited and operated the body. Eventually, a dizzying array of bodily functions—
from the beating of the heart to the filtration of the kidneys—gain a satisfactory 
mechanical explanation and a critical mass of sorts is reached where the range of processes 
explained this way overwhelm the remaining mysteries, allowing biological and medical 
science to safely, publicly, and proudly proclaim that it is just a matter of time before other 
bodily activities and functions are also subsumed beneath an all-encompassing mechanistic 
framework. 
It is a sturdy model, and one that has survived in varying guises for centuries. Yet 
despite its own claims, progress in scientific medicine has never been linear. This is most 
evident in the early days, where the mechanizations of discovery are not shrouded by walls 
of pre-existing facts; here we see an odd sort of reversal of process where the mechanics of 
function have to be re-inserted into the story at a later date. The body has never been a 
mechanical contraption: we never have been able to isolate a part of the body and 
successfully ask, “what does this do?” the way an engineer can isolate the crankshaft of a 
vehicle or the valve of a pump. 
[O]ne does not discover an organ’s functions by asking what it is used for. Only by 
following the various moments and aspects of a function does one find the organ or 
apparatus responsible for it. It was not by asking What function does the liver 
serve? that the glycogenic function was discovered but by measuring the glucose 
in blood drawn at various points in the circulatory flux of an animal deprived of 
food for several days. (Canguilhem 2008, 7) 
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This remains a discursive issue, as a clear tension exists between the fits and starts, the 
unintended consequences, the dead ends of the reality of medical research and the 
metanarrative proposed above of movement towards an eternal truth. 
The importance of the ascent into popular understanding of this mechanistic view 
cannot be overstated, nor can its sizable and practical impact: whatever our concerns are 
regarding modern allopathic medicine, it marks a clear improvement over the induced 
vomiting and bloodletting of mainstream medical practice of the early nineteenth century. 
Indeed, the rise of standardized allopathic treatment (hand in hand with the rise of the 
American Medical Association, and all of the formal bureaucracy and institutionalization 
that implies) is clearly closely tied to the growth of America between the Civil War and 
World War I. 
As one example, Charles E. Rosenberg’s The Cholera Years: The United States in 
1832, 1849, and 1866 shows in convincing detail how our understanding of disease moved 
from a proof of moral and ethical shortcomings (disease being a reflection of our internal 
state) to the result of physical conditions that could, therefore, be far more easily 
alleviated. According to Rosenberg, “cholera, a scourge of the sinful to many Americans in 
1832, had, by 1866, become the consequence of remediable faults in sanitation. Whereas 
ministers in 1832 urged morality upon their congregations as a guarantor of health, their 
forward-looking counterparts in 1866 endorsed sanitary reform as a necessary prerequisite 
to moral improvement.” (Rosenberg 1962, 5) Note that here we have a clear decrease in 
the importance of a bodily, vital energy: cholera is no longer the product of some internal, 
ethereal force but rather the result of physical contexts and contacts which can be 
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managed, organized, even controlled. 
The increasing dominance of a mechanized model should have spelled the end of 
bodily vitalism. That it didn’t speaks to three movements: first, even in the medical 
community—in fact, even among those responsible for what is now accepted as the 
debunking of vitalism—it retained a somewhat hidden position, revealing what I would 
claim as an anxiety about the unavoidable endpoint of mechanism, the dry reduction of 
each of us to overly complex clocks, merely fulfilling the unavoidable result of our gears 
clicking inexorably onwards towards death. Second, as the mysteries of the body were 
explained, the mysteries of the brain and of consciousness itself were in the ascendant, 
providing a healthy refuge for the vitalist explanation; a situation that remains today: for 
all we know of how joints and tendons operate, our understandings of the complex soups 
of the body—most notably the stomach and the brain—remain quite primitive by 
comparison. Finally, closely related to the discussion of the brain, and in a pattern we will 
see again when we examine “worldly” vitalism, as secularism rises in the west, the 
religious concept of the soul resists marginalization by migrating into new territory which 
proves fertile ground for vitalist roots. 
Before examining this last point in more detail, we should at least briefly examine 
the notion of secularism itself. A term “originally employed in the wake of the Wars of 
Religion to denote the removal of territory or property from the control of ecclesiastical 
authorities,” (P. L. Berger 1969, 106) secularism has come to refer to a generic operation 
whereby some zone of cultural influence is denuded of its overtly religious content. Our 
understanding of secularism has grown considerably, to the point where a summary of a 
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summary may be the most expeditious route towards general understanding. Building on 
the work of Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas, Christopher Partridge writes of 
a useful fourfold typology of secularization theories: the disappearance thesis; the 
differentiation thesis; the de-intensification theory, and the co-existence theory. 
The former two are the dominant models, the latter two are less common. The 
disappearance thesis, which reflects nineteenth-century theories, claims that 
religious understandings of the world will effectively disappear in the West. The 
differentiation thesis is more cautious in that it argues that religion will become 
privatized and socially insignificant: “religion gets pushed out of social domains 
whilst remaining (of some) significance in private life.” The de-intensification 
theory claims that religion will remain in society, but only in a de-intensified, weak 
and insubstantial form. The co-existence theory is more positive, in that, “whilst 
secularization takes place in particular circumstances, in other contexts religions 
retain their vitality, even grow.” Whatever the merits or demerits of this typology it 
does highlight the fact that there is no one model of secularization, just as … there 
is no one theory of the processes involved. (Partridge 2004, 1:8) 
Interestingly, this typology echoes the four ways in which Ian G. Barbour, in Religion and 
Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues sees religion and science interacting 
(through conflict, independence, dialogue, or integration). (Barbour 1997, 77–103) 
Barbour’s categories are neither unproblematic nor universally approved (Cantor and 
Kenny 2001), but they do speak in support of Partridge’s observations of a set of structural 
mechanisms within contemporary society. 
Effectively collapsing the distance between disappearance and differentiation, 
Peter Berger, from whom the earlier etymology of secularism comes, claims “it is not 
difficult to put forth a simple definition of secularization for the purpose at hand. By 
secularization we mean the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed 
from the domination of religious institutions and symbols.” (P. L. Berger 1969, 107) We 
will squabble with Berger’s introductory clause. The difficulty with his definition, and the 
part that ends up working directly against his initial claim, is that while secularization may 
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empty cultural structures of the obvious influence of formalized religious institutions, that 
does not equate—at all—with an emptying of religious content from the cultural milieu. 
Instead, we find that in the very structure of the rising tide of science, there are pockets and 
indeed entire organizing principles, that maintain space for decidedly “unscientific” 
thoughts, behaviors, and cultural systems. Giddens, to whom we turned earlier when 
discussing the movement of science over culture in general, provides some insight into 
how this happens, when he claims that “the specific authority which science once enjoyed, 
which turned it into a sort of tradition, could only be protected in so far as there was an 
insulation dividing scientific expertise from the diverse forms of knowledgibility of lay 
populations.” That is, as long as a church or, later, highly privatized forms of obtaining and 
disseminating technical knowledge, were able to maintain a thick boundary between those 
in the know and the rest of us, absolute authority was still possible. Enter Wikipedia, and 
that is no longer possible. 
The possession of esoteric knowledge, of course, still guarantees a certain 
“protection” for the technical expert against the probings of lay individuals. But 
this dividing line is no longer a generalized one, sealing off science as a whole 
from the “local knowledge” of laypersons. The very specialization which expertise 
undergoes makes it obvious to everyone that there can be no “experts of all 
experts.” But that all expert claims to knowledge are not only very specific but also 
liable often to be internally contested. 
 
The fact that experts frequently disagree becomes familiar terrain for almost 
everyone. More than this, however, the claim to universal legitimacy of science 
becomes much more disputed than before. All kinds of cult, folk knowledge and 
traditional orientations return to claim some sort hegemony alongside the realms of 
orthodox science. … The many tensions that develop between (diverse 
interpretations of) science and alternative forms of knowledge-claim are more 
disruptive than would be the case if this were just a matter of science “coming to 
understand itself better.” (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 185–6) 
In any case, discussions of secularism are inseparable from discussions of 
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boundaries: “secularization is only possible in societies in which there is a clear distinction 
between the religious and the non-religious.” (Partridge 2004, 1:9) As such, we are also 
speaking of a process of displacement of content, of meaning moving—sometimes 
meandering and sometimes in a surprising sprint—into different spaces. William Irwin 
Thompson who, along with his longtime collaborator David Spangler, will return in the 
final chapter, writes, “Once before, people looked to temples and palaces for the birth of 
the divine child, but he chose a stable. Now people look to religion for a manifestation of 
the divine, but I rather think the revelation has already happened, when they weren’t 
looking and where they least expected it: in the secular and profane conditions of our 
ordinary lives.” (Thompson 1991a, 176) The mechanics of secularization are really 
mechanics of encroachment and retreat, of the acquisition and loss of legitimacy and of 
power (this is why Lyotard’s focus on claims to authority and legitimacy remain so 
relevant to these considerations). 
This may be illustrated by returning to the rise of mechanism and its accompanying 
movements towards secularization, where we now could claim to understand how various 
bodily processes operate, and could now ascribe their efficiency to specific chemical or 
mechanical processes, not to some unseen energy. Clearly, within communities of belief, 
such energy would continue to be seen as part of the definition of a “soul” or as proof of 
God’s dwelling in the world. However, even within a growing secular population, within 
those groups that largely accepted the dominance of “science” over “religion,” we find the 
continuance of vital thought and tendencies. Here, while medical (and other forms of) 
reductionism developed into formidable currents of thought which continue to dominate 
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much of our understanding of the physical world, bodily vitalism survived and, indeed in 
the late twentieth century, surged again to the forefront of popular understanding. Its 
survival was—at least until relatively recently—a retreat, a ceding of ground to the 
encroaching scientism. As Robert Fuller summarizes in his Alternative Medicine and 
American Religious Life (recognizing that our focus on vitalism is notably smaller than his 
engagement with religion writ large), “the advent of modern science has tended to relegate 
religion and medicine to separate spheres, and most people feel quite comfortable with the 
assumption that religious beliefs are irrelevant to matters of healing and health.” (Fuller 
1989, 5) 
While Fuller’s claim may be true in terms of popular perception, the historical 
record shows a much more convoluted and complex relationship. Perhaps the most 
dominant example is that of chiropractic and osteopathy, both of which have moved from 
explicitly spiritual and vital beginnings to wide-spread acceptance (near total for 
osteopathy, less so for chiropractic, although it remains an interesting liminal case, more 
“scientific” than energy based healing methods, but less accepted than “modern” 
medicine). Emerging at the turn of the century, chiropractic was the creation of D. D. 
Palmer (1845-1913), although its rapid spread was spearheaded by his son, B. J. Palmer 
(1881-1961). Both trumpeted the importance of what D. D. termed innate, an explicitly 
vitalist ascription of the presence of life to an intelligent life force that surges forth from 
the creator to ourselves. At the same time, Andrew Taylor Still (1828-1917) was 
developing his theories of osteopathy, which relied on a conception of an electric current 
running through the body. For both practices, the key was flow and openness: if innate or 
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the electric life force were blocked, we were prevented from functioning well, from being 
healthy. As such, the alignment of the constituent parts of the body—with, in both cases, a 
focus on bones and joints—could either be correct, allowing the vital force full freedom to 
course through our bodies, or it could be incorrect, and we would suffer both from the 
buildup of the force at the blocked site, as well as from its depleted presence elsewhere. 
Notice that we have a fascinating combination of systems here: both osteopathy and 
chiropractic depend upon the increasing volume of mechanistic bodily knowledge for their 
anatomical expertise, while at the same time both strongly posit the presence of a force that 
is, at best, invisible to that same expertise. The fact that later generations of chiropractors 
and osteopaths would intentionally, and often virulently, distance themselves from their 
spiritual roots is of interest as well: the vital impulse remained strong enough to serve as 
the basis for these practices, but not so strong that it could withstand a direct confrontation 
with emergent medical practice. Fuller’s observations on the recognizably religious and, 
more specifically, American religious nature of chiropractic hold importance as we move 
through the following chapters: 
The emergence and dissemination of chiropractic philosophy represents a 
structural replay of the sectarian patterns so prominent in American religious 
history. Although its spirituality is drawn from noninstitutional sources 
chiropractic nevertheless evidences many features traditionally associated with 
such native-born American sectarian religious groups as Christian Science, 
Seventh Day Adventism, the Mormons, Pentecostalism, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
(Fuller 1989, 77) 
There were also, of course, less compatible interactions between vitalism and the 
emerging sciences. Take, as an example, the Graham cracker, the only surviving remnant 
(other than his profound influence on the dietary practices of various forms of Seventh Day 
Adventism) of the crusades of Sylvester Graham (1794-1851), who would have been 
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horrified at the success of such a commercialized, mass-produced comestible. Stephen 
Nissenbaum introduces Graham, the dominant subject of his Sex, Diet, and Debility in 
Jacksonian America, like this: 
Ralph Waldo Emerson called him “the prophet of bran bread and pumpkins.” In 
his own day he was widely regarded as a wild-eyed fanatic and a crank, and even 
many of his own supporters viewed him with a curious mixture of idolatry and 
exasperation. … Sylvester Graham wished to purge the souls of his generation by 
cleansing their debauched bodies. In his view, the source of the nation’s woes lay 
not in slavery, but in diet. In retrospect, his crusade came to appear more trivial 
than dangerous … (Nissenbaum 1980, 3) 
Nissenbaum’s account is fascinating: Graham was obsessed with notions of purity, 
with a concern for the dangerous and debilitating power of sexuality, with the more-than-
symbolic power of home-baked bread serving as manna for a nation’s impoverished souls. 
What is more directly relevant are the ways in which vitalist ideas pervade his project. As 
may be expected, eighteenth century vitalists, under the onslaught of the explosion of 
knowledge discussed above, fought back with ideas that Graham found in the works of 
Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) and François Broussais (1772-1838). 
Bichat had proposed that all living organisms were engaged in a continuous 
struggle for survival against the inorganic forms that surrounded them: life itself 
was a constant battle between the principles of vitality and those of physics and 
chemistry, and death was simply the victory of the latter over the former. 
Broussais, another French theorist, had proposed that food and drink, upon which 
living organisms depended for their survival but which literally invaded them from 
without, constituted the single greatest threat to vitality. From Broussais, then, 
Graham picked up the idea that it was the digestive system that formed the crucial 
background in the struggle between organic and inorganic forces. (Nissenbaum 
1980, 20) 
These notions mixed with Benjamin Rush’s (1745/6-1813) ideas on the contributions of 
what he termed artificial stimulants (for example, alcohol and red meat) towards an 
individual’s debility, a term in common circulation to refer to the antipode of a state of 
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healthy, energetic activity. Rush was a devoted moderate in these areas, demanding 
“temperance—not abstinence. He was more concerned about drunkenness than drinking.” 
(Nissenbaum 1980, 70) Graham held no such ambiguity, advocating a diet made entirely of 
vegetables and vegetable matter—including his beloved wheat-based bread, baked 
explicitly (and this will not be the last time that gender politics raise their head in 
unexpected locations) by “the wife, the mother only,” and imbued with all the power “of a 
mother nursing her family with bread and affection” (Nissenbaum 1980, 8)—and 
eschewing all alcohol, which he did so for concerns over its biological effects, not its 
tendency to impair judgment and alter behavior. Graham’s concerns were on the 
relationship between our own innate (and, in his mind, innately Christian) vital selves and 
the (usually negative) impacts of the substances we ingest, with both licentiousness and 
illness being held as proof of a dangerous imbalance. His ideas were profoundly incorrect, 
and more a product of his own biography and a burgeoning cultural discomfort with the 
ever-growing commercial presence in a still-expanding America (his bread was best if 
baked from grain grown locally, harvested locally, and ground by hand in the home in 
which it would be consumed), but their concerns and their general shape are very much 
relevant. Finally, lest we see him as a crackpot easily plucked from the margins of history, 
it is important to remember that he was, albeit briefly, wildly successful: “Thousands of 
people in the 1830s attended Sylvester Graham’s lectures, read his books, and, for a time at 
least, changed their lives. They did so, if their own testimony is to be believed, not in order 
to enter the emergent middle class, but for a simpler and even more pressing reason: They 
were sick, and they wished to become well.” (Nissenbaum 1980, 140) 
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Vitalism’s survival was also aided by the rise—chronologically parallel to the 
medical developments discussed above—of the field of psychology. While I would not 
claim that Freud was a vitalist, I do see the explosion of interest in the questions of 
consciousness, in the explorations of exactly what it is that animates our behaviors and 
desires, as being a fragmented continuation of the original vitalist project. Bodily vitalism 
has been evacuated upwards, moved into the realm of the mind, and the fact that these 
explorations were done under the guise of science, in the end, provides a strategy for their 
own survival—that is, to the degree to which psychology has legitimized itself, it has also 
created a culturally approved arena for discussions of matters of the mind. The difficulty is 
that, especially compared to other bodily organs, we know so very little about how the 
mind (or, to use the currently dominant term, consciousness) operates, about what it 
actually is. This absence of knowledge may very well function as a vacuum, creating an 
unbearable emptiness that forces a huge range of content to rush in. Consciousness 
becomes the most malleable of signifiers, serving equally well in referring to highly 
scientifically charged discourses on the interoperability of neural pathways and to largely 
apocalyptic claims of shared universal developments in human perception. 
A key continuity here is that of illness: remember that vitalism is almost always 
associated with questions of health. Having been forced to abandon (at least temporarily) 
most claims concerning the health of the body, vitalism finds refuge as an explanation for 
the maladies of the mind, whose mysteries are far less accessible than those of the kidneys. 
Indeed, it is in the brain that the mechanistic model fails most spectacularly. In a pattern 
that is repeated quite often, an early rush to provide a clearly mechanical explanation is 
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thwarted by the ability of the human organism to remain a fluid, flexible, and malleable 
entity. Where early research claimed to identify specific areas of the brain as determinative 
of different domains of human functioning, it is now clear that such a mapping is largely 
impossible: in different circumstances, the brain will literally re-wire itself, rebuilding lost 
functionality in different areas and through different neural pathways. These discoveries 
are very much part of a larger intellectual pattern where terms like complexity and systems 
theory are being used more and more to describe what were once thought of as mechanical 
models; here specifically it is the concept of a self-correcting system that is of the greatest 
importance, an idea we will treat in more depth in our discussion of Gaia in chapter four. 
In the end, the difficulty is one of boundaries, of how to cordon off this bodily function 
from that, this bodily system from the other. It has become clearer and clearer that such 
sectioning, such isolation, proves unsatisfactory, that the human (indeed, Canguilhem 
would insist that all life) exists only in orientation towards and participation with its 
environment. He writes, “that, to do mathematics, it would suffice that we be angels, But 
to do biology, even with the aid of intelligence, we sometimes need to feel like beasts 
ourselves.” (Canguilhem 2008, xx) 
This quote is metaphorically resonant: even for Canguilhem, vitalism is no longer 
the result of God’s work in the world, and that which animates us is no longer necessarily a 
pure and untainted manifestation of sacred power. As the tangible nature of the vital force 
becomes more and more suspect—that is, as medical science disproves various theories of 
an ethereal substance either in the air or in ourselves—vitalism loses some of its 
immediacy, its ability to be seen as a set of forces available for direct manipulation. 
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Additionally, of course, with the rise of psychotherapy, the vital forces more than ever 
before can assume an ambivalent, if not downright antagonistic nature: our unconscious is 
something that must be managed and controlled, something that threatens to burst free and 
reveal itself in inappropriate ways. This change proves unacceptable for those looking for a 
vitalist explanation, and by the end of the twentieth century, it has largely been addressed: 
we see a return of claims centering around the concept of a life-force, an active energy that 
is immediate and present in and through our bodies. This resurgence of bodily vitalism is 
closely tied to the engagement with Eastern practices that occurs in North American in the 
late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century: the growing awareness—however 
distorted through the twin lenses of colonialism and capitalism—of chi, prana, reiki, and 
other concepts originating from Asia allows bodily vitalism to regain much of its lost 
cultural eminence. I would claim that this helps us understand the form these practices take 
as well: that what emerges has much more in common with nineteenth century American 
healing movements than with any specific tradition of the Far East: as a single exemplar, 




Worldly Vitalism: Nature and 
the Wild 
Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There 
is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather 
created and would be nothing without their creator’s signature. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 
Nature emerges from this exercise as “coyote”. This potent trickster can 
show us that historically specific human relations with “nature” must 
somehow—linguistically, ethically, scientifically, politically, 
technologically, and epistemologically—be imagined as genuinely social 
and actively relational; and yet the partners remain utterly 
inhomogeneous. “Our” relations with “nature” might be imagined as a 
social engagement with a being who is neither “it”, “your”, “thou”, 
“he”, “she”, nor “they” in relation to “us”. The pronouns embedded in 
sentences about contestations for what may count as nature are 
themselves political tools, expressing hopes, fears, and contradictory 
histories. Grammar is politics by other means. 
Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women 
As we have seen, the rise of allopathic medicine pursues bodily vitalism 
relentlessly, eventually forcing it to nearly relinquish the body altogether in preference for 
a tenuous connection with the human soul. This reflects a contraction inwards, a shrinking 
down to a single point of a previously all-encompassing concept. It is also, I would claim, 
only half of the vitalist lineage: concurrent with it (and, of course, never truly isolated from 
it) is a movement outwards, an expression of vitalism that goes far beyond the human, 
eventually enfolding within its domain all of the natural world. 
It is quite easy to see in the last two centuries a simple pattern where scientific and 
religious thought are competing for the same areas in social discourse, with science swiftly 
displacing the religious, culminating in our current “secular society.” (Indeed, in his 
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discussions of cholera, Rosenberg has just such a model in mind, especially in his original 
conclusion. (Rosenberg 1962, 228)) Doing so is dangerously incorrect, not because it fails 
to account for what is often seen as a religious resurgence in our contemporary world, but 
rather because it fails to accurately capture the historic phenomenon: what secularization 
entails is not a lessening of religious ideas, it is a lessening of the rigidity of religious 
structures. And, in fact, this structural softening may indeed be responsible for the growth 
of forms of religious expression that fall beyond the scope of traditional orthodoxy. Recall 
Campbell, who concludes that 
the changeover from a dominant religious orthodoxy to a dominant scientific 
orthodoxy does not seem to correspond to any greater control of heterodox societal 
beliefs, for while the decline in power of organized ethical religion appears to have 
removed the most effective control over heretical religious beliefs, a growth in the 
prestige of science results in the absence of control of the beliefs of non-scientists 
and in an increase in quasi-scientific beliefs. Ironically enough, therefore, it could 
be that the very processes of secularization which have been responsible for the 
“cutting back” of the established form of religion have actually allowed the 
“hardier varieties” to flourish, or possibly created the circumstances for the 
emergence, not of a secular scientific society, but of a society centered on a blend 
of mysticism, magic and pseudoscience. (Campbell 1972, 23–24) 
Campbell is reacting to a process where what are clearly religious concepts and religious 
behaviors move outside the church and, in doing so, become confusing to cultural 
observers who had prior conflated the structure with the content. In this, I would squabble 
with his dominant metaphor, insisting that religion does not move underground: it just goes 
outside. 
While often this meant merely moving outside of the established church, for our 
discussions it also meant actually wandering outdoors, into the waiting wilderness. Note 
the specificity of the phenomenon under consideration: key here are moments when nature 
is used as an escape from an established socio-religious structure, when religious thought 
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and action are moved from an accepted, normative location of practice to one seen as either 
“away from” the creations of human technology and culture or “closer to” some innate 
truth held in the natural world itself. There is in this a sense of a magnetic presence within 
nature that attracts people, with promises of vitality, health, longevity, even magical 
power; this energy is the core of what I am terming worldly vitalism. Before considering 
this in more detail, however, there are some initial concepts that must be examined, most 
importantly, what is this “nature” of which we speak? Doing so will allow the opportunity 
for a distressingly superficial pass through the historical relationship between the 
colonizers of North America and their environment, however we will have the opportunity 
later to return to this in more depth. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, nature proves to be a somewhat elusive concept: while 
portraying itself as eternal and unchanging, it seems instead that our views of the natural 
world are both extremely malleable but also—and more important for our later 
considerations—nearly always somewhat conflicted if not downright contradictory. This 
thesis is greatly indebted to the work of Catherine Albanese, who provides a useful 
summary of the complexity of the term under consideration: 
For some, nature meant the physical world … for others, nature became an abstract 
principle, an environmentalism so far extruded into the starry skies that it lost the 
familiar touch of matter. In a related distinction, for some, nature meant the truly 
real. For others, it became the emblem of the higher spirit. 
 
Similarly, adherence to nature as a central religious symbol could lead to 
different—though related—injunctions for living. On the one hand, nature religion 
seemed to encourage the pursuit of harmony, as individuals sought proper 
attunement of human society to nature and thus mastery over sources of pain and 
trouble in themselves and others. And yet, nature religion fostered more 
ambivalent themes of fear and fascination for wildness and, at the same time, an 
impulse toward its dominance and control. (Albanese 1990, 12) 
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This phenomenon—and more of Albanese’s insights—will be considered in significant 
detail in later chapters, for now we will briefly examine its general contours, beginning 
with the early European colonization of North America. As with our discussion of 
medicine above, this starting point comes fast on the heels of a massive upheaval of 
cultural knowledge, in this case the rise of geology. At the most abstract level, this was a 
process of giving structure and explanation to the irregularities of God’s work: if the 
sphere was the perfect shape, our increasing knowledge of the irregularities of Earth’s 
surface, its orbit, even its vertical position all raised questions about its inherent 
imperfection. Indeed, while “mountains, for example, had generally been regarded in the 
early seventeenth century as warts, pimples, blisters, and other deformities on the earth’s 
surface,” (Nash 1967, 45) by the end of the eighteenth century, the natural world—
irregular features included—was more likely to be seen as proof of God’s handiwork. We 
will encounter this terrain again in our discussion of John Muir’s role in developing 
theories of glaciation in chapter three; for now, another figure who will return in later 
chapters, British philosopher Mary Midgley summarizes the theological issues at stake 
quite nicely: 
The earth’s moral and spiritual reputation could not improve until it could 
somehow be seen as being more intelligible—that is, until somebody found a more 
suitable way of trying to understand it. Finding one was the achievement of 
eighteenth-century geologists, notably of James Hutton. These geologists’ first 
success was in discovering a repair mechanism that could balance the process of 
erosion: a way in which the earth might be rebuilding itself so as to constitute a 
lasting system. They did this by showing how the weight of accumulated 
sediments crushes and eventually melts the lowest layers of rock, causing them to 
erupt through volcanoes and so to rebuild the mountains. 
 
This meant that the motion of the earth could be seen as a continuous cycle, an 
effective ongoing process of maintenance, no longer a one-way path to decay. The 
geologists’ second achievement, which followed from this, was to show that the 
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process was not a recent expedient but had apparently been going on for countless 
ages. It was a vast, steady, regular, reliable machine that showed, in Hutton’s 
memorable words, “no vestige of a beginning—no prospect of an end”. It might 
even be something comparable to the eternal system which Newton had proposed 
for the heavens. (Midgley 2004, 130–1) 
It is useful here to introduce some additional terminology to help clarify what is 
being examined, and in doing so I am taking advantage of Roderick Frazier Nash’s 
distinctions between nature and the wild (or wilderness), which are predicated on the 
existence of a shared boundary with humanity: nature is what lies beyond the boundaries 
of the socially constructed; the wild looms threateningly even beyond that. Our pastoral 
desires, our idealized visions of rural and agricultural life, our sense of the inherent 
goodness of bucolic vistas, these all depend on a certain sense of nature and are, in fact, the 
result of centuries of interaction with the wild, interactions that were often fearful, violent, 
and deadly. There is a raw accuracy to this description when seen through the westward 
colonization of North America: life on the edges of white civilization was terribly difficult, 
a constant struggle against the myriad obstacles offered by the wild: the severity and 
unpredictability of the weather, the presence of unfamiliar and deadly wildlife, the endless 
variety of disease and hardship of frontier life. And, of course, the ongoing violence 
between the colonizers and the indigenous population fueled the popular imagination with 
the “savage dangers” of the wild. But there was a moral quality to the risks posed by 
westward expansion as well: 
A more subtle terror than Indians or animals was the opportunity the freedom of 
wilderness presented for men to behave in savage or bestial manner. … Morality 
and social order seemed to stop at the edge of the clearing. … Would not the 
proximity of wildness pull down the level of all American civilization? Many 
feared for the worst, and the concern with the struggle against barbarism was 
widespread in the colonies. Seventeenth-century town “planters” in New England, 
for instance, were painfully aware of the dangers wilderness posed for the 
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individual. They attempted to settle the northern frontier through the well-
organized movement of entire communities. (Nash 1967, 29–30) 
It is important to realize that, with very few exceptions, the expansion of America was an 
effort to conquer and control the wild, not an effort to embrace it: the job of the settler was 
to clear land, to establish a foothold against the threats they faced, to provide a bulwark 
against the wild. In essence, to create nature, which only exists with the juxtaposition of 
the human and the wild. We idealize our purple mountains majesty, but only by following 
them with the agricultural vision of rolling waves of grain: nature may include the wild, 
but it is formed through the farm, the garden, the park, the settlement, the clearing. This is 
merely the latest chapter in a long story, although it may be the most impactful and is 
certainly the most dramatically powerful over the shortest periods of time. Giddens 
provides both the long view and an anticipatory linkage to the later topic of 
environmentalism: 
One way to read human history, from the time of the rise of agriculture, and 
particularly the great civilizations, onwards is as the progressive destruction of the 
physical environment. Environmental ecology in the current period has arisen 
mainly as a response to perceived human destructiveness. Yet the very notion of 
“the environment,” as compared to “nature,” signals a more deep-lying transition. 
The environment, which seems to be no more than an independent parameter of 
human existence, actually is its opposite: nature as thoroughly transfigured by 
human intervention. We begin to speak about “the environment” only once nature, 
like tradition, has become dissolved. (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 77) 
The industrialization of the North American west was shockingly effective and efficient: 
entire populations were destroyed or relocated, and a constant flow of population into the 
country pushed its established boundaries ever further towards the Pacific. In doing so, the 
ratio between the natural and the wild changed dramatically, and as the natural became 




In the early nineteenth century, for the first time in American history, it was 
possible to live and even to travel widely without coming into contact with wild 
country. Increasingly people lived on established farms or in cities where they did 
not experience the hardships and fears of the wilderness. From the vantage point of 
comfortable farms, libraries, and city streets, wilderness assumed a far different 
character than from a pioneer’s clearing. … wilderness had actually become a 
novelty which posed an exciting, temporary alternative to civilization. (Nash 1967, 
57) 
It is only after this that the idealization of the wild itself is possible: John Muir, one of the 
primary subjects of the next chapter, may have often professed a desire to abandon human 
settlements and live a solitary life among his beloved Sequoias, but the truth is that he 
never did so, choosing instead (and for a variety of reasons) to always maintain a home in 
society to which he could return. 
These two ideas, nature and the wild, never fully resolve themselves, a situation 
perhaps most eloquently represented by the formation of National Parks. The larger of the 
National Parks are, at their core, intentional compromises of these ideas, where a 
geographic area is cordoned off and reconstructed, and then within these controls, 
promoted as wild. And, indeed, may in fact be so. (The question of whether the wild 
observed can actually be considered wild is a philosophical concern that, while tangentially 
important to our considerations of radical environmentalisms later, will be avoided at 
present.) This reflects a sense that the proper role of the wild is as a resource, as something 
that should be preserved for purposes other than its own, whether nostalgia, a burgeoning 
environmental ethic, or as a resource for an increasingly urban population becoming more 
and more aware of the complications of their concrete and steel-bound lives. Nature 
become something that is, at its core, highly unnatural, a phenomenon that, in a different 
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register, Ulrich Beck describes thus: 
It is already becoming recognizable that nature, the great constant of the industrial 
epoch, is losing its pre-ordained character, it is becoming a product … “Nature” 
becomes a social project, a utopia that is to be reconstructed, shaped and 
transformed. Renaturalization means denaturalization. Here the claim of modernity 
to shape things has been perfected under the banner of nature. Nature becomes 
politics. In the extreme case which can already be observed today, it becomes the 
field for genetic engineering solutions to social problems (environmental, social 
and technical security, and so on). That means, however, that society and nature 
fuse into a “social nature,” either by nature becoming societalized or by society 
becoming naturalized. That only means, however, that both concepts—nature and 
society—lose and change their meaning. (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 27) 
Beck’s focus, of course, is on the social (or, here, the social nature), while ours expands 
into the vacuum that is left behind in his fusing of domains. There are highly problematic 
implications here, most revolving around the entanglement of post-industrial cultures of 
consumption and this fused social nature. On the pessimistic side of things, we veer 
towards what Baudrillard describes as 
Nature, in the form of a countryside trimmed down to the dimensions of a mere 
sample, surrounded on all sides by the vast fabric of the city, carefully policed, and 
served up “at room temperature” as parkland, nature reserve or background 
scenery for second homes is, in fact, a recycling of Nature. That is to say, it is no 
longer an original, specific presences at all, standing in symbolic opposition to 
culture, but a simulation, a “consommé” of the signs of nature set back in 
circulation—in short, nature recycled. If we have not yet reached this point 
everywhere, it is nonetheless the current trend. Whether we speak of countryside 
planning, conservation or environment, it is, in every case, a question of recycling 
a nature which is itself doomed. Like events, like knowledge, Nature is governed 
in this system by the principle of being up-to-the-minute. It has to change 
functionally, like fashion. It provides an ambiance and is therefore subject to a 
replacement cycle. (Baudrillard 2004, 100–1) 
The underlying notion is important: we will in later chapters illustrate in more depth just 
how socially constructed our notion of nature is, and in doing so the distinction between 
nature and the wild will return with even more importance. For now, however, it should 
remain in the background as our immediate concern—regardless of which serves as the 
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object—is the energy seen as animating the external world. 
The source of this animating energy may be seen as existing on a spectrum 
containing, at one extreme, “God as Nature,” where the natural world is coterminous with 
a sacred ultimate. Here, the vital force is the deity itself and, as such, the natural world is 
seen as a set of sacred exemplars, a resource for social, ethical, and communal learning. 
Nature’s worth comes precisely from its vitality, as that is the manifestation of the sacred 
in the world: nature itself is a Eliadean theophany, revealing the hidden mysteries by its 
very presence. The other end of the spectrum sees nature as existing solely for itself: there 
is no outside force that animates it, instead, nature provides its own vitality. Here, there is 
no ultimate rationale for nature, no guiding principles upon which it sheds light: the vitality 
of life is life itself, no more, but certainly no less. The clear difference between these two 
views is the role of the human, with the first being clearly anthropomorphic, maintaining 
the sense that the world exists for the human, and that the human’s rightful place is at the 
center of that world. The human is often irrelevant to the latter view—we are instead an 
accident of evolution, and from nature’s point of view, are largely a negative hindrance to 
the ongoing development of other species. There is, of course, a tension—if not downright 
open conflict—between these perspectives, stated in its most gentle register here by Arne 
Næss: 
The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for 
ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of 
understanding that others reserve for fellow humans and for a narrow section of 
ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, the equal right to live and 
blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is 
an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans 
themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction 
we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore 
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our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the 
alienation of humans from themselves. (Næss 1995a, 4) 
The movement here is typical of much of what we will encounter with regards to worldly 
vitalism: we must expand, exceed, broaden, and grow beyond the constrictions of our 
current world view and this development is centered often on recognizing connections and 
interactions that were previously either ignored, intentionally hidden, or lay dormant. We 
are, once again, seeing manifestations of the rise of complex systems and their application 
across domains, although the writers are often situated outside the realm of science per se. 
A prolonged example from Georges Bataille is worth considering: Bataille is 
attempting to conduct a thought experiment about the origin of life on the planet and, in 
doing so, anticipates many themes that we will visit again. 
As we know, death is not necessary. The simple forms of life are immortal: The 
birth of an organism reproduced through scissiparity is lost in the mists of time. 
Indeed, it cannot be said to have had parents. Take for example the doubles A’ and 
A”, resulting from the splitting in two of A; A has not ceased living with the 
coming into being of A’; A’ is still A (and the same is true of A”). but let us 
suppose (this is purely theoretical, for the purpose of demonstration) that in the 
beginning of life there was just one of these infinitesimal creatures: It would 
nonetheless have quickly populated the earth with its species. After a short time, in 
theory, reproduction would have become impossible for lack of room, and the 
energy it utilizes would have dissipated, e.g., in the form of heat. Moreover, this is 
what happens to one of these micro-organisms, duckweed, which covers a pond 
with a green film, after which it remains in equilibrium. For the duckweed, space is 
given within the narrowly determined limits of a pond. But the stagnation of the 
duckweed is not conceivable on the scale of the entire globe, where in any case the 
necessary equilibrium is lacking. It can be granted (theoretically) that a pressure 
everywhere equal to itself would result in a state of rest, in a general substitution of 
heat loss for reproduction. But real pressure has different results: It puts unequal 
organisms in competition with one another, and although we cannot say how the 
species take part in the dance, we can say what the dance is. (Bataille 1989, 32–3) 
Within the primary material under consideration, these themes are most clearly evident in 
James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis’ Gaia Theory, which claims—and, indeed, in at least a 
limited fashion has been largely accepted as proving—that the Earth itself is just such a 
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system, able to regulate its own temperature, the composition of its atmosphere, the 
production of various chemicals, etc. In noting this, we also return to the issue of 
reception: for the scientific community, the largest obstacle to the acceptance of Gaia was 
a perception that there was also a claim of how these changes were managed, an ascription 
of consciousness or, indeed, vitality, to the force “behind the curtain.” For many in that 
community, Gaia was only accepted once it was publicly declared that, indeed, the space 
behind the curtain was empty: there was nothing driving this arrangement, nothing that 
guided the self-regulation. While this allowed Gaia to gain scientific credibility, it was 
immediately discarded as the idea hit the public consciousness. Here, in the realm of 
common culture, one of the key attractions to Gaia is that it offers a purpose, a vision 
where the entire planet is alive, animated, and is somehow offering a telos towards which 
we may strive. We will return to Gaia in much greater depth in chapter four; for now, 
suffice to note that these are not solely recent considerations. Writing in 1965 of Carl 
Ritter’s Comparative Geography of 1817, Canguilhem claims that, 
according to Ritter, without man’s relation to the land—to all land—human history 
is unintelligible. The earth, considered as a whole, is the stable ground for the 
vicissitudes of history. Terrestrial space and its configuration are, consequently, 
not only geometrical and geological objects of knowledge, but also sociological 
and biological ones.” (Canguilhem 2008, 106) 
This intertwining of the natural world with various socio-biological concerns is not 
without its own dangers. Often, vitalist movements—especially the newer, highly 
environmentally conscious ones—cloak themselves in a moral invulnerability: who, after 
all, could argue against the survival of the planet? Who could not agree that clean air, 
clean water, and a healthy Earth are goals towards which we should all contribute our 
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energy and effort? Doing this often masks the quite conflicted relationship between these 
movements and their own political histories, a set of conflicts that play out along the axes 
under consideration here as well. So, as an example, we have the eugenics programs of 
early brain research, which attempted to use the core composition of the brain—the source 
of the vital energy itself—as a proof of humanity’s division into superior and inferior racial 
classifications or, more central to our concerns here, we have the relationship between 
German romanticism of the late nineteenth century and both the Nationalist and Nazi 
movements as well as the later environmental and pagan movements of the twentieth. 
In any case, half of the stage is now set. We now turn to the other half, for 
alongside the ongoing conversations about science and medicine, about vitalism and life 
itself, run a parallel set of discourses which are even more explicitly religious in nature, an 




Religion, Natural and 
Otherwise 
When I suggest, then, that the modern study of religion functions like 
both a cultural mutation and a form of secret knowledge, I am not 
romanticizing. I am trembling. I am also seeking to place the field within 
a long and quite serious history of mythological, literary, and ethical 
reflection on the psychology and politics of secrecy in Western thought. 
Jeffrey J. Kripal, The Serpent’s Gift 
If vitalism, the subject of the previous chapter, marks one pole around which this 
analysis circulates, religion, and more specifically religious concerns centered on and 
around the concept of nature and the natural world, provides the other, and it is to these 
phenomena we now turn with a similar intent of providing the ground upon which our later 
explorations will stand. As with vitalism, I am most interested in specific—and relatively 
recent—manifestations of religion in North America, and in specific interpretive 
perspectives as well. This chapter opens with a theoretical overview designed to clarify the 
tradition from which I am writing, followed by broad historical tracings of natural religion 
in North America, focusing on the period from initial contact between the indigenous 
population and Europeans to the middle of the nineteenth century, setting the stage for the 
subjects that follow in the rest of the thesis. I see this chapter as existing in an ongoing 
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series of interactions with the first: the interplay and exchange between the work of 
scholars engaged in an archaeology of ideas and those working within the history of 
religions as a tradition constantly inform, support, and argue with each other in my own 
scholarship. 
Religious History and the 
History of Religions 
We would do better to do what we do, which is to attempt to make sense 
of other people’s religions, even if we do so in the certain knowledge that 
everything we say and write is provisional and condemned to revision if 
not ridicule by future generations, as well as by our own proximate and 
distant others. 
In practical terms, this means that we need not feel ourselves compelled 
to front-load our own discussions with deconstructions of all who have 
preceded us on our path. 
David Gordon White, The Scholar As Mythographer 
Not for the last time, a diversion must be taken to clarify what is meant by a term 
presented for consideration: here, I need to identify an important distinction between the 
history of religions as a generic term encompassing the unfolding of human behavior 
through time and as a referent to a specific way of approaching the multitudinous artifacts 
left behind by that behavior. The latter, which is explicitly concerned with how those 
remnants are held in comparison, is the scholarly tradition in which I am most deeply 
trained. It may be said that the roots of the comparative study of religion trace back to the 
late nineteenth century when, paraphrasing Goethe’s remark on languages, Max Müller 
said in a lecture, “the same applies to religion. He who knows one, knows none.” (Müller 
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1872, 11) This, like all creation stories, is almost surely apocryphal, and the search for 
comparative understanding must date back to the first time someone said “what are those 
people over there doing?” This has led to a long and troubled history, mixing an early 
tendency to conflate anything foreign or different from our own experiences into a vast, 
savage, erotic other that cried out for conquest and assimilation to a later one to decry any 
act of comparison at all as exactly that type of violence combined with an insistence that 
anything that even vaguely smelled of religion was “really” something else: the product of 
economic pressures or an outbreak of a medical condition or an act of rebellion by an 
oppressed group of individuals, “anything but worldviews so powerful that they had far 
more influence on how people thought and acted than did the immediate, perceptible 
physical world.” (Patton 2000, 164) 
In the more specific use of the term, the history of religions is probably best dated 
as a quite recent phenomenon, beginning with the “Chicago School” of Joachim Wach, 
Charles Long, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Kitagawa. Continuing first through their direct 
progeny at the University of Chicago, then, as their intellectual lineages spread and 
dispersed, creating tribal variants and offshoots, odd marriages and bitter divorces, the 
general umbrella of history of religions dominated academic practice in the field, either 
directly or in reactive critique, for the second half of the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first. In order to better situate my own position vis-à-vis the history of religions and 
to hopefully clarify why I would insist—over and against some very strong voices—that 
comparison still matters, I will briefly trace the development of the field as a comparative 
discipline, using Kitagawa as an early representative before  moving to an examination of 
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the views of, on the one hand, contemporary polemicists represented by Robert Segal and 
Russell McCutcheon and, on the other, the response of Wendy Doniger to such attacks. 
This section will close with reflections informed by J. Z. Smith and Clifford Geertz as to 
the current status of the field, as well as to my place within it. While I am aware that the 
history of religions continues to be a dominant force at the University of Chicago to this 
day, I will use the term “Chicago School” explicitly to refer to the first generation of 
scholars under consideration. 
Kitagawa may be seen as an odd choice to represent the Chicago School, with most 
preferring either the towering figure of Mircea Eliade—who we have already met in the 
previous chapter—or that of Joachim Wach. I would say that, precisely because he was not 
either the dominant, visionary scholar (Eliade) or the provider of the initial theoretical and 
philosophical underpinnings (Wach), Kitagawa will serve our purposes quite well in terms 
of providing insight into how comparison functioned for this group in the mechanics of 
their scholarship. In this, I am drawing heavily on Twiss and Conser’s work on the 
phenomenology of the history of religions in which they divide the field into three 
positions, the essentialist, the historico-typological, and the hermeneutic-existentialist. (See 
their introduction in Twiss and Conser, Jr. 1992 for an exhaustive typology.) Twiss and 
Conser’s focus is on phenomenology as a whole, but the material included in The 
Experience of the Sacred is both explicitly religious and dominated by either members of 
The Chicago School or those heavily engaged in conversation with its legacy. The Chicago 
School provides the model par excellence of the historico-typological approach, where the 
concern is to provide what could be called diagrammatic guides to the study of religion: 
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phenomena is categorized, related to other categories, differentiated through the presence 
or absence of various sub-categories, and seen in the context of a global and trans-
historical network of religious practice and belief. As such, typological groupings move to 
the forefront of consideration: we are concerned with major symbols, identifiable 
movements, and variants that are used to confirm the presence of a core, repeated and 
repeatable pattern. Clearly, comparison is central here: the only reason for the construction 
of such a complex grid is to place various phenomena in relation to each other. 
This represents a major turn from the initial essentialists, whose focus was on the 
content of religion, on the very essence of ritual and practice, a target whose existence was 
unquestioned. That is, there was assumed to be a there, there: religion had a central 
content, a unifying set of conditions, that could be analyzed, explicated, and described, if 
not fully apprehended or understood. While not denying that essence—indeed, in many 
cases, the category of the sacred itself was used as the central organizing trope—the 
historico-typologists shifted their attention to cataloging the ways in which the sacred was 
made manifest, and the ways in which human cultures attempted to engage with it. As 
such, Kitagawa’s essay “Three Types of Pilgrimage in Japan” may be seen as 
representative; here, in scarcely a dozen pages, Kitagawa examines many manifestations of 
pilgrimage, arriving at three different subcategories that vary based on the goal of the 
pilgrimage and upon an examination of the relationship between the pilgrim and the 
venerated object. Kitagawa is well aware of both the importance and pitfalls of the 
comparative project, writing that 
To be sure, it is the task of the historian of religions to delineate universal 
structures out of the multitude of varied and variable religious data and to 
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telescope long and complex histories of religions by depicting certain significant 
events and their persistent characteristics. Yet, his conceptions and abstractions 
must be constantly re-examined in the light of the integrity and the unique cluster 
of meanings of particular religious systems or phenomena. (Kitagawa 1967a, 178) 
In the end, his goal is to use “a significant form of religious cult which has developed out 
of the fusion of various elements,” as a way to create a useful categorical grid that may, on 
one side, “throw some light on the characteristic pieties of Japanese religious tradition” 
(Kitagawa 1967a, 187) and, on the other, provide another small tool in the greater 
classificatory project. 
There is something essentially encyclopedic about the Chicago School, a subtext 
that seems to insist that, if we can just catalog all of the instances and variations of 
religious behavior and experience, we will then have enough data. I would claim that it is 
never quite clear exactly what the goal of the accumulation of this data is—greater 
understanding, surely, but what else? What else is contained, or hidden beneath, the effort 
to create this massive system of interrelated structures and manifestations? This is the point 
where several critics rush in to accuse the Chicago School, and especially Eliade, of 
pushing a pseudo-Christian or pseudo-Fascist agenda. While those claims may be 
overstated, I would echo Hugh Urban’s call in his response to Wasserstrom’s Religion 
After Religion for a greater examination of the parallel between the politics of the Cold 
War and those of the Chicago School (Urban 2001) as well as draw attention to what 
should be obvious parallels in other examinations of the impacts of the construction of 
grids of knowledge and power. Situating oneself in the tradition of the history of religions 
does not mean losing sight of Foucault. 
Still, at this point I would rather claim that, for the early founders and practitioners 
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within the Chicago School, the method may very well have been the ends itself, without a 
consciously sinister dimension to their work. In spite of its dominance (or, more likely, 
because of it), the Chicago School has not been accepted uncritically; and debates 
surrounding the original founders of the field, its methodology, and possible alternatives 
have raged quite loudly for the last quarter century. These debates have led to strange 
bedfellows on all sides, with similar arguments being offered by scholars who otherwise 
are in deep disagreement about the proper philosophical orientation of the field. It has also 
been marked by an opening of the history of religions to the impact of other disciplines, 
most notably anthropology and the social sciences, and these interventions are, to me, a 
key component in moving forward. Before that a review of the basic charges is in order; 
this will be done quite quickly: entering the second decade of the twenty-first century, 
these are old arguments, and much of their fire has burned out. This does nothing to lessen 
their importance or impact, but it does deflate some of the passionate zealotry that marked 
the debates in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The attack on comparison hinges on various manifestations of inequality, operating 
on several different, interrelated levels. First, there is the imbalance between the relative 
strength of cultures, seen either as a manifestation of Western imperialism, or as a 
glorification of the Other (indigenous, foreign) as a corrective to the malaise of the modern 
West. The gist is that nothing can be compared equally, that there is always dominance 
and, hence, oppression in comparison, and that comparison itself does a sort of violence to 
the object compared. Second, there is the bias of the scholar, which manifests most clearly 
in the selection of objects to compare. We see what we want to see, and therefore we select 
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objects that fit whatever our hypothesis or hidden agenda may be. More insidiously, we 
may not even be aware of those agendas, controlled as we are by unconscious agents (and, 
again, by the drive towards hegemony that is unavoidable in western scholars). Or, more 
distantly, the scholar may be driven by an initial hypothesis (for example, the existence of 
a real experiential state described by “the sacred”), leading to both bias in selection, but 
also to intentional and accidental misrepresentations and misinterpretations of data. 
Finally, there is an inequality of voice, seen either as the forced surrender of power that 
occurs when scholars decide upon categorization schemes without sufficient attention to 
the “native” description of the phenomena involved or, more philosophically and less 
politically, seen as the impossibility of comparison itself due to the inability of two 
individuals to agree fully on the meaning of any independent third term, especially and 
most problematically when issues of belief, faith, and understanding emerge. (The classic 
outline is found in MacIntyre 1964.). This last argument is often used to highlight the ways 
in which the Chicago School is obsessed with similarity, at the cost of difference; that is, in 
the quest to catalog what is the same, they are blind and/or deaf to moments of deep and 
profound difference. This critique is not without significant merit and is perhaps dealt with 
most eloquently in Tomoko Masuzawa’s In Search of Dreamtime, specifically in her 
treatment of the “discovery” by a western female anthropologist of the ways in which 
Aboriginal women in Australia partake in the dreamtime, hitherto seen by scholars—who 
only spoke to men—as an exclusively male affair. (Masuzawa 1993) 
Notice that we’re already hopelessly muddled: the same scholars who would argue 
strongly against the role of bias due to a pre-existing conviction (say, McCutcheon’s 
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attacks on Eliade) also insist that scholars never relinquish their right to pass judgment on 
the religious practices of others. Typically, though, the argument takes one of two forms: 
the first is the pure polemic of McCutcheon or Segal, where the opposition is caricatured 
and ridiculed into submission. Here, the Chicago School are presented as a marauding 
group of frauds, spreading cults of personality and irresponsible scholarship in their wake 
(Segal 1983; McCutcheon 1999; McCutcheon 2001; Segal 2001; McCutcheon 2006). I 
refuse to wade into these waters: the substance of the attacks are slim, and the noise 
surrounding them disproportionate. For a convincing rebuttal of their arguments, see in the 
specific, Bryan Rennie’s Reconstructing Eliade (1996) or, in a more general sense, the 
entire corpus of Jeffrey Kripal, Wendy Doniger, or any other of a number of the 
generational descendants of the Chicago School. I mean that quite seriously: the existence 
of such rich and nuanced scholarship is, in itself, an argument against the dismissal of the 
entire project. 
The second objection is a postmodern critique usually situated in the disparate 
power between scholar and subject and, while more nuanced than the polemic, equally 
reductive in its outcome. The power of the postmodern critique is immense, and is seen 
directly in the re-emergence of area studies in the 1980s and 1990s as the dominant 
organizing factor within the field of religious studies. The force of this argument is nicely 
summarized by David Gordon White as follows, taking Eliade as representative of the 
Chicago School as a whole: 
Eliade was constructing his own White Man’s metanarrative, and the unmasking of 
such metanarratives is what much of postmodernism is about. This is at the heart 
of Jean-François Lyotard’s critique of modernism, of “totalizing metanarratives, 
great codes which in their abstraction deny the specificity of the local and traduce 
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in it the interests of a global homogeneity, a universal history. Such metanarratives 
would include Marx’s historicist narrative of emancipation, the narrative of 
psychoanalytic therapy and redemption proposed by Freud, the story of constant 
development and adaptation proposed by Darwin,” as well as, we might add, the 
theories of myth and religion offered by the likes of Frazer, Eliade, and Lévi-
Strauss (even if structuralism itself belongs to an early phase of postmodernism). 
 
Now, if we follow Lyotard’s argument to its conclusions, as some postmodernists 
have done, we find ourselves forced to grapple with the question of the legitimacy 
of conducting comparative studies of culture, societies, or religions, that is, of 
pursuing the discipline of the history of religions as it has been constituted over the 
past century. This argument runs as follows: modernist metanarratives, in order to 
accommodate widely diverging local histories and traditions, abstract the meaning 
of those traditions by way of a “translation” into the terms of a master code, which 
leaves the specific tradition simply unrecognizable. Such metanarratives also 
become coercive and normative: they systematically control and distort the local 
under the sign of the universal. Such a drive to totality cannot respect the 
specificities of the genuinely heterogeneous traditions. (D. G. White 2000, 48–9) 
Let me pause a second to moment to underscore what is at stake here. If either of 
these critiques hold—the polemic or the postmodern—the entire field of the comparative 
study of religion collapses into rubble and dust.  
That said, if I saw these objections as fatal to the study at hand, this would be a 
slimmer thesis. Having clearly outlined the argument, the power of White’s analysis lies in 
his response. Upon re-reading what is perhaps the high-water mark of the Chicago School, 
The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, edited by Eliade and Kitagawa and 
published in 1959, White is struck that, 
some forty years after its publication, that collective effort appears more as a 
period piece than a landmark, quite nearly as antiquated in its Enlightenment 
presuppositions or Romantic agendas as the earlier works of Frazier, Freud, and 
Max Müller. In a word, this is a modernist document, the mere reading of which 
should suffice to alert us to the fact that ours are postmodernist methodologies, and 
have been so for a good many years. (D. G. White 2000, 47) 
He continues, “the postmodernist critique of modernist metanarratives is pretty much a 
dead horse as the millennium draws to a close. If we are talking about contemporary 
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Western scholarship—on art, architecture, law, literature, economics, politics, society, and 
yes, even religion—the postmodern message has been received and acted upon.” (D. G. 
White 2000, 49) Wendy Doniger, who we will visit with more below, would never be 
described as a deeply postmodern theorist, yet her work sits clearly on the near side of 
what White describes. Even if, as an Indologist, Doniger’s encounters—like Kripal’s—are 
more with the postcolonial than the postmodern, the form and structure of the critique is 
similar and overlapping: 
But there is also much in the postcolonial critique that is worth keeping; indeed, 
we can no longer think without it. We are aware, willy-nilly, of how our texts have 
come to us; they now say to us, like third-world immigrants in England, “We’re 
here because you were there.” Colonialism is no longer the political force it once 
was, but it is still here, especially if we use a word like imperialism instead of 
colonialism and bear in mind the aspects of our scholarship that still invade the 
countries we study, like the Coke bottle that intrudes into the lives of The Natives 
in the (racist) film The Gods Must Be Crazy. In particular, the postcolonial critique 
has made us aware of how deeply evolutionist ideas are embedded in the history of 
comparison, and how hard we must work to overcome them. (Doniger 1998, 69) 
While I would never claim to be beyond the concerns raised by postmodernism, I would 
say that many of the current generation of scholars have held those concerns front and 
center from the beginning of their intellectual training, and that many of our allies from 
prior generations have embraced and ingested those same concerns. We may always have 
been modern, but we are, now twenty years further on from White’s writing, always 
already postmodern as well. 
Doniger’s position warrants further attention. In The Implied Spider, she looks the 
various critiques of the history of religions in the eye and simply, an eyebrow arched 
inquisitively, asks, “… and?” That is, Doniger admits to the dangers of all of the above; 
however she also insists on the necessity of wading into the shark-infested waters if we 
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desire to swim away from the sheltered bay of theology. It is, according to Doniger, only 
through comparison that we can make sense of religious material beyond the tight 
boundaries of belief. This is, admittedly, an argument heavily influenced by her own focus 
on myth; Doniger describes her field as “a sub-caste of historians of religion, more 
precisely a half-caste formed through an illicit liaison between anthropologists and 
classicists.” (Doniger O’Flaherty 1986, 335) Her solution is both complex and direct: the 
only choice is to dive in, to surround oneself with variant upon variant of a theme, and to 
slowly and carefully sort through them, paying attention to the nuanced shifts in emphasis 
and structure between them. 
We cannot, to borrow the Zen koan, hear the sound of one hand clapping; we 
cannot hear sameness. But through the comparative method we can see the 
blinkers that each culture constructs for is retellings of myths. Comparison makes 
it possible for us literally to cross-examine cultures by using a myth from one 
culture to reveal to us what is not in a telling from another culture, to find out 
things not “dreamt of in your philosophy” (as Hamlet said to Horatio). Moreover, 
we can use comparative work to test theories about our own culture, by noting 
where our own dogs have not barked. Comparison defamiliarizes what we take for 
granted. We can only see the inflections of a particular telling when we see other 
variants. (Doniger 1998, 33–4) 
This comparative work produces a network of connections, Doniger’s web emerging, 
along which the (implied and scholarly) spider can start to move. Importantly, there is no 
claim of over-arching meaning here: the web does not have a single dominant strand. This 
is the basis for her call for a “bottom-up” methodology, as opposed to the prior insistence 
on viewing religious data from the top down (that is, starting with a broad category—say, 
pilgrimage—and moving through the available examples, refining the structural 
classification as you go). Rather, there is a network of connections, and the challenge to the 
scholar is to find ones that are interesting, illuminating, even important. In one sense, 
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Doniger dismisses many of the arguments as being ones of competency: the better the 
scholar, the more careful they are, the deeper and broader the intellectual base from which 
they draw, the more honed and clearer their instincts, the less likely they are to make the 
mistakes of bias listed above. 
Overcoming Sympathy 
through Thickness 
The question of ultimate meaning can be raised at any time and at any 
occasion—but not all the time. 
Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference 
This issue of competency leads me finally to the work of J. Z. Smith and Clifford 
Geertz, a somewhat unlikely coupling, but one that neatly pulls together the two strands of 
my scholarly training. Smith is somewhat responsible for the tempest surrounding the 
history of religions as a whole, as his essay “In Comparison A Magic Dwells” is still seen 
as a classic attack on the status of the field, the crux of which is this paragraph: 
It requires but a small leap to relate these considerations of the Laws of 
Association in memory and magic to the enterprise of comparison in the human 
sciences. For, as practiced by scholarship, comparison has been chiefly an affair of 
the recollection of similarity. The chief explanation for the significance of 
comparison has been contiguity. The procedure is homeopathic. The theory is built 
on contagion. The issue of difference has been all but forgotten. (Smith 1982, 25–
6) 
For Smith, comparative work, the underlying foundation of the field itself, for all its 
scholarly dressing, operates much like Frazer’s sympathetic magic: things that were 
somehow declared to be alike were said to share in some inexplicable essence that gave 
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them an unseen quality of power. This is a brilliant insight, and one that pulls together 
much of my own investment in the field: the structure of magic, the dangerous notion of 
purity, the perils of scholarship when faced with such a seductive subject. In examining the 
state of the field, “four basic modes or styles of comparison were isolated: the 
ethnographic, the encyclopaedic, the morphological, and the evolutionary,” (Smith 1982, 
27) with the Chicago School most often mapping to the encyclopaedic and the 
morphological. Smith summarizes: 
We stand before a considerable embarrassment. Of the four chief modes of 
comparison in the human sciences, two, the ethnographic and the encyclopaedic, 
are in principle inadequate as comparative activities, although both have other 
important and legitimate functions. The evolutionary would be capable in principle 
of being formulated in a satisfactory manner, but I know of no instances of its 
thorough application to cultural phenomena. What is often understood to be the 
evolutionary method of comparison embodies a deep contradiction which 
necessitates its abandonment. This leaves only the morphological, carried over 
with marked success from the biological to the cultural by O. Spengler, and which 
has a massive exemplar in religious studies in the work of M. Eliade, whose 
endeavor is thoroughly morphological in both presuppositions and technical 
vocabulary, even though, in specific instances, its principles of comparison remain 
unnecessarily obscure. Yet, few students of religion would be attracted by this 
alternative. Because of the Romantic, Neoplatonic Idealism of its philosophical 
presuppositions, because for methodologically rigorous and internally defensible 
reasons, it is designed to exclude the historical. The only option appears to be no 
option at all. (Smith 1982, 29) 
Note that the situation is even more dire if you accept—as, at the end of the day, I do—that 
postmodernism writ large has pretty much demolished the foundations of the 
morphological. 
Doniger and Smith are, ultimately, bemoaning depth and quality. They are 
expressing a longing for scholarship that reaches beneath the surface, and that struggles 
with the complexity demanded by the subject. 
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There is nothing easier than the making of patterns; from planaria to babies, it is 
done with little apparent difficulty. But the “how” and the “why” and, above all, 
the “so what” remain most refractory. These matters will not be resolved by new or 
increased data. In many respects, we already have too much. It is a problem to be 
solved by theories and reasons, of which we have had too little. So we are left with 
the question, “How am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of the 
two things?” The possibility of the study of religion depends on its answer. (Smith 
1982, 41) 
Smith’s answer to this challenge—exemplified in his own work—is one of careful and 
considered scholarship, of simultaneous attention to the methodology employed and the 
subject matter under consideration, and of a constant denial of essential, reductive 
categories. But his core question is also a reef where other disciplines—notably 
anthropology—have already run aground, and have already proposed a variety of 
techniques to find again the open sea. In this vein, Smith and Doniger may be seen as 
demanding of the history of religions an honest implementation of Clifford Geertz’ “thick 
description.” 
Geertz sees a challenge similar to that eyed by Smith, but in a different register: 
In short, we need to look for systematic relationships among diverse phenomena, 
not for substantive identities among similar ones. And to do that with any 
effectiveness, we need to replace the “stratigraphic” conception of the relations 
between the various aspects of human existence with a synthetic one; that is, one in 
which biological, psychological, sociological, and cultural factors can be treated as 
variables within unitary systems of analysis. (Geertz 1973, 44) 
But the only way to get there is an echo of Doniger’s concern for working from the bottom 
up. “The aim is to draw large conclusions from small, but very densely textured facts; to 
support broad assertions about the role of culture in the construction of collective life by 
engaging them exactly with complex specifics.” (Geertz 1973, 28) This is difficult, 
arduous, confusing, and disorienting work. But it 
127 
 
is not as fatal as it sounds, for, in fact, not all Cretans are liars, and it is not 
necessary to know everything in order to understand something. But it does make 
the view of anthropological analysis as the conceptual manipulation of discovered 
facts, a logical reconstruction of a mere reality, seem rather lame. To set forth 
symmetrical crystals of significance, purified of the material complexity in which 
they were located, and then attribute their existence to autogenous principles of 
order, universal properties of the human mind, or vas, a priori weltanschauungen, 
is to pretend a science that does not exist and imagine a reality that cannot be 
found. Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the 
guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions form the better guesses, not 
discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape. 
(Geertz 1973, 20) 
Robert Segal attacks Geertz on the very issue of comparison, claiming to have 
found the magic bullet of polemicists—inconsistency—in Geertz’ simultaneous disavowal 
and usage of comparison. In doing so, he confuses some core conditions of Geertz’ 
thought, most importantly, the central location of comparison itself. Geertz would insist 
that not only can comparative work be done well, in a way that illuminates each term under 
consideration, but that it is, in a sense, the second movement of a scholarly exploration of 
religious phenomenon. The first movement is the aforementioned thick description: a 
detailed, complex, multi-vocal and multi-perspectival examination of the event under 
consideration—and here we have moved from Doniger’s textual realm to that of the field 
anthropologist: ritual, personal interaction, embodied movement. Thick description not 
only provides a clear image of what occurred, but also offers emic interpretations from 
multiple vantage points, along with sufficient background (social, political, historical, 
linguistic) to embed those vantage points in meaningful and inter-related contexts. This is 
done, though, with an eye towards interpretation, and interpretation is always—and must 
be—a comparative venture, one that brings the knowledge surfaced into conversation, or, 
at least, co-existence, with other similarly complex and contoured bodies of knowledge. 
So, for example, Geertz discusses the location of the social self across the three locations 
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of his field work (Java, Bali, Morocco) by describing each of the three in detail before 
moving on to some conclusions reached by holding them loosely in contrast to each other. 
Geertz does at times indeed deny the possibility of comparison, but (and this is a 
distinction lost on Segal) this is an expression of his frustration at a lack of attention to the 
definition of the object compared. That is, Geertz (and Smith, and Doniger) would 
rightfully cringe at facile attempts to compare Islam and Judaism, as if those two nouns 
referred to something concrete and isolatable. Each, however, would insist on the ability to 
compare a specific manifestation of Islam, carefully delineated in its historical context, 
with a similar moment of Judaism; indeed, much of their work is comprised of exactly this 
type of exercise. One would expect that even J. Z. Smith would nod in agreement at the 
close of Geertz’ “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” where he 
notes that “the essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest 
questions, but to make available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other 
valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has 
said.” (Geertz 1973, 30) 
Three essays further on in The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz provides his 
definition of religion, and if only it sufficed, there would be a natural bridge between what 
precedes and what comes after. The fact that it does not should not reflect poorly on 
Geertz: there seems to be something fundamentally inimical between religion and the act 
of defining. Certainly, definitions in general are tricky things, and definitions of religion 
and its various related terms—mysticism, spirituality, religious experience and the like—
doubly so, suffering as they do from what Cupitt terms “a heavy freight of modernist 
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ideology.” (Cupitt 1998, 12) There is the general categorical issue where such work 
presents itself as objective and neutral, yet never is, a concern greatly compounded by the 
specific power carried by discussions of religion. More specifically, even scholarly 
attempts to wrangle the term seem to vacillate from positions so broad as to admit almost 
any behavior or belief to stances that reveal an all too common pattern of defining religion 
as the familiar; that is, recognizing as religious those cultural forms that are compatible in 
structure (if not in content) to our own. As J. Z. Smith states in his summary of the history 
of the term, “the most common form of classifying religions, found both in native 
categories and in scholarly literature, is dualistic and can be reduced, regardless of what 
differentium is employed, to ‘theirs’ and ‘ours.’” (Smith 1998, 276) Indeed, Smith’s 
penultimate sentence in the conclusion to his essay Religion, Religions, Religious provide a 
very useful summary of the term: 
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual 
purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order, generic concept that 
plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as 
“language” plays in linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology. (Smith 1998, 
281–2) 
These two quotes from Smith illustrate a further doubling: the religion of “theirs” and 
“ours,” the religion referred by the historical pronouncements regarding “the one true 
religion,” reflect a commonplace utility and a historical narrative surrounding the term 
stretching back in European history for hundreds of years. This is the first fold of a 
concept, and it is highly specific, resisting attempts to broaden it as wide as the notion of 
“category.” 
But Smith is pointing towards something else, towards a recognition that religion, 
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as an external and abstract category, is a term imposed from the outside, traditionally by 
those engaged in explorations draped in scholarly garb (whether within traditional 
academic structures or not). This becomes even more apparent when the plural religions is 
encountered. One reaction to this situation is to dismiss the term entirely from a scholarly 
perspective—that is, if there is no object behind the term, no clear and stable referent to 
which it points, there can be no study of it and, indeed, this line of thought has given 
significant voice to a claim that the study of religion is actually a non-discipline, and that 
its practitioners are “really” doing the work of historians or anthropologists or linguists, 
work that is more properly done within the boundaries of other, “more legitimate” 
academic disciplines. This is not, however, Smith’s conclusion: instead, he follows the 
above definition by claiming that “there can be no disciplined study of religion without 
such a horizon.” (Smith 1998, 282) In other words, it is the (dare we say, sacred) duty of 
the scholar to establish the horizons of their work, and to do so with discipline, with rigor 
in their examination of the variety of activities, beliefs, truth claims, and interactions that 
may fall under the rubric, howsoever it is defined. In this way, and with an explicit nod to 
Smith’s Map Is Not the Territory, religion becomes a cartographic term, a notion that 
establishes the known boundaries of an area to be explored. 
While recognizing the weight of Smith’s demand, I will refrain from producing an 
original definition myself: this may indeed make me undisciplined in my study of religion, 
but I have always been suspicious of discipline, especially in its close relationship to 
punishment. Perhaps more importantly, it is not religion that concerns me most, but rather 
religious behavior. The complication of the term remains, however, as it is insufficient to 
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require an agent to see their own behavior in this way: that is, some of the figures we will 
encounter in the following chapters would deny their being religious at all, and would 
bridle at the use of the term. This is where anthropological training comes in handy: the 
subjects of our investigations are not required to agree with our interpretations. Still, Smith 
tugs at me, and to quiet his insistent voice, I offer a definition of his own (again, with 
apologies for his dated gendering): 
What we study when we study religion is one mode of constructing worlds of 
meaning, worlds within which men find themselves and in which they choose to 
dwell. What we study is the passion and drama of man discovering the truth of 
what it is to be human. History is the framework within whose perimeter those 
human expressions, activities and intentionalities that we call “religious” occur. 
Religion is the quest, within the bounds of the human, historical condition, for the 
power to manipulate and negotiate ones ‘situation’ so as to have ‘space’ in which 
to meaningfully dwell. It is the power to relate ones domain to the plurality of 
environmental and social spheres in such a way as to guarantee the conviction that 
ones existence ‘matters.’ Religion is a distinctive mode of human creativity, a 
creativity which both discovers limits and creates limits for humane existence. 
What we study when we study religion is the variety of attempts to map, construct 
and inhabit such positions of power through the use of myths, rituals and 
experiences of transformation. (Smith 1978, 290–1) 
If there is a common thread that runs through the variety of religious moments 
explored in this thesis, it centers around the notion of yearning, of an embodied longing for 
something that resides outside the pale of everyday experience, recalling Bataille’s claim 
that the essence of religion “is the search for lost intimacy,” (Bataille 1992, 57) as well as 
the previous chapter’s discussion of Eliade. The individuals and groups that we will 
encounter are searching for something, but they are doing so, for the most part, in direct 
engagement with their surroundings, eschewing both ascetic isolation and the dizzying 
worlds of abstract consideration: ecstasy is found neither in an abandoned cave nor in 
frenzied recombinations of the letters that form the name of God; it is, instead, located out 
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there, in the walkable world. This is not a new notion by any means, nor is it one that is 
unconsidered in the history of religions. 
An American Metaphysics 
The universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces 
seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their 
stems the secrets that were of use to man. 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 
The work of Catherine Albanese, culminating in her magnum opus A Republic of 
Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American Metaphysical Religion, has long been 
focused on tracing the histories of the intersections between the natural world and religion 
in the West. This chapter is particularly indebted to her work, both in its specific content 
and in her insistence on the validity of what she terms the “metaphysical” traditions as 
objects of academic inquiry. Albanese’s metaphysical traditions—she is quite aware of the 
difficulties of the term, and discusses them at some length (Albanese 2007, 6–16)—
encompass a wider scope than what interests me here; however, each of the subjects in the 
following chapters could be construed as being a part of her lineage, and as such, it is 
worth some time to consider in detail how she defines the tradition, especially as it will 
also highlight where my focus differs from hers. For Albanese, these religious practices 
rely 
on an individual’s experience of “mind” (instead of “heart,” as in evangelicalism). 
In this context, metaphysical forms of religion have privileged the mind in forms 
that include reason but move beyond it to intuition, clairvoyance, and its relatives 
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such as “revelation” and “higher guidance.” Here versions of a theory of 
correspondence between worlds prevail. The human world and mind replicate—
either ideally, formerly, or actually—a larger, often more whole and integrated 
universe, so that the material world is organically linked to a spiritual one. In this 
version of “as above, so below,” metaphysicians find a stream of energy flowing 
from above to below—so powerful and constitutive of their reality that they 
discover themselves to be, in some sense, made of the same “stuff.” If there are 
differences, they are of degree and not of kind. Moreover, the influx of energy (let 
us now call it “divine”) that enlivens their world is a healing salve for its ills and—
in the strongest statement of their view—renders them divine and limitless. For 
metaphysicians, religious change may happen either suddenly or gradually, and 
practice arises organically out of these beliefs about correspondence, resemblance, 
and connection. Ritual thus involves enacted metaphors. To put this another way, 
metaphysical practice is about what may be called magic, and magic—defined in 
the way that I do here—lies at the heart of American metaphysics. Thus, 
noticeably more than the denominationalist who also does ritual, the metaphysician 
brings its willed instrumental quality to the fore. Still further, for the magical 
believer the trained and controlled human imagination brings one part of the 
world—one symbolic form, if you will—to operate or act on other “pieces.” In the 
eyes of the believer, such activity is an effective way to bring desired and 
seemingly miraculous change. (Albanese 2007, 6–7) 
I have included the beginning of Albanese’s definition to highlight a key difference that 
emerges in the work that follows: for Albanese, these movements are focused primarily on 
the mind, on mental projection, and on the powers of thought. The particular subset of her 
metaphysical tradition that I focus on, while having clear affiliations with this imaginal 
tendency, is also quite consciously uncomfortable with it and throughout the material we 
find a concern with and a validation of the body, the flesh, the physical. While in the end 
this difference is critical for understanding these movements, and may contain what is in 
fact the fulcrum around which the relationship between our imagined selves and the 
external world turns, for now it is best held in abeyance. Instead, three key tropes from 
Albanese’s quote emerge that we will encounter again and again in this material. 
First, there is a process of reflection, whereby meaning is produced through an 
active engagement with the external world. At times, this may appear as a classic “reading 
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of the world as text,” subject to all of the critique, largely along gender lines, that implies. 
There is more here than that, though: for many of the “natural metaphysicians,” to adapt 
Albanese’s category to our concerns, the world is in fact not passive, but rather quite active 
and, as such, available for acts of co-creation. This is present in ways small and large, from 
the recognition that external forces are unpredictable and uncontrollable to the core 
definition of magic offered in a quote that has become ubiquitous within neopaganism (and 
in many related arenas of thought) where magic is defined as “the art of changing 
consciousness at will.” (Starhawk 1979, 13) At their core, these movements represent a 
struggle to shift away from the variety of anthropocentric views that dominate the history 
of western religious discourse. As we will see, this struggle is not always successful, is 
certainly not always a conscious goal of the practitioners, and contains many small 
movements to and fro across the spectrum of interpretive possibilities. Underlying this is 
the claim that truth—however constructed and validated—is created, not discovered; it 
emerges as a discourse between the magician and her environment, a product of both her 
desire and the responsiveness to that desire of the larger forces at work.  
Secondly, the natural metaphysician occupies what is, at core, a monistic world. 
While often obscured by various obstacles that must be worked through or separations that 
must be overcome in order to experience the core unity of all things, the monism remains 
present, offering a unity of matter with which the magician may merge or, at least, of 
which the magician may partake. This monism may manifest in many ways, from the 
classic reliance on an underlying deistic being for its justification where all is one either 
because God made it so or because of an identification of all materiality being in fact God 
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herself to statements concerning the natural inter-connectedness of all beings to the inter-
relatedness of disparate matter in various spiritual regurgitations of quantum theory. 
Regardless of form, “religious naturalism, in effect, is often the message in the 
metaphysical world … Mind and world are the givens with which one must work in the 
here and now: all of reality is made of the same cosmic material, and therefore all is 
‘natural.’” (Albanese 2007, 7) Importantly, this does not deny the presence of various 
claims of an “other” spiritual world, or of the possibility of being “reborn” into a new state: 
rather, it is an observation of what totality encompasses those worlds and states. 
Metaphysicians are not reborn into an eternal afterlife, separate and distinct from their 
current existence; instead, they are reborn in the current world, albeit with claims to greater 
understanding or greatly expanded forms of consciousness. 
Finally, we are in the realm of energy as a fluid, of metaphors of hydraulics and 
flow. Although relatively simplistic sentiments confirming that “the only constant is 
change” and the like are certainly found, this fluidity extends to epistemological concerns 
as well: while there are some notable exceptions, natural metaphysicians tend to embrace 
the possibility of a plurality of truths, a multiplicity of world views that may provide 
insight into the ultimate nature of the universe. Given the monism described above, this 
generally takes an “all roads lead to Rome” form, where there are many paths to a single 
truth, a structure that can certainly prove problematic, not least of all because of its often 
unconsidered implications. It is also perhaps this comfort with fluidity that makes these 
traditions at times highly elusive. While Albanese’s metaphysicians—let alone the smaller 
subset we are focused on—have never been the dominant force in the religious history of 
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America, they have always been present and often highly visible. This is a minority 
tradition, not a fringe one; but it is also one that is often found in unexpected places, 
adapting itself to unfamiliar surroundings with surprising ease. As such, “tradition” may be 
the wrong term: we are looking at a set of core ideas, figures of thought, that have persisted 
for centuries in the West, but not within a single sect or religious community. 
The general intellectual history of these ideas, from classical antiquity through the 
Renaissance and into the Enlightenment, has already been laid out with greater skill than I 
possess (Among many others: James 1902; Eliade 1959; Kitagawa 1967b; Eliade 1969; 
Foucault 1970; Asad 1993; Faivre 1994; Doniger 1998; Hanegraaff 1998a; Partridge 2004; 
Albanese 2007) and the general trajectory is well established. As with all such things there 
is no real beginning—Albanese starts (following Hanegraaff) with Marsilio Ficino’s 
translation of the Corpus Hermeticum in the mid fifteenth century; Asad with traditions of 
torture in Medieval Christianity; Foucault most famously with Velázquez’ Las Meninas, 
painted in 1656. This is a natural condition for a historian of religion, as J. Z. Smith 
demonstrates in a passage whose gendered exclusion should not obscure its insights: 
The philosopher has the possibility of exclaiming with Archimedes: “Give me a 
place to stand on and I will move the world.” The quest for this place finds 
paradigmatic expression in the almost initiatory scenario of Descartes dans un 
poêle. There is, for such a thinker, at least the possibility of a real beginning, even 
of achieving the Beginning, a standpoint from which all things flow, a standpoint 
from which he has clear vision. The historian or the historian of religions has no 
such possibility. There are no places on which he might stand apart from the 
messiness of the given world. There is for him no real beginning, but only the 
plunge which he takes at some arbitrary point to avoid the unhappy alternatives of 
infinite regress or silence. His standpoint is not discovered; rather it is erected with 
no claim beyond that of sheer survival. The historian’s point of view cannot sustain 
clear vision. 
 
The historian’s task is to complicate, not to clarify. He strives to celebrate the 
diversity of manners, the opacity of things, the variety of species. He is barred, 
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thereby, from making a frontal assault on his topic. Like the pilgrim, the historian 
is obligated to approach his subject obliquely. He must circumambulate the spot 
several times before making even the most fleeting contact. (Smith 1978, 129) 
For our purposes, the important realization is that the roots of Albanese’s 
metaphysics—and hence, our metaphysics of nature—run deep, and are tangled together 
with the same religious impulses that have landed people on the shores of North America 
for centuries, a situation that Albanese nicely summarizes in the opening of A Republic of 
Mind and Spirit: 
American metaphysics is a combinative venture with beginnings in numerous 
places and times. Some of its sources were products of the nineteenth century 
and—for twentieth-century and later versions—thereafter, but others arrived 
earlier. The oldest legacies were culturally available in certain forms on American 
shores in the seventeenth century, and it is these sources that had the first say on 
what became the tradition. The classical and Hellenistic Greco-Roman world 
(which included northern Egypt), behind and beside it the Near East, later 
medieval Christian, Jewish, and synthetic lores and practices, Renaissance and 
continuing religious scholarship and experiment, a series of European folk 
traditions, their English equivalents, an English Elizabethan high cultural 
inheritance, Native American narratological traditions and ceremonial work, 
African American versions of the same—all came together in the British North 
Atlantic colonies that later became the United Sates. Later, West Coast 
southwestern, and Mississippi Gulf inhabitants, and even Sandwich-Islanders-
become-Hawaiians would add their materials. So, of course, would Asians, and so 
would a series of others whose “influences” became so many and various that a 
kaleidoscope of sources emerged. Indeed, its tangled contents defy isolation and 
separate identification. (Albanese 2007, 21) 
I stress this point because many of these movements see themselves as new, as harbingers 
of some original revelation heretofore unrevealed to the word—or, at least, as possessors 
of some new type of insight into the relationship between humanity (or, all too often, man) 
and its environs. This new insight is often shrouded, through a temporal sleight-of-hand, in 
ancient roots; as an example, neopaganism often presents itself as skipping right over 
several millennia, harkening back to even older, suppressed and forgotten religious 
movements. This move highlights the fact that these movements’ relationship to history 
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itself is an intriguing question, and one to which we shall return below. 
While our interests are slanted quite heavily towards more recent history, we 
cannot totally ignore the first centuries of colonial presence in North America, a time 
dominated for our purposes by two separate occurrences. The first is the often (yet not 
always) brutally violent interactions between Europeans and both the indigenous 
populations and those brought into the New World through force; the second is the 
important shift in the understanding of nature, as it moves from more threatening to more 
promising. The first of these is well chronicled, and while I do not want to lose contact 
with the reality of the genocides, I also do not want to get lost in them—that is a different 
scholarly project than this one. 
Combat and Combinations: 
The Complexity of the Melting 
Pot 
As such, I would like to examine some of the contours of the moment of contact, 
starting with the position of the colonizing Europeans. There is a tendency to see the 
European influx into North America—let alone the English—as creating a relatively 
monolithic cultural inheritance, for example in Abrams’ claim that “the geographical New 
World had been identified with the new earth prophesied in Revelation, and the belief that 
America was the locale of the promised millennial kingdom had been brought to these 
shores both by Franciscan missionaries and by the Puritan fathers.” (Abrams 1971, 411) 
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The truth is much closer to the combinative nature that Albanese focuses on, and many of 
the tensions that surround different conceptions of the world and how we should relate to it 
are a result of the diversity and multiplicity of the early settlers, not to their unity. 
Following the work of David Hackett Fisher, Albanese notes that four separate  
waves of British immigrants who, between 1629 and 1775, made their way to the 
North Atlantic colonies. The first was an eastern English Puritan immigration to 
Massachusetts from 1629 to 1640, and the second, the passage to Virginia from 
about 1649 to 1675 of a Royalist elite from southern England, together with large 
numbers of indentured servants. A third wave of immigrants departed from the 
North Midlands region of England and Wales to settle in the Delaware Valley from 
1657 to 1725. Finally, a fourth wave of people came from the north of Britain and 
northern Ireland, mostly from 1718 to 1775, making their American homes in the 
Appalachian backcountry. (Albanese 2007, 67) 
Each of these would contribute to the foundation of the new metaphysics of nature 
that emerges in North America; a legacy of certain oratorical traditions of public 
preaching, of anxiety around the dealings between humanity and the forbidden power of 
the demonic (most notably, in the concern over witchcraft and the prosecution of its 
performers), and of the desire for the nascent realm of science to form a bridge between the 
mysterious and the directly apprehensible is carried forth from the Puritans of the 
northeast; in Virginia, “Royalist English settlers yielded a version of proto-metaphysics 
distinct from that of New England,” (Albanese 2007, 73) where an openness to the magical 
nature of humanity focused on the notion of fortune, both as economic wealth, and as the 
ways in which we perceive and unravel the threads of our individual and collective 
destinies. As Albanese notes parenthetically, “there was surely witchcraft, but there were 
never any Virginia executions of witchcraft offenses, and the courts actually punished 
those who falsely accused their neighbors of witchcraft activity.” (Albanese 2007, 73). 
Instead, here we find myriad forms of fortune-telling, of “carving ancient signs on … 
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houses to bring good fortune,” of a dominant interest in astrology culminating in the 
publication and circulation of “fortune books,”  used to select auspicious names for 
offspring. “The same fortune books that helped to name the children of Virginia’s 
gentlemen were packed with material to help ensure luck in all aspects of life from cradle 
to grave—good health, safe travel, love, marriage, and sexuality all were covered in these 
treatments of personal faith and promise.” (Albanese 2007, 74) With the third wave of 
English immigrants, “the North Midlands immigration to the Delaware Valley from 1657,” 
we find “still another metaphysical pattern that would eventually be strongly assimilated 
into an emerging American metaphysical religion.” Here, even as witchcraft is attacked 
and the Quaker leadership officially discourage “popular practices such as prophecy, 
divination, geomancy, chiromancy … and astrology, … —through their own ‘magic’ of 
the inner light—members of the Society of Friends brought the metaphysical into their 
everyday world.” (Albanese 2007, 75) Drawing on “German sources of Continental 
Hermeticism, particularly as mediated through the works of Jacob Boehme,” the 
Pennsylvania Quakers offer a “metaphysical realm [that] was personal and communicative 
in ways that differ sharply from the Virginia gentry’s impersonal notions of fortune,” 
(Albanese 2007, 76) including explorations of how to experience God’s light in the 
experience of the world, where deep echoes of the Hermetic Kabbalah underscored 
“beliefs in the Holy Spirit’s healing power, in reincarnation, and—following the historian 
G. F. Nuttal—in Hermetic ideas regarding human fall from and restoration to unity with all 
of nature.” (Albanese 2007, 76–77) These immigrants, then, provided a way for the Puritan 
majesty of God and the Virginian openness to the power of signs in the external world to 
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join together in a revelation of spirit. As always, we also find counter-movements, 
undercurrents whose impact upon the more commonly recognized ideologies are felt in the 
margins, or only later as the dominant tides recede, and who are often obscured both by 
history and by their being branded as undesirable. Here,  
in the eighteenth-century Appalachian backcountry settled by British borderlanders 
… the signs that came to ordinary folk came from nature—a nature linked to the 
cosmos in impersonal and unfailing ways and a source of wisdom, guidance, and, 
especially, warning in everyday life. Correspondences were seemingly 
everywhere, and they were imaginatively deployed. The signs of the zodiac 
governed the planting of crops, and there were good and bad days to execute the 
various tasks that were connected with agrarian life. … Mountaineers counted fogs 
in August to predict it [the weather]—or examined the color of woolly caterpillars 
carefully, or looked closely at how the ground hornets were making their nests. 
Likewise certain character traits (human nature) made agricultural and related 
tasks easier or harder. People needed to curse well if they wanted to raise healthy 
gourds and to be bad-tempered to produce healthy peppers. From the very 
beginning of life, signs greeted and accompanied a newborn who entered this 
Appalachian backcountry world. A woman placed a necklace of corn beads around 
a baby’s neck to help it with teething, and a bullet or coin was used to keep away 
nosebleeds. Mountain folk killed the first wood tick found on the tiny body of a 
child with an ax so that the child would grow up to be a good worker. In an 
addendum, if parents wanted the child to have a good singing voice, one of them 
killed the tick on a banjo or bell. Still further, they scrutinized the body of the child 
itself for clues to future births in the family. If the baby had the same number of 
creases in both of its legs, the next child born would be a girl. (Albanese 2007, 77–
78) 
I quote this at length, both because of the clarity that Albanese’s specificity allows, but 
also because it illustrates how, in this fourth wave of immigration, the power of the 
metaphysical now moves freely between external signs that must be decoded, to internal 
energies that have an impact on the surrounding world, and upon our efficiency within it.  
Albanese sees the combination of these waves of British immigration as 
culminating in suggesting “the pervasiveness and diversity of a proto-metaphysical 
religion of correspondences and its recruitment of imaginal thinking in the service of what 
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could broadly be termed health and well-being.” (Albanese 2007, 78) If anything, the other 
major European influx in this time—that of German Protestantism into Pennsylvania and 
throughout the expanding western border—only served to increase these cultural spaces, 
where “the combinative Hermeticism of the European past and its vernacular equivalent in 
the cultures of the Continent and especially England had successfully executed Atlantic 
journeys but now open to new causes and connections in the blending of people and ideas, 
the metaphysical religion of the European world was ready to be a major ingredient in an 
American efflorescence.” (Albanese 2007, 82) 
In terms of the immigrant influences, however, there is a final crucial ingredient 
that must be examined, that of the peoples forced to join the American experiment, taken 
from their African homelands through the trauma of the middle passage into the New 
World. The impact of African, Afro-Caribbean, and African-American practices upon 
America is a vast subject, and spills far beyond what any single work could encompass. As 
such, we are again in the awkward position of having to give a fascinating and important 
topic far less attention than it is due. The complexity of the situation cannot be overstated: 
slaves were brought to North America both directly from the lands of central and western 
Africa and through Caribbean outposts that had been operating for decades and, in some 
cases, centuries; each colony (and, later, state) set its own rules about the status of 
incoming slaves; and a dizzying variety of strategies were used to incorporate slavery into 
the emerging economic and cultural fabrics of each jurisdiction. For example, Connecticut 
and Rhode Island saw a slow trickle of slaves from Barbados into the early 1700s grow 
into a slave population between three and ten percent of the state by mid-century. Contrast 
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this to South Carolina, which “offered land in exchange for the importation of slaves,” a 
process “so successful that in 1715 there were more blacks than whites—10,500 to 6,250. 
Five years later the black population was nearly double the white, and in 1724 it was triple 
the white population.” (Albanese 2007, 83) The slave population, of course, was never 
monolithic—indeed, far from it. Building on the work of Michael Gomez, Albanese, 
writing in 2007, summarizes the geographic source of Africans in the Americas as follows: 
The two largest sources of slaves in British North America were West Central 
Africa (which included Congo—the former Zaire—and Angola) and the Bight of 
Biafra (which encompassed present-day southeastern Nigeria, Cameroon, and 
Gabon). Together these two regions accounted for over 50 percent of the slave 
imports. Other major sources were Sierra Leone, Senegambia, and the Gold 
Coast—each of the three hovering close to 15 percent of the total slave imports. 
Among these three, Senegambia was an early and substantial player, whereas 
Sierra Leone started slowly and increased its role as time passed. Meanwhile the 
Gold Coast supplied a steady stream of slaves from 1673 until the end of the slave 
trade. (Albanese 2007, 84) 
While this may address the area of origin question, it does not complete the picture: 
drawing on multiple sources, Albanese lists Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Nevis, the 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Montserrat, Antigua, and the Leeward Islands as Caribbean sources 
for North American slaves, claiming that “until after 1750, the largest single source for 
New England’s slaves was the West Indies,” (Albanese 2007, 85) and making similar 
claims for other Southern states. Running the risk of understatement, Albanese writes that 
the “Africans who came spoke diverse languages, represented different ethnic and culture 
groups, lived under distinct governance units in their homelands, and practiced separate 
and different religions.” (Albanese 2007, 85) What emerges from this overview is an 
attempt to examine how people, “under continual attack by Anglo-Christian social and 
epistemological culture,” (Albanese 2007, 86) struggle to create coherence and 
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consistency, simultaneously incorporating culture from Africa (conjure, certain 
cosmological assumptions, notions of community) and interacting with—accepting, 
embracing, rejecting, changing, running from, denying, recreating, violently resisting—
ideas found in the varieties of spiritual traditions encountered in the cities and farms, 
workshops and plantations, of the emerging America. 
Even here, the notion of an American exceptionalism remains hard to dispel: 
consider the following from Walter Rucker, writing specifically on the practices gathered 
under the rubric of conjure: “Despite a general tendency by [Eugene] Genovese and other 
American historians to view the North American slave experience as unique or 
exceptional, the widespread belief and practice of conjuration proves that this particular 
phenomenon at least was a shared African diasporic reality.” (Rucker 2001, 85) Rucker’s 
stress is more on the engagement of conjure practitioners in moments of resistance, but the 
need to (re)prove the diversity of traditions that combined on these shores, many with 
several accretive stops on the way, is what catches our eye. 
Finally, we turn to the groups that were already here, the indigenous peoples living 
in North America. Again we are faced with a dazzling diversity of people and social 
systems, out of which I want to focus on a specific theme by looking closely at what the 
phrase nature religion could refer to within different permutations of the indigenous 
population. Albanese nicely summarizes the initial situation: 
Before Amerindians and Europeans encountered one another in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, anywhere from less than four to more than twelve million 
native North Americans dwelled in the area north of the Rio Grande River. Using 
perhaps 550 languages (as different from one another as, say, Chinese from 
English) and their dialects, Amerindians spoke in tongues that could be traced to 
nine linguistic stocks, each worlds apart from the other. Even when scholars 
attempt to reduce this cultural diversity to manageable proportions, they confront a 
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plethora of Indian nations, each with separate governance and self-understanding 
expressed in myth, custom, and ritual. Hence, in one way, to speak collectively of 
native North American tribal cultures is to do violence to the subjective sensibility 
of many different peoples.(Albanese 1990, 19) 
Before moving on, it is important to take note of the numbers, and to recognize that the 
violence referenced here was aimed at more than just abstract sensibilities: within four 
hundred years—that is, by 1800—the native population has been reduced to 
about 600,000, whereas by that time in North American the population stood at a 
little less than five million whites and about one million blacks. Decimated by 
European diseases like smallpox, Native American cultures encountered crisis 
unlike any their people could recall. Indeed, scholars have called the ravages of 
diseases like the smallpox, bubonic plague, measles, and hepatitis among Indian 
populations—who possessed no immunological resistance—not epidemics but 
pandemics. (Albanese 2007, 96) 
One set of specifics should suffice: Albanese’s summary of the situation in New England 
can be taken as representative of the speed and level of the decimation encountered by 
Native American groups, where 
an estimated 50,000 to 144,000 American Indians could be counted at earliest 
European contact. By the time permanent English settlements came, their numbers 
had been reduced by as much as 80 percent or, for the Ninnimissinuok of northern 
and central Massachusetts Bay, perhaps 90 percent—in the familiar narrative of 
drastic decline we have already encountered. Population estimates by the 
contemporary Puritan Daniel Gookin, which were careful, controlled, and specific 
to each separate Indian group, suggested the extent of the devastation. Indeed, in 
all of New England, after the epidemic of 1616-1617, writes Alden T. Vaughan, 
perhaps only 15,000 to 18,000 Indian people remained; and the Massachusetts 
Indians, for whom the colony was named, may have dropped from 3,000 to 500 
people. (Albanese 2007, 100) 
In addition to the sheer overwhelming diversity of the native North American 
populations, it is important to recognize that—parallel to Smith’s discussion of religion 
above—even the concept of “American Indian” is an external idea, one that the European 
colonizers needed to invent in order to coherently refer to “those people, out there.” 
Keeping this in mind, we can proceed along with Albanese: 
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On the other hand, cast beside the European invaders, Amerindians and their 
religious ways shared much in common. Indeed, in southern New England, where 
Puritan and Amerindian met face-to-face, the underlying unity among a series of 
Indian cultures was reflected in their common Algonkian heritage of related 
languages, social structure, and religious mentality. (Albanese 1990, 19–20) 
That is, even given the wide disparity of culture of the native North Americans—a 
diversity that was still present among the subset of those who inhabited the North Atlantic 
coast—there were also similarities in cultural presentation that reinforced the Europeans’ 
sense of the individuals and communities they encountered. This presents a 
methodological quandary for a rough survey such as we are currently undertaking: we 
could proceed as Albanese does, moving from group to group, drawing parallels and 
contrasts between them, but never really touching down in a single location. However, this 
works to collapse the differences cited above, to erode at the diversity between the 
indigenous groups, and to run dangerously close to the violence of which Albanese warns. 
The alternative would be to dive headlong into a single, identified community; however 
this risks creating an equally damaging reduction, where a single tribe is reified as 
emblematic of all “indianness.” Mitigating against that risk requires a heavy investment in 
Geertz’s “thick description,” something that would take the present work too far afield. 
Albanese’s solution, essentially, is to attempt to do both: after some introductory 
discussion that touches on, among others, the Eastern Cherokee, the Kiowa, the Hopi, the 
Oglala Sioux, and the Navajo she focuses on the Algonkians of Southern New England—
identified as “the Narragansett (of present-day Rhode Island), the Massachusett (of 
Massachusetts Bay), the Pokanoket or Wampanoag (of Plymouth Colony), and the Pequot 
(of present-day Connecticut)” (Albanese 1990, 26)—for deeper research. Note that the 
difficulties outlined are, in a harbinger of later chapters, fractal in nature: the identification 
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or combination of local tribes is suspect to the same concerns as larger, regional 
aggregations: no matter what scale is used, the tension between too little detail and too 
much local specificity for the academic project presents itself, calling into at least faint 
question the legitimacy of the project itself. 
The difficulty of Albanese’s situation is compounded by her existing at a double-
remove from her subjects: not only are most of the extant accounts of the Algonkians of 
Southern New England those of colonial settlers, but also, the further chronologically we 
move from the point of initial contact, the more material we have, leading to an inevitable 
dominance of later historical views over the contemporaneous. Our current work suffers 
from a third complication: Native Americans have been culturally constructed over the past 
century as being “in tune with nature,” as representing a naturally connected, spiritually 
rich alternative to modern European and American cultural practice. This construction is a 
recurring theme in this project, and it requires great care to separate observations of and 
comments on the construct from claims about either its accuracy or the real cultures upon 
which it claims to be based. 
I have taken the time to highlight these issues not because of any particular 
complaint about Albanese’s scholarship—indeed, she treats her material with exemplary 
engagement and respect—but rather because these same issues of conflation, of historical 
recreation, of skimming the surface of cultural groups in search of comparative objects will 
return several times in the following chapters. As such, it is worth noting their existence 
here, and in developing a discerning ear for echoes of their reappearance. 
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Creating Other(s) Histories or, 
Neither Your Earth Mother Nor 
Mine 
I will tell you something about stories, 
[he said] 
They aren’t just entertainment. 
Don’t be fooled. 
They are all we have, you see, 
all we have to fight off 
illness and death. 
 
You don’t have anything 
if you don’t have the stories. 
Leslie Marmon Silko, Ceremony 
I want to follow this further, tracing an example of the importance of the local 
through a complicating moment where the line between the insider and the outsider is, if 
not eradicated, certainly blurred dramatically. The first example is culled from the wide-
ranging scholarly archive of Arthur Versluis where, in Sacred Earth, he carefully unpacks 
several cosmological narratives from Native American groups of the southwest, stories 
found either in whole or as close cognates, in a variety of New Age material as proof of 
similarity, as a notion of “indianness” that, if we only embraced, would show the ultimate 
truth not only of those cultures, but of the New Age itself. The difficulty is that such claims 
are built upon fundamental misreadings. 
There are several things to note about this “myth of the Emergence,” common in 
slightly different forms to many tribes, particularly those of southwestern North 
America. Above all, we need to note that the Emergence is not a hidden tribal 
reference to evolutionism; humankind is not “evolving” toward a common “New 
Age.” Rather, the myth of Emergence refers to the doctrine of time cycles found 
throughout the world’s religious traditions; each of the four worlds represents a 
single time cycle within a larger cycle to which we belong, and each of the 
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catastrophes represents the obliteration of decadent past civilizations, some of 
which were destroyed because they had decayed into very destructive forms of 
sorcery. The catastrophe at the end of our own age will be the most complete, for 
its end represents the conclusion both of a single cycle and of a larger quadripartite 
cycle. 
 
We should note also that the symbolism involved is not a progressive ascent from 
an inferior to a superior state; rather, humans are born into a primordial “golden” 
or paradisal [sic] world; humankind slowly becomes decadent; the decadent ones 
are destroyed; and a new world appears, at its inception more perfect than the last 
at its decadence but not as perfect as the first age. Hence what we must here call 
“metahistory” is a downward spiral, each spiral returning to the same relative place 
in the circle but slightly lower. And the human state of Emergence into the world 
from the ant kiva or the hollow reeds represents the reemergence from the “heart of 
the world” of primordial man, which is precisely the symbolism also of Noah’s ark 
upon the floodwaters. (Versluis 1992, 25) 
I would quibble with the gesture towards “the world’s religious traditions,” but the rest is a 
typically economical deconstruction of false representations of aboriginal cultures in North 
America whereby the concerns of the colonizer are served by a misinformed reading of 
often unrelated material. The last thirty years have seen the situation become even more 
complex: an argument that runs beneath much of this thesis is that certain forms of magical 
thought, of mysticism, of the New Age are representations of deeply entrenched American 
ideas that find fertile ground within our general cultural milieu, just as they have in prior 
decades and centuries. As such, you are just as likely to find emic claims that offer 
similarly historically anachronistic readings as etic. 
This final twist lies at the heart of our second exemplar, one that sits squarely at the 
intersection of much of what animates this thesis: embodied notions of a religious earth 
colliding with complex movements in both culture and scholarship that call into question 
issues of authority, authenticity, and interpretation. The specific topic under consideration 
is the notion of a Native American conception of a goddess of the earth, and the key 
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scholar is Sam Gill, who sets the stage with the comparatively uncontroversial statement 
that “there has been uncontested agreement among Indians, scholars, and the general 
American populace that Mother Earth is a goddess widely known since great antiquity, one 
central especially to the religions of native North American peoples.” (S. D. Gill 1987, 2) 
Yet, as Gill goes on to show quite brilliantly, it “becomes clear that Mother Earth has come 
into existence in America largely during the last one hundred years and that her existence 
stems primarily from two creative groups: scholars and Indians.” (S. D. Gill 1987, 7) Gill’s 
study captures the process of “eternalizing” as it happens, highlighting how remarkably 
scant historical evidence—in this case two quotes from nineteenth century Native 
American leaders (the Shawnee Tecumseh and the Wanapum Smohalla) and the traditions 
of two tribal cultures (the Zuni and the Luiseño)—can in time be reproduced and 
transformed into a symbolic net under which entire cultural geographies are caught. Gill’s 
work also serves to highlight the complexity that ensues from this situation: note that, 
according to him, the two active groups in the production of “Mother Earth” are scholars 
and Indians; the process is a result of collaboration between outside experts and engaged 
members of a specific community. 
This is a different case than the boundary work explored by Hess above: in this 
case, the etic and the emic are not in conflict, but rather cooperate—albeit often 
unwittingly and in service to ideals upon which there is no agreement—to create a new 
turn in the spiral of history. This last point is vital, as it creates a space in which we can 
understand the response of claims to authenticity: that is, belief in and worship of a pan-
Native American Mother Earth certainly exists today, and the digging at the historical 
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roots done by Gill (digging that, it must be said, came at a high personal and professional 
cost) does nothing to lessen, demean, or change that reality. It does, however, shed light on 
from where that reality emerges and on how that process unfolds, in ways that will prove 
useful when encountering other alterations in belief related to nature and the Earth. 
While Gill’s historical work is impressive, I want to focus on the final turns to his 
arguments, where he looks through a wider lens at the question of just how scholars of the 
peoples of North America have come to see the figure of Mother Earth “as well established 
in the region since great antiquity.” (S. D. Gill 1987, 120) Gill begins by reaching back to 
the nineteenth-century figure of Edward B. Tylor and his claim that 
the idea of the Earth as a mother is more simple and obvious, and no doubt for that 
reason more common in the world, than the idea of the Heaven as a father. Among 
the races of America the Earth-mother is one of the great personages of mythology. 
(Tylor 1873a, 326) 
Gill traces a direct line from Tylor’s statement, along with the specifics of his three 
examples concerning North American peoples, through such scholarly luminaries as 
Andrew Lang, Albrecht Dieterich, James George Frazer, and Mircea Eliade into the 
present day with the work of the Swedish scholar Ǻke Hultkrantz. In this lineage, a pattern 
repeats again and again of a claim to the self-evident nature of the figure of the Earth-
Mother that is then supported with the smallest scraps of evidence drawn from widely 
disparate sources: the Earth Mother is assumed, not proven; and therefore allowed to stand 
without question despite a lack of serious inquiry. In fact, Gill identifies only five examples 
that, in being passed down from scholar to scholar, form the entire supporting structure for 
these claims. In a remarkable summary of the situation, Gill writes that,  
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given that there are hundreds of tribes in North America and hundreds of 
thousands of pages of ethnographic documentation of the history, oral traditions, 
and religious practices of these tribes, it is highly peculiar that the documentation 
for the nature and existence of Mother Earth, held to be a major figure throughout 
North America, rests almost wholly upon a scant reference to an earth-related 
goddess told in a captivity narrative, a statement attributed to Tecumseh during 
negotiation with the U.S. government revealed in an anecdote, the statement of a 
leader of a small and hopeless millenarian movement in which the leader defended 
his relationship with the land against the overwhelming forces of American 
settlement, the outlines of Zuni creation conceptions formulated into story form by 
a romantic ethnologist, and the stories of an incestuous, rapacious world creation 
story told by persons of a culture at the brink of extinction. (S. D. Gill 1987, 121) 
The next step in the argument is radical for the material at Gill’s disposal, yet somewhat 
obvious given the questions about power raised above: that is, if these claims that are 
presented as such obvious foundations for the examination of the cultures of the world 
(admittedly not all of the scholars cast their nest so broadly, but this was clearly the focus 
of Tylor, Frazer, and Eliade) are not to be found in the source materials themselves, what 
does that tell us? First, let there be no question: Gill states quite explicitly that “there is no 
possibility whatsoever of beginning with the data of North America and drawing the same 
conclusions that have been so commonly made, that is, that Mother Earth is a major 
American goddess, or even more strongly put, that she is the goddess of the native races of 
America.” If she is not to be found there, then the “only explanation for such conclusions 
is that, for scholars who have studied her, Mother Earth must exist before they even 
consider the North American evidence. This may also imply that they understand her to 
have existed even before the formation of North American cultures.” (S. D. Gill 1987, 122) 
Gill frames his analysis in terms of stories and story-telling, a move that both aligns 
him explicitly with a variety of North American traditions and creates a space where he is 
able to interrogate his material while avoiding some of the traditional antagonisms of 
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scholarship. That is, Tylor, Eliade and the rest are telling a certain story, and the 
relationship of the teller to the tale, as well as the reception of the tale by a range of 
audiences remains, in the end, at least as important in its evaluation as its truth, if such a 
thing could even be ascertained. He does this in explicit resistance to the use of the term 
“myth,” which Gill sees as “sufficiently confused in its usage, not only in a technical sense 
among scholars, but also in its contrast with common public usage, to make it a term worth 
avoiding.” That said, he clearly intends his use of story to include his preferred meaning 
for myth as “the story on which truth is based.” (S. D. Gill 1987, 156) 
As such, there are clear political and social repercussions for the selection of one 
story over and against another which prevents the storytellers from escaping the 
implications of the narrative they offer: in the end, the story of Mother Earth 
is a story of the oneness of humankind, but a story in which the many peoples of 
the world are hierarchically interrelated with one another. It is a story that makes 
Native Americans primitives when compared with European-Americans. It is a 
story that supports a range of social, economic, and political relationships, very 
likely oppressive, among peoples in America. (S. D. Gill 1987, 128) 
In our post-colonial world, this is simple enough. We have the collapse of complexity, 
individuality, and specificity into a single narrative, generated by a colonial power and 
projected upon a dominated and oppressed culture. The net result is that a single, 
universalized and eternalized Mother Earth is created, which replaces the wide diversity of 
female and feminine divinity that exists across Native American tribal traditions, where a 
rich variety of female figures whose stories and characters are often complex and 
sophisticated will be found. Some of these figures may be associated with fertility 
and growth, but many of them with evil and death; some of them are treated with 
reverence and respect, but many of them are not; some of them are associated with 
the earth or with the earth’s life and productivity, but many of them are not. (S. D. 
Gill 1987, 154) 
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It also, however, leaves a significant thread hanging unresolved: the story that Gill traces is 
a creation story, and “stories, especially creation stories, have power … I believe it can be 
shown that Mother Earth has literally stepped forth from the word to become a major 
Native American goddess.” (S. D. Gill 1987, 128) References to Mother Earth (and, 
incidentally, Father Sky) in the statements and writings of Native Americans begin to 
proliferate in the second half of the twentieth century, a phenomenon that Gill attributes to 
the confluence of many factors, including the increased importance of political and social 
movements with a Pan-Indian focus, the increasing prevalence of environmental concerns, 
and the expectations of a non-Indian audience for the presence of such a figure. 
The first of these is the simplest, but also the most historically fragile for his 
specific claims. While there is a very long history of alliances and confederations among 
tribes that predates the arrival of Europeans, the birth of the various Pan-Indian movements 
can be traced to the forced relocations of various tribes that began within a decade of the 
formation of the United States of America, but gained dramatically in scope and violence 
during the nineteenth century. Neighboring tribes, tribes that were historically aligned, 
tribes that were historically antagonists, tribes that had never met; all were forced together 
in what became a melting pot of Indian culture, centered in the Western plains from 
Oklahoma to Idaho. Responses to this varied, of course; but one strategy was for leaders to 
focus on downplaying—if not attempting to erase—tribal differences under the banner of a 
single “Indianness.” This is, essentially, a dual strategy, where unity is created by claims 
that “we are all Indians,” and, sometimes more or less explicitly, through the dramatic 
contrast this allows between us and our oppressors: “we are all not white.” This second 
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part can take many forms, from the total rejection of white culture and institutions, to the 
insistence that Indian culture supersedes, anticipates, or is otherwise superior. These 
reactions can be seen from the rise of the Native American Church in the late nineteenth 
century, through countless other examples, to the calls for cultural revolution by activist 
Russell Means in the early 1970s to the claims of Hopi revelation by Thomas Banyacya in 
recent times. (S. D. Gill 1987, 138–147) 
In any case, Mother Earth emerges as a double reaction to the European story about 
her: on the one hand, she is expected and anticipated, and as such offers a powerful symbol 
to use in negotiations with or appeals to the white power structure; on the other hand, she 
is a symbol of what the Europeans lack, that is, she comes to help define the difference 
between them and us, and as such, becomes a rallying point around which strategies for 
resistance may be formed. It is not coincidental at all that a large number—indeed, in all 
likelihood a majority—of the references to Mother Earth are associated with discussions of 
the ownership, use, or appropriation of the land, a theme integral to European-Indian 
relations from the first appearance of Europeans. Note that the bulk of the exceptions to 
this are moments when Mother Earth is used in support of the expansion of various 
religious practices into the white marketplace, foreshadowing our discussion of the global 
economy of the New Age in chapter five. 
Gill offers us a very useful model in our explorations of how ideas and cultural 
structures are exchanged and developed as they move along and across the borders that 
join disparate communities. Most importantly, his insistence on the simultaneous 
production and reception of cultural forms will prove an instructive idea to retain as we 
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progress, specifically as the figure of the earth is passed back and forth between scientific 
and religious interests later in our discussions. From Albanese through Versluis and Gill, 
we are left with a picture of the religious dimensions of pre- and post-colonial North 
America that contains an extraordinary diversity, both at any given historical moment, but 
also across them and, while the former is commonly embraced, the latter rarely is, 
jettisoned for notions of historical continuity that all too often fade away through close 
examination. 
With this in mind, it is with caution that I proceed with some very broad 
generalizations about the local cultures encountered by the first waves of European 
colonization and about the components of their world-views that could be interpreted as 
sympathetic. One such similarity concerns how humans envision their interactions with the 
natural world, and with the non-human creatures that inhabit it. For native North American 
cultures, this was essentially a relational process, a network of interactions, disclosures, 
and revelations between a variety of beasts, beings, and forces. Animals and even 
inanimate objects themselves often (and sometimes always) contained the possibility of a 
both/and presence where they were simultaneously a creature of the earth and something 
more, something that was alive in a different way. 
Not all of what we name nature was identified by the Indians in personal terms, but 
the presence of persons animating “nature” radically grounded their nature 
religion. “Are all the stones we see about us here alive?” the anthropologist A. 
Irving Hallowell asked one old Ojibwa man in the 1950s. After reflecting a long 
time, the man replied, “No! But some are.” (Albanese 1990, 20) 
A second common thread was the power of the human agent, the sometimes-latent, 
sometimes-manifest ability of certain (if not all) individuals to perform what I follow 
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Albanese in terming magic, a term that requires some examination before we proceed 
much further. Albanese’s understanding of magic—and mine and, most importantly, that 
of the subjects we encounter in later chapters—reaches far afield of earlier uses of the term 
in the study of the history of religion. For example, Marcel Mauss’ turn-of-last-century 
definition sees magic as a category of those practices that are held separate from 
“organized cults—it is private, secret, mysterious and approaches the limit of a prohibited 
rite.” (Mauss 1972, 30) Mauss is sensitive to the arbitrariness of the notion that “what we 
do is religious, what they do is magical,” but he is unable to cleanly extricate himself from 
the subjective difficulties, a problem that may be the result of his commitment to creating a 
sort of operational checklist that could be used to identify the magical, focused on the 
types of actors involved, the relationship of the behavior to other social interactions, the 
timing and perceived efficacy of the activities, etc. This sense of magic as the dark 
underbelly of religion clearly has some historical roots, echoing both a notion of tantrism 
and confirming a location for those religious practices that are nearly ubiquitous, but push 
towards the boundaries of a socially constructed comfort zone. For Mauss, the “only firm 
conclusion seems to be that the vague notion of magical power stands disreputably on the 
social periphery, assuming many ambiguous forms, but always constituting a threat to the 
social order.” (Styers 2004, 89) Similarly, it is important to keep in mind that, in Eliade’s 
words, “magic does not dominate the spiritual life of ‘primitive’ societies everywhere by 
any means; it is, on the contrary, in the more developed societies that it becomes so 
prevalent.” (Eliade 1958, 23) Magic cannot be seen as something old and discarded, a 
mystery whose truth is shrouded by layers of time and distance. 
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All well and good, but it doesn’t help us move closer to a definition of what magic 
actually is. “As G. R. Quaife rather succinctly expresses the situation, ‘Magic is a label 
applied to phenomena which have certain characteristics in common. There is little 
agreement on the phenomena or the characteristics.’” (Styers 2004, 29) The topography is 
well described by Styers, when he writes that 
The effort to mark off a region of the conceptual and social terrain as magical 
involves, at the most basic level, an act of demarcation, a juxtaposition of magic 
with other social practices and modes of knowledge. As the social context shifts, 
so also magic is transformed, assuming new forms and exerting new powers. 
 
The nature and role of magic in Western society have changed profoundly over 
recent centuries as the social order itself has changed, the most significant of these 
developments involving transformations in economic and political structures and 
concomitant shifts in the demarcation and social position of religion and science. 
(Styers 2004, 25) 
Albanese offers what may be thought of as a structural definition of magic, one that 
describes its function but remains agnostic on any particular form. While this enables our 
comparative venture in exceedingly useful ways, it also makes the definition itself 
complicated. Magic involves the active engagement of the will of the practitioner with the 
monistic divine energy described above; it can happen through “the use of artifacts and 
stylized accoutrements, in ritual, or ceremonial, magic” or it can happen on the imaginal 
plane, where “the mental powers of imagination and will can affect and change the 
material order, abolishing apparent flaws by realizing its unity with a cosmic Source.” 
(Albanese 2007, 7) Magic is a “bringing about,” aimed at internal or external change and 
while they may be obscured, hidden, or even inaccessible to some, the energies that allow 
magic to occur are of this world, present alongside and intertwined with normative reality. 
Magic is, at its core, natural. Indeed, magic may be seen as the manifestation of the natural 
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into the social world: it is, much like the clearing of the wild to which we will turn shortly, 
an expression of the transformation of the unruly and uncontrollable into a tangible and 
perceptual moment. 
This brings us to the intense conflict at the point of contact: the Puritans were quite 
open to what we are terming the metaphysical in the abstract; indeed, their imprint is still 
felt in many of the practices and traditions we will encounter. However, the form of their 
traditions, and the specific form of their relation to nature, created a core incompatibility 
with the native North Americans they encountered. 
If Amerindians lived a nature religion without possessing the abstract and 
universalized European concept of nature, Puritans understood nature in 
overarching and universal terms but never found the centeredness in nature 
characteristic of native peoples. Both cultures, in the contact situation, 
acknowledged the existence of sacred powers and, more, saw a holy presence in 
the world and in daily life. And both cultures valued community and lived 
according to “tribal” norms. But with the absolute claims of their religions 
commitment, the Puritans could not find common ground in nature with southern 
New England Algonkians. (Albanese 1990, 34) 
This encounter based on a mutual failure to comprehend, a deep inability to see each other, 
was doomed to fail, and fail it did, culminating in a century of constant displacement, of 
the forced relocation of thousands and thousands of people westward, away from the 
places they had lived, in war and in peace; in plenty and in need; sometimes for millennia, 
sometimes for only a few generations; accompanied by intentional violence that often 
manifested in brutal, bestial behavior. It should be noted that the violence, while mutual in 
scope, was also manifest in a typically asymmetrical pattern between the native North 
Americans and the colonizers. 
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Beneath the Bridge: Shadows 
and Violence on the Road to 
America (I) 
When he come home, his politicking done, 
The western march had just begun. 
So he packed his gear, and his trusty gun 
And lit out a grinning to follow the sun. 
Davy, Davy Crockett, Leading the Pioneers. 
 
His land is biggest, and his land is best 
From grassy plains to the mountain crest 
He's ahead of us all in meeting the test 
Following his legend right into the West 
Davy, Davy Crockett, King of the Wide Frontier 
King of the Wild Frontier. 
George Bruns (Music) and Grant Sherman Henry & Thomas 
W. Blackburn (Lyrics), The Ballad of Davy Crockett 
What, for our purposes, joins the early colonial moment to later America? The 
usual answer here invokes the Enlightenment, and, joining it to the American Revolution, 
presents an image of inalienable natural rights, of an anthropocentric world centered 
around men attempting to live life to its fullest; at its most noble, striving towards a perfect 
state dictated by nature and/or God. This reading is not incorrect, and indeed forms a 
useful intellectual bridge between the “founding fathers” and, say, Transcendentalism. 
There is, though, more to the narrative than this, a more that is often revelatory of a darker, 
less attractive heritage. The point is not—as is far too common in recent scholarship—to 
deconstruct or destroy the other readings, but to reinforce the multiplicity of heritages that 
form the backdrop for this project, and to underscore the methodological assumption that, 
for all of us and for all of the subjects we study, there are often many things happening at 
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once, often contradictory impulses simultaneously struggling for expression. Albanese 
offers the notion of “meetings” to hold this concept, using that as a shorthand for the ways 
in which North America provided a venue where “challenge, confrontation, and exchange” 
occurred, forging “new circumstances, relationships, and meanings” for all involved. 
While agreeing with the general thesis she puts forward, I would caution against the 
equality she sometimes ascribes to the model. That is, while it is true that “the land under 
Indian feet was reentered by native peoples made over by their encounters with Europeans 
and Africans, just as the Europeans and Africans walked on unaccustomed terrain,” it is 
too easy to lose sight of the disparity in power and violence distributed among and between 
those three groups. Still, the underlying concept of seeing early America as a flow of 
diverse interactions is a powerful corrective to the standard reading of American history, 
where many of these exchanges have been “read mostly in terms of European influence on 
the ‘lesser’ and ‘simpler’ peoples from Africa and North America—or simply not seen at 
all, since much of the cultural trade occurred without the benefit of archives.” (Albanese 
2007, 110) 
Methodologically, the previous chapter combined with the above should suffice. 
The traditions that I write in are traditions of juxtapositions, of complexity, of holding up 
figures of thought to each other to see what is reflected between. If I am successful, they 
are also traditions that result in moments of insight and meaning and that avoid the dangers 
of speaking too long without saying anything, as well as the dangers of casual engagement 




The data are accepted as being overwhelmingly and massively there. Interpretation 
and comparison are simply not asked for. Similarly it is the aesthetic of the 
catalogue or list to present largely a surface appearance. Depth, the problematics, 
are eliminated (much as in a Robbe-Grillet novel) in favor of the “hard” 
enumeration of things. When one does begin to ask depth questions, when one 
inquires into the context of the material, the principles of internal order governing 
the lists, or asks for some evaluation of the significance of the material (other than 
it is exotic and hence intrinsically interesting), the surface cracks apart. Franz 
Steiner, in his important book Taboo, has caught a classic instance in Frazer: 
“Burial grounds were taboo; and in New Zealand a canoe which had carried a 
corpse was never afterwards used, but was drawn on shore and painted red. Red 
was the taboo colour in New Zealand; in Hawaii, Tahiti, Tonga and Samoa it was 
white. In the Marquesas a man who had slain an enemy was taboo for ten days; he 
might have no intercourse with his wife and might not meddle with fire; he had to 
get some one [sic] to cook for him. A woman engaged in the preparation of cocoa-
nut oil was taboo for five days or more. (Smith 1978, 252) 
Following chapters will detail some of the progressions from the nineteenth century into 
the present day, and while many important moments will be left out entirely (most notably, 
the early American roots of what comes to be referred to as the New Age is given scant 
treatment), it seems more proper to embody these methodological concerns directly in 
those discussions, rather than provide a critical lineage at this juncture. That said, two 
further moments will serve as additional opportunities to demonstrate these concerns. The 
first continues our debt to Albanese, building upon parts of her discussion of the late 1700s 
and the westward expansion of a fledgling America; the second attempts to use Emerson 
and, specifically, 1836’s Nature as a moment to consider in some depth the relationship of 
humanity to the external world, completing the backdrop necessary to move more deeply 
into our source material itself. 
The first stopping point finds us with Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), writing in 
Notes on the State of Virginia of the majesty of the view from the top of “the most sublime 
of nature’s works,” the Natural Bridge formed where the Potomac River flows into the 
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Blue Ridge Mountains. The specifics of Jefferson’s writing here are worth noting: the view 
from the ground is spectacular, “so beautiful an arch, so elevated, so light, and springing as 
it were up to heaven! the rapture of the spectator is really indescribable!” This is held in 
sharp contrast—indeed, “delightful in an equal extreme”—to the view from above, from 
the “parapet of fixed rocks” where it was possible to gaze over the edge. However, 
Jefferson finds that view dizzying, “painful and intolerable,” and resulting in “a violent 
head-ache.” (Jefferson 1782, 148) 
This is summarized by Albanese, perhaps a little too patly, as “American sublime,” 
where, “rather than being terrified, one liked and enjoyed being on top. That Jefferson was 
the legal owner of Natural Bridge as real estate only underlined the connection: American 
sublime hinted of empire and dominion.” (Albanese 1990, 69–70) Here we have the subtle 
dominance of the transcendent moment: a lone figure, at first humble and gazing upwards 
towards a spiritual majesty, but quickly revelatory of a different perspective altogether, one 
that places the actor more on the divine side of the spectrum than the human, gazing down 
and out, encompassing in his view that which is yet to be assimilated and, if truth be told, 
more than a little discomfited by the god’s-eye view. 
This reveals a constant in early American discourse: a consumptive mechanics of 
production, a process whereby a resource—in this case, land itself, although there is a 
structural parallel with the populations that are brought into the burgeoning America—is 
acquired, integrated into the existing system, and then converted into a new form. This is, 
of course, the cultural logic of “manifest destiny,” but it is also seen in more tangible 
cultural forms: take, for example, Davy Crockett (and, explicitly, Davy, not David 
164 
 
Crockett, the real-life politician who began service in Washington for the state of 
Tennessee in the 1820s). The “King of the Wild Frontier” was a child of the 1830s, a work 
of fiction created through the popularity and widespread success of Davy Crockett’s 
Almanack of Wild Sports of the West, and Life in the Backwoods. As such, he should be 
read both as a projection of a specific historical context, and also as a symbolic desire, an 
image of what the consuming public wanted to believe about America, about our relations 
with others, and about our continued westward drive. Crockett’s expansionism was 
unambiguous: he “was certain that Texas, Oregon, and California all belonged to the 
territorial domain of the United States,” or, as he put it himself, he “knows how to talk 
about Oregon, annex Texas, flog Mexico, swallow a Frenchman whole, and lick John Bull 
clear out of his breeches!” Albanese repeatedly paints the cannibalistic tendencies on 
display as a Eucharist, however—as compelling as the picture is—I am not convinced that 
the same mechanics are at play here, especially with regard to the value of the host. 
Another example: in a speech from his seat in Congress, Davy Crockett says, “I can walk 
like an ox, swim like an eel, yell like an Indian, fight like a devil, and spout like an 
earthquake, make love like a mad bull, and swallow a nigger whole without choking if you 
butter his head and pin his ears back.” (Albanese 1990, 75) There is an animal shamanism 
here, but the unapologetic racism of consumption is more striking. Native Americans fared 
no better, their blood is used to water fields, the violence against them explicitly forwarded 
as a means for increasing the fecundity of the American enterprise in yet another example 
of what Versluis calls “a history of unparalleled abuse and perfidy.” (Versluis 1992, 137) 
“What all of this suggests is that Davy Crockett and the demands of manifest destiny 
165 
 
represent, in fact, the underside of revolutionary idealism. The twisted vision of Crockett 
… reflect the twists in a popular American mentality grown arguably overlarge. In this 
nineteenth-century American enactment of its themes, nature religion had become 
dominance over the land.” (Albanese 1990, 78) 
In linking these two figures as symbolic exemplars of cultural modes, the 
distinction drawn in the previous chapter between nature and the wild may again prove 
useful. Jefferson is a man of nature—he unabashedly embraces his agrarian roots, and 
remains in his life quite settled. The majesty of the outdoors for him is delimited by the 
cleared field, the geography of the known; the caricature that is Crockett, on the other 
hand, is a man of the wild, constantly on the move, and constantly pushing the boundary of 
the American domain outward through his acts of conquest. While the ideals of the 
Enlightenment embraced by Jefferson may certainly be seen as undergirding the 
domination over both other racial groups and the environment that Crockett espouses, 
however, the two remain more different than similar. That is, I would argue against seeing 
the symbolic Crockett as a “dark underbelly” of the symbolic Jefferson: the history of 
American thought rebels against such monolithic interpretation. And, while the orgiastic 
violence publicly embraced by Crockett participates in a clear American tradition that both 
predates him and continues quite strongly into the present, those traditions play less of a 
role in what follows than the notion of enlightened reason in the face of nature. We will 




Emerson: Man at the Center 
of Nature 
And with Mr. Emerson. What a height of mind is there! What a negative 
depth, a bottomless abyss, of heart is there! I accept both—his assets and 
his abysmal deficiencies. He, not unlike Mr. Hawthorne, is distrustful of 
what the body has to tell us. He knows not the rapture of the physical. 
How then, I ask, can either of them thoroughly respond to the sublime in 
nature? Show them a mountain—show them Mont Blanc—and do their 
bodies thrill to know it? to know it biblically with their whole being, with 
the thighs, with the lungs, with the quickened nostrils consuming the 
crystalline air in great gulps. They know not great gulps of anything! 
They are too restrained. They fear passion. 
Sena Jeter Naslund, Ahab’s Wife or, the Star-Gazer 
The writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) are clearly too vast for full 
engagement in this kind of survey. Instead, I want again to follow Albanese’s lead, and 
focus on a structural tension in his works, a tension that remains key for contemporary 
metaphysicians of the west. At its simplest, this tension again recalls last chapter’s 
discussion of nature and the wild; more specifically, I want to pay close attention to 
Emerson’s early essay, Nature, and use it as a way to highlight several of the ambiguities 
and tensions that form the later movements that provide the focus of the following 
chapters. In this, I am treating Nature independently of the rest of Emerson’s oeuvre, 
seeing it more as an exemplar of later issues than representative of either Emerson himself 
or Transcendentalism as a whole. The focus here is on how Emerson constructs nature 
itself, which, in spite of it serving both as title and central figure in the essay, remains a 
highly problematic concept. Indeed, Emerson is himself aware of this and lays out the 
roots of the difficulty in the first two paragraphs of the first chapter of the essay, quoted 
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here in full: 
To go into solitude, a man needs to retire as much from his chamber as from 
society. I am not solitary whilst I read and write, though nobody is with me. But if 
a man would be alone, let him look at the stars. The rays that come from those 
heavenly worlds will separate between him and what he touches. One might think 
the atmosphere was made transparent, with this design, to give man, in the 
heavenly bodies, the perpetual presence of the sublime. Seen in the streets of cities, 
how great they are! If the stars should appear one night in a thousand years, how 
would men believe and adore; and preserve for many generations the remembrance 
of the city of God which had been shown! But every night come out these envoys 
of beauty, and light the universe with their admonishing smile. 
 
The stars awaken a certain reverence, because though always present, they are 
inaccessible; but all natural objects make a kindred impression, when the mind is 
open to their influence. Nature never wears a mean appearance. Neither does the 
wisest man extort her secret, and lose his curiosity by finding out all her perfection. 
Nature never became a toy to a wise spirit. The flowers, the animals, the 
mountains, reflected the wisdom of his best hour, as much as they had delighted 
the simplicity of his childhood. (Emerson 1981, 9) 
In the opening paragraph, nature is presented as both the sacred ideal, omnipresent 
as a beacon guiding humanity and as an ultimate source of isolation, the ultimate reminder 
of how truly alone we are. Indeed, this inaccessibility is a mark, not only of the celestial 
bodies, but of all natural objects, sharing as they do this “kindred impression.” Nature, 
exalted and praised, remains fundamentally other, a destination that is unreachable. “In the 
tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat 
as beautiful as his own nature.” (Emerson 1981, 11; emphasis added). Here, then, nature is 
an external model, containing a reality all its own, and offering a set of behavioral goals, a 
set of ideals to emulate in its purity. And, reaching towards nature, allowing it to aid us in 
our “return to reason and faith,” we find the height of Emerson’s communion: “standing on 
the bare ground,—my head bathed by the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space,—all 
mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents 
of the universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God.” (Emerson 1981, 
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11) As Fuller observes, “in the context of that Protestant tradition which posits an 
unbridgeable chasm between god and the natural order, this statement is unthinkable. But 
according to his own lights Emerson was describing the lawful conditions governing 
intercourse between the divine and human realms.” (Fuller 1986, 15) 
However, Emerson remains unwilling to cede ultimate authority to nature: “it is 
certain that the power to produce this delight does not reside in nature, but in man, or in a 
harmony of both. … For nature is not always tricked in holiday attire, but the same scene 
which yesterday breathed perfume and glittered as for the frolic of the nymphs is 
overspread with melancholy to-day.” (Emerson 1981, 11) Nature’s reality, then, is 
mediated by humanity, and our attitude, our mercurial moodiness, ends up determining 
much of what we take in of the surrounding grandeur. As such, how “real” can we claim it 
to being, and, even more troubling, could it be not real at all, but rather illusory, an all-too-
human set of projections that serve to distract us from the eternal truths Emerson is 
pursuing? Albanese summarizes the emergent tension thus: 
If nature was, indeed, real and sacramental, then corresponding to it became 
paramount. Harmony with nature became the broad highway to virtuous living 
and, more, to union with divinity. One discovered what was permanent and lasting 
precisely by identifying with the regular tides of nature’s flux. If, however, nature 
was at best a passing show, a foil to obscure the Absolute behind and beyond it, 
then seeking the enduring truth of Mind became key. Mastery over nature through 
mental power became the avenue to a “salvation” that transcended, even as it 
managed, nature. (Albanese 1990, 82) 
This is an important moment in Nature, where the first chapter is brought to a sudden 
close, followed by an exploration of “the final cause of the world,” (Emerson 1981, 12) as 
seen through the prism of nature. The prism refracts in four directions, which Emerson 
terms commodity, beauty, language, and discipline. In each of these, nature provides 
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guidance and sustenance to a child-like humanity and, as such, is both real in and of itself 
and a benevolent presence. This is not a nature of the Trickster, nor one of illusion: it is a 
nature firmly to be emulated, one whose spirituality remains firmly “embedded in the 
material of nature;” (Albanese 1990, 84) yet it remains open to profound and deeply 
troubling doubts. Having detailed the majestic reality of the natural world, Emerson 
immediately admits that “a noble doubt perpetually suggests itself,—whether this end be 
not the Final Cause of the Universe; and whether nature outwardly exists.” (Emerson 1981, 
32)  
The question seems to revolve around the issue of permanence, of eternal stability. 
One of Emerson’s working assumptions is that such variability is at odds with God: “any 
distrust of the permanence of laws would paralyze the faculties of man. Their permanence 
is sacredly respected, and his faith therein is perfect. The wheels and springs of man are all 
set to the hypothesis of the permanence of nature. We are not built like a ship to be tossed, 
but like a house to stand.” (Emerson 1981, 33)  The difficulty is that nature seems to be 
both subject to dramatic change and eternal in its manifestations. Even the mountains 
move, and while every winter is the same as every other, the moment where Emerson 
claims that, “crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, 
without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a 
perfect exhilaration” is specifically unique and personally transcendent. The lack of 
stability in the external world is underscored by the variability of our own perceptions: 
Emerson marvels over how a slight change in perspective—“looking at the landscape 
through your legs,” or someone unaccustomed to riding who “needs only to get into a 
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coach and traverse his own town”—makes everything fresh and new. And here Emerson 
offers, haltingly, a radical reversal of the previous chapters, claiming that “hence arises a 
pleasure mixed with awe; I may say, a low degree of the sublime is felt, from the fact, 
probably, that man is hereby apprized that whilst the world is a spectacle, something in 
himself is stable.” (Emerson 1981, 35) Note the uncertainty and the movement: may, low, 
sublime, probably, as well as the grandiose global announcement. There is something 
uneasy in the recognition, something I would claim emerges from Emerson’s inability to 
arrive with certainty at a way to comfortably create a both/and position where nature and 
the (explicitly Christian) God are able to coexist in the grandeur of his vision. 
Albanese claims that, in Nature, “Emerson’s rhetoric masked and remasked 
theological substance—and the substance of what Emerson said was rich in ambiguity.” 
(Albanese 1990, 82); likewise, Dunlap claims that “Emerson was not a systematic 
philosopher or an exact writer, and his essays did not so much present ideas or develop 
arguments as set out quotable musings on declared truths in vivid phrases.” (Dunlap 2004, 
47) Whether this is read as ambiguity, confusion, or philosophical error is a product of how 
open to the Emersonian/Transcendentalist project one is: my concern here is twofold. First, 
following Albanese, I would claim that “Emerson’s confusion did not cause America’s 
confusion, but it became America’s confusion;” (Albanese 1990, 87) that is, rather than 
attempting to excuse or attack Emerson for his lack of rigor, it seems more interesting to 
see him as honestly reflecting a set of tensions in American culture, tensions which remain 
forever unresolved. More immediately, I want to draw attention to some of the contours of 
what Emerson’s masks are concealing, specifically the ultimate chasm between humanity 
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and nature: in spite of nature’s allure, in spite of the claims that “every natural process is a 
version of a moral sentence,” where morality itself “scents the air, grows in the grain, and 
impregnates the waters of the world, is caught by man and sinks into his soul,” (Emerson 
1981, 29), in the end, “we are as much strangers in nature as we are aliens from God. We 
do not understand the notes of the birds. The fox and the deer run away from us; the bear 
and tiger rend us. We do not know the uses of more than a few plants, as corn and the 
apple, the potato and the vine.” (Emerson 1981, 43) In reality, however, we are looking at 
a triad, not a duality. The structure that Emerson establishes contains a third component, 
one that I intentionally passed over in the above survey of Nature, namely humanity itself. 
Here, we encounter another major trope in the material under consideration, one 
that seems often to be ignored, that of anthropocentrism and its uneasy relationship with 
both God and the natural world. That is, humanity is more than a mediator, more than just 
an open passage through which the messages of God/Nature pass or are received. 
Humanity, instead, is placed at the core of it all: the underlying claim is that all of this 
exists for us. We are 
placed in the center of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being 
to him. And neither can man be understood without these objects, nor these objects 
without man. All the facts in natural history taken by themselves, have no value, 
but are barren, like a single sex. But marry it to human history, and it is full of life. 
Whole floras, all Linnaeus’ and Buffon’s volumes, are dry catalogues of facts; but 
the most trivial of these facts, the habit of a plant, the organs, or work, or noise of 
an insect, applied to the illustration of a fact in intellectual philosophy, or in any 
way associated to human nature, affects us in the most lively and agreeable 
manner. (Emerson 1981, 21) 
Lest there be any confusion at all as to the absolute nature of Emerson’s claim that all 
meaning, all of the natural world, exists with humanity as its end: “the instincts of the ant 
are very unimportant considered as the ant’s; but the moment a ray of relation is seen to 
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extend from it to man, and the little drudge is seen to be a monitor, a little body with a 
mighty heart, then all its habits, even that said to be recently observed, that it never sleeps, 
become sublime.” (Emerson 1981, 21) Making humanity the center of all that surrounds us 
has its difficulties however; perhaps the largest of which is how to explain our seeming 
insignificance in the face of such majesty? Answering this requires for Emerson the 
invocation of a new voice, his “Orphic poet,” which is allowed certain liberties that the 
essayist may not. This voice, however, rings a clarion call for an explanation of humanity 
after the Fall: 
Man is the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by spirit. He 
filled nature with his overflowing currents. Out from him sprang the sun and 
moon, from man the sun, from woman the moon. The laws of his mind, the periods 
of his actions externized [sic] themselves into day and night, into the year and the 
seasons. But, having made for himself this huge shell, his water retired; he no 
longer fills the veins and veinlets; he is shrunk to a drop. He sees that the structure 
still fits him, but fits him colossally. Say, rather, once it fitted him, now it 
corresponds to him from far and on high. He adores timidly his own work. Now is 
man the follower of the sun, and woman the follower of the moon. (Emerson 1981, 
47) 
Nature, then, came not from God, but from man—that which we turn to for guidance, that 
which provides us the uses of commodity, beauty, language, and discipline, the subject of 
the entire essay is, in the end, not something out there containing its own reality, but rather 
the lost past of humanity itself, a paradise towards which we must navigate in the dark, a 
destination that, as it emerges from the distant horizon, we “shall enter without more 
wonder than the blind man feels who is gradually restored to perfect sight.” (Emerson 
1981, 50) 
Two striking themes emerge from these final turn of the essay: the first is an echo 
of the discussion of Eliade’s primal time in the previous chapter, underscoring the 
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prescience of his insight. It is through Eliade that we are able to see that pattern of a 
paradise lost, yet possibly regained, of an original state towards which we strive as more 
than simply an unspoken Christianity, allowing an opening of interpretation and readings 
of later similar claims. Second, Emerson describes a mechanism of projection, of an 
investment into the surroundings of an essential human nature, that is then deified and 
worshipped. Structurally, this seems to echo the process by which Émile Durkheim (1858-
1917) envisioned all religion as an externalization of our love for ourselves. While 
Durkheim’s discussions center on the concept of the social, they are also quite useful 
within the domain of Emerson’s individuality. (The tension between an anthropocentric—
and therefore individualistic—view and that of the sociologist is a false one: both are 
concerned with the representation of humanity, turning to different metaphoric stores for 
their language and form.) That said, however, we must note that Durkheim’s discussion of 
what he terms “naturism” is deeply embedded in a highly suspect project: he opens The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life by stating that his goal is to “study the simplest and 
most primitive religion that is known at present, to discover its principles and attempt an 
explanation of it” (Durkheim 1995, 1) The rationale for doing this is that the “lower” or 
“more primitive” cultures are able to, by their proximity to an undiluted source, help us 
understand our own (higher, more advanced, preferable) culture. Interestingly, Durkheim 
softens his judgment on religion as a whole: 
Fundamentally, then, there are no religions that are false. All are true after their 
own fashion: All fulfill given conditions of human existence, though in different 
ways. Granted, it is not impossible to rank them hierarchically. Some can be said 
to be superior to others, in the sense that they bring higher mental faculties into 
play, that they are richer in ideas and feelings, that they contain proportionately 
more concepts than sensations and images, and that they are more elaborately 
systematized. But the greater complexity and higher ideal content, however real, 
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are not sufficient to place the corresponding religions into separate genera. All are 
equally religions, just as all living beings, are equally living beings, from the 
humblest plastid to man. If I address myself to primitive religions, then, it is not 
with any ulterior motive of disparaging religion in general. (Durkheim 1995, 2) 
Disparaging human beings—in spite of the universal claim of equality to a category of 
plant/algae cells—is, however, an ever present component of Durkheim’s project. In this, 
of course, he is not alone: we are in an awkward position of wanting to take what we can 
from earlier scholars, while recognizing the often harmful assumptions that undergird 
much of their work. Specifically in this case, Durkheim turns to naturism in order to prove 
that it is not, in fact, the most primitive form of religious behavior; still, his insights offer 
an interesting lens through which to reflect upon our discussion of Emerson. Importantly, I 
am not claiming that Nature is a form of Durkheimian naturism; rather, there is 
considerable overlap between the two, and Durkheim’s observations may help clarify some 
of the remaining ambiguity in Emerson’s essay. 
Durkheim’s naturism is predicated on the reality of experience, that is, while 
speaking of Max Müller, presented as the seminal figure in the analysis of naturism, he 
claims that, “it is axiomatic that religion rests on an experience from which it draws its 
entire authority,” and, soon after, that religion arises “not as a kind of vague and confused 
dreaming but as a system of ideas and practices well grounded in reality.” (Durkheim 
1995, 70) These experiences match well with Emerson’s, although Durkheim remains ever 
more reserved than the enthusiastic American: “Man cannot enter into relations with nature 
without gaining a sense of its infinity and its immensity … It surpasses him in every 
direction. Beyond the spaces he sees, there are others that stretch out limitlessly; each 
moment of duration is preceded and followed by a time to which no limit can be set; the 
175 
 
flowing river manifests an infinite force, since nothing exhausts it.” (Durkheim 1995, 72) 
While the details of Durkheim’s detour into the roots of naturism, and its dependence upon 
language for its development can be passed over for our purposes, his critique echoes the 
unease spoken by Emerson: if religious sentiment is based upon experience, observation, 
and interpretation of nature, and if nature is taken as a guide for human action, “it becomes 
inexplicable that religious thought should have survived the first tests made, and 
unintelligible that religious thought has been maintained. … If the point of religion was to 
give us a representation of the world that would guide us in our dealings with it, then 
religion was in no position to carry out its function, and humanity would not have been 
slow to notice that fact.” (Durkheim 1995, 77) Remember Durkheim’s purpose—he is 
attempting to disprove certain claims about religion; we are not. As such, his insistence 
that naturism “fails” in some essential way is not of as much interest as his isolation of the 
locus of anxiety in a disparity between what is externally observed in nature and our ability 
to turn those observations into a livable morality. This gap is further highlighted in the 
difficulty hinted at above in resolving the eternal flux and tension of the natural world: 
We talk about the amazement that men must have felt as they discovered the 
world. But it is a regularity shading off into monotony that above all characterizes 
the life of nature. Every morning, the sun climbs the horizon, and every evening it 
sets; every month, the moon completes the same cycle; the river flows 
uninterruptedly in its bed; the same seasons periodically bring back the same 
sensory experiences. Some unexpected event occurs here and there, no doubt: The 
sun is eclipsed, the moon disappears behind the clouds, the river floods. But these 
passing disturbances can never give birth to anything but equally passing 
impressions, the memory of which is erased after a time. (Durkheim 1995, 81) 
Emerson, of course, argues that these perceptions are far from passing, that instead they are 




Interestingly, Emerson offers the seeds of a solution to these tensions, although he 
is never able to fully commit to it, in spite of stating it several times within the text of 
Nature, both implicitly and explicitly. Initially, Emerson’s description of evocative nature 
is tied to a misreading of the landscape, an ignoring of certain bits of knowledge in 
preference to an intuitive perception of the whole:  
The charming landscape which I saw this morning is indubitably made up of some 
twenty or thirty farms. Miller owns this field, Locke that, and Manning the 
woodland beyond. But none of them owns the landscape. There is a property in the 
horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the 
poet. This is the best part of these men’s farms, yet to this their warranty-deeds 
give no title. (Emerson 1981, 10) 
As the essay progresses, the force of a unifying whole becomes more explicit, first in our 
understanding of language itself, where “the same symbols are found to make the original 
elements of all languages,” and where nature, as reflected in these symbols the alpha and 
omega of perception: “and as this is the first language, so is it the last.” (Emerson 1981, 
21) This unity emerges as a set of mirrored reflections, a variety on “age-old theory of 
correspondence between the human project and its cosmic referent, between microcosm 
and macrocosm,” (Albanese 2007, 164) where “is especially apprehended the unity of 
Nature,—the unity in variety,—which meets us everywhere. All the endless variety of 
things make an identical impression. … A leaf, a drop, a crystal, a moment of time, is 
related to the whole, and partakes of the perfection of the whole. Each particle is a 
microcosm, and faithfully renders the likeness of the world.” (Emerson 1981, 30) Further, 
and soaringly,  
Each creature is only a modification of the other; the likeness in them is more than 
the difference, and their radical law of one organization, holds true throughout 
nature. So intimate is this Unity, that, it is easily seen, it lies under the undermost 
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garment of Nature, and betrays its source in Universal Spirit. For it pervades 
Thought also. Every universal truth which we express in words, implies or 
supposes every other truth. Omne verum vero consonant. It is like a great circle on 
a sphere, comprising all possible circles; which, however, may be drawn and 
comprises it in like manner. Every such truth is the absolute End seen from one 
side. But it has innumerable sides. (Emerson 1981, 30–31) 
This unity is compelling for Emerson, but it also is the final move that leads him to 
doubting the presence of the exterior world: there is something about the ultimate unity of 
reality that is anxiety-provoking, something about the monism that he seems to move 
towards that must, in the end, be resisted. Indeed, after this florid passage, Unity—as a 
proper noun—doesn’t appear again in Nature, and the references to the concept are 
focused more on the gap between nature and humanity: “the reason why the world lacks 
unity, and lies broken and in heaps, is, because man is disunited with himself.” (Emerson 
1981, 48) This later weakening of the earlier Unity is what allows other commentators to 
claim, for example, that “Emerson regarded Nature as at once the radically Other and the 
gateway to ourselves.” (Dunlap 2004, 47) In doing so, the unity—the connectedness that 
would allow both ourselves and the radically Other to exist within the single container of a 
Nature writ large—is lost. 
Finally, Durkheim reminds us that the spiritual observations and commitments of a 
time are not unrelated to the social. Emerson exists very much at an important moment in 
American history, when the relationship between rural and urban, between the farm and 
the city, is changing, a topic already encountered in the opening chapter’s discussion of 
Sylvester Graham. He hungers for both: while he lightly chides city folk for supposing 
“that the country landscape is pleasant only half the year,” (Emerson 1981, 15) he praises 
the inventions of industrial age: speaking of man, Emerson writes 
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He no longer waits for favoring gales, but by means of steam, he realizes the fable 
of Aeolus’s bag, and carries the two and thirty winds in the boiler of his boat. To 
diminish friction, he paves the road with iron bars, and, mounting a coach with a 
ship-load of men, animals, and merchandise behind him, he darts through the 
country, from town to town, like an eagle or a swallow through the air. By the 
aggregate of these aids, how is the face of the world changed, from the era of Noah 
to that of Napoleon! (Emerson 1981, 13) 
And, in spite of seeing that his explorations of nature “may suggest the advantage which 
the country-life possesses, for a powerful mind, over the artificial and curtailed life of the 
cities,” Emerson reassures us that 
We know more from nature than we can at will communicate. Its light flows into 
the mind evermore, and we forget its presence. The poet, the orator, bred in the 
woods, whose senses have been nourished by their fair and appeasing changes, 
year after year, without design and without heed,—shall  not lose their lesson 
altogether, in the roar of cities or the broil of politics. (Emerson 1981, 23) 
The urban, then, poses no real threat to our spiritual development—either as people or as a 
nation. Still, a challenge remains to retain our ability to access nature, to stay, if you will 
“in touch” with the depths of the natural world. 
There are several gravitational points at work here, around which various 
considerations orbit: does the natural world, on the one hand, represent a set of patterns 
providing a model for human development or, on the other, a set of forces available for 
mastery by the human mind? Do we emulate the rhythms of the natural world, struggling 
to decode the relevance of its messages for our current challenges, or do we see it as a 
resource, available to us both physically and spiritually, and available for our control? 
And, what is the nature of our relations? Are we masters-in-waiting of nature? If so, how 
do we explain the awe, the sublime, the terror and the passion that it inspires? 
These are the questions that form the backdrop against which American 
environmentalisms emerge, a movement that is only possible once the environment 
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becomes both geographically exhausted and problematic; that is, once the push of 
European settlers (and, by now, their descendants) has reached the Pacific coast and gazed 
backwards across the mountains, across the vast prairie, back towards the fast-growing 
urban sprawl that hugged the Atlantic, a question emerged of where to go from here? 
Decades were spent filling in the gaps, or abandoning the areas deemed inhospitable in 
their entirety (or, in a move that should surprise nobody, such areas were set aside as the 
final destination of indigenous populations removed from their more fecund and habitable 
homes into the dust and rock of the western plains). But the two forces were irreconcilable: 
the populations kept expanding and the amount of land, finally, after centuries of 
exploration and cultivation, had been mapped from end to end. In such a situation, the land 
itself was soon to become problematic in entirely new ways: no longer was the issue one of 
how best to expand the borders of the civilized across the dangerous wild; instead, the 
challenge was how to best manage, exploit, and pillage that land to ensure its service to the 
expanded population: how to mine it, how to dam it, how to extract building materials 
from its forests, how to blast through its inconvenient contours in service of a network of 
roads. These are the concerns that define our next chapter, and specifically its focal point, 
the Scottish immigrant John Muir.
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Walking the World 
When I was a boy in Scotland I was fond of everything that was wild, 
and all my life I’ve been growing fonder and fonder of wild places and 
wild creatures. 
John Muir, Boyhood in Scotland 
The bare outlines of the first half of John Muir’s life are as follows: born in 
Dunbar, Scotland on April 21st, 1838; emigrated to America—specifically, a farm in 
Wisconsin—in 1849; enrolled in the University of Wisconsin-Madison for two years in the 
early 1860s. This was followed with several years of wandering the Canadian wilderness 
working as a laborer until he moved to Indianapolis, apparently well-prepared to settle into 
a life of industry, having been hired as something between a foreman, tinkerer, and lead 
engineer. It was not to be. In March of 1867 an accident nearly cost him his sight and 
provided the impetus for dramatic change: spending six weeks in a darkened room, unsure 
if he would ever regain his vision, Muir realized he was drawn to a different life, one 
located outside of the walls of either academia or the factory; indeed, outside any walls at 
all. Once his vision returned, Muir decided he would walk from Indiana to Florida, hoping 
there to gain passage on a ship to South America to further his desire to explore the 
Amazon. He did walk—roughly 1,000 miles—but contracted malaria in Florida, halting 
his progress. Not fully recovered, Muir changed direction, turning instead to California, 
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where he would spend most of the rest of his life. 
Muir arrived in San Francisco in March of 1868, and immediately left the urban 
environs to see Yosemite which became a focal point for many of his efforts. The rest of 
his life was spent moving between the true wild—hiking the Sierra Nevada’s, exploring 
the Alaskan glaciers, wandering the backwoods of Yosemite itself—and a wide-ranging set 
of social activities that included a deep engagement with what we would today term 
environmental politics. Muir was instrumental in the movement to create the National Park 
system, was a leading voice in the emerging environmental debate of his time, and was one 
of the founders of the Sierra Club; along with all this, he was a prolific writer, publishing 
hundreds of essays and roughly a dozen books (many were collections of essays, some 
were collections of previously unpublished material). Muir died from complications related 
to pneumonia on December 24th, 1914, survived by two daughters; his wife of twenty-five 
years had passed nearly a decade before, in 1905. 
Add to this a sprinkling of detail: the looming presence of a religiously 
domineering father; a childhood marked by masculine competitions of physical endurance 
and violence inflicted by both peers and parents; an aptitude—even a genius—for 
mechanical engineering resulting in a host of fascinating contraptions and, through a 
competition in the Wisconsin state fair, both a scholarship that enabled his formal studies 
(never completed) and the introduction to Jeanne and Ezra Carr, who would become 
lifelong friends, confidants, and benefactors; a level of self-discipline that enabled a near 
ascetic lifestyle; a set of iconic, almost unbelievable, experiences that combined danger 
and soaring moments of communion (holding on to a pine tree as it is whipped to and fro 
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in a storm, rushing out to “ride” an avalanche down a mountain, risking his—and his 
lovable dog, Stickeen’s—life on the side of an Alaskan glacier); and a series of economic 
opportunities that would likely have led to great wealth bypassed in favor of greater direct 
interaction with the natural world. Two themes emerge that I want to particularly highlight: 
first, Muir’s stance towards nature—ultimately, his religion—was one of experience, of a 
singular attention focused on observing the world around him through both his eyes and 
his body. The equation of nature and religion is quite explicit in Muir, whose stance 
towards the sacred is summarized by Donald Worster, one of his biographers, like this: 
“God” for Muir was a deliberately loose and imprecise term referring to an active, 
creative force dwelling in, above, and around nature. Continuously animated by 
that divine force, every part of the natural world was in constant flux—the earth 
moving under foot, glaciers flowing down mountainsides, plants and animals 
evolving and spreading. Always the flux was purposeful. Always it moved toward 
beauty. Always and everywhere it was holy. (Worster 2008, 8) 
This view of an always changing, always moving sacrality is the second theme: Muir’s life 
is extraordinary in its wandering, in the compulsion he obeyed to move through the land 
itself, usually on foot, and usually alone. As Ehrlich notes (quoting from a posthumous 
collection), “In his late, undated journal fragments, he wrote: ‘Not like taking the veil—no 
solemn abjuration of the world. I only went out for a walk, and finally concluded to stay 
out till sundown, for going out, I found, was really going in.’” (Ehrlich 2000, 9) 
So much, then, for the skeleton outline. I want to enflesh this overview by focusing 
on a few themes from Muir’s life, selecting the metaphor quite intentionally as one of the 
key tropes in Muir’s writing is the relationship between nature and body. Muir’s asceticism 
is the stuff of legend—he was known to set out for a multi-week journey through the 
backwoods of the mountains with merely some water, some crushed tea, and a couple 
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loaves of crusty bread. The fondness with which Muir saw these deprivations emerges in 
nostalgic bloom in some of his later writings, for example: “Long ago I made these Sierra 
trips, carrying only a sackful of bread with a little tea and sugar and was thus independent 
and free, but now that trails or carriage roads lead out of the Valley in almost every 
direction it is easy to take a pack animal, so that the luxury of a blanket and a supply of 
food can easily be had.” (Muir 1912, 39) Here, though, it is not the Spartan conditions that 
are my focus, rather, the first of the rituals from Muir’s life that I want to examine is the 
way in which mobility—in his case, walking the earth—was a significant factor in his 
well-being, best understood as a methodology of self-healing, a solitary practice that time 
and time again served to refresh and renew his body and soul. While his voyage from 
Indiana to Florida is the first of the major undertakings of this kind, it was not new 
behavior for Muir—not only was his boyhood full of long runs and walks in the Scottish 
country side, but retreats into the wilderness continually were seen as a source of 
restoration and invigoration. He speaks of his time as a boy: 
in the winter, when there was but little doing in the fields, we organized running 
matches. A dozen or so of us would start out on races that were simply tests of 
endurance, running on and on along a public road over the breezy hills like hounds, 
without stopping or getting tired. The only serious trouble we ever felt in those 
long races was an occasional stitch in our sides. … We thought nothing of running 
right ahead ten or a dozen miles before turning back. (Muir 1913, 8) 
This deepened as he aged. Consider this passage of a type so common in his writing as to 
be unremarkable: “Next day I made up a package of bread, tied my notebook to my belt, 
and strode away in the bracing air, every nerve and muscle tingling with eager indefinite 
hope, and ready to give welcome to all the wilderness might offer. The plushy lawns 
staffed with blue gentians and daisies soothed my morning haste, and made me linger; they 
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were all so fresh, so sweet, so peaceful.” (Muir 1888, 10) 
There is a deeper connection with Muir’s roots here as well: the need to transform 
spiritual impulse into physical action has a decidedly Protestant undertone, a compulsion 
not just to see or bask in God’s glory, but rather to enact it upon the external world, to see 
it as a product of physical exertion that leaves God’s mark upon the world through the 
effort of a human vessel. While this instinct for Muir may be quintessentially Scottish, it 
marks him also as very American, as part of the narrative of the pioneer, the hard-working 
industrialist, the individual who is able to, through work, fulfill the destiny promised by 
both the magnificence of the unfolding continent and divine providence. For Muir, the 
most sublime moments are those that come from effort—seeing a waterfall is one thing, 
clambering along a three inch ridge directly below the full force of the rushing water 
brings a knowledge that goes beyond the visual. This is true in less death-defying moments 
as well—close attention to the flowers reveals the most minute movements of insects, bees, 
and butterflies, all combining to demonstrate without reservation the beauty of God’s plan. 
“One must labor for beauty as for bread, here as elsewhere.”(Muir 1912, 8) 
In 1863, at a moment when he was faced with deciding whether his career would 
continue within the world of the university, Muir found himself confused with what the 
proper response to the very real prospect of civil war should be. His reaction was never 
fully clear, always a mix of a resignation to a notion of national duty and a clear reluctance 
to commit himself to the violent brutality of the war effort. The initial solution, arrived at 
in consultation with the Carrs, was to alter his academic course to study medicine—being a 
field surgeon was, for Muir, an acceptable compromise. However, “by the end of the 
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school year Muir was thin and exhausted, the result of his customary impoverished 
circumstances and his increasing anxiety about a proper personal response to the war.” (F. 
Turner 1985, 107) Having decided to spend the summer walking through the borderlands 
of the American-Canadian frontier, Muir himself writes “I am not so well as I was last 
term, I need a rest. Perhaps my tour will do me good, though a three or four hundred mile 
walk with a load is not, at least in appearance, much of a rest.” (Badè 1924, 32) Yet, it 
worked: “when he emerged near the end of July he had regained his health and spirits in 
hiking the valley lands, clambering about the cliffs, poking through the green dells.” (F. 
Turner 1985, 107) The healing was more than physical—the time that summer also opened 
up new possibilities for Muir, new avenues that in the relative bustle of school life seemed 
impossible. As Turner interprets it, this time allowed Muir to ask, “what if you could 
simply escape the war, mounting social pressure to settle down, family squabbles—all of 
it—and simply wander off into the American wilderness?” (F. Turner 1985, 108) Note 
Turner’s nationalistic attribution: Muir had little regard for such boundaries, and indeed 
spent many of those months wandering well north of the territorial limits of the United 
States. Nature, for Muir, was an opening, a space that allowed for possibilities unavailable 
in the world of the social, and it was these possibilities that seemed to allow him to regain 
his energy and his passion for life. 
The notion of these wanderings as an “escape” is intriguing, but ultimately more a 
space for conjecture than firm conclusion. Muir was a prolific, if reluctant, writer and there 
is virtually no time period in his life that is not the subject of extraordinary documentation 
and reflection in his writings and/or his voluminous correspondence. A notable exception 
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begins in late Spring of 1864, when he began a long traipse through the Canadian woods, a 
time referred to by Ehrlich as Muir’s “lost years.” Turner summarizes this lacuna, 
commenting that, 
for a man who had so astonishing a recall of detail and whose voluminous 
notebooks were carefully preserved through years of hard travel and perilous 
adventure to form at last the bases of every book he wrote, there is not much here. 
He did take botanical notes from the Canadian period, but he left them with a 
friend in Indianapolis in 1867 and never asked for their return. It is possible that he 
made some further travel notes that were subsequently destroyed by fire, but Muir 
never cared to go back and fill in the gaps. (F. Turner 1985, 114) 
While accurate, this is a little misleading. Muir’s surviving words on this period are limited 
to a fragment regarding his difficulty in explaining the idea of someone wandering the 
backwoods in search of plants—he was taken “for a government official of some kind, or 
minister, or pedlar [sic].” (Badè 1924, 40) and a single sentence commemorating his 
discovery, “far in the dark maple woods,” of people who shared his hometown of Dunbar, 
Scotland. However, his practice of meticulously dating and identifying the location of the 
plant samples he gathered during these treks does allow his first biographer, William 
Frederic Badè to reconstruct the time thusly: 
In April he was already wading about in Canadian swamps, and by the month of 
May he had penetrated northward as far as Simcoe County. On the 18th of that 
month he started—on a three weeks’ ramble through Simcoe and Grey Counties, 
walking an estimated distance of about three hundred miles through the townships 
of Guillimbury, Tecumseh, Adjala, Mono, Amaranth, Luther, Arthur, Egremont, 
Proton, Glenelg, Bentinck, Sullivan, Holland, and Sydenham. (Badè 1924, 40) 
That is—and Turner is explicitly aware of the existence of this as well—while we may not 
have Muir’s own words to support us, there is a great deal of information about where he 
was and what he was doing: Muir’s Canadian wanderings are not blank and unknown, 
rather they stand without much self-reflection from the man himself, something which 
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marks them as unusual in his archive. 
This time of isolation lasted into the early Fall, when he met up with his brother 
Dan near Niagara Falls. The brothers found employment at a local mill and factory 
(producing at the time broom handles and related parts), and Muir seemed to have emerged 
from the wild healthier, but also resigned to a life in the social world: as such, it seems that 
Muir himself may have seen his trip through Canada as a last hurrah of sorts, a final time 
in his beloved woods before he settled down to a life of lathes and lumber, machines and 
marriage. This was helped by his clear aptitude for mechanical engineering and 
specifically for what might today be called process improvement. Repeatedly in his 
“professional” life (that is, the times spent in various manufacturing and/or farming 
endeavors), Muir would become obsessed with a problem of productivity and immerse 
himself in designing a (usually mechanical) set of solutions. So, in early 1866, while 
working at a small-town mill in Canada, 
he had perfected his designs for the improved lathe and also for a machine that 
bored and drove rake teeth. He set them in operation, and they worked famously. 
So absolute was the improvement in production that Muir turned 23,000 of the 
30,000 broom handles in a single day. 
Muir’s own reflections on these efforts, from a letter to Jeanne Carr, are revealing 
when subjected to a close reading: 
I have been very busy of late making practical machinery. I like my work 
exceedingly well, but would prefer inventions which would require some artistic as 
well as mechanical skill. I invented and put in operation a few days ago an 
attachment for a self-acting lathe, which has increased its capacity at least one 
third. We are now using it to turn broom-handles, and as these useful articles may 
now be made cheaper, and as cleanliness is one of the cardinal virtues, I 
congratulate myself in having done something like a true philanthropist for the real 
good of mankind in general. What say you? I have also invented a machine for 
making rake-teeth, and another for boring for them and driving them, and still 
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another for making the bows, still another used in making the handles, still another 
for bending them, so that rakes may now be made nearly as fast again. Farmers 
will be able to produce grain at a lower rate, the poor get more bread to eat. Here is 
more philanthropy; is it not? I sometimes feel as though I was losing time here, but 
I am at least receiving my first lessons in practical mechanics, and as one of the 
firm here is a millwright, and as I am permitted to make as many machines as I 
please and to remodel those now in use, the school is a pretty good one.(Muir and 
Badè 1916, 1) 
There is a decided ambiguity here, a recognition that it may not in the end be enough that, 
in Turner’s words, “the world would perhaps be better swept now.” (F. Turner 1985, 118) 
While it is impossible to know for sure, it seems reasonable that this instinct of Muir’s was 
part of the motivation for his leaving the Canadian wilds, this time for the bustling industry 
of Indianapolis, where he “he quickly found work. The firm of Osgood and Smith was the 
oldest manufactory in the city and the year before Muir’s arrival had bought the patent for 
the infamous Sarvan carriage wheel.” (F. Turner 1985, 121) Although still technically 
employed as a sawyer, Muir was engaged by Osgood and Smith in December of 1866 to 
produce a “time and motion” study of the factory. What he saw here was striking in its 
prescient anticipation of the economics of Fordist America yet to come: “without formal 
training and without an abundance of actual manufacturing experience, Muir had grasped 
the vision of the total factory as a machine itself, where laborers, machines, and products 
were interchangeable, smoothly functioning parts.” (F. Turner 1985, 124) We have at this 
point a Muir that was never to be, but seems quite possible: he is poised on the edge, not 
for the last time in his life, of economic freedom, of joining the burgeoning ranks of the 
industrial capitalists, and seemingly destined for great heights in their company. 
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The Threat of Blindness and 
Seeing Nature 
The vision isolates, separates the visionary from the “ordinary” life to 
which she or he had formerly been accustomed. It is the prelude to a 
period of uncertainty, of disorientation, of the suspended animation of the 
self. The time is troubled indeed but culminates in a pivotal inspiration 
that is itself a prelude to a renascence, to the reentry of a self revived and 
rechristened into something of the same—if by no means entirely the 
same—life from which she or he had been removed. 
James D. Faubion, The Shadows and Lights of Waco 
All that is gold does not glitter 
Not all those who wander are lost 
J. R. R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring 
Instead, on March 6th, 1867, Muir suffered an accident that changed everything 
when a file slipped from his hand and impacted his eye. 
After the first shock was over I closed my eye, and when I lifted the lid of the 
injured one the aqueous humor dripped on my hand the sight gradually failed and 
in a few minutes came perfect darkness. “My right eye is gone,” I murmured, 
“closed forever on all God’s beauty.” At first I felt no particular weakness. I 
walked steadily enough to the house where I was boarding, but in a few hours the 
shock sent me trembling to bed and very soon by sympathy the other eye became 
blind, so that I was in total darkness and feared that I would become permanently 
blind. (Badè 1924, 52) 
While the fears of blindness proved unfounded, recovery meant spending over a month in a 
darkened room as his prognosis slowly improved. As he healed, Muir re-evaluated the 
components of his current life, and decided upon a radical solution: he would, instead of 
returning to the factory, “ready manfully to look that busy world in the face and get on 
with his career,” return “to his plans for a walking tour of the southern states and from 
there to South America. He read and was charmed by an illustrated brochure of 
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California’s Yosemite Valley—there, too, were mysteries he might experience.” (F. Turner 
1985, 127) 
This was a moment of epiphany, a complete re-ordering of his priorities, and 
parallel inversion of the process of seeing described in the epigraph with which this section 
opens: Muir’s new life was brought into existence by terror at the possibility of losing his 
vision of nature, a sight that always saw in excess of what was “really there.” It was this 
fear that propelled him out of the increasingly successful comforts of Indianapolis and into 
the American wild. Muir’s choice was unusual for his time, although clearly not as unusual 
as it would be today: in the late 1800s, it was still possible to wander the land, to roam 
across territory that had not yet been fully claimed, plotted, and industrialized by the 
crisscrossing boundaries of the American road system. So, Muir’s journey, which took him 
through Kentucky and Tennessee, across Georgia and into Florida, was made largely 
across back country, along paths and open fields, using natural landmarks—rivers and 
mountains, mostly—to guide his way. As was his wont, Muir would downplay the dangers 
of the road, recounting encounters with brigands and roughs with a self-deprecating humor 
that attributed his continued survival more to his appearance, easily confused with “a poor 
herb doctors a common occupation in these mountain regions” (Muir and Badè 1916, 9) 
than to any bravery on his part. While some of this is humility, much of it is simple truth: 
Muir traveled with only the barest of provisions, indeed, at the very start of his walk, he 
encountered a would-be thief on horseback, 
who soon showed that he intended to rob me if he should find the job worth while 
[sic]. After he had inquired where I came from, and where I was going, he offered 
to carry my bag. I told him that it was so light that I did not feel it at all a burden; 
but he insisted and coaxed until I allowed him to carry it. As soon as he had gained 
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possession I noticed that he gradually increased his speed, evidently trying to get 
far enough ahead of me to examine the contents without being observed. But I was 
too good a walker and runner for him to get far. At a turn of the road, after trotting 
his horse for about half an hour, and when he thought he was out of sight, I caught 
him rummaging my poor bag. Finding there only a comb, brush, towel, soap, a 
change of underclothing, a copy of Burns’s [sic] poems, Milton’s Paradise Lost, 
and a small New Testament, he waited for me, handed back my bag, and returned 
down the hill, saying that he had forgotten something. (Muir and Badè 1916, 8) 
Muir possessed a remarkable confidence that he would never fall to harm from the natural 
world—the dangers of weather, predators, loose rocks and the like never troubled him, 
often only deemed worthy of a passing reference, for example in late September he found 
himself moving through the “Chattahoochee bottom lands” in Georgia where, after a 
labored crossing of a swift running river, “[I] sauntered on southward as soon as I was dry. 
Rattlesnakes abundant. Lodged at a farmhouse. Found a few tropical plants in the garden.” 
(Muir and Badè 1916, 12) 
Muir was not the first to explore America in this manner; indeed, as he wound his 
way southward, his path crossed that of William Bartram, who had over 100 years prior 
spent four years traveling on foot in the same region. Bartram was, “like Muir excited by 
the language of birds, the hunting habits of spiders, and the secret life of plants” (F. Turner 
1985, 141) Indeed, Bartram’s rapture at discovering (what was to him) a new species of 
rhododendron mirrors Muir’s own constantly ecstatic accounts of biodiversity throughout 
his walk. Bartram, however, was quite ambivalent at times with regards to his solitude, and 
the long periods of loneliness his migrations required. To Bartram (and, quite 
emphatically, virtually never to Muir), “the mountains seemed ‘dreary,’ even threatening. 
Bartram took the opportunity to observe that perhaps men were gregarious beings whose 
delight was in civilization.” (Nash 1967, 55) These thoughts were short-lived: Bartram 
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found himself on the edge of a cliff “from which he could see the sweep of the wilderness 
to the west,” (Nash 1967, 55) This moment of encounter dispelled all fear and doubt from 
his mind, and serves as a model for many moments on Muir’s wanderings when a question 
is answered through a sudden revelation of the natural. This notion of revelation, of truth 
written in nature waiting to be discovered, may also be traced back to Bartram who was, 
according to Nash, the earliest American writer to attribute to nature the quality of the 
sublime, a term that was to become key in Muir’s musings on nature. Nash claims that 
Bartram’s journals  
mark the first extensive use of that term in American letters. Instances appear on 
almost every page of his Travels. Camping beside Florida’s Lake George, Bartram 
admitted being “seduced by those sublime enchanting scenes of primitive nature,” 
and in the Carolina wilderness he “beheld with rapture and astonishment, a 
sublimely awful scene of power and magnificence, a world of mountains piled 
upon mountains.” For him, as for the European aesthetes, the sublime in nature 
was linked with God’s grandeur, and Bartram frequently praised “the supreme 
author of nature” whose “wisdom and power” were manifested in wilderness. 
(Nash 1967, 54, empahsis added) 
We have encountered the sublime before with Emerson; its first use in A Thousand-Mile 
Walk to the Gulf shall serve as illustrative of Muir’s usage. Here is his entry for September 
10th, 1867: 
Escaped from a heap of uncordial kindness to the generous bosom of the woods. 
After a few miles of level ground in luxuriant tangles of brooding vines, I began 
the ascent of the Cumberland Mountains, the first real mountains that my foot ever 
touched or eyes beheld. The ascent was by a nearly regular zigzag slope, mostly 
covered up like a tunnel by overarching oaks. But there were a few openings where 
the glorious forest road of Kentucky was grandly seen, stretching over hill and 
valley, adjusted to every slope and curve by the hands of Nature the most sublime 
and comprehensive picture that ever entered my eyes. Reached the summit in six 
or seven hours — a strangely long period of up-grade work to one accustomed 
only to the hillocky levels of Wisconsin and adjacent States. (Muir and Badè 1916, 
7) 
Note both the preference of the woods to lukewarm human companionship (he is referring 
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to a “thrifty Tennessee farmer,” who had been overly reluctant in Muir’s eyes to provide 
food and shelter the night before), and the sense of purpose in the revelation of the 
sublime: the hills are not solely a geologic process, but are also shaped by “the hands of 
Nature.” 
This is not to say that every moment outside was a moment of unbridled joy for 
John Muir: in addition to the physical deprivations of the journey, he was no stranger to 
desolation, nor to loneliness. For someone so steeped in botanical lore, the further south 
Muir traveled, the more foreign and indecipherable the landscape became. Heading toward 
Savannah, and edging towards a marshy swampland, the like of which he had never 
encountered, Muir writes 
Am made to feel that I am now in a strange land. I know hardly any of the plants, 
but few of the birds, and I am unable to see the country for the solemn, dark, 
mysterious cypress woods which cover everything. 
 
The winds are full of strange sounds, making one feel far from the people and 
plants and fruitful fields of home. Night is coming on and I am filled with 
indescribable loneliness. Felt feverish; bathed in a black, silent stream; nervously 
watchful for alligators. (Muir and Badè 1916, 13) 
This is an important moment in Muir’s corpus: his writings are overflowing with his 
supreme confidence in the natural world, with his remarkable lack of any sense of 
discomfort, danger, or desperation. Here we find him made to feel “dreadfully lonesome” 
(Muir and Badè 1916, 14) by his exposure to the strange and unknown, the eerie. Note the 
specific source of his difficulties: it is the distance from home, the foreign nature of the 
fauna that make him ill at ease. Addressing this situation is not accomplished through 
social interactions: during his journey, Muir has occasion to interact with a wide range of 
people, usually in a supplicant’s role, and while he enjoys some more than others, finds 
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some better conversation partners, and is more or less impressed or appalled by the level of 
hospitality, other than the addressing of core creature comforts—a bed, a meager meal—he 
finds little true solace in these interactions. Instead, he turns back towards nature itself, or 
more properly, towards nature’s borders, towards the blurry edge that separates nature 
from the wild and, by treading there a while, finds ways to ever expand the zone of his 
comfort outwards, away from the cultivated. This is a process of “getting comfortable,” a 
gaining of local knowledge that allows him to assimilate the unknown into the known. 
The first example of this comes directly after his feeling “dreadfully lonesome and 
poor,” referred to above. He has reached Savannah, but is near the end of his funds, and 
additional monies, due via Western Union from his brother in Wisconsin, have not yet 
arrived. After a single night in “the meanest looking lodging-house that I could find,” 
(Muir and Badè 1916, 14) he discovers the Bonaventure graveyard. Muir is delighted by 
Bonaventure, and completely seduced by its foreign treasures: 
Bonaventure to me is one of the most impressive assemblages of animal and plant 
creatures I ever met. I was fresh from the Western prairies, the garden-like 
openings of Wisconsin, the beech and maple and oak woods of Indiana and 
Kentucky, the dark mysterious Savannah cypress forests; but never since I was 
allowed to walk the woods have I found so impressive a company of trees as the 
tillandsia-draped oaks of Bonaventure. (Muir and Badè 1916, 15) 
It is more than the trees, even if Muir claims that the “noble avenue of live-oaks” are “the 
most magnificent planted trees I have ever seen,” that fascinates Muir. It is the liminality 
of the space, the zone that encompasses both the living and the dead that draws his 
attention; at first this is a result of the ongoing reclamation of the land by natural processes, 
the way that “even those spots which are disordered by art, Nature is ever at work to 
reclaim, and to make them look as if the foot of man had never known them;” (Muir and 
195 
 
Badè 1916, 14) but Muir saves his most soaring language for an extended meditation on 
the relationship between life and death: 
I gazed awe-stricken as one new-arrived from another world. Bonaventure is called 
a graveyard, a town of the dead, but the few graves are powerless in such a depth 
of life. The rippling of living waters, the song of birds, the joyous confidence of 
flowers, the calm, undisturbable grandeur of the oaks, mark this place of graves as 
one of the Lord’s most favored abodes of life and light. 
 
On no subject are our ideas more warped and pitiable than on death. Instead of the 
sympathy, the friendly union, of life and death so apparent in Nature, we are taught 
that death is an accident, a deplorable punishment for the oldest sin, the arch-
enemy of life, etc. Town children, especially, are steeped in this death orthodoxy, 
for the natural beauties of death are seldom seen or taught in towns. 
 
Of death among our own species, to say nothing of the thousand styles and modes 
of murder, our best memories, even among happy deaths, yield groans and tears, 
mingled with morbid exultation; burial companies, black in cloth and countenance; 
and, last of all, a black box burial in an ill-omened place, haunted by imaginary 
glooms and ghosts of every degree. Thus death becomes fearful, and the most 
notable and incredible thing heard around a death-bed is, “I fear not to die.” 
 
But let children walk with Nature, let them see the beautiful blendings and 
communions of death and life, their joyous inseparable unity, as taught in woods 
and meadows, plains and mountains and streams of our blessed star, and they will 
learn that death is stingless indeed, and as beautiful as life, and that the grave has 
no victory, for it never fights. All is divine harmony. (Muir and Badè 1916, 15) 
Muir is not arguing against death here as much as he is suggesting that everything is 
properly seen as life: the harmony he ends with is one of the living, of the present moment, 
and of the importance of not resisting that which is destined to happen in the natural world. 
Instead of—as the human caretakers of Bonaventure do—erecting fences between highly 
organized gravesites or structures designed to shield the graves from the rain and sun, the 
proper relation to nature is to live in it, abiding by its irreversible rules. Indeed, such 
construction is, in the end, useless: 
It is interesting to observe how assiduously Nature seeks to remedy these labored 
art blunders. She corrodes the iron and marble, and gradually levels the hill which 
is always heaped up, as if a sufficiently heavy quantity of clods could not be laid 
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on the dead. Arching grasses come one by one; seeds come flying on downy 
wings, silent as fate, to give life’s dearest beauty for the ashes of art; and strong 
evergreen arms laden with ferns and tillandsia drapery are spread over all — Life 
at work everywhere, obliterating all memory of the confusion of man. (Muir and 
Badè 1916, 15) 
This is not an isolated moment attributable more to Muir’s exhaustion than deeper 
reflections. Much later, railing against the construction of the Hetch Hetchy dam (a topic 
we will discuss in more detail below), he returns again to this notion of a false death, 
where humanity interferes with the natural cycle by creating an artificial context within 
which life is eliminated. Here, he is arguing against the notion that the dam would create “a 
crystal-clear lake,” adding to the beauty of the area. Muir writes that such a lake would “be 
full only a month or two in the spring, when the snow is melting fast.” The rest of the year, 
the water would gradually drain, “exposing the slimy sides of the basin …, with the 
gathered drift and waste, death and decay of the upper basins, caught here instead of being 
swept on to a decent natural burial along the banks of the river or in the sea. Thus the 
Hetch Hetchy dam-lake would be only a rough imitation of a natural lake for a few of the 
spring months, an open sepulcher for the others.” (Muir 1912, 48) 
As he reflects on the graveyard in Georgia, Muir is calling for a certain kind of 
attention, a focus from us in our encounter with nature. Note that he is not calling for 
people to be active, not calling for them to participate in some grand scheme of outdoor 
preservation or cultivation, but rather is claiming that “the apparently irreconcilable 
opposition between life and death was in truth resolved by simply looking at nature itself. 
If you looked with a steady, calm regard, you could not find the dread opposition,” (F. 
Turner 1985, 144) instead this sort of perception led to the recognition that all dissolved 
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into a sacred unity. Turner makes much of this moment, seeing in it “a major breakthrough 
against the inhibiting intellectual and spiritual influences of his childhood and adolescence, 
… [whose] implications were to prove incalculably great.” (F. Turner 1985, 145) And, 
even loftier: 
Now that he sensed powerfully, immediately the oneness of existence, the way was 
prepared for the last vestiges of his orthodox Christianity to fall away. Not 
immediately, however flashing this graveyard meditation, but surely and steadily, 
leaving at last no place for the old fear of death in a spirit so filled to its capacity 
with wonder. (F. Turner 1985, 147) 
This oversteps, but perhaps not by too much. In truth, Muir’s rebellion against his father’s 
strict orthodoxy was long in developing, and his realizations of unity in nature are found 
from his very earliest writings. Indeed, Muir’s first printed article, which appeared in 
December of 1866 in The Boston Recorder, detailed his encounter with Calypso borealis 
in a Canadian swamp. Towards the end of a day spent “struggling through tangled 
drooping branches and over and under broad heaps of fallen trees,” at a point “when the 
sun was getting low and everything seemed most bewildering and discouraging,” Muir 
sees the plant, “growing not in the ground but on a bed of yellow mosses in which its small 
white bulb had found a soft nest and from which its one leaf and one flower sprung. The 
flower was white and made the impression of the utmost simple purity like a snowflower.” 
(Badè 1924, 41) And then, revelation:  
It seemed the most spiritual of all the flower people I had ever met. I sat down 
beside it and fairly cried for joy. 
 
It seems wonderful that so frail and lowly a plant has such power over human 
hearts. This Calypso meeting happened some forty-five years ago, and it was more 
memorable and impressive than any of my meetings with human beings excepting, 
perhaps, Emerson and one or two others. … 
 
How long I sat beside Calypso I don’t know. Hunger and weariness vanished, and 
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only after the sun was low in the west I splashed on through the swamp, strong and 
exhilarated as if never more to feel any mortal care. (Badè 1924, 41) 
While perhaps not as direct as his reverie at Bonaventure, this is clearly cut of the same 
cloth. 
Fittingly, Muir decides—as much from economic necessity as from his attraction to 
the place—to create a haven in the cemetery in which to spend his nights. Eschewing even 
a blanket, Muir writes that “I used four of the bushes as corner posts for my little hut, 
which was about four or five feet long by about three or four in width, tied little branches 
across from forks in the bushes to support a roof of rushes, and spread a thick mattress of 
Long Moss over the floor for a bed.” Muir spends the better part of a week here, spending 
a few hours each day getting “acquainted with my bird neighbors in this blessed 
wilderness,” (Muir and Badè 1916, 16) before heading into town to see if his money has 
arrived and, when at last it does, he is off again on foot, completing his passage through 
Georgia until towards the end of October, he finally reaches the coast. Of his encounter 
with the ocean, he writes: 
October 23. To-day I reached the sea. While I was yet many miles back in the 
palmy woods, I caught the scent of the salt sea breeze which, although I had so 
many years lived far from sea breezes, suddenly conjured up Dunbar, its rocky 
coast, winds and waves; and my whole childhood, that seemed to have utterly 
vanished in the New World, was now restored amid the Florida woods by that one 
breath from the sea. Forgotten were the palms and magnolias and the thousand 
flowers that enclosed me. I could see only dulse and tangle, long winged gulls, the 
Bass Rock in the Firth of Forth, and the old castle, schools, churches, and long 
country rambles in search of birds’ nests. I do not wonder that the weary camels 
coming from the scorching African deserts should be able to scent the Nile. 
 
How imperishable are all the impressions that ever vibrate one’s life! We cannot 
forget anything. Memories may escape the action of will, may sleep a long time, 
but when stirred by the right influence, though that influence be light as a shadow, 
they flash into full stature and life with everything in place. For nineteen years my 
vision was bounded by forests, but to-day, emerging from a multitude of tropical 
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plants, I beheld the Gulf of Mexico stretching away unbounded, except by the sky. 
What dreams and speculative matter for thought arose as I stood on the strand, 
gazing out on the burnished, treeless plain! (Muir and Badè 1916, 22) 
His walk, at first inspired by an accident that threatened to rob him of his sight and 
therefore of his ability to perceive the glories of nature, ends temporally displaced, in his 
childhood. Muir has walked over two thousand miles and has found himself a boy again in 
Scotland. 
As tempting as it may be, the Freudian turn should, I think, be resisted or, at least, 
heavily modified. While it is seductive to see the imposing figure of Daniel Muir looming 
over John’s life at every turn—and, certainly, his dominance over Muir’s childhood cannot 
be overstated—it also, in the end, does a disservice to John himself. A striking feature of 
Muir’s reflections on his life is a consistent lack of angst, of questioning his roots, of 
obsession with the shadow cast by his father. Whatever impact Daniel had on the young 
boy, John the adult emerges having found not only resolution or peace, but also an 
emotionally powerful connection to the spiritual whose familial roots he would never deny, 
even if their growth turned in a very different direction, towards a very different sun. 
There may be a psychological process of transference at work here, the substitution 
of a harsh and judgmental God of the Old Testament for a sublime and peaceful presence 
but, if so, that transference is simultaneously a powerful healing, a transformation that 
allows Muir both clarity of vision and a compulsion to act. His returns to his boyhood are 
not the tortured reenactments of a man struggling against a long-dead father; they are 
instead the joyous recollections of the early seeds of his connection to the natural: his 
months spent wandering through America are the grown-up versions of his miles of 
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running as a boy, the ocean that beckons to him so strongly at the end of his journey is the 
same ocean that fascinated him so on the Scottish coast. If I am correct, then, it is not so 
much that Muir’s wanderings reflect a search for something as that they are an enactment 
of sacred behavior, a ritualistic pilgrimage that has no spiritual goal outside of itself.  
Heading West: Finding God, 
Glaciers, and Politics in 
California 
That is what Big Sur will become—the frontier of the frontier, … the 
furthest edge of the spirit of the West. … This, in other words, was the 
final goal and destination of the American expansion and colonization of 
the West. 
Jeffrey J. Kripal, Esalen 
While his thousand mile walk has ended, his journey—and the text itself—continue 
well beyond this point: from here, Muir sails further down the coast into Florida, spends 
time in Cuba, and—most dramatically—nearly succumbs to a bout with malaria, from 
which he is not fully healed until early the following year. These events, along with the 
vagaries of shipping schedules, conspire to force him to change his original plan of sailing 
to South America; instead he finds passage first to New York City, and then to California, 
where (with various voyages of exploration elsewhere) he will reside and spend the rest of 
his days and where he will gain his greatest acclaim and influence.  
Muir’s explanation of how he ended up in California after the walk to the gulf is 
worth reproducing in full for the characteristic ease with which it dismisses the brush with 
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malaria and the long recovery period—while he would often revisit memories of earlier 
events, Muir was never one to dwell on such hardships: 
When I set out on the long excursion that finally led to California I wandered afoot 
and alone, from Indiana to the Gulf of Mexico, with a plant-press on my back, 
holding a generally southward course, like the birds when they are going from 
summer to winter. From the west coast of Florida I crossed the gulf to Cuba, 
enjoyed the rich tropical flora there for a few months, intending to go thence to the 
north end of South America, make my way through the woods to the headwaters of 
the Amazon, and float down that grand river to the ocean. But I was unable to find 
a ship bound for South America—fortunately perhaps, for I had incredibly little 
money for so long a trip and had not yet fully recovered from a fever caught in the 
Florida swamps. Therefore I decided to visit California for a year or two to see its 
wonderful flora and the famous Yosemite Valley. All the world was before me and 
every day was a holiday, so it did not seem important to which one of the world’s 
wildernesses I first should wander.(Muir 1912, 4) 
Muir’s arrival in San Francisco is retold numerous places, the punch line of which is his 
inquiry as to the nearest way out of town, and when pressed for a more specific 
destination, his answer of “to any place that is wild.”(Muir 1912, 4) Apocryphal or not, the 
retelling of the story underscores its centrality to Muir’s conception of his early life: the 
destination did not matter in the specific, rather the goal was to wander in the wilderness, 
wherever it may lead him. 
It led to a place that would go on to define the next phase of Muir’s life, into the 
Sierra Nevada mountains and specifically to the Yosemite Valley. Muir’s first encounters 
with the Sierras—indeed, his first exposure to true mountains in his travels—is a 
revelatory moment where, out of “a lake of pure sunshine … rose the mighty Sierra, miles 
in height, and so gloriously colored and so radiant, it seemed not clothed with light, but 
wholly composed of it, like the wall of some celestial city.” Muir reinforces this 
sensibility, insisting that even “after ten years of wandering and wondering in the heart” of 
the mountains, “it still seems above all others the Range of Light.” Light alone, however, is 
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not sufficient for the depth of Muir’s relationship to the mountains: instead, he adds that, 
“no mark of man is visible upon it, nor any thing to suggest the wonderful depth and 
grandeur of its sculpture. None of it magnificent forest-crowned ridges seems to rise much 
above the general level to publish its wealth. No great valley or river is seen, or group of 
well-marked features of any kind standing out as distinct features.” In other words, the 
Sierra Nevada mountains are both wild, untouched by the hands of humanity, but they are 
also full of promise, full of riches that may be encountered only be wandering through “the 
whole range five hundred miles long,” through its “canons 2000 to 5000 feet deep, in 
which once flowed majestic glaciers, and in which now flow and sing the bright rejoicing 
rivers.”(Muir 1912, 4–5) Our journey, which started with a loss of vision from a wound 
inflicted by a carpenter’s tool, ends in wild light. 
Muir’s Yosemite is explicitly a holy place, a bursting forth of sacred presence into 
the world. Consider: 
But no temple made with hands can compare with Yosemite. Every rock in its 
walls seems to glow with life. Some lean back in majestic repose; others, 
absolutely sheer or nearly so for thousands of feet, advance beyond their 
companions in thoughtful attitudes, giving welcome to storms and calms alike, 
seemingly aware, yet heedless, of everything going on about them. Awful in stern, 
immovable majesty, how softly these rocks are adorned, and how fine and 
reassuring the company they keep: their feet among beautiful groves and meadows, 
their brows in the sky, a thousand flowers leaning confidingly against their feet, 
bathed in floods of water, floods of light, while the snow and waterfalls, the winds 
and avalanches and clouds shine and sing and wreathe about them as the years go 
by, and myriads of small winged creatures birds, bees, butterflies—give glad 
animation and help to make all the air into music. Down through the middle of the 
Valley flows the crystal Merced, River of Mercy, peacefully quiet, reflecting lilies 
and trees and the onlooking rocks; things frail and fleeting and types of endurance 
meeting here and blending in countless forms, as if into this one mountain mansion 
Nature had gathered her choicest treasures, to draw her lovers into close and 
confiding communion with her. (Muir 1912, 5) 
Muir’s desire to commune with this presence was the initial motivation for his wanderings, 
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and while his writings reflect a gradual diminishing of the holy exuberance of his youth in 
favor of more staid scientific description, he never lost the passion and the awe that we see 
here. The change is attributable to a movement in Muir’s later days towards a more social 
arena which saw him engaged more and more deeply—and with quite conflicting 
emotions—in two forms of activism, one political and one intellectual. We will 
concentrate on the former momentarily; the latter is a reflection of his contributions in the 
fields of botany (more a product of his wide ranging travels and honed skills of close 
attention) and geology (where his observations were key in recognizing and theorizing 
about the existence and importance of glaciers). 
When Muir first encountered the Yosemite valley, the role of glaciers in its 
formation was a hotly contested idea as was even the notion that glaciers were a suitable 
scientific phenomenon at all. The dominant view was that Yosemite was a product, not of 
glaciation, but rather of “a huge and sudden subsidence in which the valley floor sank due 
to the collapse of its support. Half Dome was the most spectacular and obvious evidence of 
this catastrophic event, the missing half having gone down with the rest of the valley.” (F. 
Turner 1985, 195) This view was most publicly supported by Josiah D. Whitney (1819-
1896), the leader of the California State Geological Survey conducted in the 1860s and 
early 1870s. While “Whitney was a man of science and hardly a study-bound theologian 
arguing from Scripture to explain rock-hard facts,” (F. Turner 1985, 196) there was indeed 
a scriptural basis for Whitney’s thesis which harkened back to earlier notions of holy 
miracle and catastrophe forming the basis of massive geological change. The strict 
scripturalism of earlier centuries had largely fallen out of favor after the groundbreaking 
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work of James Hutton (1726-1797) and Charles Lyell (1797-1875) had laid the 
foundations of “uniformitarianism,” the assertion that “the forces that had produced the 
earth in its present form were still in operation, still acting in the selfsame way they had 
from the beginning of geological time.” (F. Turner 1985, 197) Through his studies at 
Madison, as well as through the work of his close friend Ezra Carr, Muir was familiar not 
only with Hutton and Lyell, but also with the work of Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), who had 
greatly forwarded theories of glaciation through expeditions in northern Europe. 
Emboldened by this knowledge, but more so by a frank and direct love of scientific truth 
which remained undiminished throughout his life, Muir publicly confronted Whitney, who 
was famously acerbic in his dismissal of the young amateur. However, Muir’s argument 
won the day, and indeed his defense of the glacial formation of Yosemite is accurately seen 
as a turning point in the continued growth of geological science in the west. There are, of 
course, obvious and direct echoes of other threads of Muir’s life here: the rejection of a 
Biblically based authority, the iconoclastic belief in independence and observation, and the 
profound trust in nature providing an intelligible index and guide to the history to the 
world. 
Muir’s life as a political activist is dominated by his work around the proposed 
development of the Hetch Hetchy valley. It is important to note that we move here to a 
very different point in Muir’s biography: he married Louisa Strentzel in 1880, a first 
daughter, Wanda, was born in the spring of the following year and their second child, 
Helen, arrived five years on, in 1886. We alluded earlier to a period in Muir’s life that was 
more domestic, more reconciled to the social, and more focused on concerns that engaged 
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wider communities in discourse and action and his turning to the political arena at this time 
must be seen in the context of these other shifts. 
In the first decade of the new century, the picturesque Hetch Hetchy valley, created 
by glacial movements quite similar to those that formed Yosemite (although significantly 
smaller in scope and size) would be at the center of a national controversy that very neatly 
outlines the contours of environmental debate in America to this day. Muir wrote for the 
Weekly Transcript in Boston about his first visit to the valley, which occurred in the fall of 
1872, and the article (published the following spring) is pleasant enough, notable for his 
encounters with a family of bears, a nighttime visit from “a brown nugget of a wren,” and 
by his declarations that Hetch Hetchy was essentially a second Yosemite, where visitors 
could “see rocks and waterfalls, meadows and groves, of Yosemite size and kind, and 
grouped in Yosemite style.” (Muir 1873) Indeed, the likeness was so striking that Muir 
believed that “only the more calm and careful observers would be able to fix upon special 
differences” (Muir 1873) between the two valleys. There is, however, nothing here that 
presages the later tempest regarding the valley. Nash sets the stage: 
Situated on a dry, sandy peninsula, the city of San Francisco faced a chronic fresh-
water shortage. In the Sierra, about one hundred and fifty miles distant, the erosive 
action of glaciers and the Tuolumne River scooped the spectacular, high-walled 
Hetch Hetchy Valley. As early as 1882, city engineers pointed out the possibility 
of damming its narrow, lower end to make a reservoir. They also recognized the 
opportunity of using the fall of the impounded water for the generation of 
hydroelectric power. (Nash 1967, 161) 
At first the defense of the valley was successful and it was not until the spring of 
1906, when “earthquake and fire devastated San Francisco and added urgency and public 
sympathy to the search for an adequate water supply” (Nash 1967, 161) that the issue 
reached national prominence. While “no system could have survived the earthquake to 
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deliver the water necessary to quench the hundreds of fires that raked the city on those 
April days,” it was “charged that … [the] denial of the city’s petition for the Tuolumne 
River sites had contributed to the disaster, and in the climate of that time it is 
understandable that … [the claim] was widely believed.” (F. Turner 1985, 338) The details 
of this controversy are a dense web of political intrigue, but the crux of the debate is vital 
for considerations of later movements in environmentalism. Nash may be overstating the 
situation when he claims that as the battle over Hetch Hetchy unfolded, “for the first time 
in the American experience the competing claims of wilderness and civilization to a 
specific area received a thorough hearing before a national audience;” (Nash 1967, 162) 
but if he does, it is not by much. He devotes an entire chapter in Wilderness & The 
American Mind to Hetch Hetchy, using it as a bridge between his discussions of Muir and 
what he terms “the wilderness cult” before it and the following section on Aldo Leopold 
(more on whom, below). 
A political history of Hetch Hetchy would focus on a different set of actors: 
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were key to the various related bills 
being passed; Robert Underwood Johnson, associate editor of Century and a long-term 
close friend of Muir’s, was probably the most active voice against the plan; and California 
Congressman William Kent—who also donated “several hundred acres of virgin redwood 
forest on the shoulder of Marin County’s Mt. Tamalpais” (Nash 1967, 172) to establish the 
Muir Woods in 1908—was probably the key voice in the eventual creation of the reservoir. 
While keeping in mind their considerable practical impact, the two ideological leaders of 
the debate were Muir and Roosevelt’s Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot. The two men had 
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first met in 1895, at a dinner hosted by Pinchot’s father in Boston, however their first 
extended time in each other’s company occurred in the summer of 1896 as part of a 
Forestry Commission assigned by the Secretary of the Interior through the National 
Academy of Science to “tour the Western woodlands” with a task of “formulating explicit 
policy for the management of the reserves.” (Nash 1967, 135) (Pinchot was officially a part 
of the Commission, serving as the secretary; Muir was along in an unofficial capacity as an 
advisor.) 
Muir came to the Commission admittedly wearied from a year of travelling—he 
writes to Helen, now ten, from the office of a friend that he is “waiting the arrival of the 
forestry commission with whom I expect to start work tonight at half past ten o’clock. It is 
now about noon. I feel that this is the end of the strange lot of events I have been talking 
about for when I reach the Rocky Mountains Ill [sic] feel at home.” (Muir 1896a) Pinchot 
was quite taken by Muir, writing quite positively about his impressions of the tall 
Scotsman. Muir’s reaction is less clear: on the one hand, the only mention made of Pinchot 
in his letters from July and August of 1896 concerns the group’s attempt to locate his 
whereabouts: “Pinchot is out here somewhere but we have not yet found him. Though we 
expect to meet him soon.” (Muir 1896b) On the other, Muir did convince Pinchot to 
accompany him on a voyage to Alaska later that fall, an invitation that, on July 23, Pinchot 
regretfully declined having been informed by the Commission that he “should be of some 
service to the general cause by spending more time in the Bitter Root Mountains than was 
intended at first.” Pinchot claimed deep regret, writing that Muir “will know, without any 
words from me, how sorry I am that matters have turned out this way. I had already written 
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home that I was going with you, and I know how sorry my people will be when I tell them, 
as I must tonight, that the plan is changed.” (Pinchot 1896) Whether Pinchot was merely 
being polite or not, Muir’s only other acknowledgment of him in these two months of 
surviving correspondence is a simple confirmation in a note on August 5 to Robert 
Underwood Johnson: “Pinchot is not going with me as was at first planned.” (Muir 1896c) 
The two would come to highly public loggerheads within a few years, but even at this first 
meeting the differences between them 
surfaced that fall when the commission began the task of drawing up its report and 
recommendations. All the members could agree that some form of immediate 
federal regulation was needed to protect the nation’s timberlands, but what kind of 
regulation and enforced by whom? Pinchot alone among the commission members 
had any real idea of practical forestry and the governmental administration of 
forest reserves, having gained valuable experience in Europe, where forestry 
practices were now far in advance of America’s. While he was captivated by 
Muir’s personal magnetism and deferential to Sargent with his vast fund of 
dendrological knowledge, he was not going to be persuaded by them simply to 
lock up broad swaths of highly valuable timberlands under the vigilant supervision 
of the U.S. Army. Instead Pinchot envisioned a civilian force of trained foresters 
administering forest reserves to which commercial interests had supervised access. 
(F. Turner 1985, 302) 
Hetch Hetchy serves to bring into clearer view the emergent spectrum of positions 
vis-à-vis the relationship between humanity and the environment. At one extreme, we have 
advocates of the true wild, people whose vision includes an elimination of all human traces 
from wilderness areas. While Muir was sympathetic to this group, and indeed his writings 
can easily be used to demonstrate support for it, in truth he was much more pragmatic in 
his outlook, recognizing that such a movement was doomed to failure. Note that, in this 
judgment, he may have erred: Earth First! would certainly see themselves as being at this 
end of the spectrum, and, whatever the evaluation of their policies, they have certainly 
been a long-standing voice in environmental activism. 
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At the other extreme, we find absolute support for the exploitation of the natural 
world. This position has—and continues to have—its advocates, but is generally seen, 
especially from the 1960s on, as a more fringe position, inhabited for the most part by 
committed industrialists, speculative capitalists of certain stripes, and small pockets of 
radical Christianity who interpret man’s dominion over the natural world to be absolute 
and who often make a linkage between the biblically ordained fleeting nature of the 
physical world and climate change: that is, God has already told us that the world will not 
last forever, so all of the nonsense about hastening its demise is actually in accordance 
with His plan. 
Recognizing that neither Muir nor Pinchot truly occupy either of these extremes, 
Nash summarizes the difference in the two men’s positions thus: “For all his love of the 
woods, Pinchot’s ultimate loyalty was to civilization and forestry; Muir’s to wilderness and 
preservation.” (Nash 1967, 135) Contrary to a plethora of political caricatures from both 
sides, neither man favored the unfettered exploitation of natural resources and even Muir 
recognized that the inexorable expansion of the American population—both in numbers 
and geographically—made any move to isolate and retain the true wild untenable. They 
were left, therefore, on opposite sides of questions of maintenance: of what to do with 
nature, defined as those areas that were neither urban nor agriculturally rural. Pinchot’s 
position became broadly known as “fair use,” a stance that advocated the preservation of 
nature as a planned, cultivated, and harvested resource. For example, in his primary 
domain—that of forestry—he saw the need for a renewable supply of timber, and looked to 
implement policies that allowed an annual harvest that would be counterbalanced through 
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planting efforts. Aldo Leopold, who we will meet in greater detail shortly and who was 
also a long-term employee of the American government’s forestry department, sketched 
these two positions thus: 
Conservationists are notorious for their dissensions. Superficially these seem to 
add up to mere confusion, but a more careful scrutiny reveals a single plane of 
cleavage common to many specialized fields. In each field one group (A) regards 
the land as soil, and its function as commodity-production; another group (B) 
regards the land as biota, and its function as something broader. How much 
broader is admittedly in a state of doubt and confusion. (Leopold 1949, 221) 
Specifically regarding Hetch Hetchy, Pinchot’s position is summarized in his 
testimony before the House Committee on the Public Lands, which Nash quotes: “the 
fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is that of use, to take every part of 
the land and its resources and put it to the use in which it will serve the most people.” 
(Nash 1967, 171) This was an eminently practical position, one based on his experiences in 
Europe as a student and young professional, and one that safely aligned Pinchot with great 
machines of economic and political power. 
In what Nash sees as a potentially fatal strategic mistake, the preservationists 
opposed this view with an essentially aesthetic argument. This is, I would claim, a 
misreading of the position: recognizing that for some of these activists, there is a religious 
argument along with the aesthetic, Nash seems to miss the clear connection between the 
two. While characteristically overtly Freudian to a fault, Turner paints a different picture, 
where the extended difficulties of the Hetch Hetchy debate wear Muir down to the point 
that he returns again to his hardscrabble Protestant roots: 
During the prolonged anguish of Hetch Hetchy, Muir lost some of the hard-won 
philosophical balance of his mature years and spoke like a desert father. … There 
recurred too an Augustinian sense of humans’ departure from the divine plan, as if 
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at the end of his life the revenant form of old Daniel Muir had arisen to hound his 
freed son, warping his perception into the paternal pattern. Right was blazingly 
clear; wrong was absolute. The motives of the proponents of the dam scheme were 
stained and even Satanic. “But what can you expect?” he asked rhetorically of the 
despoilers. “The Lord Himself couldn’t keep the devel [sic] out of the first 
reservation that was ever made.” (F. Turner 1985, 341) 
Hetch Hetchy was part of “God’s freely bestowed natural beauties,” (F. Turner 1985, 341) 
and it mattered not as a distant, inanimate tableau, but rather because of what it could 
inspire in humanity, in how these protected spaces could create a context for a conduit to 
some sacred sense of place and power. Even the secular defense of preservation makes 
common reference to higher and loftier goals, often in direct juxtaposition with what is 
seen as the crass commercial interests of the fair use advocates. Either way, however, the 
argument still relies on natural space’s ability to function as a mirror for humanity, one that 
serves as a restorative counterweight to the burdens of urban life or to the hard realities of 
rural agriculture. Neither position, the aesthetic or the religious, specifies a value in the 
wild for itself. This opens the door for a significant counter-argument: if in the process of 
flooding Hetch Hetchy, it is possible to also address these needs, through the creation of 
parks on the shores of the flooded lakes or through the continued protection of the 
surrounding areas, advocates of the dam exclaimed, why should we not have both? San 
Francisco can have water and electricity and we can create ways to meet these other needs 
as well. Nash claims that if “more attention had been paid specifically to the wilderness 
qualities of Hetch Hetchy—which any man-made construction would have eliminated—
San Francisco’s point about the scenic attraction of an artificial lake could have been more 
easily answered. As it was, this tactical error cost the preservationists considerable 
support.” (Nash 1967, 170) 
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Still, for Nash, the debate over Hetch Hetchy retains its importance without regard 
to the ultimate outcome. For him, the furor over Hetch Hetchy reflects a profound yet 
subtle shift in the American stance towards nature, where “previously most Americans had 
not felt compelled to rationalize the conquest of wild country in this manner. For three 
centuries they had chosen civilization without any hesitation. By 1913 they were no longer 
so sure.” (Nash 1967, 181) Doubt and uncertainty had crept in to the process: having 
reached the Pacific, having largely relocated all native resistance to expansion, it was time 
for America to take stock of its land and to open the debate of what to do with the vast 
swathes that remained mostly unpopulated. 
We will encounter Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912-2009) in more depth 
momentarily; for now he serves as a useful reminder that, even if Nash is correct about 
Hetch Hetchy marking a beginning, the two opposing views of Muir and Pinchot that it 
spawned are still quite alive. In 1973, speaking of the growing awareness of the ecological 
crisis, Næss writes that “a shallow, but presently rather powerful movement, and a deep, 
but less influential movement, compete for our attention.” (Næss 1995a, 3) The former is 
easy enough to define as it urges us to “fight against pollution and resource depletion” with 
a central objective of “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.” 
(Næss 1995a, 3) The latter is harder to identify, and Næss proposes seven headings under 
which he adds description. Just the titles will suffice for our purposes at this point: the 
relational, total-field image, biospherical egalitarianism, principles of diversity and of 
symbiosis, anti-class posture, a need to fight against pollution and resource depletion, 
complexity not complication, and local autonomy and decentralization. We’ll examine 
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some of these later, for now I just want to call attention to the disparity: the rationale for 
Pinchot’s fair use land management is simple, focusing on the precedence of human needs 
above all else. San Francisco deserves clean water and reliable power, and if that requires 
the creation of a lake where once there was a valley, so be it. The rationale against this 
position is far more complex, requiring considerations that range from the aesthetic to the 
spiritual to a deep examination of the relationship between globalization and the 
preservation of natural habitats. Predictably—at least in hindsight—when the desires of 
early and late capitalism are pitted against a complicated, philosophical examination of 
priorities and interrelated engagements, capitalism wins. Easily. 
In Nature, Of the World, With 
God 
Instead of being a machine, nature at large turns out to be more like 
human nature—unpredictable, sensitive to the surrounding world, 
influenced by small fluctuations. 
Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life 
This perspective is fundamentally incompatible with a view of nature 
such as that presented by Annie Dillard. Dillard’s nature is not sweet 
and harmonious, but decidedly “red in tooth and claw”. An experience of 
the sacred—a mixture of fear and fascination in the face of an inscrutable 
mystery—is fundamental to Dillard’s world view but conspicuously 
absent in New Age religion. 
Wouter Hanegraaff, Reflections on New Age and the 
Secularization of Nature 
The question remains of why I should choose to listen to John Muir at all: what is it 
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that he offers us as we try to think through the issue of our relationship with our ecology? 
Clearly, there is aesthetic enjoyment: the soaring, prosaic nature of Muir’s writing, the 
seeming eternal optimism he displays with regards to the depths of nature can all speak to 
contemporary people. This is important: as Næss writes, “in environmental affairs, perhaps 
we should try primarily to influence people toward beautiful acts.” (Næss 2008, 93) But 
the real attraction is Muir’s demand for direct engagement with nature, the continued 
insistence that people benefit not just from knowing nature exists, not just from seeing it, 
but rather from being in it, from paying close attention to it. There is a lack of theoretical 
distance in Muir’s writings that remains refreshing, a sense that some behavior need not be 
deeply considered, but is rather worthwhile merely as it is. 
That is not to say Muir’s positions are unproblematic. Chief among the concerns is 
his sense that nature exists as an unmitigated “good,” incapable of error and of harm. This 
links back to his largely solitary existence: Muir’s experience of nature was consistent with 
this conviction, and he never attributed any harm—and very little risk—to his various 
perilous endeavors. Consider a representative moment: Muir has just described a major 
earthquake in Yosemite, an event that caused much consternation among most of the 
people, yet prompted him to run “out of my cabin, near the Sentinel Rock, both glad and 
frightened, shouting, ‘A noble earthquake!’ feeling sure I was going to learn something.” 
(Muir 1901, 99) He dryly notes the differences in reaction between himself, the Indians 
present and “the few whites wintering in the valley,” by claiming that, “It is always 
interesting to see people in dead earnest, from whatever cause, and earthquakes make 
everybody earnest.” (Muir 1901, 100) This piece closes with quintessential Muir, where 
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the seeming chaos and danger of nature is presented as an epiphany that is only accessible 
through direct experience: 
If for a moment you are inclined to regard these taluses as mere draggled, chaotic 
dumps, climb to the top of one of them, tie your mountain shoes firmly over the 
instep, and with braced nerves run down without any haggling, puttering 
hesitation, boldly jumping from boulder to boulder with even speed. You will then 
find your feet playing a tune, and quickly discover the music and poetry of rock 
piles,—a fine lesson; and all nature’s wildness tells the same story. Storms of 
every sort, torrents, earthquakes, cataclysms, “convulsions of nature,” etc., 
however mysterious and lawless at first sight they may seem, are only harmonious 
notes in the song of creation, varied expressions of God’s love. (Muir 1901, 100) 
One of Muir’s most well-known works traces a very similar arc. Teale sets the 
scene like this: 
During the time he was making his solitary expeditions into the California 
mountains, subsisting largely on tea and bread, Muir calculated his living expenses 
at three dollars a month. The last week of December 1874 found him exploring the 
high divided between the Yuba and Feather rivers in northern California. When a 
winter gale struck the forest along one of the tributaries of the Yuba, Muir climbed 
to the top of a Douglas spruce—now called a Douglas fir—better to enjoy the wild 
adventure of the storm. Four years later, Scribner’s Monthly published an account 
of his experience as “A Wind Storm in the Forests of the Yuba” in its issue of 
November 1878. This later became a chapter in Muir’s first book, The Mountains 
of California. Nothing else he ever wrote, with the exception of his dog story, 
Stickeen, brought Muir so many letters from readers. (Teale 2001, 181) 
Muir writes that, “when the storm began to sound, I lost no time in pushing out into the 
woods to enjoy it. For on such occasions Nature has always something rare to show us, and 
the danger to life and limb is hardly greater than one would experience crouching 
deprecatingly beneath a roof.” (Muir 1894, 121) Again, what most would interpret as 
danger is seen not just as knowledge, but rather as knowledge to rush towards headlong, 
with no consideration of harm. 
Toward midday, after a long, tingling scramble through copses of hazel and 
ceanothus, I gained the summit of the highest ridge in the neighborhood; and then 
it occurred to me that it would be a fine thing to climb one of the trees to obtain a 
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wider outlook and get my ear close to the Æolian music of its topmost needles. But 
under the circumstances the choice of a tree was a serious matter. One whose 
instep was not very strong seemed in danger of being blown down, or of being 
struck by others in case they should fall; another was branchless to a considerable 
height above the ground, and at the same time too large to be grasped with arms 
and legs in climbing; while others were not favorably situated for clear views. 
After cautiously casting about, I made choice of the tallest of a group of Douglas 
Spruces that were growing close together like a tuft of grass, no one of which 
seemed likely to fall unless all the rest fell with it. Though comparatively young, 
they were about 100 feet high, and their lithe, brushy tops were rocking and 
swirling in wild ecstasy. Being accustomed to climb trees in making botanical 
studies, I experienced no difficulty in reaching the top of this one, and never before 
did I enjoy so noble an exhilaration of motion. The slender tops fairly flapped and 
swished in the passionate torrent, bending and swirling backward and forward, 
round and round, tracing indescribable combinations of vertical and horizontal 
curves, while I clung with muscles firm braced, like a bobolink on a reed. 
 
In its widest sweeps my tree-top described an arc of from twenty to thirty degrees, 
but I felt sure of its elastic temper, having seen others of the same species still 
more severely tried—bent almost to the ground indeed, in heavy snows—without 
breaking a fiber. I was therefore safe, and free to take the wind into my pulses and 
enjoy the excited forest from my superb outlook. (Muir 1894, 122–3) 
Even his more calamitous moments are brushed aside in similar fashion: escaping a week 
stranded in a severe snowstorm on Mount Shasta, summarized in Muir’s description of 
himself and his company as being “Frozen, blistered, famished, benumbed, our bodies 
seemed lost to us at times — all dead but the eyes,” (Muir 1918, 14) he goes on to describe 
their descent below the line of the storm as a reincarnation of sorts: 
We had been so long without food that we cared but little about eating, but we 
eagerly drank the coffee he prepared for us. Our feet were frozen, and thawing 
them was painful, and had to be done very slowly by keeping them buried in soft 
snow for several hours, which avoided permanent damage. Five thousand feet 
below the summit we found only three inches of new snow, and at the base of the 
mountain only a slight shower of rain had fallen, showing how local our storm had 
been, notwithstanding its terrific fury. … In two hours’ ride the last snowbank was 
left behind. Violets appeared along the edges of the trail, and the chaparral was 
coming into bloom, with young lilies and larkspurs about the open places in rich 
profusion. How beautiful seemed the golden sunbeams streaming through the 
woods between the warm brown boles of the cedars and pines! All my friends 
among the birds and plants seemed like OLD friends, and we felt like speaking to 





In the afternoon we reached Strawberry Valley and fell asleep. Next morning we 
seemed to have risen from the dead. My bedroom was flooded with sunshine, and 
from the window I saw the great white Shasta cone clad in forests and clouds and 
bearing them loftily in the sky. Everything seemed full and radiant with the 
freshness and beauty and enthusiasm of youth. Sisson’s children came in with 
flowers and covered my bed, and the storm on the mountaintop banished like a 
dream.(Muir 1918, 15) 
When there is blame for these happenings to be placed, it is located squarely on the human 
and, even more clearly, the time spent away from those lessons taught by nature. Consider 
this recollection of a walk in 1872: 
After I had passed the tall groves that stretch a mile above Mirror Lake, and 
scrambled around the Tenaya Fall, which is just at the head of the lake groves, I 
crept through the dense and spiny chaparral that plushes the roots of the mountains 
here for miles in warm green, and was ascending a precipitous rock front, 
smoothed by glacial action, when I suddenly fell — for the first time since I 
touched foot to Sierra rocks. After several somersaults, I became insensible from 
the shock, and when consciousness returned I found myself wedged among short, 
stiff bushes, trembling as if cold, not injured in the slightest. 
 
Judging by the sun, I could not have been insensible very long; probably not a 
minute, possibly an hour; and I could not remember what made me fall, or where I 
had fallen from; but I saw that if I had rolled a little further, my mountain climbing 
would have been finished, for just beyond the bushes the cañon wall steepened and 
I might have fallen to the bottom. “There,” said I, addressing my feet, to whose 
separate skill I had learned to trust night and day on any mountain, “that is what 
you get by intercourse with stupid town stairs, and dead pavements.” I felt 
degraded and worthless. I had not yet reached the most difficult portion of the 
canyon, but I determined to guide my humbled body over the most nerve-trying 
places I could find; for I was now awake, and felt confident that the last of the 
town fog had been shaken from both head and feet. 
 
I camped at the mouth of a narrow gorge which is cut into the bottom of the main 
canyon, determined to take earnest exercise next day. No plushy boughs did my ill-
behaved bones enjoy that night, nor did my bumped head get a spicy cedar plume 
pillow mixed with flowers. I slept on a naked boulder, and when I awoke all my 
nervous trembling was gone. (Muir 1918, 5) 
This scene is somewhat buried in a longer piece on geology, but it has caught the eye of 
later readers, prompting its inclusion in Teale’s collection as well. The themes here are 
clear: the harshness of both the self-critique and the cure; the insistence that we are 
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smarter, both mentally and physically, outside of the urban; and the conviction that Muir’s 
true self lived out here, on the mountains and in the wind. The difficulty here, of course, is 
that these moments that Muir so eloquently describes in language of beauty and purpose 
are also moments of intense devastation, depending on the vicissitudes of geography. 
When we grapple with the meaning of nature, we must simultaneously hold the immense 
power of destruction it holds along with the revelatory and soul-shattering beauty. 
The Other Side of the Tracks: 
Shadows and Violence on the 
Road to America (II) 
I see it as central to the ecological issue that when blacks were forced to 
work the land, the process of human domination and the exploitation of 
nature occurred at exactly the same time. 
Carl Anthony, Ecopsychology and the Deconstruction of 
Whiteness 
Before moving on from our direct engagement with Muir and his writings, there is 
one additional issue I want to explore. In doing so, I am already gazing towards the future, 
as I want to examine the racism expressed in some of Muir’s writings not with a close 
critique of him or his cultural setting in mind, but rather to lay the groundwork for later 
discussions of contemporary (or nearly contemporary) ecological movements. As such I 
am not highlighting these passages to judge Muir per se, but rather to suggest that the ways 
in which this material is treated is both problematic and, more importantly, representative 
of some significant issues with the majority of ecological thinking and theorizing. In 
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drawing this out, we will quickly join three elements: Muir’s own writings, the 
contemporary environmentally inspired ritual known as “The Council of All Beings,” and 
a conversation between two contemporary thinkers, Theodore Roszak and Carl Anthony. 
This methodology is intentional: this is not the place for a long disquisition into the 
cultural history of race in America and, I hope, the argument is clear enough that, by the 
last of the three stops, the sketch is complete enough to proceed. 
Muir’s world, like our own, was shaped by racism, and it comes as no surprise that 
an individual with his background would inherit some of the dominant cultural 
assumptions of the day. Such things are complicated, and it is important to remember that 
Muir was an avowed opponent of slavery and that his journals reveal someone committed 
to reciprocal personal engagement with a wide variety of individuals. These “truths” need 
to be held together with his clear inheritance of a variety of racially motivated 
assumptions, both in terms of his expectations of the African Americans he encounters and 
in larger cultural terms—one of the reasons I quote these excerpts at some length is to 
show the metaphorical impact, the use of imagery of light and dark, the other associative 
content that being in the presence of African Americans raises for Muir in his long walk 
through America. Consider this excerpt from his A Thousand-Mile Walk to the Gulf: 
Met a young African with whom I had a long talk. Was amused with his eloquent 
narrative of coon hunting, alligators, and many superstitions. He showed me a 
place where a railroad train had run off the track, and assured me that the ghosts of 
the killed may be seen every dark night. 
 
Had a long walk after sundown. At last was received at the house of Dr. Perkins. 
Saw Cape Jasmine [Gardenia florida] in the garden. Heard long recitals of war 
happenings, discussion of the slave question, and Northern politics; a thoroughly 
characteristic Southern family, refined in manners and kind, but immovably 
prejudiced on everything connected with slavery. (Muir and Badè 1916, 13) 
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Worster’s treatment of Muir and race is illuminating as an example of the kind of omission 
that draws Anthony’s attention. (In some ways, Turner’s near-complete avoidance of the 
issue is equally important, but for our purposes, Worster’s pattern of recognition and 
avoidance is a richer source of material.) As a summary of Muir’s encounters on his long 
walk through the antebellum south, Worster claims that 
It was not Muir’s intention to discover what the Civil War had meant to the losers 
or winners. He remained opposed to war of any kind or for any purpose. He had 
been against slavery too, but pacifism more than abolitionism had dominated his 
thoughts in the run-up to the war. Now, inevitably along his trail he would 
encounter both black and white southerners, would eat at their tables, sleep in their 
beds, listen to the dominant race’s views about the future of the South, as they 
writhed under a federal policy of military occupation and reconstruction, and 
encounter for first time in his life a minority people who had long been oppressed 
by Euro-American civilization. He would find white southerners bitter, obsessive, 
and reactionary about such matters. Blacks he would get to know less well, as they 
guarded their speech carefully and he recorded little of whatever conversations he 
had with them, but on the whole his experience with them left him a positive 
impression. [emphasis added] (Worster 2008, 121–122) 
Later, Worster writes that, “whatever Muir may have missed about the deeper turmoil of 
southern black’s lives, he met them more or less as equals and shared the intimacy of their 
homes to an extent that few white northerners, or white southerners, ever did.” (Worster 
2008, 127) And yet, Muir writes the following of two encounters on that journey : 
Cotton is the principal crop hereabouts, and picking is now going on merrily. Only 
the lower bolls are now ripe. Those higher on the plants are green and unopened. 
Higher still, there are buds and flowers, some of which, if the plants be thrifty and 
the season favorable, will continue to produce ripe bolls until January. The negroes 
are easy-going and merry, making a great deal of noise and doing little work. One 
energetic white man, working with a will, would easily pick as much cotton as half 
a dozen Sambos and Sallies. The forest here is almost entirely made up of dim-
green, knotty, sparsely planted pines. The soil is mostly white, fine-grained sand. 
 
September 26. Reached Athens in the afternoon, a remarkably beautiful and 
aristocratic town, containing many classic and magnificent mansions of wealthy 
planters, who formerly owned large negro-stocked plantations in the best cotton 
and sugar regions farther south. Unmistakable marks of culture and refinement, as 
well as wealth, were everywhere apparent. This is the most beautiful town I have 
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seen on the journey, so far, and the only one in the South that I would like to 
revisit. The negroes here have been well trained and are extremely polite. When 
they come in sight of a white man on the road, off go their hats, even at a distance 
of forty or fifty yards, and they walk bare-headed until he is out of sight. 
 
September 27. Long zigzag walk amid the old plantations, a few of which are still 
cultivated in the old way by the same negroes that worked them before the war, 
and who still occupy their former “quarters.” They are now paid seven to ten 
dollars a month. (Muir and Badè 1916, 12) 
and 
In the center of this globe of light sat two negroes. I could see their ivory gleaming 
from the great lips, and their smooth cheeks flashing off light as if made of glass. 
Seen anywhere but in the South, the glossy pair would have been taken for twin 
devils, but here it was only a negro and his wife at their supper. 
 
I ventured forward to the radiant presence of the black pair, and, after being stared 
at with that desperate fixedness which is said to subdue the lion, I was handed 
water in a gourd from somewhere out of the darkness. I was standing for a moment 
beside the big fire, looking at the unsurpassable simplicity of the establishment, 
and asking questions about the road to Gainesville, when my attention was called 
to a black lump of something lying in the ashes of the fire. It seemed to be made of 
rubber; but ere I had time for much speculation, the woman bent wooingly over the 
black object and said with motherly kindness, “Come, honey, eat yo’ hominy.” 
 
At the sound of “hominy” the rubber gave strong manifestations of vitality and 
proved to be a burly little negro boy, rising from the earth naked as to the earth he 
came. Had he emerged from the black muck of a marsh, we might easily have 
believed that the Lord had manufactured him like Adam direct from the earth. 
 
Surely, thought I, as I started for Gainesville, surely I am now coming to the 
tropics, where the inhabitants wear nothing but their own skins. This fashion is 
sufficiently simple, “no troublesome disguises,” as Milton calls clothing, — but it 
certainly is not quite in harmony with Nature. Birds make nests and nearly all 
beasts make some kind of bed for their young; but these negroes allow their 
younglings to lie nestless and naked in the dirt. (Muir and Badè 1916, 19–20) 
“A positive impression,” indeed! Interestingly, Worster deals explicitly with these two 
moments, yet never seems to recognize the depths of racism that Muir demonstrates, not 
only the obvious language that leaps from the page, but also the associations between light 
and darkness, activity and passivity, etc. 
Again, the point here is not to castigate Muir for views that were all too common 
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and banal in his time, but rather to use these moments to reinforce two propositions. The 
first is that we all tell many stories, and that human lives are variegated, complex things 
containing behaviors and thoughts that are often inconsistent and less than savory. The 
second is that this part of Muir’s worldview—his whiteness, if you will—is inherited along 
with the rest, that later environmental thinkers have also been similarly shaped by their 
(nearly universal) whiteness, and that these issues are often ignored a la Turner, or 
explained away a la Worster. 
Inheriting Foothills: What Leads 
Aldo Leopold to Think Like A 
Mountain? 
The world is not what I think, but what I live through. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
A more concrete example may be in order, and will allow us to engage with the 
other two touchstones for this section. I want to start with a phrase, usually attributed to 
Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac, where he supposedly asks his readers to “think 
like a mountain,” a slogan that has been widely adapted within various ecological 
movements. The difficulty is that the attribution is largely apocryphal: not only does the 
exhortation not occur in the text; the section it refers to is not at all clear in its 
interpretation. This is actually a recurring issue with Leopold, as the plentiful references to 
A Sand County Almanac seem to focus almost exclusively on the final page or two of the 
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two hundred and twenty page text. This will not be the last time our attention is focused on 
the gap between the actual language and structure of a text and its reception in 
environmental and/or religious circles, an issue which plagues Gaia theory of the next 
chapter as well. 
The phrase in question is taken from the section “Arizona and New Mexico,” a 
chapter that focuses not on Leopold’s home base of Wisconsin, but on the desert southwest 
where he spent roughly fifteen years of his early professional life, interrupted by a struggle 
with Bright’s Disease (a historical term used to cover a wide range of kidney disorders) 
that lasted over a year. The chapter opens with a nostalgic piece, “On Top,” which speaks 
of the wide plateau that crowns White Mountain, accessible when Leopold first arrived in 
Arizona solely by horseback and hence “the exclusive domain of the mounted man: 
mounted cowman, mounted sheepman, mounted forest officer, mounted trapper, and those 
unclassified mounted men of unknown origin and uncertain destination always found on 
frontiers.” (Leopold 1949, 123) Leopold goes on to mourn the passing of such a pure 
frontier, ending the section by claiming that “despite several opportunities to do so, I have 
never returned to the White Mountain. I prefer not to see what tourist roads, sawmills, and 
logging railroads have done for it, or to it. I hear young people, not yet born when I first 
rode out ‘on top’ exclaim about it as a wonderful place. To this, with an unspoken mental 
reservation, I agree.” (Leopold 1949, 128) 
What Leopold seems to be really mourning, however, is a certain notion of 
masculinity. He has already explicitly made the frontier the domain of various kinds of 
men, certain and otherwise. He goes on to describe an annual contest, where “in the little 
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village at the foot of the mountain there existed, each spring, a tacit competition to be the 
first rider to invade the high solitudes. Many of us tried it, for reasons we did not stop to 
analyze. Rumor ran fast. Whoever did it first wore a kind of horseman’s halo. He was ‘man 
of the year.’” Leopold’s masculinity is concerned with frontiers, borders, extremes: being 
‘on top’ allows even “the dullest rider, as well as his horse, … [to feel] these moods to the 
marrow of his bones.” (Leopold 1949, 125) Indeed, the intensity of an emotion, 
experienced in solitude, becomes a mark of honor as he describes thunder and lightning on 
that high plateau, concluding that “it must be [a] poor life that achieves freedom from 
fear.” (Leopold 1949, 126) 
Masculinity is literally inscribed onto the top of the mountain, where exists a 
“profusion of initials, dates, and cattle brands inscribed on the patient bark of aspens at 
every mountain camp site,” a long “history of Homo texanus and his culture.” (Leopold 
1949, 126) This history follows a trans-generational narrative that is set in opposition to 
“the cold categories of anthropology,” preferring instead the 
terms of the individual career of some founding father whose initials you 
recognized as the man whose son bested you at horse-trading, or whose daughter 
you once danced with. Here, dated in the ‘nineties, was his simple initial, without 
brand, inscribed no doubt when he first arrived alone on the mountain as an 
itinerant cowpuncher. Next, a decade later, his initial plus brand; by that time he 
had become a solid citizen with an ‘outfit,’ acquired by thrift, natural increase, and 
perhaps a nimble rope. Next, only a few years old, you found his daughter’s initial, 
inscribed by some enamored youth aspiring not only to the lady’s hand, but to the 
economic succession. 
 
The old man was dead now; in his later years his heart had thrilled only to his bank 
account and to the tally of his flocks and herds, but the aspen revealed that in his 
youth he too had felt the glory of the mountain spring. (Leopold 1949, 126–7) 
There is a lot packed into these few pages: the marginality and economic use of women, 
the clear delineation of not just a masculinity, but a young masculinity, the inevitability of 
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increased social engagement as maturity is reached. But, most of all, here and throughout  
A Sand County Almanac, there is loss. The way of life that Leopold idolizes and idealizes 
is gone, relegated to an existence as something of a prior generation, and this situation 
causes him profound disease. 
Leopold squarely places the blame for the decline of the American man—which he 
sees explicitly as an outdoorsman, a sportsman, a hunter—at the feet of technology. (The 
Freudian implications of the following passage are almost too blatant to warrant attention, 
but the notion of technology as a phallic substitute, as a dildo of the outdoors, cannot be 
completely ignored.) It may be argued that Leopold does not object to technology, but 
rather to the individuals who become slaves to it, to 
the gadgeteer, otherwise known as the sporting-goods dealer. He has draped the 
American outdoorsman with an infinity of contraptions, all offered as aids to self-
reliance, hardihood, woodcraft, or marksmanship, but too often functioning as 
substitutes for them. Gadgets fill the pockets, they dangle from the neck and belt. 
The overflow fills the auto-trunk, and also the trailer. Each item of outdoor 
equipment grows lighter and often better, but the aggregate poundage becomes 
tonnage. The traffic in gadgets adds up to astronomical sums, which are soberly 
published as representing ‘the economic value of wildlife.’ But what of cultural 
values? (Leopold 1949, 180) 
The four virtues listed—self-reliance, hardihood, woodcraft, marksmanship—are all 
exalted elsewhere in the text. There is no room in A Sand County Almanac for the urbanite, 
the community organizer, the factory worker, the pacifist or, and perhaps especially, 
women. To be fair, they do make an occasional appearance: in a conversation about the 
importance of amateur research in the burgeoning “sport” of wildlife research, he praises 
Margaret Morse Nice, “an amateur ornithologist … [who] has become a world-authority 
on bird behavior, and has out-thought and outworked many a professional student of social 
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organization in birds.” (Leopold 1949, 185) Sport, however, has already been deemed a 
masculine affair, centering around the negotiation of a code of conduct as it relates to 
hunting; so at best, Ms. Nice is a trespasser of sorts. Examples of the ethical nostalgia 
centered around the relationship between men, their tools, and their violent relations with 
the animal kingdom abound, but perhaps a good example is found in Leopold’s own early 
development, where, after declaring his “unspeakable delight” on shooting his first duck 
(which, giving a title to this section, “hit the snowy ice with a thud and lay there, belly up, 
red legs kicking”), Leopold moves on to the complications of hunting partridges. Again, 
the elements are starkly drawn: the paternal injunction, the struggle against temptation, the 
grace and visual power of Leopold’s writing, and the clear longing: 
When my father gave me the shotgun, he said I might hunt partridges with it, but 
that I might not shoot them from trees. I was old enough, he said, to learn wing-
shooting. …  
 
Compared with a treed partridge, the devil and his seven kingdoms was a mild 
temptation. 
 
At the end of my second season of featherless partridge-hunting I was walking, one 
day, through an aspen thicket when a big partridge rose with a roar at my left, and 
towering over the aspens, crossed behind me, hell-bent for the nearest cedar 
swamp. It was a swinging shot of the sort the partridge-hunter dreams about, and 
the bird tumbled dead in a shower of feathers and golden leaves. 
 
I could draw a map today of each clump of red bunchberry and each blue aster that 
adorned the mossy spot where he lay, my first partridge on the wing. I suspect my 
present affection for bunchberries and asters date from that moment. (Leopold 
1949, 121–2) 
The edition of A Sand County Almanac in front of me contains line drawings by Charles 
W. Schwartz. Almost all of the drawings are of animals, with a clear connection to the 
surrounding text. The previous page shows a duck in flight, with a windmill in the distance 
(Leopold shoots his first duck by identifying a warm spot in the otherwise frozen pond 
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near a windmill runoff line). This page shows what I assume to be the same duck—the bill 
is clearly not that of a partridge—on its back, legs and wings akimbo. There is no blood, 
no wound, nothing aside from the pose to suggest the bird is dead or dying. Leopold’s 
nostalgia is a sanitized one. 
Leopold is no fool, and he is, at some level, aware of the complications of his 
position—he rants against technology and the ever-expanding sphere of human intrusion 
into the wilderness, yet he is aware that the behaviors he holds dear, the clearing of the 
land, hunting, solitary activity in the outdoors are all manifestations of the same cultural 
activities, in a different modulation: 
The answer is not a simple one. Roosevelt did not disdain the modern rifle; White 
used freely the aluminum pot, the silk tent, dehydrated foods. Somehow they used 
mechanical aids, in moderation, without being used by them. 
 
I do not pretend to know what is moderation, or where the line is between 
legitimate and illegitimate gadgets. It seems clear, though, that the origin of 
gadgets has much to do with their cultural effects. Homemade aids to sport or 
outdoor life often enhance, rather than destroy, the man-earth drama; he who kills 
a trout with his own fly has scored two coups, not one. I use many factory-made 
gadgets myself. Yet there must be some limit beyond which money-bought aids to 
sport destroy the cultural value of sport. (Leopold 1949, 181) 
Leopold casts about for a sport that has proven resistant to the encroachment of technology 
(fishing is seen as “less severely mechanized than hunting,” a claim that reflects Leopold’s 
greater engagement with what he terms “gunpowder sports” than with watery pursuits), 
and fails to discover much in the way of solace: hunting foxes “with hounds, backwoods 
style,” remains “one of the purest of sports; it has real split-rail favor; it has man-earth 
drama of the first water.” (Leopold 1949, 182) In a final move that can only be described 
as curmudgeonly, Leopold castigates the indiscriminate sharing of knowledge as a final 
negative byproduct of our increased reliance on technology. Here, information mirrors the 
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use of gadgets: there is the same lack of clarity as to exactly where the train ran off the 
tracks, the same sense of an inner circle where such behavior is accepted and an outer ring 
of hoi-polloi that are infringing upon the domain of the true sportsman. 
Knowledge of the whereabouts of good hunting or fishing is a very personal form 
of property. It is like rod, dog, or gun: a thing to be loaned or given as a personal 
courtesy. But to hawk it in the marketplace of the sports column as an aid to 
circulation seems to me another matter. To hand it all and sundry as free public 
‘service’ seems to me distinctly another matter. Even ‘conservation’ departments 
now tell Tom, Dick, and Harry where the fish are biting, and where a flock of 
ducks has ventured to alight for a meal. 
 
All of these organized promiscuities tend to depersonalize one of the essentially 
personal elements in outdoor sports. I do not know where the line lies between 
legitimate and illegitimate practice; I am convinced, though, that ‘where-to-go’ 
service has broken all bounds of reason. (Leopold 1949, 182–3) 
Before we write Leopold off entirely, however, he veers in an unexpected direction. 
Facing what seems to be an intractable situation, where he believes deeply in the positive 
impact of prolonged engagement with nature but is openly hostile to the increased 
commodification of that experience in its entirety, from the accoutrements required for its 
success to the distribution of knowledge that surrounds it, Leopold insists upon the virtues 
of 
a totally new form of sport, which does not destroy wildlife, which uses gadgets 
without being used by them, which outflanks the problem of posted land, and 
which greatly increases the human carrying capacity of a unit area. This sport 
knows no bag limit, no closed season. It needs teachers, but not wardens. It calls 
for a new woodcraft of the highest cultural value. The sport I refer to is wildlife 
research. (Leopold 1949, 184) 
Interestingly, part of the benefit of wildlife research is its ability to break “the professional 
monopoly on research” held by what “started as a professional priestcraft.” Leopold does 
recognize the value of experts: “the more difficult and laborious research problems must 
doubtless remain in professional hands, but there are plenty of problems suitable for all 
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grades of amateurs.” (Leopold 1949, 185) So, wildlife research offers a stark contrast to 
the immediately preceding discussion of hunting, where knowledge is preferred to remain 
in the domain of the experts, parceled out grudgingly and only after the recipient is deemed 
worthy of such a gift. Instead, we have Leopold exhorting that “the promotion of wildlife 
research sports is the most important job confronting the profession of wildlife 
management.” (Leopold 1949, 186) This difference is explained by intent: wildlife 
research contains knowledge that may be crucial for our self-understanding: 
This state of doubt about the fundamentals of human population behavior lends 
exceptional interest, and exceptional value, to the only available analogue: the 
higher animals. Errington, among others, has pointed out the cultural value of these 
animal analogues. For centuries this rich library of knowledge has been 
inaccessible to us because we did not know where or how to look for it. Ecology is 
now teaching us to search in animal populations for analogies to our own 
problems. By learning how some small part of the biota ticks, we can guess how 
the whole mechanism ticks. The ability to perceive these deeper meanings, and to 
appraise them critically, is the woodcraft of the future. 
 
To sum up, wildlife once fed us and shaped our culture. It still yields us pleasure 
for leisure hours, but we try to reap that pleasure by modern machinery and thus 
destroy part of its value. Reaping it by modern mentality would yield not only 
pleasure, but wisdom as well. (Leopold 1949, 187) 
Leopold closes this chapter, then, with an argument that recurs quite often in the ecological 
literature: nature is a sort of mirror, a puzzling reflection of ourselves where heretofore 
unimaginable riches of knowledge and perception lie if we could only apply ourselves to 
learn the tricks of its distorting surface. Additionally, there is a macro/micro argument as 
well: any insight into the biota, no matter how small, has the potential to throw light on the 
larger ecology. 
Do not, however, be confused by the apparent movement towards a democratic 
impulse, where expertise may be spread around indiscriminately. Leopold remains an 
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elitist, and his encouragement of amateur wildlife research is aimed at raising more people 
to the level of scholar in their areas of focus. This is reinforced by the end of this section, 
the final paragraph before the oft-quoted “Land Ethic” closes out the text. 
Ability to see the cultural value of wilderness boils down, in the last analysis, to a 
question of intellectual humility. The shallow-minded modern who has lost his 
rootage in the land assumes that he has already discovered what is important; it is 
such who prate of empires, political or economic, that will last a thousand years. It 
is only the scholar who appreciates that all history consists of successive 
excursions from a single starting-point, to which man returns again and again to 
organize yet another search for a durable scale of values. It is only the scholar who 
understands why the raw wilderness gives definition and meaning to the human 
enterprise. (Leopold 1949, 200–1) 
“The Land Ethic” begins with a switch in register for Leopold: he invokes “god-
like Odysseus’” return from the war in Troy and moves quickly into a discussion of ethics, 
specifically a claim that “there is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land, and to 
the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus’ slave-girls, is still 
property. The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not 
obligations.” Leopold is at least passably conversant with scripture, citing both “the 
Mosaic Decalogue” and making the claim that “individual thinkers since the days of 
Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the despoliation of land is not only inexpedient but 
wrong,” so his omission of Genesis 1:26’s claim of human dominion over the earth and its 
animals is surprising. Still, his conclusion sets the stage for what has become one of the 
clarion calls of environmentalism: “the extension of ethics to this third element in human 
environment is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an 
ecological necessity.” (Leopold 1949, 202–3) 
Leopold’s summary of the situation is worth considering in full, paying special 
attention to the neat inversion from beginning to end of the conqueror and the 
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scientist/scholar. What may be seen as—and is often presented as—an ecology of equals 
here is explicitly a replacement of the tyranny of force with that of expertise. 
a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-
members, and also respect for the community as such. 
 
In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror role is eventually 
self-defeating. Why? Because it is implicit in such a role that the conqueror knows, 
ex cathedra, just what makes the community clock tick, and just what and who is 
valuable, and what and who is worthless, in community life. It always turns out 
that he knows neither, and this is why his conquests eventually defeat themselves. 
 
In the biotic community, a parallel situation exists. Abraham knew exactly what 
the land was for: it was to drip milk and honey into Abraham’s mouth. At the 
present moment, the assurance with which we regard this assumption is inverse to 
the degree of our education. 
 
The ordinary citizen today assumes that science knows what makes the community 
clock tick; the scientist is equally sure that he does not. He knows that the biotic 
mechanism is so complex that its workings may never be fully understood. 
(Leopold 1949, 204–5) 
Leopold never considers the possibility of a conquering scientist, and his writing is 
certainly quite dated, still clinging innocently to the notion of a purely technological, 
peaceful utopia. Still, taking this quote along with the previous material, the core planks of 
the modern platform are all here: ecological disaster is caused by a certain aggressively 
dominant stance towards the environment; the notion that the land is there to provide for 
humanity is flawed; and that the “biotic mechanism” remains at its core a mystery, 
although a mystery that contains deeply relevant and important knowledge for humanity. 
Leopold’s analysis of the cause and solution are both quite clear: the key error has 
been an American insistence on tying conservation efforts to clearly identifiable economic 
analysis, where efforts at preserving the ecology only take hold if they are tied to material 
benefits for those involved. What is missing is an ethic, a sense of moral obligation that 
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extends beyond the community and into the land itself. “The land ethic simply enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: 
the land.” (Leopold 1949, 204) For Leopold, this is a natural evolution where ethics began 
as a person to person affair, expanded to included social concerns, and now needs to grow 
further to encompass both society and its environment. Unfortunately, “land-use ethics are 
still governed wholly by economic self-interest, just as social ethics were a century ago.” 
(Leopold 1949, 209) 
The major obstacle in this next stage of evolution is the intermingled dependence of 
the farmer and the government, each expecting the other to either be the one who suffers or 
the one who provides recompense.  
When the private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act for the good 
of the community, he today assents only with outstretched palm. If the act costs 
him cash this is fair and proper, but when it costs only forethought, open-
mindedness, or time, the issue is at least debatable. The overwhelming growth of 
land-use subsidies in recent years must be ascribed, in large part, to the 
government’s own agencies for conservation education: the land bureaus, the 
agricultural colleges, and the extension services. As far as I can detect, no ethical 
obligation toward land is taught in these institutions. (Leopold 1949, 213–4) 
Until care for the biotic community is felt as an ethical obligation, no progress will be 
made: “obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the 
extension of the social conscience from people to land.” (Leopold 1949, 209)  
In order to build the foundation for an ethical relation to the land, Leopold makes 
one more interesting detour. He has already provided several examples of how intertwined 
parts of the environment are, and how an impact in one area can carry unexpected echoes 
in another; he has talked about the tangled web of relationships between predator and prey 
and about how a diversity of arboreal species are required for a healthy forest, where “the 
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interdependence of … its constituent tree species, ground flora, and fauna is taken for 
granted.” (Leopold 1949, 212) However, something is missing, a final element that will 
make his ethical impulse ultimately compelling: energy. “Land, then, is not merely soil; it 
is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals.” (Leopold 
1949, 216) Leopold is far from a vitalist, but this final appeal definitely carries a vitalist 
appeal: ultimately, what connects the different components of the biota is an animating 
force, an energetic flow, that allows for their connections and interdependence. He goes to 
great lengths to explain these flows scientifically, as a result of various processes of 
decomposition, predation, erosion, etc., but the underlying premise remains. 
Having made this final connection, the stage is set for Leopold’s summation, 
including the maxim that is oft-repeated and that seems to be his primary contribution to 
the ecological conversation that follows his work: 
The ‘key-log’ which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an 
ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic 
problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, 
as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong 
when it tends otherwise. (Leopold 1949, 224–5) 
The last two sentences are often offered as a summary of how to “think ecologically,” and 
they certainly do encapsulate a large amount of ecological thought that both precedes and 
follows after Leopold. In the end, the point of this long detour through A Sand County 
Almanac comes to this: perhaps even unknown by the thinkers and writers who hold up 
this part of Leopold’s slim book, we also inherit the rest. Lurking behind the insistence on 
the value in and meaning of the biotic community is the elitism, the romantic nostalgia, the 
lurking shadows of unexamined gender assumptions and roles, the confused longing for 
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the perceived simplicity of the past that fills the preceding two hundred pages. When we 
are encouraged to think like a mountain, we are also nudged in these directions. 
Go Tell It On the Mountain: 
The Whiteness of the Peaks 
If you are incapable of seeing the beauty that’s around you and the 
beauty of the people around you, if you are constantly running from 
them, then you can never make your peace, you’re always trying to 
escape to somewhere else. But if we appreciated living in a multicultural 
neighborhood, appreciated something beautiful there, the beauty of people 
from different places who have different stories, then instead of running 
from it you’d be drawn to it. 
Carl Anthony, Ecopsychology and the Deconstruction of 
Whiteness 
One of the adaptations of this phrase is found in John Seed and Joanna Macy’s 
Council of All Beings, a ritual widely performed at ecologically-focused gatherings, both 
academic in nature and not. The ritual revolves around individuals inhabiting a natural 
persona—flora or fauna, mineral or vegetal—and engaging in conversation with humans. 
The pattern is usually remonstrative and then forgiving, and the ritual is often seen as a 
way of “re-earthing,” or reconnecting with a perspective outside of our own. Just to be 
clear, this notion of “thinking like a mountain” has become a cultural meme, albeit a minor 
one, existing on its own and turning up in potentially surprising places. Consider Robert 
Hurley’s introduction to his translation of Gilles Deleuze’s Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 




The environment is not just a reservoir of information whose circuits await 
mapping, but also a field of forces whose actions await experiencing. In a human 
sense, it can be called the unconscious, or at least the ground on which the 
unconscious is constructed. Which of these actions are we capable of 
experiencing? What is a walk in the forest (where the tick is waiting to experience 
us)? And what new individual do we compose when we “think like a mountain?” 
For Deleuze (for Spinoza), Nature itself is an Individual, composed of all modes of 
interaction. Deleuze opens us to the idea (which I take as a contribution to 
ecological thought) that the elements of the different individuals we compose may 
be nonhuman within us. What we are capable of may partake of the wolf, the river, 
the stone in the river. One wonders, finally, whether man is anything more than a 
territory, a set of boundaries, a limit on existence. (Deleuze 2001, ii–iii) 
We now move into difficult territory: as we shall see in chapter five, I remain 
absolutely committed to the possibility of positive personal change emerging from 
activities that engage with spiritual narratives. Side-stepping the question of reality for a 
moment, such experiences may indeed be energizing, revelatory, or otherwise highly 
powerful events. And that is often a very, very good thing. But that doesn’t exempt them 
from analysis, and there are two issues here worth teasing apart. The first is a simple 
psychoanalytic exploration of the importance in these narratives of the re. We are always 
exhorted to reconnect with the earth, to return to a primal awareness of nature, to 
rediscover knowledge that has either been lost or is only found in a primitively defined 
other. This is a classic grand narrative—it is the longing for Eden and the search for Israel, 
the desire to return to the womb and the shining city on the hill, and it plays out in a 
curious way. Ecological analyses often attribute the causes of the environmental issues to 
another set of grand narratives: the dependence on technology in the West; the ways we 
have become separated from our bodies and our emotional selves; the aggressive and 
repressive dominance of masculine qualities and modes of being over feminine. In this, 
there is an implied clarity where the environmental movement itself is seen as immune to 
such critique, leaving its own operational logic largely unexamined. 
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I would like to walk a fine line here: the goal is not to deconstruct ecological 
thinking, but rather to enrich it, to prod it and poke it in some hard to reach places with a 
hope that, by leaning into some of its discomfort, a stronger consideration may emerge. 
The first foray into this will be guided by the conversation between Roszak and Anthony, 
captured in Roszak’s anthology, Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind 
(note the re, again). Anthony summarizes his position at the start of the interview: 
Ecopsychology tells us that the healing of the self and the healing of the planet go 
together. The environmental justice movement could benefit from that insight; it 
needs a greater understanding of the psychological dimensions of environmental 
racism. But a framework for such an understanding hasn’t yet been established. 
There is a blind spot in ecopsychology because the field is limited by its 
Eurocentric perspective, in the same way that the environmental movement as a 
whole has been blind to environmental racism. There are a lot of people who 
would like to hear the voice of the Earth who are not currently being reached by 
the movement for Deep Ecology, which I believe, can be seen as the basis for 
ecopsychology. (Anthony and Roszak 1995, 264) 
The challenge for thinking ecologically is that, in a subject that is staggering in its diversity 
and scope, “we have stories that are lies. But what may be worse, we only have a limited 
range of stories, when we ought to have a much fuller range.” (Anthony and Roszak 1995, 
272) Note that Anthony is not arguing against all of the existing stories (although there are 
certainly motifs—most notably that of “purity” that remain profoundly troubling). Instead, 
there is a desire for more: more stories, more complexity, more perspectives, more 
exploration of the differences that reveal all of the ways in which ecology matters. In this 
sense, when Anthony asks “why is it so easy for these people to think like mountains and 
not be able to think like people of color?” (Anthony and Roszak 1995, 273) he is calling 
directly for the same outcome as The Council for All Beings, but with an expanded focus 
on the inter-species. This speaks directly to the heart of the issue: in a movement often 
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concerned with understanding, supporting, and preserving external diversity, there is a 
surprising tendency towards internal monoculture, towards relatively simplistic 
assumptions of value and origin. And if there is anything that is definitionally opposed to 
the aims of an ecologically grounded activism, it is monoculture based on a set of 
theoretical abstractions. 
Abstraction means distance from immediate experience, from annoyingly concrete 
particulars, the substitution of a remote symbol for a given sensuous reality. But 
that’s what ecology is all about: the real complexity. You have to deal with the fact 
that there is a river here, or deal with the fact that bugs come. In contrast, the 
whole idea of “perfection” leads to monoculture: flatten the land, have only one 
crop, come along with an airplane and spray. You don’t have to deal with the fact 
that this is an organic process. (Anthony and Roszak 1995, 272) 
For Anthony, the root of the problem is clear: it is the destructive power inherently 
rooted in “the monolithic human identity that has been built around the mythology of pure 
whiteness.” (Anthony and Roszak 1995, 277) This is not, in general, a comfortable subject 
for environmental thinkers: most often, a hasty retreat is beaten under the banner of the 
ecology surpassing any narratives of class or race or a romanticized vision of a native 
tradition is held forth as proof of the diversity of thought. Rarer is a recognition that race 
and ecology are explicitly linked considerations, that the narrative of the land—especially 
in the United States of America—is inherently entangled with the narrative of those that 
were either moved off the land or brutally imported to cultivate it in order to build the 
fortunes of others. Ignoring racism—or blithely sweeping it away under the banner of an 
ecological humanism—does not eradicate it. 
Anthony argues that the solution to this lies in a proliferation of narratives, in a 
welcoming of alternatives into the stories that form the grounding for ecological thought. 
The goal of all this is finding “a way to build a multicultural self that is in harmony with an 
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ecological self. … An ecopsychology that has no place for people of color, that doesn’t 
deliberately set out to correct the distortions of racism, is an oxymoron.” (Anthony and 
Roszak 1995, 277) And he remains optimistic about this approach: 
If you are actually in dialogue with people, and somebody tells you you don’t have 
it right, then you say, “Well, tell me what is right.” And then you say, “Okay, I’ll 
remember that.” And the next time, you tell it differently. Not being right is only a 
problem when you have a very tenuous, fearful relationship with somebody. But if 
you are in substantial dialogue with another person, then you learn through trial 
and error. (Anthony and Roszak 1995, 274) 
The problem, then, is one of engagement, with an explicit critique of what Anthony sees as 
a misguided focus on the non-human at the expense of direct encounters with the rich 
diversity of the human world. While his argument highlights several issues in ecological 
thinking that are very important for our considerations, it is a little unfair. That is, pursuing 
that logic would reduce all worthwhile activity to social activism or, more limited yet, 
psychology. Those are both worthy pursuits, but they are clearly not the only worthy 
pursuits (even if certain social activists or psychologists may disagree). The challenge is to 
hold Anthony’s narrative critique close while still allowing a focused contemplation of the 
non-human. 
The relevance to Muir of our three-step diversion is twofold. First, there is the 
recognition of the power and the continued presence of “whiteness” in the unfolding of 
ecological thought. Second, this discussion moves us towards an underlying issue that I 
want to spend some time surfacing and exploring, that of subjectivity and, more 
specifically, that of how to attempt to cross the chasm between subjectivities: what is it 
that is encountered when we encounter nature? Or, each other? In bringing the discussion 
of Muir forward in time, this question of subjectivity will loom large, as will that of the 
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limits and function of scientific knowledge, especially when it relates to ecological 
questions. If I am building a bridge with Muir’s nineteenth century wanderings forming the 
abutment at one end, then deep ecology and more specifically, Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Næss will anchor the conversation at the other. 
Chaos: A Pause for Science 
Fantasy is not just fantasy. It is also ethnography going further than 
anthropologists had yet dared to tread. 
Charlotte E. Hardman, He May Be Lying But What He Says Is 
True 
In our crossing, we return, momentarily, to the question of science and to the 
discussions of the previous chapter, albeit from a slightly different perspective. Here, I 
want to focus on a peculiar temporal twist in ecological science, where we run full speed 
into the limits of mechanical projection. The crux of the issue is nothing new, but its 
implications are far-reaching. As an illustration, I will return again to the history of 
manned flight in space, where we find one of the peaks of classical physics: we are able to 
project the forces required to land various size craft onto surfaces roughly a quarter-million 
miles away, accounting for changes in velocity due to crossing through a variety of 
atmospheric conditions and boundaries, changes in direction from the smallest course 
corrections, and changes in payload from a process of gradually jettisoning unneeded fuel 
reserves. It’s really quite stunning. And it works because the interaction of forces involved 
is relatively limited: the spacecraft is but so large and the bulk of the journey is through 
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space, which is mostly, well, space. These efforts are scheduled multiple times per year 
across the globe, their frequency impacted by the vagaries of geo-political and economic 
forces, but their occurrences are impacted most directly by a single uncontrollable variable: 
weather. Weather patterns represent a limit of knowledge, a limit that cannot be solved by 
the same tools that send rockets soaring in flight towards Mars. And the reason is that it’s 
just too complicated. We know how to make one hundred thousand pounds of spacecraft 
land on the Descartes Highlands (Apollo16). But we can only guess at whether or not it 
will rain on the morning of the launch. 
This uncertainty is tied up with time: the physics of motion are testable and 
repeatable and, hence, predictable. But we can’t do the same for systems so large or so 
complex that they brush with the boundaries of chaos (of course, nor can we do it for 
systems so small they move into the quantum realm). However, as soon as the moment 
passes and we move from predicting what will happen to measuring and analyzing what 
actually did happen, we are once again returned to solid ground. But the incredible volume 
of knowledge about the past can only reduce uncertainty in future predictions: it cannot 
eradicate it. 
Ecological systems are, in many cases, several degrees more complicated than 
weather patterns (demonstrated most clearly by the fact that the weather is merely one of 
the interlocking systems that impact a given ecology). So, in many cases we possess an 
exquisite understanding of the present and the past, which then leads to our making various 
pronouncements about the future. And, of course, these are usually dire, taking the form of 
if the polar caps keep melting at the current rate, all coastal cities in North America will 
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be flooded by 2030. Note the structure: intense measurement of the immediate past leading 
to a wider projection into the future. 
The problem is that our ability to project out from the current situation is horribly 
flawed: the global ecology (and, for that matter, the global economy) is just too vast, too 
resilient in some places and too fragile in others, for those predictions. We know that the 
chemical composition of the atmosphere has changed dramatically in the last hundred 
years, we know that the oceanic dead zones are at their largest recorded size, we know that 
global weather patterns are less stable than they were in the recent past. But we can only 
guess at the impacts of these events, and all too frequently those guesses are more in the 
service of various political narratives than of any true exploration of possibilities. Amidst 
dire predictions, and after several years of severe decline, the salmon harvest in 2010 was 
the largest seen in dozens of years (Eggers and Carroll 2011). 
A group of scientists from all parts of the world met in 1984 at São José dos 
Campos in Brazil. The meeting, held at the request of the United Nations 
University, posed the question, “How does human intervention in the natural 
ecosystem of the humid tropics affect the forest, the regions around it, and the 
whole world?” It soon became clear that, whatever their disciplines, the specialists 
had little to offer other than a frank and honest admission of ignorance. Asked, 
“When shall we know the consequences of removing the forests from Amazonia?” 
they could only answer, “Not before the forests have gone.” (Lovelock 1988, 146) 
This is a situation that demands that dreaded bugaboo of modern times, complexity: in an 
age where a five paragraph article on cnn.com requires three one sentence bullet points at 
the top for those of us too busy to read the entire thing; where media consumption is being 
driven by the one hundred and forty character summary tweet, this is problematic. Dire 
predictions of disaster make great headlines, but are usually based on highly questionable 
science. The entire question is incredibly more complicated than we can easily summarize. 
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Organisms, ways of life, and interactions in the biosphere in general exhibit 
complexity of such an astoundingly high level as to color the general outlook of 
ecologists. Such complexity makes thinking in terms of vast systems inevitable. It 
also makes for a keen, steady perception of the profound human ignorance of 
biospherical relationships and therefore of the effect of disturbances. (Næss 1995a, 
6) 
To comprehend all of this, we need “less prognosis, more clarification of possibilities. 
More sensitivity towards continuity and live traditions, and—most importantly—towards 
our state of ignorance.” (Næss 1995a, 6)  
It fascinates me that the key moment here is that of the entrance of fantasy, of the 
imposition of creative imagination into the problem, and that this notion is so rarely 
recognized. One of the challenges to anyone who wishes to think about these ecological 
issues is to find a way to harness our own projections, avoiding both Eden and the 
apocalypse. A vision of a future where we will muddle along, reacting as best we can to 
the changing world around us may not be compelling enough to become a best-seller, but it 
needs to become a goal, allowing a middle ground between the assumption that technology 
will cure any of the myriad problems it generates and that of inevitable global catastrophe. 
Crossing Chasms, Crossing 
Species 
We look at an animal and see a mirror. The obsession with putting 
ourselves at the centre of everything is the bane not only of theologians 
but also of zoologists. 
Yann Martel, Life of Pi 
Thinking ecologically requires thinking broadly and deeply about a wide array of 
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things. It is a tangled, complicated, difficult subject. I would affirm with Donna Haraway, 
who we will visit with in more depth momentarily, that “the point is not to celebrate 
complexity but to become worldly and respond.” (Haraway 2008, 41) Two parts of 
Haraway’s phrase speak to me: first there is a call to the embodied world, an insistence that 
the issues of ecology are issues that must be worked out in the flesh. That is not to deny the 
importance of theory, only to affirm the importance of praxis. Indeed, that is the second 
question that Haraway raises: she urges us to “become worldly,” but what is it that we are 
becoming if we do so? 
This quickly becomes more a problem of philosophy than practicality or politics. 
Anthropocentrism is a near universal constant across human history—and one that makes 
intuitive sense when carefully considered. We only have access to one subjectivity, our 
own, and we struggle mightily to extend that to other humans, let alone when trying to 
understand what truly thinking across species might necessitate. This is not a simple 
question. In thinking through it, I find Haraway’s work to be quite useful, especially her 
extended meditations on human/canine relationships in When Species Meet. Before looking 
more closely at her arguments, however, I want to examine her description of herself 
before she dove deeply into considerations of her subject matter. With her typical playful 
complexity, she writes that 
In the beginning of everything that led to this book, I was pure of heart, at least in 
relation to dog breeds. I knew they were an affectation, an abuse, an abomination, 
the embodiment of animalizing racist eugenics, everything that represents modern 
people’s misuse of other sentient beings for their own instrumental ends. Besides, 
so-called purebreds got sick all the time, as well they should from all that genetic 
manipulation. Really bad, in short. Mutts were good as long as they were 
sterilized; trained to a low standard—lest human control play too big a role—by 
positive methods; and off leash in every possible situation. Fertile street and 
village dogs were good because they lived in the third world or in its moral and 
244 
 
symbolic equivalent in doggish humanism, but they needed to be rescued 
nonetheless. At home, in my progressive, American middle-class, white bubble, I 
was a true believer in the Church of the Shelter Dog, that ideal victim and 
scapegoat and therefore the uniquely proper recipient of love, care, and population 
control. Without giving anyone quarter about our collective and personal 
obligations to mutts and shelter dogs, I have become an apostate. I am 
promiscuously tied with both my old and new objects of affection, two kinds of 
kinds, mutts and purebreds. Two terrible things caused this unregenerate state: I 
got curious, and I fell in love. Even worse, I feel in love with kinds as well as with 
individuals. (Haraway 2008, 96) 
This is a pattern that we will encounter again in different contexts, where clearly and 
devoutly held assumptions, ideals that seem instinctive and natural in their formation, are, 
when pressed, less resilient than anticipated. For Haraway, her loss of romanticism with 
regards to the webs of interaction between canines and humans leads to two breaks: first, 
with the liberal outlook outlined above, but second with the use of a non-human alterity in 
service of fashionable metaphors. Here, she collides directly with two thinkers that in other 
contexts both she and I hold in the highest esteem: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The 
contested territory is a chapter in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus titled 
“1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal.” As Haraway summarizes,  
A Thousand Plateaus is a part of the writers’ sustained work against the 
monomaniacal, cyclopean, individuated Oedipal subject, who is riveted on daddy 
and lethal in culture, politics, and philosophy. Patrilineal thinking, which sees all 
the world as a tree of filiations ruled by genealogy and identity, wars with 
rhizomatic thinking, which is open to nonhierarchical becomings and contagions. 
So far, so good. (Haraway 2008, 28) 
The difficulties begin when Deleuze and Guattari turn their gaze outwards to the animal 
kingdom. The moment of introduction is worth considering in full: 
A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in 
short, a multiplicity. We sorcerers have always known that. It may very well be 
that other agencies, moreover very different from one another, have a different 
appraisal of the animal. One may retain or extract from the animal certain 
characteristics: species and genera, forms and functions, etc. Society and the State 
need animal characteristics to use for classifying people; natural history and 
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science need characteristics in order to classify the animals themselves. Serialism 
and structuralism either graduate characteristics according to their resemblances, or 
order them according to their differences. Animal characteristics can be mythic or 
scientific. But we are not interested in characteristics; what interests us are modes 
of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling. I am legion. The 
Wolf-Man fascinated by several wolves watching him. What would a lone wolf 
be? Or a whale, a louse, a rat, a fly? Beelzebub is the Devil, but the Devil as lord 
of the flies. The wolf is not fundamentally a characteristic or a certain number of 
characteristics; it is a wolfing. The louse is a lousing, and so on. What is a cry 
independent of the population it appeals to or takes as its witness? Virginia Woolfs 
[sic] experiences herself not as a monkey or a fish but as a troop of monkeys, a 
school of fish, according to her variable relations of becoming with the people she 
approaches. We do not wish to say that certain animals live in packs. We want 
nothing to do with ridiculous evolutionary classifications à la Lorenz, according to 
which there are inferior packs and superior societies. What we are saying is that 
every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack. That it has pack modes, rather than 
characteristics, even if further distinctions within these modes are called for. It is at 
this point that the human being encounters the animal. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
239) 
Animals exist in multiplicities: we are only becoming-animal (a good thing, something all 
fellow sorcerers should aspire towards) if we are doing so in that context. This is actually 
not all that radical of a concept, although of course the language-game engaged in here is 
radically different, consider the following from James Lovelock (note also the lovely 
happenstance of a reference to the molecular, another favorite trope of Deleuze and 
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Life is social. It exists in communities and collectives. There is a useful word in 
physics to describe the properties of collections: colligative. It is needed because 
there is no way to express or measure the temperature or pressure of a single 
molecule. Temperature and pressure, say the physicists are the colligative 
properties of a sensible collection of molecules. All collections of living things 
show properties unexpected from a knowledge of a single one of them. (Lovelock 
1988, 18) 
But for Deleuze and Guattari, it is not sufficient to be in community; instead the focus falls 
onto the anomalous, a concept defined initially by its negative and then in a difficult 
passage of relations. 
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The anomalous, the preferential element in the pack, has nothing to do with the 
preferred, domestic, and psychoanalytic individual. Nor is the anomalous the 
bearer of a species presenting specific or generic characteristics in their purest 
state; nor is it a model or unique specimen; nor is it the perfection of a type 
incarnate; nor is it the eminent term of a series; nor is it the basis of an absolutely 
harmonious correspondence. The anomalous is neither an individual nor a species; 
it has only affects, it has neither familiar or subjectified feelings, nor specific or 
significant characteristics. Human tenderness is as foreign to it as human 
classifications. Lovecraft applies the term “Outsider” to this thing or entity, the 
Thing, which arrives and passes at the edge, which is linear yet multiple, “teeming, 
seething, swelling, foaming, spreading like an infectious disease, this nameless 
horror.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 244–5) 
Oh. Oh dear. Recognizing, perhaps, where they have gone, Deleuze and Guattari 
try another avenue, claiming that “the anomalous is neither an individual nor a species” 
before settling that instead, “It is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon of bordering. This is 
our hypothesis” a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, 
not by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and 
dimensions it encompasses in ‘intension.’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 245) This is more 
complex, but also more reasonable: becoming-animal is a movement at the borders of the 
pack, something that combines acceptance and transgression, something that conspires to 
add a change in speed to the movement of the collection seen as a single entity. This is the 
argument against seeing the anomaly as an “exceptional individual; that would be to equate 
it with the family animal or pet, the Oedipalized animal as psychoanalysis sees it, as the 
image of the father.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 244) Clearly, exceptionalism is merely a 
guise of traditional filiation—the best son, the exemplar that spills beyond the pre-
established categories, the next improvement in performance and competition. We 
become-animal not in crossing a boundary but in transforming the category as we move 
past its threshold, in blurring and overlapping or trail as we do so. The point is, though, 
that we don’t need to become demonic snails from Cthulhu leaving behind an eerie slime 
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as we do so. 
Earlier, and in a quote we will grapple with in our final chapter, Donna Haraway 
had claimed that, “though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would rather be a cyborg 
than a goddess.” (Haraway 1991, 181) There is consistency with her most succinct riposte 
to Deleuze and Guattari: “I think we learn to be worldly from grappling with, rather than 
generalizing from, the ordinary. I am a creature of the mud, not the sky.” (Haraway 2008, 
3) Haraway has great sympathy for notions of multiplicity, for the rejection of the 
hierarchy and linear correspondences of filiations. And the questions asked in “1730: 
Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal” are in essence, her own. Haraway begins When 
Species Meet with a simple declaration of purpose: “Two questions guide this book: (1) 
Whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog? And (2) How is ‘becoming with’ a 
practice of becoming worldly?” (Haraway 2008, 3) She returns to these questions again 
and again, and by the end of the text what is most clear is that there are no easy answers: 
inquiring into exactly how we bridge the intra-species divide reveals more and more points 
of both connection and disconnect, moments of understanding and moments of absolute 
alterity. But there is always (at least) an other involved, even if identification of what 
exactly that might be is quite difficult. Haraway reinforces, again and again, that 
none of it can be approached if the fleshly historical reality of face-to-face, body-
to-body subject making across species is denied or forgotten in the humanist 
doctrine that holds only humans to be true subjects with real histories. But what 
does subject or history mean when the rules are changed like this? We do not get 
very far with the categories generally used by animal rights discourses, in which 
animals end up permanent dependents (“lesser humans”), utterly natural 
(“nonhuman”), or exactly the same (“humans in fur suits”). (Haraway 2008, 66–7) 
She never allows herself to, as Deleuze and Guattari very easily do, lose sight of an actual 
animal, of the specific dog with which she becomes … what? Something, something more 
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than a woman and a dog, but also not something lycanthropic, something that preserves the 
disparate natures while honoring the often slim zone of overlap. 
Contrast the italicized original in A Thousand Plateaus: “anyone who likes cats or 
dogs is a fool.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 240) Deleuze and Guattari have no time for 
pets, no regard for their relations, and no patience for those enamored by their presence. 
The old, female, small, dog- and cat-loving: these are who and what must be 
vomited out by those who will become-animal. Despite the keen competition, I am 
not sure I can find in philosophy a clearer display of misogyny, fear of aging, 
incuriosity about animals, and horror at the ordinariness of flesh, here covered by 
the alibi of anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist project. (Haraway 2008, 30) 
There is intersection here with the discussion of Anthony above: Deleuze and Guattari 
have no consideration for what is lost when we switch planes of thought, when we move 
from a consideration of the flesh in front of us to the lofty heights of abstraction. Thinking 
like a mountain and thinking like a pack may be very different, but they may be subject to 
the same critiques of inheritance and assumption. 
It may seem strange to claim that Haraway has helped me think about these issues, 
given the profound lack of clarity in her own conclusions. In one way, however, that is the 
point: communication between species is always already a becoming, a process of 
movement, in Haraway’s words, “animals are everywhere full partners in worlding, in 
becoming with. Human and nonhuman animals are companion species, messmates at table, 
eating together, whether we know how to eat well or not.” (Haraway 2008, 301) These 
issues are even more problematic when the other under consideration cannot even be 
identified: if it is so difficult to understand how we partner with another species in the act 
of worlding, how do we ever hope to do so with the exterior world, with nature itself? We 
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may not fully grok how we interact with an animal companion, but we can at least make 
inroads into the simple definitional questions, separating at the practical level at least, the 
cat from the furniture, the mythologized (although Deleuze and Guattari would scream at 
the word) border-dwelling pack member from the person in front of me. But when we turn 
back to nature, we are led almost inexorably into a philosophical swamp: it turns out that 
even defining the true other in ecological terms becomes incredibly difficult. We are 
encouraged to take into account the needs of the river, the mountain, the swamp and yet 
any attempt to figure out exactly what that refers to—what are the boundaries of the 
swamp? What is included in the river?—is quite confounding. 
At the same time, there is something equally compelling about the need for a 
correction to our rampant anthropocentrism: it has become increasingly clear that a 
conception of the world that sees humanity as isolated and separate from our surroundings, 
that places the bounty of the world—animal bounty, vegetable bounty, mineral bounty—at 
our pleasure, is somehow fundamentally short-sighted. If there is no desire to hasten a 
coming apocalypse (this is actually a relatively common argument of several strains of 
conservative Christianity, used to defend environmentally destructive or exploitational 
practices), then something needs to change and, of course, we would prefer that change to 
be grounded in something that feels solid and stable, whether that be found in science or 
philosophy or somewhere else. Hence we return to the original two problems: the scientific 
evidence is tightly bound to the present while the philosophical remains lost in a complex 




Ultimately, deep ecological awareness is spiritual or religious awareness. 
When the concept of the human spirit is understood as the mode of 
consciousness in which the individual feels a sense of belonging, of 
connectedness, to the cosmos as a whole, it becomes clear that ecological 
awareness is spiritual in its deepest essence. 
Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life 
At the Third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest in 1972, Arne Næss 
first used the term “deep ecology movement” in reference to a growing body of work (his 
own and many others) concerned with a new framework through which to view humanity’s 
interactions with the external world. (Næss 2008, 25) This phrasing is consistent with 
Næss’ outlook in general: he was reluctant to take up a mantle of leadership and reluctant 
to even assert the existence of deep ecology itself: it was, instead, the deep ecology 
movement, which brought together a diversity of views and viewpoints under a shared set 
of goals. Monoculture, for Næss, was anathema or, more strictly speaking, impossible: 
nothing exists on its own. “Pluralism is inescapable and nothing to lament. Reality is one, 
but if accounts of it are identical, this only reveals cultural poverty.” (Næss 2008, 182) 
Næss remains for me the most direct descendant of Muir, and before we explore the 
philosophy surrounding his notion of deep ecology, a brief biographical sketch may help 
illustrate the similarities between the two men. Most strikingly, both remained, to the end 
of their days, committed to a first-hand encounter with nature that permeated their 
theoretical work. Næss famously built and maintained a small and isolated cottage in 
central Norway where he would spend weeks of each year. This cottage, named 
Tvergastein, was more than a place of refuge for Næss, it was a touchstone to remind him 
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of the beauty of the stark Nordic countryside, of the joy he found in hiking and climbing 
the surrounding peaks, and of the value of isolation as a tool for contemplative 
development. David Rothenberg describes the cottage and its surroundings thus: “In 
central Norway there is a mountain, Hallingskarvet, a large, long ridge like a huge loaf of 
bread. Imagine that it rose too fast in the oven, making a sharp cliff on the southern side of 
the crust. Beneath this precipice stands a tiny hut, at the place called Tvergastein.” 
(Rothenberg 1993, xiii) Throughout his life, Næss had “done much of his most original 
creative writing and other work” in this small space, surrounded by “endless cliffs to climb 
and a view with few equals for its extent and impressiveness.” (Næss 2008, 9) 
Arne Dekke Eide Næss was born in January of 1912 “in a house in Slemdal, on the 
outskirts of Oslo, with a wild garden that blended into woods.” (Næss 2008, 8) He was 
“the unexpected last child of four. His father died less than a year after he was born, and 
his mother, Christine, hired a governess to take care of the little one. The relationship 
between mother and son remained strained, and young Arne developed an aversion to his 
mother’s love of language and emotional exaggeration.” (Rothenberg 1993, 1) 
Næss was a gifted child, a loner who spent more time examining what he saw as 
the small beauties of nature than engaging in social play with other children. Isolation 
came easy to him in many forms, including as a defense mechanism against his mother. In 
his own words: 
I adopted a tremendous resistance to emotion. When I should be spanked, for 
instance, normally I should have been carried off to the second floor, or dragged 
off to a sofa, but when spanking was on the program, I went by myself up the stairs 
to the second floor, and lay down on the couch to await my fate. I tried to have no 
reactions before, during, and after, and this was terrible for my mother. When she 
scolded me, I was just bleak and I would not talk to her for a long while. She was 
trying to connect with me, and I had some feeling of power over her because I 
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would resist her. Later, this led me to place an enormous weight on impartiality. I 
tended to use language in a bureaucratic or scientific way, valuing so-called 
objectivity. (Rothenberg 1993, 6–7) 
The discipline this required served him well in his academic work, and at age 27, Næss 
was the youngest person appointed full professor in the hundred-plus year history of the 
University of Oslo. He taught there until 1969, taking early retirement then “to devote his 
remaining years and energies to the active support of the long-range deep ecology 
movement.” (Næss 2008, 11) During his years as a professor, he became a devoted 
follower of Gandhi, or, at least, of a version of Gandhian non-violence and actively 
participated in anti-Nazi resistance movements. These last two items are important in our 
considerations, as they underline how, for Næss, there was always a necessary ethical 
component to the philosophical considerations that engaged him so deeply. 
This is not, however, a chapter devoted to Arne Næss. Instead, I want to use his 
writings as part of a synthetic thought-experiment aimed at extending a consideration of 
Muir into contemporary times. I intentionally refrain from labeling this thinking “beyond,” 
rather it is an extension, a lengthening of Muir’s shadow if you will. Næss’ environmental 
contributions constantly mediate between two poles: at one hand, he is a gestalt thinker, 
constantly concerned with the totality of context that comprises our relations and 
perceptions; on the other, he spent his life fascinated with wonder at small things, and 
indeed made a point of preferring the stark beauty of a single small flower to that of, say, a 
jungle in bloom. These ideas, when not the subject of memoir or casual recollection, are 
expressed with a philosophic depth and rigor that reflects his training and expertise; for 
example, when outlining the importance of gestalt, Næss writes (and I quote at length): 
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When absorbed in the contemplation of a concrete, natural thing, a person does not 
experience a subject-object relation. Nor does a person have this experience when 
absorbed in vivid action, whether in movement or not. There is no epistemological 
ego reaching out to see and understand a tree or an opponent in a fight, or a 
problem of decision. A tree is always part of a total, a gestalt. Analysis may 
discover many structural ingredients, sometimes an ego-relation, sometimes not. 
The gestalt is a whole, self-contained and self-sufficient. If we call it “experience 
of the gestalt,” we are easily misled in a subjectivist direction 
 
When describing a constellation of gestalt relations, we must not let the usual 
stress on the epistemological subject-object distinction dominate the expression. In 
a spontaneous experience, there may or may not be an ingredient corresponding to 
the distinction. … 
 
If “cheerful tree” and “dark and threatening tree” are two spontaneous expressions, 
analysis in terms of relations may conclude that they refer to “the same” tree. But 
this sameness is definable only in terms of an abstract structure, whereas 
utterances refer to two concrete contents. (Næss 2008, 76) 
The argument here centers on the dangers inherent in separating the world into a 
subject/object dichotomy. Næss instead insists on the ubiquitous presence of a gestalt, a 
totality in which we are always already embedded in the same tableau that we observe and 
that, indeed, different moments of perception argue against a continuity of being with 
regards to external objects. This is, to say the least, problematic: if the identity of the tree is 
not consistent, what claim do we have that your identity is consistent between the days I 
love you and the days I loathe you? And, if that identity is unstable, how do we create 
ethical norms that govern our treatment of each other? 
Næss’ answer to this—some may claim his answer to everything—lies in his 
concept of ecosophy, an attempt to provide a philosophical framework for life. Næss 
names his own personal philosophy Ecosophy T, however in a more general sense, an 
ecosophy is 
a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of 
sofia [or] wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, 
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value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our 
universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description 
and prediction. 
 
The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant 
differences concerning not only ‘facts’ of pollution, resources, population, etc., but 
also value priorities. (Næss 1995a, 8) 
The need for ecosophies comes from a set of somewhat obvious questions: 
Supporters of the deep ecology movement refer approvingly to a diversity of 
philosophers, cultural traditions, and religious trends. Some authors ask for 
clarification: Where is the essence or core? Is there a definite general philosophy 
of deep ecology, or at least a kind of philosophy? Or is it essentially a movement 
with exasperatingly vague outlines? (Næss 2008, 105) 
A Næssian ecosophy has four interrelated levels, moving from the most abstract through 
the concrete practicalities that govern our everyday behavior. Explicitly ecumenical, the 
crux of this structure (which Næss sketches out in what has become known as the “apron 
diagram”) is at the second level, that of a platform, “preferred to principle, because the 
latter may be misunderstood to refer to ultimate premises.” (Næss 2008, 105) While this 
model is applicable across concerns, Næss and his followers nearly universally apply it to 
issues of ecology—therefore, the second level becomes synonymous with “the platform of 
the deep ecology movement” specifically. The structural value of the apron diagram is that 
it explicitly creates space for different underlying “ultimate premises,” (the “strings” of the 
apron, and the foundation of our motivations) that agree on a specific platform, leading to 
largely overlapping (but not totally congruent) sets of “general views” and “concrete 
decisions.” (Næss 1995a, 11–12) 
The strings are vital for Næss, as they simultaneously allow him to welcome a wide 
diversity of motivations and to enforce agreement on a common set of conclusions. He 
introduces this by writing that 
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the platform of the deep ecology movement is grounded in religion or philosophy. 
In a loose sense it may be said to be derived from the fundamentals. The situation 
only reminds us that a set of very similar or even identical conclusions may be 
drawn from divergent premises. The platform is the same, the fundamental 
premises differ. One must avoid looking for one definite philosophy or religion 
among the supporters of the deep ecology movement. Fortunately there is a rich 
manifold of fundamental views compatible with the platform of the deep ecology 
movement. (Næss 1995a, 11) 
It’s a tidy solution, and one that has some support practically, as Næss is surely correct in 
writing that “in spite of different philosophical and terminological leanings, the three 
groups—the supporters of social ecology, the ecofeminists, and the deep ecology 
movements—cooperate well in praxis, learning from each other’s special activities. The 
frontier of the work is long, and we need to express our appreciation of work done in 
different sectors from our own.” (Næss 2008, 101)  
Næss offers a fascinating combination of two very disparate worlds: on the one 
hand, his commitment to rigor, to the exactness of language, to the power held in 
specificity give him a philosophical grounding that thoroughly eludes Muir. On the other, 
his unwavering loyalty to his conception of gestalt, to the importance of the total 
experiential moment, to the vital importance of recognizing the wide disparity of 
simultaneous experience that individuals may undergo all contribute to a much more 
humanist position than might be expected. While resistant to the term dialectic, Næss 
clearly saw a parallel process at work: “If you leave out the nonprecise things, you are lost 
in accuracy. One must go back and forth, from precision to ambiguity. Rarely in 
philosophy can the vague be eliminated.” (Rothenberg 1993, 29) 
The roots of both of these areas of focus reach back to Næss’ youth, most clearly to 
the years spent in Austria just before the second World War, where in “Vienna, the city of 
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neurosis itself, an intellectual center on the verge of annihilation by the Nazi threat, home 
of Freud’s psychoanalysis, as well as the site of the latest movement in philosophy, known 
as logical empiricism (positivism) developed by a group of philosophers known as the 
Vienna Circle.” (Rothenberg 1993, 21) Næss recalls that, “by chance and luck, I went 
straight into the graduate seminar of the logical positivists, with Moritz Schlick, Rudolf 
Carnap, Friedrich Waismann, Herbert Feigl, and others …They were so nice to me as a 
very young man. It was a miracle that I could be there. Their discussion was tough, but 
clear, without nonsense.” (Rothenberg 1993, 23) 
At the same time, Næss entered an intense, six day a week, course in 
psychoanalysis, proving himself quite compatible with the stream of consciousness 
discussions that it required. At the time, completion of a certain number of hours of 
treatment “on the couch” was all that was required to become authorized to treat patients 
on one’s own, and it seems that Næss was at least toying with this idea as a prospective 
path. However, after just over a year, he realized that “even if I wasn’t sure I wanted to be 
a teacher, I was certain I wouldn’t be an analyst.” (Rothenberg 1993, 35) However, at this 
time, he began to serve in an unofficial capacity at a mental institution and this experience 
appears to have opened up his own sense of the possibilities of human contact: “That’s 
what made me both sensitive to the full range of human suffering and aware of the ocean 
of possibilities one has for really helping other people. I saw that just sitting there made a 
difference to her.” (Rothenberg 1993, 37) This is not an easy conclusion for Næss, as he is 
also sensitive to the utter bleakness of the situation, as well as to the flimsy comfort that 
living may contain. The series of recollections is worth quoting in full, as the clarity of 
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vision and the unflinching encounter with the less palatable conclusions it may reveal are 
consistent with Næss’ overall presentation. 
DR: Now, how did this connect to the fact that you always felt a distance 
between yourself and other people? 
 
AN: That’s a curious thing, that distance may very well go together with a 
feeling of sympathy, empathy, and grasp of how much affliction there is all 
around. … 
 
It made a tremendous impact on me to sit there with another human being, and 
once she had a clear enough moment to say, “Now I am completely crazy.” It 
helped her to have somebody in the neighborhood. She was in a small room, alone, 
in a straitjacket, and there was distress and panic. What a fate: to sit alone like that, 
for hours and hours every day, and with no prospect except to get out and then try 
to kill yourself. 
 
DR: From your experience with it, did the field of psychiatry offer any cure for 
this? 
 
AN: At the time, paranoid-schizophrenic people had little hope. So they were 
sent to a particular institution, where they were put away, like old furniture that 
should not be destroyed but somehow just kept around. They would be sent to 
Steinhof. Some of them know of Steinhof and the possibility that they would be 
sent there, and there was a lot of screaming. 
 
DR: And from there, there was no return? 
 
AN: It was bleak. I hope that this patient I have talked about got out of the 
clinic and was successful in suicide. From that time, I viewed suicide as a very 
natural thing that many people could commit for good reasons. 
 
DR: Is that because life itself is not of value, with on a certain kind of life, a 
certain quality of life, worth living? 
 
AN: Life is wonderful, delightful, and fantastic, but to be alive is a completely 
different thing. Under certain circumstances, it is so awful that suicide should not 
be discouraged. I am talking about cases where someone has been suffering a long 
time and it’s quite clear that they would prefer to stop living. We are all going to 
stop, we all have limited time, and it’s not of value to go on as long as possible. 
Reasonable people, after cool reflection, may prefer to stop, to have an abrupt 
close, and look back to some good memories, and decide it was enough. 
 
I never seriously thought I would be a psychiatrist, but I was grateful to all those 
who showed me these things. Much later, I gave a lecture to the students of Oslo 
University on the meaning of life, because so many young people search for 
something they can do that really would make a difference for humanity. I said, 
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“Well, it’s very easy, just sit down. Sit down with somebody who is in extreme 
pain.” It’s tremendously simple if you have some empathy. Go out to either the 
prisons or the clinics. I was not the same person after I heard those screams. 
(Rothenberg 1993, 37–8) 
This moment is notable in Næss’ conversations with Rothenberg, as elsewhere a much 
more limited portrait of a loner emerges, one who often shies away from interactions with 
others even at their times of need. Næss confesses that “I still live too much in my own 
world. This is worst when it compromises the norms of friendship. A couple of people 
have complained, saying that when they were in real trouble, I was not very helpful. Even 
if I may worry a lot about their situation, I was not very helpful.” (Rothenberg 1993, 186) 
This stance for Næss is rooted, oddly as it may seem, in an intensely felt humanism: 
When it really comes to a question of this, I try to say, “By God, you are on par 
with anybody else and you are different, but this is within the human range of 
differences, and you will find others who are different in approximately the same 
way, and you will have good feeling for what you are.”  On the radio, I have said 
this: “Everybody should feel equal to Einstein and Leonardo da Vinci as human 
beings, unique and infinitely rich.” 
 
I don’t know how I got that feeling, but when I am together with one human being 
in the mountains or in other situations where we get close, I never have any feeling 
that certain people are boring or that certain people don’t have an inner life. If they 
were able to articulate exactly what they were experiencing, then, of course, it 
would be a book of great importance. (Rothenberg 1993, 183) 
Distance is a constant in Næss’ recollections, from his initial climbing excursions, 
which revolved around a series of calculated achievements, where he and a friend were 
focused on reaching “the top of as many mountains as possible—counting each mountain, 
and also calculating the number of kilometers needed for the climb, the distance in 
kilometers, and then the height. When we went on trips we had a certain way of calculating 
the amount of climbing. The first mountain on the range went up to, say, 2,000 meters, and 
the next might only be worth three hundred meters, because we went only a little down and 
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then up again. This was our cult of the mountain.” (Rothenberg 1993, 15) This conversion 
of experience into something that could be measured and analyzed served him well in his 
early career, certainly contributing to the level of philosophical rigor that allowed him 
entry to academia at such a young age. Eventually, however, the distance became more 
problematic, as he realized that it also separated himself from other people, often against 
his will. That said, it retained its usefulness: after World War II, Næss served as a sort of 
mediator, helping surviving families reach some closure about the fate of loved ones who 
disappeared during the Nazi invasion and its aftermath. This work often involved highly 
emotional interactions between murderers—or at least their accomplices—and the 
surviving bereaved, a situation where Næss’ calm affability and emotional distance served 
him well. Again, though, his belief in humanity rings through: “I belong to those—among 
which also include certain Christian priests—who cannot judge any human being. We can 
judge actions, but never the human being. To me, human beings have in a vague sense an 
infinite value. There is something that calls for respect, even in torturers.” (Rothenberg 
1993, 115) 
Næss was not a social man, and while he craved human company, he was explicit 
about not desiring too much of it—his description of perfection was time spent at 
Tvergastein with a single good companion. But humans remain central to his world: while 
he struggles explicitly with exactly where and how to draw the boundary, he clearly states 
on numerous occasions that unique human cultural needs have a superior value to any 
environmental or animal concern. In the end, nature may function for Næss as the ultimate 
marker of distance, a mirror that he needed in order, eventually, to see the reflection of 
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other people across the barren and harsh landscape that he loved. Nature offered him an 
implacable solitude and a place where the intense rigor of his thoughts could flourish, 
finding small toeholds no matter how barren the soil. The title of Rothenberg’s book 
reflects this process, and is a subject of explicit comment: thought, for Næss is always 
painful. “Always. Because by thinking, I mean to get further than you have been. That 
means rethinking with closer attention, going deeper.” (Rothenberg 1993, 108) 
I suspect that here we have finally arrived at both the point of irreconcilability 
between Muir and Næss, as well as at an impasse that sheds light onto what these two 
mountaineers may have to offer each other. There is of course, the obvious: the Spartan 
nature of Tvergastein would have delighted Muir, and Næss’ finely tuned understanding of 
the costs of the highly-developed social world would, I believe, have been a point of great 
agreement between the two. But ultimately, Næss is an anthropocentric thinker. Even his 
initial love of the mountains was, in hindsight, based as much on their addressing a deeply 
felt psychological need to the point where Næss claims that, when he was five, the 
mountains were a “kind of a substitute for a good father.” When Rothenberg tries to protest 
that this must be something the he “learned later in analysis—a mountain is a substitute for 
a father,” and that this realization may be unfair to the young Næss, “humanizing” the 
experience in a way that he “might not originally have wanted,” he is met with protest: 
“Yes. But it was a kind of protector. It showed me what was worthwhile, suggesting that 
one should try to be calm and self-contained.” (Rothenberg 1993, 17) The pursuit of a 
healthier, more balanced, more sane relationship with nature for Næss is ultimately a way 




Muir, on the other hand, remained committed to nature quite independent of 
humanity, believing that there was value purely in the mountain, the glacier, the valleys of 
his beloved California. Nature was not a mirror for Muir, but a tunnel, through which, at 
certain angles of the sun or during the extremes of certain storms, or under the divine 
tutelage of certain stars, one could glimpse God at the far side. Still, Muir could certainly 
have benefitted from some of Næss’ rigor, some of his philosophical understanding of the 
world: at the end of the day, Muir’s writings are somehow underwhelming in their overall 
impact. They are beautiful, surely, and they are inspiring to many. But there is a lack of 
cohesion, a lack of formality that makes it quite difficult to identify more than a generic 
“nature is good” program from them. His writing is quoted on web pages and made into 
slogans on t-shirts, but neither of those would please him. Næss’ work, on the other hand, 
both identifies certain general goals about nature that Muir would fully support and 
identifies some practical ways to align one’s life with those goals. Næss’ humanism leads 
him irresistibly into politics, and while neither man was comfortable in that arena (Hetch 
Hetchy soured Muir on the public arena for the rest of his life, while Næss, when elected to 
a minor position in his community, made it excruciatingly clear that he was not the man for 
the job), Næss’ recognition of the need for individuals to find their own paths through 
these questions and his subsequent development both of his own ecosophy but also of a 
methodology by which he hoped others could generate their own principles for 
engagement, leave him a much more compelling figure on the practical level. 
Both are unified, in the end, by a mystery: for all his soaring prose, Muir can never 
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quite identify what the magnetic attraction to the earth is for him and for all his considered 
and careful explorations, Næss can never explain the deep pull of his simple cabin high in 
the mountains. But for both, there existed a connection, something that moved them to 
consider their relationship with the deep ground, with the open spaces, with the glaciers 
and with the desert in a way that illustrates how spiritual practices can be and are centered 
on the ground that surrounds us.
263 
 
As Above, So Below 
Perhaps we no longer need to see the Earth in reality when we can see it 
so well on Google. 
James Lovelock, The Vanishing Face of Gaia 
James Lovelock, one of the two key collaborators in the creation of Gaia theory 
(the other, whom we will meet in more detail below, is Lynn Margulis), describes himself 
repeatedly as an “independent scientist,” rather than a consultant or an entrepreneur or, 
more prosaically, an intellectual explorer or something of that ilk. Any of these would be 
accurate, although entrepreneur may be a bit of a stretch: Lovelock has formed a few 
different companies, as well as a few non-profits over the course of his career, but the 
growth or financial success of those enterprises never emerges as a primary concern. 
Instead he chooses to focus, with enough pride to use it as the subtitle of his 2000 
autobiography, on his independence, his working apart from the established scientific 
community and its entanglements with academic and/or industrial contexts. It’s not an 
entirely comfortable situation: Lovelock is aware of his isolation from various types of 
“cutting edge” work and of his missing the give and take of working side by side with 
other scientists, but his position as an outsider has also served him well: the roots of his 
work on Gaia may be traced to a moment where his outsider status allowed an unpopular 
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thesis to be examined more fully than may otherwise have been possible. We will explore 
the substance of Gaia shortly; before that, a brief sketch of Lovelock’s early career will, 
along with some very quick biographical notes, help set the scene. 
Born in 1919 in Letchworth, England, Lovelock’s childhood follows a form that, 
while perhaps not typical, was also not too far beyond the norm: a smart mother who 
believed deeply in education, a failed enterprise that kept the family on the edge of the 
economic cliff, a childhood where the greatest lessons were taught outside the confines of 
the school day and usually learned alone. “I was neither a perfect pupil nor happy to be at 
school. In fact, I hated it so much that every day was a kind of ordeal. If, as often happened 
in the winter, the filthy coal smoke that polluted the Brixton air made me ill, it was a vast 
relief. I could stay at home in bed with my beloved books, freed by bronchitis or 
pneumonia from the tyranny of school.” (Lovelock 2000, 18) 
Lovelock’s autobiographical writing is refreshingly and at times disturbingly frank. 
Consider the following recollection from his youth, concerning a prank played on a 
teacher, seen as representative of the ongoing conflict between students and what we 
would now term the administration, 
one small battle in our long war. A master, who taught French so badly that I could 
recall hardly a word of it, had the nickname “Sappho.” This was not because he 
was inclined, like others among the staff, to a feeble fumbling of young boys that 
aimed at, but never reached, its target of pederasty. No, we called him “Sappho” 
because it was in his hour that pubescent boys explored their bodies in an orgy of 
mutual masturbation. Much is made of the troubled minds of young girls of those 
repressed times, of their panic when they reached the menarche and first 
experienced bleeding from their vaginas. I cannot recall ever having heard any 
public comment on the similar puzzlement of boys when masturbation produced a 
sticky liquid product. For most of them, the 1930s were still a time when 
masturbation was a mortal sin, not something to mention to parents or indeed any 
adult. It was not so surprising that in the warm community of their peers they 
explored their bodies and discussed such things. As far as I know, little of this 
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intimacy led to homosexuality; those of that inclination seemed to pair up early on 
and avoid the general scrimmage in Sappho’s room. (Lovelock 2000, 18) 
There is much to unpack here: the common banality of sexual behavior between teachers 
and young boys, the sense of gender disparity from young Lovelock’s perspective, the 
notion that homosexuality would manifest in a reserved avoidance of the orgy. And, of 
course, the twin questions of why Lovelock shares this and why I include it. One reason is 
the simple absence of material like this in other parts of the archives under consideration. 
For example, Turney’s Lovelock & Gaia, a very useful guide through the history of Gaia 
the idea, has little to say about Lovelock, the man. Other than this clear humanizing 
effect—we are in the company of flesh and blood here, not the distant scientist whose 
white coat provides a barrier against the outside world—this scene also serves to bookend 
his autobiography in a thematic sense. Lovelock’s final decades (he is ninety-three at the 
time of writing) have been dominated by three themes: the success of his work on Gaia; a 
joyous and sexually active relationship with a much younger American woman; and a 
horrific set of surgical mistakes that literally tore apart the inside of his penis. The 
relationship is clearly intertwined with the pain and recuperation from the multiple 
surgeries, and both bear a passing explanation. 
In the early 1980s, Lovelock was hospitalized for an urgent operation on his heart. 
In the post-operative procedure, something went horribly wrong with the removal of his 
catheter, leading to a long series of excruciatingly painful surgeries and, eventually, a 
diseased kidney. At one point, by the mid-1980s, this required weekly surgeries on his 
urethra, where his surgeon 
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diligently repaired blind holes and other problems caused by the crude dilations 
with stainless steel rods at Barnstaple. He tidied my urethra to make it again a pipe, 
rather than something like an inverted river delta, but there was still scar tissue 
from the damage done earlier. The problem with scar tissue is that it contracts, and 
I needed relatively frequent operations to keep my urethra open. A less serious side 
effect was that I now had a curved penis when it was erect. (Lovelock 2000, 364) 
This seemed the least of his worries, indeed as an operation was proposed that would, in 
the words of his doctor, “make a short channel from your bladder to the inguinal region. In 
other words, to arrange for you an artificial urethra that would be similar in construction to 
that in most women,” Lovelock decided that, “with the thought that my penis would soon 
be redundant, celibacy seemed now not to matter quite so much.” (Lovelock 2000, 364) In 
an oddly unexplained twist, Lovelock wakes from that surgery to find that, instead, his 
medical team elected to perform a far less invasive urethrotomy, leaving his sexual organs 
intact and functional. Lovelock writes, “I should have sung my praises to him there and 
then. Where would I have been in five years’ time with nothing to bring to my second 
marriage but a withered member?” (Lovelock 2000, 366) 
Lovelock met Sandy Orchard in the spring of 1988 at the Global Forum: he was 
there as a participant, “she shared with Wilfrid Grenville-Grey, of the London office, the 
task of arranging and running the conference. The New York organizers of the Global 
Forum, led by Akio Matsumura, Dean Morton, and Cecile Reyes, were in charge.” 
(Lovelock 2000, 373) It was—complicated by a busy schedule, but not by reticence on 
either’s part—love at first sight. Before the end of the conference, the two were sharing a 
bed. Of the first night, Lovelock says, “We talked and nibbled at the cheese and grapes, but 
not for long. Soon we were in bed for a riotous night. Awake for most of the time, we 
repeated our lovemaking. … For the first time in a lifetime, I had fallen deeply in love and 
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had it requited in full. I knew that this was real—not sex after the seminar for two hungry 
delegates: it was total commitment and in our hearts and in our genes we knew that it was 
a perfect marriage.” (Lovelock 2000, 378) At this time, both of them were married to their 
first spouses, relationships that are described more in terms of long-term caretaking and 
deep friendship than anything else (Helen Lovelock was in the final stages of a long 
struggle with multiple sclerosis that would end with her death in 1989, while David 
Orchard was similarly burdened with a cancer that would take his life the following year). 
The affair continued unabated: “After a brief and light meal in our suite we went to bed for 
an orgy of lovemaking that lasted all night. We were so physical that early in the morning, 
Sandy cricked her back, and pain spoilt what should have been a cosy and slow breakfast.” 
(Lovelock 2000, 381) Sandy and James married in 1991. 
The portrait of Lovelock that emerges from Homage to Gaia is that of a forthright, 
clear-thinking man attempting an honest assessment of an extraordinary career. If, in doing 
so, he felt the need to push the boundaries of the usual scientific memoir, and if that was 
partially energized by the wonders of octogenarian sex by one for whom that had once 
seemed impossible within the confines of his marriage and then again due to surgical 
invasion, I feel more inclined to indulge the disclosures. They also serve to put him into 
conversation with the figures of Muir and Næss: the great lacuna of Muir’s life is not his 
years in Canada, but rather the nature of his relationship with Jeanne Carr, a set of 
questions unlikely to be resolved given the fierce editing (and burning) of many of their 
letters shorty after Muir’s death. There is another, more theoretically relevant connection 
with these two men as well, and one that also bookends Lovelock’s boyhood and dotage. 
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While in college in Manchester, Lovelock  
joined the Mountaineering Club. This student society had a club hut at a place 
called Tal-y-Braich in the Ogwen valley in North Wales. Thanks to the fact that 
medical students and young physicians were over-represented in the club, someone 
nearly always legitimately had a car and could drive to Wales for a weekend of 
climbing … I remember one day we left the converted farm cottage at Tal-y-
Braich to satisfy an older member’s wish to complete his list of Welsh 25s. A 25 is 
a mountain higher than 2500 feet. There is a curious obsession amongst mountain 
walkers to climb every mountain that high in some given area. The peak we were 
making for was Drum, one of the Carneddau—a mountain mass of mostly smooth 
moss and grass punctuated by small crags, rather like Dartmoor, only higher. … it 
was over ten miles to Drum and we passed over Carnedd Dafydd, Carnedd 
Llewylen, and two prominent peaks on the way. … Suddenly, the dangers we 
faced became real when one of us crested the sharp rise between the mountains and 
a gust lifted him into the air. He fell in the snow on the slope just beside me and 
did not fall further. But our leader pressed on like the Bellman in “The Hunting of 
the Snark.” His desire to collect the last of the 25s overcame common sense. … 
 
I should have known from the fate of other students that it is indeed the most 
dangerous of activities. Mountains then claimed a high proportion of the lives of 
those who climbed them and more than ten climbers and hill walkers I knew 
personally died in the years that I was a student, and mostly from exposure, 
although a few did fall. … 
 
We felt so good as we stood on that high mountain range in the snow, gazed down 
through the clear air, and enjoyed the exhilaration of the endorphins raised by the 
effort of climbing. Dangerous it may be but few other sports can offer such a 
reward. (Lovelock 2000, 48–9) 
He and Næss would at least have something to talk about, even if Lovelock’s 
mountaineering evolved into a constant series of walks around his long-time residence in 
England, Coombe Mill. These walks come up at key moments: it was where his friendship 
with William Golding developed, and it was through them that his heart problems initially 
manifested. It is also a walk—in direct, if muted in scope, echo of Muir’s use of walking as 
physical therapy—that forms the end of his autobiography. It is ten years on from their 
marriage, a decade that is remembered in sharp contrast to the 1980s,which Lovelock 
refers to as “a time of painful self-absorption, whose bounds were limited as if by the 
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straitjacket of an insect’s pupa,” (Lovelock 2000, 387). The 1990s, instead, are described 
as  
the most fulfilling years of my life: the sustained joy of my second marriage, 
recognition by the international scientific community through the award of three 
major environmental prizes, one literary prize, the Nonino, eight honorary degrees 
and, most of all, a visit to Buckingham Palace to receive the honour of CBE from 
the Queen. (Lovelock 2000, 406) 
Gazing at an uncertain future and back over the terrain of his past, Lovelock writes of his 
desires: 
As we enter the 21st century, Sandy and I have a sense that we have paid and 
received our dues. We feel that the rest of our years together should be free of the 
tasks that we have disliked, but felt the need to do for duty’s sake. Prominent 
among these for me is lecturing and attending meetings and, for us both, answering 
letters comes next. Instead, we plan to walk the 630-mile path around the 
southwest coast of England, from Poole in Dorset, via Land’s End in Cornwall, to 
Minehead in Somerset. It involves a total climb of over 91,000 feet, more than 
three times the height of Mount Everest. This is no epic quest: for mankind it is a 
pointless and useless endeavor; for us it is a thrilling challenge and a joy to plan. 
(Lovelock 2000, 407) 
Lovelock’s early scientific career was a product of what may be termed a “free 
apprenticeship,” where young scientists worked with quite a lot of freedom alongside more 
experienced researchers. There were financial limits, and there were specific challenges 
upon which they were directed to focus their efforts, but the picture painted by Lovelock is 
one where he was given free rein to approach his work in creative, innovative, and 
potentially risky ways. This self-reliance was partially a product of necessity: Britain 
during and after World War II was a country struggling to regain its footing in the world, 
and shortages of everything, from food to scientific equipment, were relatively common. 
Lovelock thrived under these conditions, combining determination and ingenuity in equal 
measure and, it would seem, never being discouraged by the logistical and material 
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obstacles that appeared. 
These efforts led to his first and, from a practical perspective, most important 
invention, the Electron Capture Detector, or ECD. The ECD is a very small device, easily 
held in one hand. It is also an extraordinarily sensitive one, able to detect the presence of 
incredibly minute amounts of different chemicals within an easily obtained sample. In 
Lovelock & Gaia: Signs of Life, Jon Turney neatly summarizes the functioning of the 
ECD: 
A small radioactive source is installed inside a tube of nitrogen gas which has 
electrodes at each end, one positive, one negative, connected to an external circuit. 
The slight but continuous radioactive bombardment strips electrons from some of 
the nitrogen atoms, and these free electrons move to the positive electrode—thus 
generating a steady electric current which can be monitored. 
 
Now introduce a trace of a more chemically reactive gas, say DDT, into the stream 
of nitrogen. This mops up some of the free electrons, and the current decreases. 
And it really only does need a trace to produce a detectable effect. A femtogram—
a thousand million millionth of a gram—is enough to produce a reading. (Turney 
2004, 16–17) 
The key is that the fluctuations in current are constant for any particular chemical or 
compound: each one has a unique signature which the ECD can record. As such, the 
reading from the ECD can be used to identify very, very small trace amounts of chemicals. 
Combined with its ease of use and portability, the ECD is also well suited to examining 
questions related to the dispersion of a chemical or compound over very large distances. It 
is hard to overstate the impact of the ECD: it was lightweight, cheap, and had application 
in dozens of disparate scientific fields. Lovelock writes that, “this simple device that fits 
easily into the palm of my hand was without doubt the midwife to the infant environmental 
movement. Without it we would not have discovered that chlorinated pesticides like DDT 
and dieldrin had spread everywhere in the world. … It made us aware for the first time of 
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the global extent of pollution. Without the ECD, the appearance of environmentalism and 
green politics might have been delayed by as much as ten years.” (Lovelock 2000, 191) 
Note that the ECD was an invention, not a discovery: Lovelock constructed, 
refined, and tinkered the first devices into existence, a process that here—as elsewhere in 
the annals of science—led to what may be seen as an asynchronous process of discovery, 
where the eventual uses of knowledge may be apparent initially but are not recognized 
until much further on. Consider: 
I had to make everything from the electronic amplifier to the sensor itself by hand. 
Remember also that in those days we used vacuum tubes not solid-state 
electronics. I even made the radioactive source needed to ionize the air by scraping 
the dial paint from gauges taken from the flight deck of old wartime aircraft. These 
gauges provided a rich harvest of radium. I made the sources by ashing this paint, 
resuspending the ash in lacquer, and then painting this radioactive lacquer onto the 
anemometer ion source. It worked well and I was able to take it on my Arctic 
expedition in the winter of 1949. Its only drawback was that cigarette smoke 
perturbed its response; it was as sensitive to this as is a reformed smoker. To 
discover the cause of this disturbance by smoke and perhaps find a cure, I exposed 
the anemometer to a number of different gases and smokes and found that, in 
addition to smoke, CFCs disturbed its function. At the time, we did not need a 
device to detect low levels of halocarbons and so the electron capture detector was, 
in a sense, prematurely discovered. (Lovelock 2000, 193) 
Lovelock remained a committed proponent of hands-on science throughout his career, to 
the point of holding much theoretical work in more than slight disdain. His passion for 
science as a physical exercise, as something that contains things you can touch and see and 
measure, would both plague and pave the way for the later success of Gaia: Lovelock was 
at the vanguard of those looking for experimental results that would confirm or deny Gaia, 
and he had absolutely no reticence about the iterative exchange of interpretations that 
marks scientific process and the seeming reversals of opinion that go along with them. At 
the same time, it is conceivable that the enormity of Gaia, the difficulty in doing more than 
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finding evidence for different parts of the phenomenon, remained troublesome for 
Lovelock himself. 
Inferring Life: Entropy and 
Equilibrium 
Life could not exist on a planet sparsely; it could not hang on in a few 
oases. 
James Lovelock, Ages of Gaia 
This interplay between the theoretical and the practical marks much of his 
professional career, and was part of the work that laid the foundation for Gaia. The ECD 
had paved the way for Lovelock’s professional career, and had given him access to a wide-
ranging network of peers across many disciplines. He had stayed both independently 
employed and professionally active, and in 1965, Lovelock was approached by NASA to 
participate, in collaboration with Dian Hitchcock, on work related to the exploration of 
Mars. Lovelock reminds us that 
At that time, and it now seems long ago, it was generally believed that there was a 
sporting chance of finding life on that planet. In any event, it was felt that the 
discovery of life anywhere outside the Earth would be a momentous event that 
would so enlarge our view of the Universe and of ourselves as to be well worth the 
cost of trying. Hitchcock and I did not disagree with those noble sentiments, but 
we were concerned that most of the experiments then proposed were much too 
geocentric to succeed even if there were life on Mars. 
 
If seemed as if the experiments had all been designed to seek the sort of life each 
investigator was familiar with in his own laboratory. They were seeking Earth-type 
life on a planet not in the least like Earth. To Dian and me, it seemed that we were 
guests of an expedition to seek camels on the Greenland icecap or of one to gather 
the fish that swam among the sand dunes of the Sahara. (Lovelock 1979, 85) 
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Lovelock and Hitchcock began to frame the problem more broadly, looking to “design a 
more general form of life-detection experiment, one which would recognize life, whatever 
its form might be.” (Margulis and Guerrero 1991, 85) This led them to realize that there 
was, in fact, no need to go to Mars to determine the presence of life. Instead, an analysis of 
the Martian atmosphere would suffice, and such measurements could be done safely from 
the surface of the earth: 
If a living cell is exchanging chemicals with the outside world, there must be a 
means of moving the chemicals around, removing wastes and bringing nutrients 
within reach. The only two ways of doing this, the only media for transport and 
exchange, are air or water. As it looked like there was no liquid water left on Mars, 
what passes for air on the planet was the only thing left for life to use. (Turney 
2004, 9–10) 
Here’s the key: earth’s atmosphere is radically, maniacally unstable. There are 
thousands of different chemical exchanges happening all the time. All of this activity 
serves, in general, to increase order in local systems: that is, it works against the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics, which decrees that systems tend towards entropy, towards a 
maximum dispersal of energy. There is a tendency to talk about the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics as stating that the universe tends towards disorder or chaos. This is a 
technically correct, but often gross misunderstanding of Rudolf Clausius’ famous 
statement in 1865 that “the entropy of the universe tends to a maximum.” Entropy does 
indeed equate with disorder—at the microscopic level, where increased entropy refer to the 
increased number of possible states that are available to the system; that is to the greater 
range of unpredictable outcomes. The most common example of this involves a thought 
experiment where something like the following is proposed: take two sets of a dozen tennis 
balls, twelve red and twelve white and enclose them in a three foot square cube. Shake the 
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cube for long enough to ensure random distribution of the balls and then freeze them mid-
shake. How will the balls be arranged? The answer, of course, is impossible to pin down 
exactly, but the odds of an incredibly highly ordered outcome—say all of the red balls 
lined neatly against one side of the cube and all of the white ones against the other—are 
infinitely worse than a highly disordered outcome, where the arrangement of white and red 
balls seems to follow no discernible pattern at all. A similar thought experiment would be 
to throw small blocks with the letters of the alphabet in the air and have them land in such 
a way that they spell something meaningful. The difficulty is that the system at the height 
of disorder may, in fact, appear the most well blended at the macroscopic level (think of, 
say, a blueberry, banana, and strawberry smoothie: after a few minutes in the blender, we 
are likely to see a uniform color emerge instead of stripes or polka dots or identifiable 
swirls of blue, yellow, and red). Erik Davis observes that “the second law does seem to 
condemn all the interesting things in the universe to tread water for a while before they get 
sucked downstream into a cold amorphous sea of bland disorder. More than any other 
force in physics, entropy strikes the mind like some dark and ancient doom etched into 
natural law.” (Davis 1998, 104) This perceptive difficulty has led, over the past few 
decades, to the term disorder falling out of favor in deference to the more accurate—but 
admittedly less compelling—“energy dispersion.” 
When thought of this way, the constant processes of chemical exchange that fill the 
atmosphere are clearly working against the dispersion of energy. And, the source of all this 
dynamism? Life. It is the presence of life on Earth that results in the atmosphere being in a 
constant state of flux; conversely, closed systems absent of life result in a dead state: a 
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neutral equilibrium that remains undisturbed. The Second Law of Thermodynamics always 
wins; but the absence of life allows the process to speed up considerably.  
Were there no life, temperature and gas composition would be predictable solely 
from physical factors. The sun’s output of energy and the rules of chemistry and 
physics would determine Earth’s surface properties. But these properties deviate 
significantly from predictions based on physics and chemistry alone. The non-
biological sciences do not suffice to explain the Earth’s surface environment. 
(Margulis 1998, 124) 
This is a critical moment, and one that resonates deeply outside the scientific community 
as well. Consider Bataille: “I insist on the fact that there is generally no growth but only a 
luxurious squandering of energy in every form! The history of life on earth is mainly the 
effect of a wild exuberance; the dominant event is the development of luxury, the 
production of increasingly burdensome forms of life.” (Bataille 1989, 33) 
It is a simple thesis, one that ultimately led Lovelock to the formulation of Gaia 
many years after his efforts to identify traces of life on Mars. When he proposed it to 
NASA, however, the notion that he could prove the existence of life on Mars from the 
safety of a laboratory in England was greeted with some horror: such an idea, no matter 
how correct, was politically imprudent given the years of manpower and money that had 
already been committed to the exploration of Mars, especially since the only provable 
result from Lovelock and Hitchcock’s work was the affirmation that, indeed, life existed 
on our own planet—which does not, as you would imagine, make for good headlines. 
Lovelock recalls that 
This was not welcome news to our sponsor, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. They badly needed reasons to go to Mars, and what better than to 
find life there? Much worse, it was hardly good publicity for NASA to claim that 
work they had funded proved that there was life on Earth. It would have been a gift 
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to Senator Proxmire, and I was not surprised to find myself soon unemployed. 
(Margulis and Guerrero 1991, 87) 
“It might make sense to send a spacecraft all the way to Mars to scoop soil samples. 
However, the subtleties of chemical spectroscopy meant that the composition of the 
atmosphere could be worked out using earthbound telescopes.” (Turney 2004, 10) 
Lovelock’s participation on the project was limited to the creation of some 
instrumentation, even though his ideas about the existence of life proved correct. 
From this beginning, Lovelock, working closely with American biologist Lynn 
Margulis, explored some of the questions that followed from his experiences with NASA. 
Margulis has as fascinating a biography as Lovelock: she was married to the eminently 
well-known astrophysicist Carl Sagan at a young age, went through what is hinted at as an 
extremely difficult separation and eventual divorce from him, on which Turney notes with 
a level of understatement that is found in most descriptions of their relationship that, 
“while Sagan may have been forward-looking in science, his views about a woman’s duty 
to support her husband’s career did not chime with Margulis’ ideas of what she wanted to 
do in life.” (Turney 2004, 23) Then, in both a rough parallel to Lovelock’s own career and 
in an echo of their collaborative work itself, Margulis would pursue her research into the 
symbiotic nature of biological and bacterial relationships to what turned out to be a major 
reformulation of one part of evolutionary biology that was initially ridiculed and later 
accepted as orthodoxy. “Clever, combative, well-informed, and deeply committed to a 
controversial change in ideas, Margulis was an ideal tactical as well as intellectual 
sounding board for the equally radically-minded but retiring and conflict-hating 
Lovelock.” (Turney 2004, 25) The professional partnership between Lovelock and 
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Margulis spanned more than forty years, and while both write with the utmost affection 
and respect for each other, they also each acknowledge that the professional nature of their 
relationship is part of what allowed it to flourish for such a long time. Margulis has turned 
out to be the more prolific writer, writing (usually in partnership with her son, Dorion 
Sagan) about evolutionary biology, sex, and what it means to “do science.” 
At first, however, Margulis and Lovelock were pondering several atmospheric 
puzzles with an intuition they could be interrelated: for example, we know that, over long 
stretches of time (thousands of millions of years), the amount of heat that reaches the earth 
from the sun has been variable in a range far greater than that of the ambient temperature. 
That is, temperatures have varied only within a roughly ten degree Celsius span (eighteen 
degrees Fahrenheit) but the output of the sun has varied much more dramatically in that 
time, to the point where, “if our planetary temperature depended only on the abiological 
constraints set by the sun’s output and the heat balance of the Earth’s atmosphere and 
surface, then the conditions of either the upper or lower extremes … could have been 
reached.” (Lovelock 1979, 20) The limits Lovelock refers to here are either all water on the 
planet dissipating into steam or all freezing into ice: in either case—in any situation that 
even remotely approaches either case—all life would be eliminated. Another: the amount 
of oxygen in the atmosphere has, over spectacularly long periods of time, remained 
strikingly constant at around twenty-one percent. We know this because if the level of 
oxygen drops too low not only does life suffer, but fire—which is, in various forms, a 
constant in the earth’s history—becomes impossible to sustain; just a few percentage 
points higher in concentration, though, and any spark would turn into a roaring 
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conflagration that would never be extinguished. Between these points is a margin of error 
of roughly ten percent: “if it dropped to below 15 percent, nothing would burn. Organisms 
could not breathe and would asphyxiate. If the oxygen in the air rose to above 25 percent, 
everything would burn. Combustion would occur spontaneously and fires would rage 
around the planet.” (Capra 1996, 241–2) A third, that both brings Lynn Margulis’ voice 
into the conversation and stresses the role played by other biological entities and 
foreshadows the complex kinds of regulatory interaction that would become the hallmark 
of her and Lovelock’s later work, both independently and collaboratively, begins with the 
recognition that, “our atmosphere contains far too much oxygen in the presence of 
methane. These gases, highly reactive when mixed, could not coexist at such high 
concentrations unless the levels were being actively maintained.” (Margulis 1998, 115) 
Recalling one of her initial communications with Lovelock, Margulis continues: 
Why is this gas, which reacts so strongly with oxygen, always measurably present 
in Earth’s atmosphere? It should disappear. Suspecting life from the beginning, he 
asked whether I knew what could possibly produce this gas. I responded the way 
anyone who reads microbiology would. Methane gas is produced by bacteria, 
mainly the methanogens that live in waterlogged soil or in cattle rumen. The 
metabolic product of methanogenic bacteria is released in copious quantities not in 
cow flatulence (as I always thought) but in their belches. Methane is released into 
the air through the mouths of calves, bulls, and cows. Atmospheric methane 
quickly reacts with oxygen to produce carbon dioxide. Clearly air methane is 
replenished on a regular basis because it is always present at concentrations from 
two to seven parts per million. (Margulis 1998, 117) 
What could account for these conditions? Here is where Lovelock’s background in 
engineering and his lifelong attraction to tinkering comes into play. He was well 
conversant with the notions of self-regulation and feedback loops, mechanisms by which 
mechanical systems are able to maintain stable states despite a varied level of inputs. That 
sounds more complex than it is: the question being considered here is why doesn’t your car 
279 
 
overheat as the engine runs hotter and hotter or how does your oven know when to turn on 
and off to maintain a temperature of 400 degrees Fahrenheit? Feedback loops are the 
answer to both these questions. There is a device under the hood that has an opening 
controlling the flow of coolant around the engine and to the radiator. As the engine heats 
up, the opening expands, allowing more coolant to flow; as the engine cools, the opening 
shrinks, restricting that same flow. The notion of a radiator is worth keeping in mind as 
well: the radiator is a heat sink, used to transfer heat that is generated within solid materials 
(the engine itself) to fluid mediums (air or liquids), where it can then be dispersed more 
efficiently. A similar process is at work in a gas oven, where a diaphragm that expands or 
contracts in response to the internal temperature of the oven controls the flow of gas. When 
you set the desired temperature, a limit is set on that expansion; as the oven heats up, less 
gas is allowed through the diaphragm, as the temperature drops, more gas is allowed 
through, causing the temperature to rise once again. 
Both of these examples are properly referred to as homeostatic, meaning they 
regulate a certain condition—called a set point—around a pre-determined state: in both of 
these cases, a certain desired temperature or temperature range. “If the set point itself is not 
constant but changes with time, it is called an operating point. Systems with operating 
points rather than set points are said to be homeorrhetic rather than homeostatic. Gaian 
regulatory systems, such as the embryological ones, are more properly described as 
homeorrhetic rather than homeostatic.” (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 176) 
There is something of a spectrum here, with tightly coupled examples of self-
regulation at one end and what might be termed complex cyclical systems at the other. The 
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hydrologic cycle—more commonly referred to as the water cycle—is an example of the 
latter. Here, in the simplest view, water is transformed between its various possible states 
by geologic and atmospheric forces: starting with its existence in oceans, seas, and smaller 
bodies of water, heat from the sun causes it to evaporate into water vapor which is carried 
into the atmosphere. As it rises, the vapor cools, causing condensation and the formation of 
clouds, which move around the atmosphere and then return to Earth as precipitation. There 
are, of course, additional details: some precipitation adds to ice caps or glaciers which 
return to the sea much more slowly; some precipitation is soaked into the ground as 
infiltration, which replenishes long-standing aquifers. But, eventually, the cycle of water to 
evaporation to precipitation holds, and the total amount of water—counting all three 
states—remains fairly constant over an extended time (remember, geologic time: it remains 
absolutely stable in times that we can easily comprehend, and only varies slightly over 
millennia). 
There is nothing regulatory here: the process happens mechanically, automatically, 
without any adjustment to input or output that maintains something else in the process as a 
constant. The amount of water on earth stays constant, not because of regulation, but 
because when two atoms of hydrogen bond with an atom of oxygen, they turn out to be 
remarkably difficult to destroy: they willingly change form as a reaction to temperature 
and pressure, but getting rid of the molecule altogether proves difficult to the point of 
statistical insignificance. This actually hints at another one of the narrow tolerances: 
hydrogen atoms are able to escape the atmosphere, especially on planets with (compared to 
Earth) low gravitational forces. Essentially, the lighter molecules, as they drift upwards 
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into the atmosphere, may be subject to any one of a number of mechanisms whereby their 
velocity exceeds what is required to escape the planet’s gravitational pull: this is one of the 
accepted theories as to how both Venus and Mars lost their water reserves. 
It is important to reexamine some common perceptions, at least among those of us 
who do not have a natural inclination towards chemistry and the ubiquitous nature of 
chemical exchange, before proceeding. The atmosphere—which we routinely perceive as 
empty space, as a void through which we gaze at distant objects—is riotously, vibrantly 
active; a constantly chaotic series of chemical reactions are occurring all around us, usually 
without any visible impact (although the olfactory presence of sulfur pools is often quite 
strong). As Sagan writes, 
Certain elements are planetary lifeblood. Like blood, they flow through the 
biosphere in limited supply. The carbon, sulfur, nitrogen, phosphorus, oxygen, and 
hydrogen that make up all organisms on Earth are not infinite. They must be 
continually redistributed, or cycled. Unlike an animal, Earth has no heart pushing 
this global flow in a simple beat. Instead, the planet lives on a complex of different 
forces all pulsing to a syncopated rhythm. These forces include wind, daily 
sunlight and darkness, ocean currents and tides, the erosion and surges of 
volcanoes and mountain building, the separation and collision of continents, and 
the incessant motions of living beings. (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 185) 
Mind the Gap: Filling In the 
Sulfur Cycle 
The difficulty with these cycles is that, the closer they were examined, the more 
likely certain shortfalls were exposed. Perhaps the most important of these in Lovelock’s 
early career was “the sulfur gap.” Sulfur “is found in the proteins of all organisms and is 
therefore required for all growth. The element exists in both hydrogen-rich forms and in 
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highly oxidized forms. Chemical reactions, from oxidized to hydrogen-rich compounds 
and vice versa, yield energy.” (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 186) The sulfur cycle describes 
how the chemical is recycled through a series of bio-chemical exchanges, vaguely akin 
structurally to the hydrologic cycle described above, or to the carbon cycle, or to any one 
of the ways other substances are created, dispersed, and moved around in, on, and above 
the earth. As more and more precise measurements of this cycle were made, questions 
began to emerge. “Measurements of the weathering of sulphur-bearing rocks, sulphur take-
up by plants, and of gaseous sulphur compounds dumped into the atmosphere by burning 
coal and oil seemed to add up to less sulphur in total than was being carried down to the 
sea by the action of rivers. Some unknown carrier must be transporting sulphur dissolved 
in the ocean back to land. But what?” (Turney 2004, 60) 
Some contributors were well known: bacterial and microbial contributions to the 
sulfur cycle are well understood, including their role in the creation of pyrite (more 
commonly known as “fool’s gold”), which provides a lovely metaphor for our purposes. 
The illusion here, the false gold, is the search for a purely mechanical process to explain 
the chemical cycles, a simple and linear chain of reactions where a set input condition 
results invariably in a predictable set of outputs. By re-examining our notion of the status 
of bacteria and microbes—a topic we will look at more closely below when we dive more 
deeply into Margulis’ work—we arrive at a very different picture. If the presence of sulfur 
in “mineral deposits depend on and, in a real sense, are part of life, then why are they 
considered static, inanimate, and nonliving?” (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 187) Lovelock 
proposed that the key to understanding the flow of sulfur was a compound, dimethyl 
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sulphide (DMS) which at the time was not thought to exist in enough quantity to serve this 
purpose. In 1971, he applied “for a small grant to measure dimethyl sulphide, methyl 
iodide, and the CFCs aboard the research ship, Shackleton, which was due to make its 
voyage to Antarctica and back later the same year.” (Lovelock 2000, 206) Lovelock writes 
that his application 
was rejected unanimously. Not only this, but appended to the report was the 
complaint that bogus proposals such as mine should not in future be presented to 
the committee, it wasted their time. Their annoyance stemmed from the fact that 
the senior chemist of the committee was sure that no one could measure the 
chlorofluorocarbons at parts-per-trillion levels, as I had claimed I could do. He said 
the CFCs are among the most inert chemical compounds known and it would be 
difficult to measure their abundance in the atmosphere at the parts-per-million 
level; it was impossible to measure them at the parts-per-trillion level and therefore 
the proposal was bogus. Now this was a profoundly ignorant statement and could 
only have come from a narrow specialist, unaware of the advances in other 
branches of chemistry. (Lovelock 2000, 206–7) 
I quote this passage partially for detail but partially, of course, for the explicit swipe at 
scientists whose vision is tightly bound by a single sub-discipline, something Lovelock 
sees as a profoundly distressing impact of the growing corporate institutionalization of 
scientific fields of inquiry. 
Others who saw the proposal were more open, and the Natural Environment 
Research Council (NERC) offered Lovelock a berth on the Shackleton and passage back 
from Uruguay (one of the ports of call on its itinerary towards Antarctica). 
As far as the expedition was concerned, I would have to supply the equipment and 
any personnel other than myself. Because the academic committee rejected my 
proposal, NERC could only offer this limited support. I was delighted: I could 
easily afford to make a simple gas chromatograph for the voyage. I would travel 
and do the measurement at least as far as Montevideo myself; I could afford that 
much time. (Lovelock 2000, 206) 
Lovelock’s initial attempts to gather samples aboard the RV Shackleton are worth 
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recounting for their quaint—and decidedly British-themed—ingenuity, the continued range 
of receptivity displayed by other scientists, as well as for their insights about just how 
sensitive his devices were: 
By mid-morning it was time to take the first water samples. A research ship like 
the Shackleton has a pump to draw in fresh seawater from the bows so that the 
scientists aboard have a continuous sample of the sea the ship passes through. My 
first sample of this water was so laden with chlorine and sulphur compounds that it 
overloaded the chromatograph and I could make no analysis. I was sure that these 
substances were not in the sea itself but were contaminants coming from the pump 
or the pipes through which the water flowed. I could see no way to get a truly clean 
water sample from this source, so I tried collecting sea water by tying a small 
bucket to a rope and dropping it over the side of the ship. This was foolish, for the 
fierce pull of the rope nearly dragged me overboard, and I should have calculated 
that a bucket dropped into water flowing past at 14 mph exerts a pull of over 100 
pounds. Contritely, I asked the ship’s technician if he had a smaller vessel I could 
use. Lab vessels such as beakers were much too fragile; saucepans too difficult to 
manoeuvre on our rope. Then suddenly we wondered whether we could use a 
teapot? Sure enough, the galley had an old aluminum teapot now retired from use. 
This was tied to our rope, and everything was easy from then on. Every day we 
lowered it into the sea and used it as a source of surface water samples. 
 
The sight of our teapot samplings stirred the serious-minded company of scientists; 
some were derisive of such low technology, others were appalled. One of them, 
who was not experimenting until the ship reached Antarctica, said to me, “You 
know, the ship has proper Nansen bottles for water sampling and I’m sure the 
captain will stop to let you sample down to lower depths.” Captain Shelby Smith 
was more than willing to do this, and at frequent intervals we stopped to lower the 
ships’ bottles by cables down to depths as low as several hundred metres. Again, I 
was frustrated in my measurements, this time by the rubber closures of these 
bottles. The rubber absorbed and later released any volatile chemicals in the air 
around it. This memory of past atmospheres contaminated the water samples from 
these Nansen bottles. We tried several tricks. Taking the rubber and boiling it in 
water for hours helped, so did leaving the bottles exposed open to the sun and air 
on deck before use. In the end, we used bottles without the rubber closures. They 
leaked, but not enough to prevent them serving my needs. Up until this voyage, 
marine scientists has been interested only in the inorganic constituents of 
seawater—things like salt, acidity, and other minerals. The rubber-sealed Nansen 
bottles were fine for this need. No one had anticipated the need to collect volatile 
organic vapours like the CFCs and DMS, and so they never designed bottles for 
this purpose. (Lovelock 2000, 211–2) 
Lovelock’s work on the RV Shackleton was key in his career: it catapulted him into what 
became known as “the Ozone Wars,” it provided more data than he could plow through in 
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many years, and it proved the field-worthiness of the ECD under a range of conditions. 
It also provided the information necessary to crack open a solution to the original 
question regarding the quantity of sulfur: it turns out that DMS is far more prevalent than 
believed possible and the source of it were various “marine algae which stick methyl 
groups (CH3) onto sulphur, perhaps as a means of getting rid of an unwanted chemical by 
turning it into something more volatile.” (Turney 2004, 60) That is, the algae dispose of 
sulfur by turning it into DMS and shedding it, in a quantity which could, theoretically at 
least, “balance the books” of the sulfur cycle.  
Suddenly, however, we have changed our position on the spectrum mentioned 
above: no longer are we discussing a purely mechanical process, now, somehow, life is 
engaged and involved in the regulation of sulfur. This is a watershed moment, requiring a 
sea change in thought for full comprehension: we know that too much or too little sulfur on 
the planet could be at worst deadly and at best detrimental to the continued existence of 
life. And here we find life—in the form of marine seaweed—participating in the process 
by which the total amount of sulfur is regulated. The sticking point is the same as the old 
saw about the thermos being the greatest technological invention of all time because it 
keeps cold drinks cold in the winter and hot drinks hot in the summer: How do it know? 
Without assigning any form of sentience to the Earth, how do marine plants add more or 




New technologies of perception and communication open up new spaces, 
and these spaces are always mapped, on one level or another, through the 
imagination. 
Erik Davis, TechGnosis 
The question proved entirely intractable, demanding either the interference of a 
coordinating intelligence or a level of knowledge of the interaction of complex systems 
that continues to elude us entirely. Lovelock’s response was to re-examine the problem 
from the other end, resulting in a context that Turney sums up like this: 
The evolution of life was an ever-branching tree, not a targeted affair. So Gaia’s 
apparent regulation of environmental conditions did not stem from some overall 
imperative, a goal-seeking property of the whole system. To be allowed into the 
scientific mainstream, Gaian effects had to be explained non-teleologically: they 
had to emerge from the properties of lower-level parts of the whole, preferably 
ones which were compatible with natural selection. (Turney 2004, 85) 
This led to “a thought experiment which quickly became a simple computer model, then a 
continuing line of research lasting for the next twenty years,” (Turney 2004, 85) the focus 
of which was, perhaps surprisingly, daisies. Or, hypothetical daisies. Here’s how it started: 
imagine a planet roughly akin to Earth, where the only species present was a daisy that 
exists in two varieties, light and dark, and grows best in temperate conditions. In the initial 
generation, half the daisies were light and half were dark. The question is this: how will 
variable heat over time impact the population of daisies, given that the dark colored daisies 
will soak up heat while the light colored ones will reflect it? Lovelock’s goal was to mirror 
the long history of our sun, whose heat has been increasing over the millennia. 
Out of this was born Daisyworld, a computer program that simulated these, and 
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many other, conditions. The initial runs of Daisyworld were spectacularly encouraging: at 
first, with a cooler planet, the darker daisies grew better, especially around the equator. As 
populations increase, the darker plants absorb and trap more heat, increasing local 
temperatures ever so slightly. Eventually, the dark plants colonize the entire planet while 
also raising its temperature above what it would be without any life on its surface. Over 
time, this allows the light colored daisies to make a comeback and, as the heat input from 
the star increases, they eventually survive in greater numbers than the dark ones; as this 
happens, less heat is trapped at the planet’s surface, and global temperatures are cooled 
ever so slightly. Until, of course, the heat output of the star overpowers the system entirely: 
the regulatory system is overloaded, the daisies all die off, and the planet is left with ever 
increasing temperatures and no life whatsoever. 
In visual terms, we would expect planetary temperatures to increase along a 
relatively stable slope (at least in the initial models); however Daisyworld results in a 
classic stair step, where temperatures increase steeply at first (as the dark daisies 
dominate), then hold steady for a significantly long period of time (while the mixture of 
light and dark daisies interact), before again steeply increasing (when it becomes too hot 
for the light colored daisies). Note the final stage: the daisies are totally incapable of 
altering the long view: the planet still starts relatively cool and still burns to a crisp in the 
end. Daisyworld contains a message about limits, about the constraints within which it is 
possible to impact change. 
Perhaps the strangest knowledge to come from our quest for Gaia has been the 
realization that, robust though she may be, the conditions of our Earth are moving 
close to the point where life itself may not be far from its end. The quite 
unstoppable increase of the sun’s heat soon will be beyond the capacity of 
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regulation or adaptation. In human terms the Earth is still forever inhabitable. But 
in Gaian terms, if the length of life on Earth were one year, we are now in the last 
week of December. (Margulis and Guerrero 1991, 96–7) 
The rightful area of focus (and, as Lovelock points out, the death of the sun will happen 
long, long after humans have disappeared from the planet) is the long, fairly horizontal bar 
in the middle, where surface temperatures are kept within a fairly narrow range far longer 
than they would be without some modification of the energy output from the star. 
Computer models are pretty easy to attack, and Daisyworld proved no exception: 
critics insisted it was “rigged” to produce the results Lovelock desired or that since it was 
so simplistic it had no relationship to any actual planet, let alone the one we inhabited. The 
former argument was difficult to refute, but was ultimately ignored (remember, this was in 
early 1980s, long before a notion of “open source” was in vogue—nowadays, you can 
download dozens of versions of Daisyworld, verify their programmatic assumptions and 
techniques, and modify them as much as desired). The latter argument is what led to the 
decades of further work with the model, which resulted in some unexpected and potentially 
startling knowledge: in general, the more complexity that is introduced to Daisyworld, the 
better it is able to regulate the environment. Fritjof Capra, with whom we will deal in 
depth shortly, summarized the spiraling complexity of work on Daisyworld by listing out 
how far the model had come, where, 
Instead of just two, there are many species of daisies with varying pigments in the 
new models; there are models in which the daisies evolve and change color; 
models in which rabbits eat the daisies and foxes eat the rabbits; and so on. The net 
result of these highly complex models is that the small temperature fluctuations 
that were present in the original Daisyworld model have flattened out, and self-
regulation becomes more and more stable as the model’s complexity increases. In 
addition, Lovelock put catastrophes into his models, which wipe out 30 percent of 
the daisies at regular intervals. He found that Daisyworld’s self-regulation is 
remarkably resilient under these severe disturbances. (Capra 1996, 110) 
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Additionally, Daisyworld has acquired dozens of additional bio-chemical processes, 
rudimentary weather patterns, the existence of clouds to block the sun’s rays before they 
ever reach the daisies, and stars with variable heat outputs that change over time. And 
Capra’s key sentence remains true: The net result of these highly complex models is that 
the small temperature fluctuations that were present in the original Daisyworld model 
have flattened out, and self-regulation becomes more and more stable as the model’s 
complexity increases. This is a remarkable and important point whose implications range 
far beyond the present topic: we tend to believe that simple models are the most stable and 
that the addition of complexity is equivalent to introducing chaos, unpredictability, and 
instability into our thought. Daisyworld has survived all this additional complexity almost 
completely unscathed, continuing to illustrate that local adaptations, working consistently 
with well-known genetic principles can indeed contribute to systemic self-regulation. 
Lovelock theorized that, in addition to the mechanical cycles, many of which were well 
known and well documented, a regulatory mechanism akin to Daisyworld was at work 
with regards to the Earth itself. And, edging towards half a century on, he was clearly 
correct: there are in fact dozens of such self-regulating systems at work simultaneously, 
some working in concert, some independently, all of which combine to preserve a certain 
band of narrow tolerances on the planet that support the continued existence of life. 
“Daisyworld … shows how self-regulation could be a property of a planetary system and 
result from the tight coupling of biological and physical evolution. Daisyworld also 
provides a tractable working model of the phenomenon of emergence, and is an illustration 




This should have been a relatively straightforward moment for science: a new 
hypothesis is suggested; experimental results, while providing enough friction to further 
refine its claims, serve largely to confirm it; and eventually the hypothesis moves from the 
realm of theory to the realm of fact. Along the way, though, something remarkable 
happened, something that reveals the topology at the center of our explorations in this 
thesis as a whole. 
I have tried, in this initial summary, to avoid the language of intent. Doing so has 
been difficult and has created some exceedingly awkward formulations in the writing. But 
doing so has also avoided the largest issue that emerged around Lovelock’s claims, that of 
a projection of intentionality behind these systems. There is no sentience—in any way that 
we recognize—behind your engine or your oven, yet we easily and without remark use 
language like the engine overheated, or the oven is acting up again. These phrases roll by 
without notice as a shorthand for a mechanical process that may or may not be fully 
understood at the time. Language about complex cycles proves slightly more troubling: the 
question who makes it rain? is one that has a variety of answers in different contexts, but 
there is a general acceptance in scientific circles that rain just happens. That is, rain is not 
intended, it is not a result of desire nor is drought the result of human misbehavior; instead 
it is part of the hydrological flow, and something that, while doggedly unpredictable the 
more local one’s focus (recall the discussion of weather in the previous chapter), is 
absolutely reliably predictable at the most macro of scales. That is, water will evaporate, 
and it will form clouds and those clouds will result in precipitation. Somewhere. Sometime. 
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All Hail the Queen: Gaia’s 
Grand Entrance and the 
Evolutionary Response 
Selfish-genery now colours large areas of our intellectual landscape and 
it is likely to go on doing so until some other invading myth displaces it. 
Mary Midgley, Evolution As A Religion 
But self-regulating natural systems open up an entirely different challenge for 
language and for our perceptions. Questions about how the target output state is chosen, 
why that particular state instead of another, how the inputs are set in motion; these plague 
us. This is why Daisyworld was (and remains) so important:  
The radical insight delivered by Daisyworld is that global homeorrhesis is in 
principle possible without the introduction of any but well-known tenets of 
biology. The Gaian system does not have to plan in advance or be foresighted in 
any way in order to show homeorrhetic tendencies. A biological system acting 
cybernetically gives the impression of teleology. If only the results and not the 
feedback processes were stated, it would look as if the organisms had conspired to 
ensure their own survival. (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 177) 
Certainly, Lovelock did himself no favors in naming his theory as well. Gaia’s naming is a 
tale repeated so often it has a slightly apocryphal tone to it, but the general facts remain 
stable through the retellings. We’ll use a version from Lynn Margulis: 
The term Gaia was suggested to Lovelock by the novelist William Golding, author 
of Lord of the Flies. In the early 1970s, they both lived in Bowerchalke, Wiltshire, 
England. Lovelock asked his neighbor whether he could replace the cumbersome 
phrase “a cybernetic system with homeostatic tendencies as detected by chemical 
anomalies in the Earth’s atmosphere” with a term meaning “Earth.” “I need a good 
four-letter word,” he said. On walks around the countryside in that gorgeous part 
of southern England near the chalk downs, Golding suggested Gaia. The ancient 
Greek work for “Mother Earth,” Gaia provides an etymological root of many 




Lovelock acquiesced, and while early in Gaia’s life he expressed some reservations about 
the name, by the time the current millennium rolled around, he had embraced it fully, 
although both he and Margulis recognized the impact of the choice. Writing just before the 
turn of the century, Margulis notes that, 
Many scientists are still hostile to Gaia, both the word and the idea, perhaps 
because it is so resonant with anti-science and anti-intellectual folks. In popular 
culture, insofar as the team is at all familiar, it refers to the notion of Mother Earth 
as a single organism. Gaia, a living goddess beyond human knowledge, will 
supposedly punish or reward us for our environmental insults or blessings to her 
body. I regret this personification. (Margulis 1998, 118) 
This was too much for the scientific community on the whole: the notion that 
feedback systems existed that impacted the Earth? Sure, of course. But the notion that they 
were somehow constructed with a purpose, with a teleology that focused on the conditions 
necessary for life? That raised, at the least, questions of sacrality, of a higher purpose, of 
exactly who set the billiard balls in motion originally. On top of that, to have to refer to 
theory by the name of an ancient Greek goddess, further muddying the waters with a 
notion that the process was controlled by, not only a deity, but a female one? Preposterous 
and unacceptable. While some of the protest was overwrought, there were genuine 
concerns at work. Consider this passage from David Spangler, a leading figure in the New 
Age (about which much more anon): 
For example, the image of Gaia as the spirit of the living Earth embodies much of 
what I mean when I talk about the new Age. Gaia for me means more than just 
ecology or environmental concerns, and more than just a sense of the Earth as a 
living being. It means an evolving system in which individuality, diversity, 
complexity, connections, wholeness, and emergence all come together in a 
condition and consciousness of synergy and co-creativity. To me, Gaia means the 
challenge to learn to think and act the way the spirit of the planet does—in a 
manner that empowers and sustains life and its unfoldment. (Spangler 1991, 48) 
This language—perhaps compelling, perhaps insightful—is certainly not scientific and 
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reflects the complexities of the chasm between the reception of science and science itself. 
Lovelock’s sometimes soaring descriptions of Gaia show in stark contrast to 
Margulis’ concise summary of the theory, where it is reduced to a claim that “aspects of 
the atmospheric gases and surface rocks and water are regulated by the growth, death, 
metabolism, and other activities of living organisms.” (Margulis 1998, 2) Such a 
formulation would probably have raised few eyebrows. Instead, Lovelock was, for the 
most part, torn to pieces by the scientific community in general. The criticism, however, 
spilled well beyond a dispute of the science behind his ideas: he was vilified for his choice 
of name, for his insistence on metaphor, for the sniff of intentionality that he gave to the 
earth. 
Biologists have attacked the name Gaia and the metaphor of a living Earth as if I 
intended them as fact. I now think they did this form an instinctive dislike of 
holistic ideas, not because they were greedy over metaphors. I never begrudged 
them “The Selfish Gene,” “The Red Queen,” or the [sic] “The Blind Watchmaker.” 
Nor do I pedantically ague that to be selfish a gene would have to take thought and 
have purpose. Their attack on the metaphor of Gaia, the living Earth, was not a 
proper scientific criticism: it was a gut reaction to an unwelcome theory. Not all 
biologists were hostile. (Lovelock 2000, 256) 
Perhaps not, but many were; indeed, perhaps the harshest response to Lovelock’s 
initial claims came from evolutionary biologists, led by the overwhelming presence of 
Richard Dawkins (who, at that time, was at the height of his intellectual power and 
influence). Dawkins’ most cited critique of Gaia is both compelling and misguided, a 
dangerous combination for Lovelock’s argument. Initially, Dawkins both identifies his 
common ground with Lovelock and neatly performs a slippage that contains almost all of 
their disagreements when he writes that “Lovelock rightly regards homeostatic self-
regulation as one of the characteristic activities of living organisms, and this leads him to 
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the daring hypothesis that the whole Earth is equivalent to a single living organism.” He 
goes on, with strong notes of incredulity to insist that, “He really means it.” (Dawkins 
1982, 235) 
One of, equivalent, really means. We are dealing with fuzzy concepts more proper 
to linguistics than biology, and doing so allows Dawkins to set up a series of powerful 
straw men that he neatly tumbles down: 
The fatal flaw of Lovelock’s hypothesis would have instantly occurred to him if he 
had wondered about the level of natural selection process which would be required 
in order to produce the Earth’s supposed adaptations. Homeostatic adaptations in 
individual bodies evolve because individuals with improved homeostatic apparatus 
pass on their genes more effectively than individuals with inferior homeostatic 
apparatuses. For the analogy to apply strictly, there would have to have been a set 
of rival Gaias, presumably on different planets. Biospheres which did not develop 
efficient homeostatic regulation of their planetary atmospheres tended to go 
extinct. The Universe would have to be full of dead planets whose homeostatic 
regulation systems had failed, with, dotted around, a handful of successful, well-
regulated planets of which Earth is one. Even this improbable scenario is not 
sufficient to lead to the kind of evolution of planetary adaptations of the kind 
Lovelock proposes. In addition we would have to postulate some kind of 
reproduction whereby successful planets spawned copies of their life forms on new 
planets. (Dawkins 1982, 235–6) 
Fascinatingly, Dawkins recognizes what he is doing. He follows this paragraph with 
I am not, of course, suggesting that Lovelock believes it happened like that. He 
would surely consider the idea of interplanetary selection as ludicrous as I do. 
Obviously he simply did not see his hypothesis as entailing the hidden assumptions 
that I think it entails. He might dispute that it does entail those assumptions, and 
maintain that Gaia could evolve her global adaptations by the ordinary process of 
Darwinian selection acting within the one planet. I very much doubt that a model 
of such a selection process could be made to work. (Dawkins 1982, 236) 
And, further on, “I do not deny that somebody may, one day, produce a workable model of 
the evolution of Gaia …, although I personally doubt it.” Dawkins moves immediately into 
a full dismissal of Lovelock’s project, calling it “an extreme form of what, for old times’ 
sake although it is now rather unfair, I shall continue to call the ‘BBC Theorem.’” 
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(Dawkins 1982, 236) Note that Dawkins’ belief is that he is now being unfair to the BBC, 
not to Lovelock. Dawkins’ “BBC Theorem” is actually of significant interest to us, as it 
represents an awareness of one of the phenomenon we are exploring: if you read beyond 
the obvious sneer in his tone, he is describing a movement towards an almost religious 
holism in how we use science to perceive nature: 
For years the dominant message of these commentaries was one that had been 
elevated almost to the status of a religion by pop ‘ecology’. There was something 
called the ‘balance of nature’, an exquisitely fashioned machine in which plants, 
herbivores, carnivores, parasites, and scavengers each played their appointed role 
for the good of all. … The BBC Theorem is often expressed in terms of the poetry 
of webs and networks. The whole world is a fine-meshed network of 
interrelationships, a web of connections which it has taken thousands of years to 
build up. (Dawkins 1982, 236–7) 
So, one of the two preeminent spokesmen for evolutionary biology of the day (the other 
being Dawkins’ major foil in popular discussions of evolutionary biology, Stephen Jay 
Gould) has slipped his true position, that of being not yet convinced of Gaia, between two 
moments of intense ridicule, one an extreme position that he admits Lovelock never takes, 
the other a marginalization into the horrendously un-scientific world of “pop ecology.” 
There are two problems with Dawkins’ caricature: the first is that, from a lay 
perspective, the situation he describes of a radical imbalance of “dead” to “live” planets 
with many avenues by which the “dead” state can be reached seems quite similar to what 
we observe: we know of hundreds of thousands of planets with different atmospheric 
densities and compositions, different surface structures and environments while, right now, 
we remain with only a single instance containing proof of life. This response only goes so 
far, of course: many of those planets are known only through inference and, more directly, 
Dawkins is insisting that, since there is no interplanetary sex, there can be no genetic 
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selection. The notion of planetary copulation must have raised some odd memories for 
Lovelock: back in his short stint at NASA, 
There was much argument about the need to sterilize the spacecraft before sending 
them to Mars. I could never understand why it should be thought so bad to run the 
small risk of accidentally seeding Mars with life; it might be the only chance we 
had of passing life on to another planet. Sometimes the argument was fierce and 
macho; full of adolescent masculinity. In any event, feeling as I did—that Mars 
was dead—the image of rape, sometimes used, could not be sustained; at worse the 
act would be only the dismal lonely aberration of necrophilia. (Lovelock 1988, 6) 
Side-stepping the issue of just what that kind of copulation that would be, there remain 
other problems with Dawkins’ conception, which highlight the fact that we have a battle 
over scientific territory more than scientific truth. As Sagan and Margulis write, 
if the critics of Gaia cannot accept the notion of a planet as an amorphic but viable 
biological entity, they must have equal if not greater cause to dismiss the origin of 
life. Surely at one point in the history of Earth a single homeostatic bacterial cell 
existed that did not have to struggle with other cells in order to survive, because 
there were no other cells. The genesis of the first cell can no more be explained 
form a strict Darwinian standpoint of competition among selfish individuals than 
can the present regulation of the atmosphere. While the first cell and the present 
planet may both be correctly seen as individuals, they are equally alone, and as 
such the both fall outside the province of modern population genetics. (Margulis 
and Sagan 2007, 180–1) 
There is a strain of planetary exceptionalism that runs through this response that I want to 
ignore: discussions of the uniqueness of the earth tend to devolve very quickly into the 
harsh reality that, not only from the point of view of pure self-interest is the planet quite 
special but that, it is also, through a product of the paucity of our knowledge, unique. The 
latter point gets lost in the mysticism of large numbers: we predict the existence of millions 
of planets and while we are able to analyze chemically the atmosphere of only a fraction of 
those, even at the larger end of the scale we are looking at a population far short of the 
number of conjoined mutations that led to life here. Instead, I want to focus on the notion 
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that Gaia’s structure, that its presence as a system of interconnected feedback loops itself, 
somehow moves it beyond the boundary of Dawkin’s gaze. Part of the defensiveness of his 
reaction seems to be focused on the temerity of Lovelock—a geophysicist for God’s 
sake—to intrude upon the territory of the evolutionary biologists who, it must be said, have 
enough difficulty maintaining their own arguments these days. As a student and scholar of 
religious studies, this is somewhat ironic: these boundaries in scientific domains are very 
tightly policed, yet anybody feels fully qualified to write about religion, whether they have 
any training or insight into the field or not. 
What is missed in this critique is that Gaia is not a theory grounded in evolution, 
but in sustainability or, perhaps better, maintenance; it does not claim a teleology where 
the Earth is actively moving towards some future state. Rather, it claims that there are a 
host of independent and interconnected processes that seem to work together in order to 
maintain a certain set of tolerances for a wide variety of conditions, and that the common 
presence across these is life itself. In simpler terms, the Earth is not a living being; it is a 
self-regulated system that supports life. 
Gaia itself is not an organism directly selected among many. It is an emergent 
property of interaction among organisms, the spherical planet on which they 
reside, and an energy source, the sun. Furthermore Gaia is an ancient phenomenon. 
Trillions of jostling, feeding, mating, exuding beings compose her planetary 
system. Gaia, a tough bitch, is not at all threatened by humans. Planetary life 
survived at least three billion years before humanity was even the dream of a lively 
ape with a yearning for a relatively hairless mate. (Margulis 1998, 119) 
Margulis may sum up the situation most concisely when she claims to “prefer the idea that 




The conversation between Lovelock and Dawkins—or, better, between Gaia and 
the “selfish gene,” is really one of fundamental assumptions. Dawkins’ flame burned 
brightest in his extended discussions of genes as operating amorally and independently, 
striving only for self-replication. This was the heyday of the “gene for” discussions: as 
soon as we identify the gene for cancer and we will someday isolate the gene for 
psychopathic behavior and birth defect screening procedures are moving to a model of 
searching for the gene for specific conditions. Anything that smacked of communalism, of 
group behavior or identity, of an extended pattern of interaction between organisms and 
their environment was vehemently denied and dismissed, albeit often with the same 
rhetorical strategy demonstrated above: the escape hatch of “maybe someday a model will 
be created but I doubt it” was left open. It turns out it was needed. The more we discover 
about genetic behavior, the more we discover about the behavior of organisms, the more 
infuriatingly complex the picture becomes: for an overwhelming number of genetic 
characteristics, there is no “gene for” to be found. Instead, there is are a network of 
interactions between different genetic sets where various genes combine over time in ways 
that seem to depend on a variety of necessary and sufficient other genetic combinations in 
order to create a context where different conditions may emerge. 
Most properties are affected by many genes; most genes affect many properties. 
Also, owing to polymorphism, properties which are similar in living individuals 
may be produced by different combinations of genes. The effect of a given gene 
can vary greatly, too, according to the influence of other genes which are 
combined with it. Moreover, genes tend to be correlated in blocks in a way which 
usually makes it hard to identify the influence of each of them. Thus, even 
properties which might seem no more complex than eye colour are normally 
impossible to change without a large, unpredictable series of other changes. 
(Midgley 1985, 47) 
It is important to note that other narrative models for the evolutionary role of genes have 
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existed and continue to exist within the community of evolutionary biologists themselves: 
The model for developmental biology imagines that a master gene triggers a 
subordinate gene, which cascades to downstream genes in a descending hierarchy 
of control. In this picture, bodies develop as though a bowling ball were accurately 
rolled to hit the genetic kingpin at just the right spot and cause all the genetic 
bowling pins behind to fall down in perfect order. Producing a normal baby is 
bowling a genetic strike. 
 
Instead, imagine that genes are like mice released at the top of the bowling lane, 
who scurry down the lane, bumping into genetic pins as they go and eventually 
knocking down all the genetic pins in a variable, but directional, clamor. In my 
picture of how development works, diversity figures from the very beginning. 
 
The narrative I tell of development emphasizes the interrelatedness of gene 
function and avoids exaggerating the role of genetic control. My model of how a 
gene works is the “genial gene”—a gene that cooperates with other genes, in 
contrast to the well-popularized concept of the “selfish gene.” In other words, my 
narrative of development deemphasizes individualism. (Roughgarden 2004, 186) 
Roughgarden’s work offers a different way to imagine evolution, well-grounded in “hard 
research.” It also begins to open up the evaluation of evolution to notions of diversity and 
complexity, which are required thought-partners as more information emerges. For 
example, one of the core features of our genetic code is the amount of noise in the signal: 
our genes are anything but the highly streamlined machine that is often portrayed. Instead, 
they are full of unused, repetitious genetic material that seems to never be accessed and 
used, but is rather part of the by-product of the arbitrary nature of genetic mutation: 
Redundancy is a common feature of living organisms where different genes are 
involved in the same or in partially overlapping functions. While this may seem a 
waste, mathematical models show that evolution by natural selection has to 
produce molecular redundancy because when a new function is necessary it cannot 
be carried out by a gene that is already doing something else, without 
compromising the original function. On the other hand, if the gene gets duplicated 
(by mutation), one copy is freed from immediate constraints and can slowly 
diverge in structure from the original, eventually taking over new functions. This 
process leads to the formation of gene “families,” groups of genes clearly 
originated form a single ancestral DNA sequence, and that now are diversified and 
perform a variety of functions (e.g., the globins, which vary from proteins allowing 
muscle contractions to those involved in the exchange of oxygen and carbon 
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dioxide in the blood) … the majority of duplicated genes end up as pseudogenes, 
literally pieces of molecular junk that are eventually lost forever to any biological 
utility. (Pigliucci 2003, 103) 
Given this, Dawkins’ mocking note that “the whole world is a fine-meshed network 
of interrelationships, a web of connections which it has taken thousands of years to build 
up” (Dawkins 1982, 237) is recast in a totally alternate key. Genetic modeling is more 
systemic than mechanical, a proposition strongly echoed by Fritjof Capra when he writes 
that 
The great achievements of molecular biology, often described as “the cracking of 
the genetic code,” have made us think of the strands of genes in the DNA as some 
kind of biochemical computer executing a “genetic program.” However, recent 
research has increasingly shown that this way of thinking is quite erroneous. In 
fact, it is as inadequate as the metaphor of the rain as an information-processing 
computer. The complete set of genes in an organism, the so-called genome, forms 
a vast interconnected network, rich in feedback loops, in which genes directly and 
indirectly regulate each other’s activities. (Capra 1996, 204) 
There is a ghost from previous chapters that hovers here: Dawkins may be seen, I believe, 
very much as part of the final thrashes of the old guard, a violent spasm that may still 
twitch for decades to come, but is clearly fading, “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of 
the sea.” (Foucault 1970, 387) Foucault’s image is apt here: the linear genetics of Dawkins 
bear direct inheritance from the modes of knowledge that he examines in European thought 
since the sixteenth century. 
The horizon of an archaeology, therefore, is not a science, a rationality, a 
mentality, a culture; it is a tangle of interpositivities whose limits and points of 
intersection cannot be fixed in a single operation. Archaeology is a comparative 
analysis that is not intended to reduce the diversity of discourses, and to outline the 
unity that must totalize them, but is intended to divide up their diversity into 
different figures. Archaeological comparison does not have a unifying, but a 
diversifying effect. (Foucault 1972, 160) 
It would be wrong to simply paint genetic research in the late twentieth century as 
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discursively old-fashioned, with Gaia—or, perhaps more properly, some of the figures we 
will meet shortly, like Capra or Maturana and Varela—as the postmodern correction. But it 
is likewise irresponsible to ignore the relationship between science and the centuries old 
wave of cultural thought that Foucault—and countless others—have spent so much time 
(and to such a wide degree of sophistication and success) analyzing. 
Lovelock can certainly be seen as part of the undertow to that wave, a metaphor 
chosen intentionally to highlight how interconnected they are: Gaia is not an antidote to the 
selfish gene, nor is it a harbinger of some new age of cultural enlightenment, but it is 
representative of a different way of analyzing systems, a different approach to seeing 
interconnectedness as being on par with visible difference in its ability to contribute to 
understanding. Margulis’ reflection on her own position within science is revealing here as 
well: “As a species, we still fear the eccentric in our views of ourselves. Despite or perhaps 
because of Darwin, as a culture we still don’t really understand the science of evolution. 
When science and culture conflict, culture always wins. Evolutionary science deserves to 
be much better understood.” (Margulis 1998, 4) 
Evolutionary Systems: From 
Capra to Complexity 
We require just a little order to protect us from chaos. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 
As one way out of the impasse between Lovelock (and Margulis) and Dawkins, I 
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want to turn the question of evolution on its head, and expand its domain slightly as well 
by looking at Fritjof Capra’s The Web of Life. Capra is of course the theoretical physicist 
who first became a cult figure in the emergent New Age in the mid-1970s with the 
publication of The Tao of Physics. While a remarkably frustrating book from the 
perspective of a scholar of religion (Capra conflates the myriad specificities and 
differences of cultural practices across vast geographical and temporal scales into a largely 
non-differentiated “east,” a practice with a rich history in the West that continues 
unabated), The Tao of Physics does offer some initial explorative directions that Capra 
would follow quite passionately in his later research and writings. It also, quite 
importantly, brings the notions of physics and, more specifically, quantum physics, into the 
discussion: while this thesis looks more closely at both biology and the environmental 
sciences, the interactions between modern religious movements and physics has been the 
template for many of these moments. Olav Hammer, a theorist to which we will return in 
more depth in the final chapter, provides a useful overview to keep in mind: 
Interestingly, modern physics is used by several faiths to support their sometimes 
mutually incompatible claims. To this effect, different religious traditions choose 
partly different aspects of physics for their apologetic purposes. Whereas this 
section concentrates on quantum physics, since this is the aspect of modern science 
that has most preoccupied the Esoteric Tradition, spokespersons of a theistic faith 
may be more inclined to rely on the anthropic principle, the claim that the laws of 
physics are fine-tuned for the existence of life. One might argue that this selective 
reading of science is due to the interest to the New Age in human consciousness, 
ESP and healing, whereas theists are more interested in finding support for a “fine-
tuner” of the universe, i.e. God. (Hammer 2003, 261) 
If anything, Hammer’s net is cast quite tightly: we see the same impact of popular 
understandings throughout the humanities. Consider this from Gianni Vattimo: 
The emancipation and liberation that mankind has always sought are attainable 
through a weakening of strong structures, a reduction of claims, and that implies, 
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in general terms, that quality counts for more than quantity, that listening to what 
others have to say counts for more than measuring objects with precision in all 
fields, including science, truth itself is becoming an affair of consensus, listening, 
participation in a shared enterprise, rather than one-to-one correspondence with the 
pure and hard objectivity of things: this objectivity is only conceivable as the 
outcome of a social labor that binds humans to one another rather than to the 
“reality” of objects. (Vattimo 2006, 35) 
It’s a lovely and compelling passage, and is embedded in a much longer exegesis on 
freedom and moral responsibility to which we do disservice in our excision. But it is also 
an insightful artifact of the degree to which the narrative of physics—for what else can he 
be referring to in his “even science” aside—has spread notions of being comfortable with a 
conception of truth that has wandered far afield from Newton’s precision. Note, of course, 
that many of the actual scientists that study these phenomena would protest vehemently 
against these characterizations, insisting that, indeed, their work is profoundly tied to 
objective reality. Still, consider the explanations of the Higgs-Boson particle that, in the 
summer of 2012, triumphantly accompanied its …. what? Confirmation? Inference? 
Certainly not observation or measurement, in any commonly understood way. The lack of 
reality of objects creeps back in. 
We—and Capra—follow Hammer in being most concerned with quantum physics, 
but will also wander into other dimensions of the discipline. Capra’s scientific bona fides 
came under fire for many of his interpretations in The Tao of Physics, most notably for his 
devotion to what is known as “bootstrap theory,” a hypothesis formulated by Geoffrey 
Chew in the early 1960s, which rejected the historical search for ever-more-fundamental 
particles (which became known as “quark theory”) in favor of the recognition that “the 
theories of atomic and subatomic physics made the existence of elementary particles 
increasingly unlikely. They revealed a basic interconnection of matter, showing that energy 
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of motion can be transformed into mass, and suggesting that particles are processes rather 
than objects.” (Capra 2000, 285) The real issue among the scientific community—or at 
least the small percentage of the scientific community that would gain exposure to Capra’s 
writing—was that 
The discovery of the so-called J/ᴪ meson in 1974 decisively confirmed the quark 
model, and the scientific community almost unanimously adopted the quark 
hypothesis as the definitive model of particle physics. Thus, by the time Capra 
published the first edition of The Tao of Physics, Chew’s proposal had already 
been demoted to the status of yet another historical curiosity in the development of 
physics. Nevertheless, Capra continued to support the bootstrap hypothesis in his 
later writings, and avoided informing his presumably less knowledgeable readers 
of the fact that his argument in part rested on marginal or even defunct theories of 
physics. (Hammer 2003, 285–6) 
Whatever we call the intellectual advance surrounding the Higgs Field this past summer, it 
did serve as the final turn of the screw in moving the quark hypothesis, much like the Gaia 
hypothesis, relatively solidly into the realm of established and accepted scientific truth. Or, 
barring the discomfort of that term, into a firm position within the currently accepted 
model. 
Hammer’s criticism is deadly from the perspective of the scientific world, but 
perhaps not so much if we view Capra as searching much less for scientific truth than for 
an interpretive framework through which he can make sense of a world that has moved 
from being dominated by the once-simple notion of Newtonian mechanics, where the 
equations could prove maddeningly complex but were highly dependable, to one where 
“all we can do is predict the odds.” (Capra 2000, 133) Both Hammer and Hanegraaff agree 
that The Tao of Physics is a starting point for Capra, albeit a highly problematic one that 
Hammer, in a somewhat scathing turn of phrase, summarizes as a combination of “a view 
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of quantum physics shared by practically none of his colleagues with a presentation of the 
Orient that most specialists in Asian religions would regard as fundamentally misguided.” 
(Hammer 2003, 286) Neither, however, are willing to dismiss him entirely, partially 
because—quite importantly for our purposes—“Capra’s type of physics-mysticism 
parallelism, whether valid or not, has unquestionably become one of the cherished beliefs 
of the New Age movement.” (Hanegraaff 1998a, 129) 
Speaking of the writings of Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg, Robert Fuller 
writes 
It was their form and vision, not their substance, that gave them their poignancy. 
Their influence was much like that exerted by the writings of Teilhard de Chardin, 
which in the 1960s and 1970s helped pull together the religious and scientific 
interests of many involved in holistic and psychic healing. That is, they lent an 
ideological matrix to a wide array of activities and gave them a certain plausibility 
they might otherwise have lacked. (Fuller 1989, 49) 
Similarly, Capra’s importance is not as a physicist nor as an interpreter of eastern religion, 
rather it is his contributions to this ideological matrix that form his greatest legacy. His 
later writings reflect the recognition that his focus was “not so much quantum physics per 
se as a specific worldview for which he attempts to find support in modern science.” 
(Hammer 2003, 286) In doing so, Capra shifted his attention from physics to other 
emerging scientific fields; however, unlike some of his followers and unlike part of the 
larger religious movements that embrace his work, Capra never harbored a hostility 
towards science or the established scientific methods. Indeed, he argues that 
the key to a comprehensive theory of living systems lies in the synthesis of those 
two very different approaches, the study of substance (or structure) and the study 
of form (or pattern). In the study of structure we measure and weigh things. 
Patterns, however, cannot be measured or weighted; they must be mapped. To 
understand a pattern we must map a configuration of relationships. In other words, 
structure involves quantities, while pattern involves qualities. (Capra 1996, 81) 
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Capra’s focus on form and pattern is really a focus on system thinking, on analyzing flows 
of organization and, importantly, self-organization. Here, he draws heavily and explicitly 
on the work of Humberto Maturana, especially in Maturana’s collaborations with 
Francisco Varela. Maturana and Varela were the first use the term autopoiesis (literally, 
self-making) to refer to the processes by which living systems achieve self-organization. 
This understates by a bit; Niklas Luhmann offers clarification when he describes 
autopoiesis as it relates to social systems: 
Autopoietic systems, then, are not only self-organizing systems, they not only 
produce and eventually change their own structures; their self-reference applies to 
the production of other components as well. This is the decisive conceptual 
innovation. It adds a turbocharger to the already powerful engine of self-referential 
machines. Even elements, that is, last components (in-dividuals) which are, at least 
for the system itself, undecomposable, are produced by the system itself. Thus, 
everything that is used as a unit by the system is produce as a unit by the system 
itself. This applies to elements, processes, boundaries, and other structures and, last 
but not least, to the unity of the system itself. Autopoietic systems, then, are 
sovereign with respect to the constitution of identities and differences. (Luhmann 
1990, 3) 
Of interest, in light of prior chapters, “Maturana and Varela begin their essay on 
autopoiesis by characterizing their approach as ‘mechanistic’ to distinguish it from vitalist 
approaches to the nature of life: ‘Our approach will be mechanistic: no forces or principles 
will be adduced which are not found in the physical universe.’” (Capra 1996, 97) Or, in 
Luhmann’s words, “A social system can only communicate. A living system can only 
live.” (Luhmann 1990, 13) In spite of this, echoes of Canguilhem are found quite often in 
their work, and when closely examined, the part of vitalism that proposes a unitive, holistic 
order to living systems is inseparable from autopoiesis, even if the ascription of spiritual 
power or matter to that part is rejected.  
A key component of this turn away from a mystical vitalism is a deep embedding in 
307 
 
modern mathematical theory, if not in the math itself. Historically, one of the challenges to 
complexity has been the inexplicability of diversity; that is, without positing a plan, a 
creator, a teleological unfolding, how do we arrive at the dizzying array of organizational 
possibilities of the natural world? How do we explain how bumblebees dance or how crabs 
in the deep ocean exist on sulfur alone or anything at all about a platypus? The notion that 
they just evolved that way remains simultaneously true and unsatisfying, a situation born of 
two difficulties. 
First, there is a vastness to the question that, in general, eludes our capacity for 
thought: not only are the numbers, the sizes, the timeframes too large to comprehend fully, 
the simplified models do little to address the situation satisfactorily. Noting, as Capra does, 
that “if the planet is represented by a globe the size of a basketball with the oceans and 
countries painted on it, the thickness of the biosphere would be just about the thickness of 
the paint” (Capra 1996, 214) makes for a striking image, but I would claim it does little to 
make real the incredible size of the earth itself—let alone the universe that surrounds it. 
Similarly, David Brower’s compression of the history of the planet into a biblical six days 
offers a stark presentation of the newness of humanity (we come into existence at about 
eleven seconds to midnight on the final day and start to write things down less than one 
second to midnight—as a contrast, dinosaurs have a good five hour run earlier that day), 
but I’m not sure that the scale translates into anything useful: the gap between the 
exemplar and its referent is just too great. We can look at a football field and imagine how 
big eight of them would be, end-to-end. Eight thousand, let alone eight million? Not so 
much. (For a description of Brower’s work, see Capra 1996, 261–2) 
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The other difficulty facing Capra is more daunting, and requires his being able to 
show that such complexity can be explained without resorting to religion. That he does so 
while remaining open to an emergent spirituality is part of the reason he is embraced by 
various segments of the New Age; that he does so at all requires a long digression into 
chaos. At the highest level, things began to fall apart shortly after Newton put them 
together: Newton (and Leibniz) gave us calculus and in doing so offered a series of 
solutions that, as we saw earlier, could land human beings on the moon. But in doing so 
they also ushered in several centuries of model-making, a tradition of using, essentially, 
brute force and a volume of approximation to serve as stand-ins for direct experience and 
accuracy. Calculus is based on flattening out curves into straight lines that are so small as 
to be “infinitely small” in difference from the curve itself. Doing calculations on straight 
lines is easy: put enough of them together and you can reassemble the results into 
something that is indistinguishable—at least at a glance—from the original curve itself. 
Math becomes model making: sophisticated model making, incredibly accurate model 
making, but model making nonetheless. 
The precision of this world served to hide some of its mysteries, which were 
usually dismissed as relating to the realms of the very small or the very large—implying 
that they are marginal and unworthy of the bulk of our attention. This is patently false: 
whirlpools and tornadoes, the flow of a fast-moving stream over a bed of rocks, the 
dissipation of smoke, the spread of fire; these are things that range from the mundane to 
the spectacular and they exist in a world where Newtonian calculations are of little help, 
other than at the most generalized of levels (lest there be any notion of this list being 
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complete, here is another claiming that we encounter the same issues if we attempt to 
measure with any precision, “the coast of Brittany, the crater-filled surface of the moon, 
the distribution of stellar matter, the frequency of bursts of interference during a telephone 
call, turbulence in general, the shape of clouds”). And, as Jean-François Lyotard (the 
author of that second list) notes, this is part and parcel of the structure of reality: “Quantum 
theory and microphysics require a far more radical revision of the idea of a continuous and 
predictable path. The quest for precision is not limited by its cost, but by the very nature of 
matter.” (Lyotard 1984, 56–58) But this shortfall wasn’t only present in attempts to predict 
or describe the observed world: evolution itself raised the same questions. For example, 
consider the notion of convergence. In a highly problematic paragraph, Capra writes that 
convergence 
Is the tendency of organisms to evolve similar forms for meeting similar 
challenges, in spite of differing ancestral histories. Thus eyes have evolved many 
times along different routes—in worms, snails, insects, and vertebrates. Similarly, 
wings evolved independently in insects, reptiles, bats, and birds. It seems that 
nature’s creativity is boundless. (Capra 1996, 232) 
I call this quote problematic because the tendency of evolution to return to common 
solutions would actually be evidence against boundless creativity and indeed offers quite a 
challenge to a theorist, as it requires a model where mutation exists randomly, but in 
somehow limited avenues, where genetic change that begins to move in a certain direction 
finds itself guided in its development along recognizable pathways.  
It turns out there are models that account for this exactly, but they all engage with 
areas of mathematics that only began to emerge, or at least, to draw serious consideration 
in the last century or so. At the most abstract level, they reflect ways in which periods of 
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great stability interact with moments of intense chaos, resulting in self-perpetuating and 
self-correcting patterns. These models show that, given a particular set of starting 
conditions, a particular set of possible interactions each with a particular set of rules, and a 
particular set of ongoing contexts that create particular forms of additional interactions 
and/or constraints, you can show that, indeed, a set of cells not only can evolve into eyes 
which then become stable as components of living organisms, but that such evolution 
shifts from the nearly impossible to the plausible (albeit still unlikely). This science is a 
science of relationship, communications, flow; it is a science of state transformations, of 
transition points, of pattern recognition. It is no longer sufficient to “solve for x;” it has 
become necessary to observe x in its environment, to recognize its contingent relationship 
with y and z as well as its slow transformation into x2. 
All of this becomes increasingly and incredibly complicated: certainly, the pure 
science side of it eclipsed my capabilities quite some time back in our discussions, and 
even the theoretical models that are spawned are very challenging to wrestle into some 
form of understanding. The difficulty is the same as with the history-of-the-universe-in-
six-days mentioned above: we can easily isolate a few interactive systems and understand 
how they may fit together, but grasping a near-infinite number of them interacting 
simultaneously over as large an environment as the earth itself eludes us. There is a need 
for something to bridge the gap, something that takes us from the sense of wondrous 
amusement at the ability of fractal images to replicate perfectly the intricate paisley of fern 
leaves to an understanding of purpose. 
Varela summarizes the problem by recognizing the need for 
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A subtle but powerful twist: we emphasize the system’s coherence, instead of 
taking the perspective of a supposed design. In other words, we understand the 
system as an autonomous cognitive system: an active, self-updating collection of 
structures capable of informing (or shaping) its surrounding medium into a world 
through a history of structural coupling with it. (Varela 1987, 52) 
Note that Varela is clearly trying to defend his language against something here, 
specifically, I would claim, a notion of God’s plan, which is certainly one possible 
explanation for the same condition and, indeed, evangelical Christianity in America has 
found itself with some profoundly uncomfortable partners when it comes to forays into 
recent science. By skimming the surface of the possibilities, the traditional argument for 
intelligent design is reinforced: how do cells, which are indistinguishable from each other 
at early stages of development, “know” whether they will become fingernails, white blood 
cells, or linings on our lungs? How can simple mathematical graphs reflect the complexity 
of the natural world so perfectly? How can a given ecosystem depend so heavily on just 
such an arrangement of predators and prey, harkening back to Dawkins’ “BBC Theorem?” 
How could the earth have settled its oxygen level at such a perfect point? In each case, the 
answer of the unfolding of the master plan of a great architect seems as understandable, 
and as compelling, as Varela and Maturana’s intensely complex system modeling.  
A Gut Feeling: Bacterial Sex 
and the Myth of the Self 
Feeling humbled is, therefore, a logical response to the perception that 
organisms too small for us to see do exist, have existed and will exist 
happily without us. And that the reverse is not true. 
Anne Primavesi, Sacred Gaia 
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Myths are even more Copernican than novels. Or perhaps we might say 
that if dogma moves in a Ptolemaic universe and novels move in a 
Copernican universe, myths move in an Einsteinian universe, a place of 
true relativity. 
Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider 
At the beginning of Symbiotic Planet, Lynn Margulis asks essentially the same 
question: prompted by an inquiry from one of her sons, Margulis begins to probe what 
could possibly connect the “two major scientific ideas that I have worked on all my 
professional life, serial endosymbiosis theory (SET) and Gaia, and the relation of one to 
the other.” Her first answer is “Nothing … or at least nothing as far as I’m aware.” 
(Margulis 1998, 2) This is a striking example of the gap we are trying to observe: what 
could possibly be the connection between Gaia, and its large, planetary large, claims of 
regulation and feedback processes and SET, which concentrates on the millions of 
microscopic and near-microscopic organisms that permeate all of life. 
At the most abstract and most simplistic level, Margulis’ work has focused on an 
inversion of what had been accepted evolutionary canon, where the progression from a 
common, single-celled ancestor was seen as a long series of divisions, of branches by 
which organisms mutated into difference, creating all of the extensions of a tree of life 
spreading ever-outward from the common originary trunk. Margulis saw the question from 
a different starting point, most clearly described in her memory of going, at the urging of 
her son and collaborator Dorion  
into the Boston MBTA Auditorium-Massachusetts Avenue station to see the 
graffiti scrawled on a worn map in a subway tunnel. The huge black letters 
queried, “Whence Come Amoebae in Chaos?” I laughed out loud. The statement, 
my focus, in essence my life question, shone on the dim walls of the dingy 
underground metro stop. (Margulis 1998, 18) 
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This question of how did the original bacterial soup come to be, of what led to the cell 
itself, is one that confirms her claim that her work “began off-center;” (Margulis 1998, 19) 
indeed, it would continue off-center into the present as well (or, nearly so: Lynn Margulis 
died in the fall of 2011). Her explorations into the initial formation of amoebae led her to 
pick up strands scattered across the landscape of Biology, papers long ignored and thinkers 
long discarded, in addition to what were seen as minor developments in canonized work. 
She wove all of this together into a fundamentally different narrative structure, one that 
depended on fusion, on coming together, on emergent combination, on a whole host of 
biological works that she embraced under the rubric of symbiogenesis. 
She knew what she was up against. The notion of branching, of a constant chain of 
evolutionary process that moved ever-forward, that gave us both a past from which to 
distance ourselves and a better future into which we could project our progeny was—and 
remains—a core assumption of western scientific thought. As she writes, 
Our outlooks shape what we see and how we know. Any idea we conceive as fact 
or truth is integrated into an entire style of thought, of which we are usually 
unaware. Call the cultural constraints “trained incapacities,” “thought collectives,” 
“social constructions of reality.” Call the dominating inhibitions that determine our 
point of view whatever you wish. They affect all of us, including scientists. All are 
saddled with heavy linguistic, national, regional, and generational impediments to 
perception. Like those of everyone else, the scientist’s hidden assumptions affect 
his or her behavior, unwittingly directing thought. 
 
One widely held unstated assumption is the great chain of being. It defines the 
venerable position of humans as the exact center of the universe in the middle of 
the chain of being below God and above rock. This anthropocentric idea dominates 
religions thought, even that of those who claim to reject religion and to replace it 
with a scientific worldview … 
 
These ideas are rejected as obsolete nonsense by a consistently scientific 
worldview. All beings alive today are equally evolved. All have survived over 
three thousand million years of evolution from common bacterial ancestors. 
(Margulis 1998, 3) 
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Instead, Margulis offers a sense of loops, of evolution by incorporation. Note that this view 
is not necessarily kinder or gentler: while symbiosis importantly offers up a way to 
understand evolutionary cooperation in new light, there is no requirement for rose-colored 
glasses. One cell ingesting another to form a new third set of capabilities may occur at 
great cost to one of the original members; as such, the term incorporation may be more 
evocative than language that seems to drape the process in a friendly notion of 
collaboration. Many of these takeovers are indeed hostile. 
Behind the great chain of being and, indeed, behind huge swathes of scientific 
thought, lurks the principle of differentiation: we categorize objects into clear 
arrangements based on observable difference and even changes in the scope of our 
observational data don’t shake our belief in the primal necessity of the structural operation. 
That is, while genetic analysis is now eagerly shifting animals between taxa, they remain 
firmly this or that. At its most extreme, this is why the intersexed pose such a fundamental 
problem to the traditional medical model: if you cannot be categorized as male or female, 
how can you exist? Margulis’ work, along with that of hundreds of other scientists, some 
working with her, many others in parallel ignorance, is deeply threatening to this. 
Examples abound, with one area of concentration being the intense overlap between plants 
and animals when water and sunlight merge; one, at some detail, from Margulis herself: 
In Brittany, on the northwest coast of France, and along beaches bordering the 
English Channel is found a strange sort of “seaweed” that is not seaweed at all. 
From a distance it is a bright green patch on the sand. The patches slosh around, 
shimmering in shallow puddles. When you pick up the green water and let it slip 
through your fingers you notice gooey ribbons much like seaweed. A small hand 
lens or low-power microscope reveals that what looked like seaweed are really 
green worms. These masses of sunbathing green worms, unlike any seaweed, 
burrow into the sand and effectively disappear. … The flatworms of the species 
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Convoluta roscoffensis are all green because their tissues are packed with 
Platymonas cells; as the worms are translucent, the green color of Platymonas, 
photosynthesizing algae, shows through. Although lovely, the green algae are not 
entirely decorative: they live and grow, die and reproduce, inside the bodies of the 
worms. Indeed they produce the food that the worms “eat.” The mouths of the 
worms become superfluous and do not function after the worm larvae hatch. 
Sunlight reaches the algae inside their mobile greenhouses and allows them to 
grow and feed themselves as they leak photosynthetic products and feed their hosts 
from the inside. The symbiotic algae even do the worm a waste management favor: 
they recycle the worm’s uric acid waste into nutrients for themselves. Algae and 
worm make a miniature ecosystem swimming in the sun. (Margulis 1998, 9–10) 
Under very high powered microscopic examination, it is possible to identify where the 
worm ends and the algae begins. But what is served by such severance? If they are 
separated, both die, although it is easier to cultivate colonies of Platymonas without a host 
than it is for the flatworm to exist without its symbiotic partner. 
Margulis challenges us to reconsider what it means to be an individual, a call that 
also has profound implications for the arguments of Dawkins outlined above. At a base 
level, “it is not clear what sociobiologists think an individual is; they fail to analyze or 
define this term, assuming that it is self-evident because of a parochial focus on the animal 
kingdom.” (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 214) More prosaically, 
As positivists, materialists, or physical reductionists in the Western scientific 
tradition, we would like to think that the picture of the body as an adequately 
closed topological surface is necessary and sufficient prima facie self-evidence—
for the self. And so it is within a certain rectilinear closure. However, as we—and 
even this coauthorial “we” must be put in quotation marks as we ponder the self, 
the subject, the person, et cetera—intimated, the egotistic I is clear only in the 
sense of a fundamentally fictional or topologically displaced mirror image; there is 
nothing behind the mirror. (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 19) 
While this passage opens both towards Buddhism and, more compellingly for me, towards 
Irigaray and her own questioning of the notion of the self, most eloquently in This Sex 
Which Is Not One, we will instead steadfastly maintain our focus on the evolutionary 
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argument itself, the crux of which is the insistence that evolution cannot work above the 
level of the individual, that there is no such thing as “group selection.” This is a standard 
and important concept in evolutionary thought: groups don’t evolve, individuals do. At the 
extreme, this is the answer to the myth of the hundredth monkey, a common contemporary 
trope that appeared initially in the 1970s with reference to macaque monkeys that lived on 
Japanese islands who were all able to acquire skills as soon as one hundred members of the 
troop learned it: the hundredth monkey represented a tipping point where the newly 
acquired knowledge was instantly accessible to the entire group. Often used as a metaphor 
for an impending change in human consciousness, the hundredth monkey is seen by most 
scientific commentators as a clear example of bad science misapplied, with a core error in 
understanding how genetic improvements work. 
There are many responses to the model that supposes that no evolution is possible 
beyond the level of the individual. The most common and, indeed, most banal, are all of 
the examples of cooperative behavior that abound in virtually any glance at the natural 
world: from child-rearing practices to cross-species engagement in feeding and nesting, 
there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that species do, in fact, quite often work 
together both individually and in groups. This is fairly easily rejected, however: the ability 
to cooperate may very well be a trait that confers evolutionary advantages upon its bearer, 
however, it does so individually. That is, the gene is still acting “selfishly” for the 
individual by passing on the traits required to work cooperatively. 
More interesting to me and, indeed, the primary focus of the rest of this chapter, is 
the assertion, in what may be seen as an odd refraction, of the existence and possibilities of 
317 
 
the embodied individual over and above their genetic material; that is, the claim that we 
are, indeed, more than our genes. Taking the notion that there is no such thing as group 
selection as being a thin code for there only being the existence of selection at the genetic 
level, an understanding emerges that “sociobiology denies the ontological value of the 
individual; all value rests in the gene pool and in the relationship of ‘inclusive fitness.’ The 
individual is simply a package for ‘the selfish gene.’” (Thompson 1987, 21) This critique, 
leveled by William Irwin Thompson in the introduction to Gaia: A Way of Knowing. 
Political Implications of the New Biology, is profoundly uncomfortable with the notion that 
we are merely assemblies and carriers, our humanity a side-effect of genetic processes 
yearning to replicate, where the only truth is that of the component part, the mechanical 
operation. This has deep philosophical implications: 
The role of unities is thus doubly denied by sociobiology: first, unities are broken 
down and defined in terms of fragments in the reductionist method, and, second, 
abstractions like species, gene pool, and inclusive fitness are reified and not simply 
seen as descriptive procedures of the observer. This world of broken fragments and 
chimerical abstractions is the frightening world of Science, capitalist or socialist, a 
world completely set apart from the organic process of life in an ecology. 
(Thompson 1987, 21–2) 
Thompson sees these notions as troubling and dangerous, and he moves very quickly from 
the scientific through the ethical to the religious, illustrating that although it may seem that 
we have been far removed from spiritual concerns in this chapter, they are always present, 
if slightly askew from our current angle of vision. 
Thompson moves his focus to the notion of the tool, joining the mechanistic 
thinking above to the idea that the tool and, ultimately, the use of tools to destroy and 
especially to kill, is what “made us human and separated culture from nature. In this view 
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it is in the act of killing that we most truly perform our humanity. The weapon has a force 
of its own and it hurls its user into a new ecological niche, a new adaption, and all that is 
left behind is the sloughed-off animal nature of the primitive.” (Thompson 1987, 23–4) 
This idea (which we first encountered in the opening chapter’s discussion of Bataille) is 
initially contrasted with research suggesting a far more cooperative model of early 
hominids before the explicit turn to the religious, where “food was transported from one 
place to another where it was shared in circumstances of relative safety. Now here the 
basic act which makes us human is the sharing of food; small wonder that the religious 
among us feel that we most truly perform our human nature in the communion that comes 
from the sharing of food.” (Thompson 1987, 25) Thompson continues, somewhat 
rhapsodically: 
In the technological definition of human culture, the tool basically separates 
culture from nature. In the social definition of human culture, the act of food-
sharing is a relationship between nature and nurture. This vision of relationship is 
symbolically emphasized in the Christian sacrament, for when one takes raw grain 
and turns it into bread, one is involved in a performance of the movement from 
nature to culture; and so it is with the movement of the grape into wine. When 
Jesus takes bread and wine and says: “Take this in remembrance of me, for this is 
my body and blood,” he is not the masochistic psychopath that Freud made him 
out to be, but a poet with an ecological vision of life who is using myth and 
symbol to express how all life is food to one another. The Upanishads would 
express the idea in a different poetic diction to say that: Earth is food; air lives on 
earth; earth is air, air is earth; they are food for one another.” The theological idea, 
then, of the Mystical Body of Christ put forth by St. Paul, is a vision of a planetary 
being, a cell in which we as individuals are organelles. (Thompson 1987, 25) 
Thompson is really asserting the individual in order to affirm the collective and, if we are 
to be generous, it is only a lack of understanding of the complexity of the biological reality 
that leads him to his insistence on the primacy of the unique self. 
Margulis, of course, suffers from no such limits, and her argument against the 
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established tropes in evolutionary thought prove the most interesting obstacle yet for 
thinking of the primacy of the gene, as they open up a space where the very nature and 
definition of the individual is called into question. Understanding Margulis’ position 
requires a slight, yet potentially profound, detour into cellular biology and sex. 
Specifically, and perhaps disappointingly, bacterial sex, as opposed to the more familiar 
meiotic sex practiced by virtually all animals and plants. 
We know that mammalian copulation is merely one of many fertilization and 
reproduction strategies that exist and while many biologists would protest against our 
anthropomorphic tendencies to see the variety of options employed by reptiles, 
amphibians, birds, insects, fish, and plants as odd imitations of that model, they do remain 
fundamentally understandable. “Meiotic sex involves two reciprocal processes: the 
reduction by half of the number of chromosomes to make sperm, eggs, or spores and the 
fertilization that reestablishes the original chromosomal number.” (Margulis and Sagan 
2007, 115) So, whether the eggs are kept internally, whether the sperm is left to float on 
the ocean currents or the summer breeze, whether fertilization occurs once or several 
times, whether there is a relation between the organisms involved in fertilization and those 
engaged in the future task of rearing the young, the process of the formation of haploid 
cells that later join together to form diploid cells in offspring repeats. Meiotic sex serves 
two purposes: it enables the transmission of genetic material across organisms and it 
allows for the survival of the species. 
“While bacteria have sex under certain conditions, they never need it to reproduce.” 
(Margulis and Sagan 2007, 115) It is a simple sentence, but one that has enormous impact: 
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for bacteria, the only utility in sex is the free and open transmission of genetic material. 
Bacteria move genetic material amongst themselves in chaotic patterns, resulting in a 
dizzying complexity of adaptation, rejection, and the discovery of genes being both used 
and abandoned in species far removed from their source. 
Bacterial sexuality fundamentally differs from the sexuality of so-called higher 
organisms because it occurs independently of reproduction, crosses “species” 
barriers, and involves, in principle, the sexual sharing of genes by bacteria all over 
the world. Indeed, Canadian bacteriologist Sorin Sonea and his colleague Leo 
Mathieu point out that bacteria, since they are able to trade genes freely across 
would-be species barriers, are not really divisible into (or assignable to) species at 
all. (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 138) 
So much of our conception of life depends on the notion of the individual: individual 
people, individual opossums, individual cells tightly bounded by their membranes. 
Margulis’ work threatens these notions on two fronts, first by recognizing that such 
conceptions only apply to some of those things that surround us that are considered, by 
almost any definition you choose, fully alive; and second by realizing that even in our 
limited world of mammalian behavior, we are a combination of these forms of life working 
symbiotically. The following is taken from the transcript of the second Lindisfarne 
conference on Gaia, and is a presentation given by Margulis in conjunction with her 
husband, the Professor of Microbiology, Ricardo Guerrero (John and Nancy Todd are both 
biologist and ecological activists based in Massachusetts who were also participants in the 
conference). 
Guerrero: … An “individual” is intrinsically complex and intrinsically divisible. It 
sounds paradoxical, but in the prokaryotic world (i.e., all life until a mere 1.2 
billion years ago) nothing smaller than a community can be an individual. The 
integrating mechanisms of the members of the community make the individual. 
Bacteria, prokaryotes in general, can practically interchange genes or other 
materials among themselves. “Individuals” emerge when this interchange is 
restricted; the membrane toughens, the genes become packaged into a membrane 
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bounded nucleus, and our world of sex and death emerges. 
 
Margulis: I’d like to clarify Ricardo’s comments for people who are not familiar 
with bacteria. Imagine if John Todd went out for coffee and drank some genes, 
drank up someone else’s genes so when he comes back, John Todd, who was 
blond when he went out, now has Nancy Todd’s brunette hair. I mean, he simply 
changes his genetic makeup by eating; this is what bacteria do all the time. 
 
We have trouble imagining the promiscuity, the genetic laxity of bacteria that 
consume genes as if they were food. Genes for bacteria are replicating food. 
Bacteria exchange genetic material in a way that is completely different from our 
experience. (Margulis and Guerrero 1991, 59–60) 
The key conceptual element is that, for Margulis and for an increasing number of 
biologists, there has not been anything that we could accurately describe as an individual 
for a very, very, very, very long time—since the first bacteria began to exchange genetic 
information with its neighbor. She asks, “how, then, can evolution not work at a level 
above that of the individual if the very first animals were themselves multicellular 
collections—populations—of once independent heterogeneous cells?” (Margulis and 
Sagan 2007, 214) In other words, millions and millions of years ago, when the very first 
animals and plants began to appear, they were the product of a complex series of joining 
and negotiations between single celled organisms and, from that day on, the notion of 
existence outside of a group has been itself flawed.  
The animal body itself has evolved as a unit from a morass of individuals working 
simultaneously at different levels of integration. Sociobiologists and neo-
Darwinian theorists disdain “group selection” because they don’t have strong 
enough cases for its existence in populations of animals. But it may well be that, 
due to their large size and late appearance on the evolutionary stage, animals have 
not yet achieved the high level of group consolidations found in microbes. No 
matter how elegant the mathematics, dismissing group selection as an evolutionary 
mechanism requires dismissal of individual animals also, for the body of the 
academic itself provides a counterexample to the thesis that natural selection (if it 
“works” at all) never works on “groups.” A person is, after all, a composite of 
cells. (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 215) 
We are, always already, plural. And, fractal: that is, Margulis and Sagan move from 
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this, which is, at the very least, an issue under hot debate in the scientific community, to an 
emphatic, soaring declaration of emergent complexity, in language that Capra would 
certainly approve: 
Therefore, we must (again, within this framework) concede that evolution favors 
populations of individuals that act together to re-create individuality at ever higher 
levels. This somewhat freaky assertion calls into question the very usefulness of 
trying to isolate the units of natural selection: because of the articulation or 
community relations of living things, the differential reproduction of units at one 
level translates into the differential reproduction of units at a higher, more 
inclusive level. I anticipate that the mathematical theory of fractals, in which the 
same features are present in interlocking geometrical figures at various scales of 
analysis, may be useful in illustrating the principle of emergent identity in the 
series cell, multicellular organism, and superorganismic society. In principle, the 
“animal-like” nature of Earth can be considered fractally as resulting from the 
Malthusian dynamics of cells reproducing in a limited space. (Margulis and Sagan 
2007, 216) 
So, where traditional evolution sees an ever-dividing tree, branches that constantly fork 
into more and more refined and specialized varieties, Margulis and Sagan propose an 
unfolding, a mathematically understandable pattern whereby complexity increases as 
components (first, cellular; later at the level of the organism) are forced, due to limited 
resources, to overlap and join, merge and assimilate. 
We are in no position to judge the scientific merit of Margulis’ position—or 
Dawkins’ for that matter. Instead, the focus is on the form the arguments take, the kinds of 
logic they invoke on their behalf: in Margulis, we find the kind of questioning, the 
invocation of complexity, the focus on emergence, cooperation, and possibility that is, I 
would claim, representative not just of turns in the development of modern science, but in 
other realms of thought as well: the same forms of thought allow reflections on the nature 
of the earth itself, and it is no accident that the essay from which the bulk of the argument 
against traditional evolution is taken ends with a joining of two of the major tropes of our 
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explorations: moonrise and the body itself: 
Perhaps another Greek myth, because it has not strayed onto the dangerous 
battleground of truth, better sums up the present philosophical situation. Once 
Narcissus stood and eyed the still waves that reflected his own image. He had 
never seen himself before. He became infatuated. And now we gaze in the looking 
glass of satellite imaging technology. Again we see the water. Again … but what is 
“ourselves”? And who—or what—is this body? (Margulis and Sagan 2007, 221) 
Sudden Shifts: The Ends of 
Science (Texts) as an Opening 
to Ideologies of Evolution 
The environmental movement … addressed ultimate, religious questions 
without the language or concepts of religion or even those from the 
academic study of religion. To complicate things it crossed many of the 
boundaries the culture enforced between reason and emotion, relying on 
science to describe nature but seeking spiritual experience and emotional 
connections to the world, and a purpose for individuals and the species, 
accepting a material world and material explanations but explaining our 
relationship with the world in moral terms. 
Thomas Dunlap, Faith In Nature 
This may be seen as a minor example of what is a standard structure in many of the 
texts produced by scientists for wider consumption: the bulk of the work will be solidly 
scientific, draped in numbers and experimental results, in finely crafted conclusions and 
the slow burn of the careful layering of theoretical concepts. Then, in the final paragraphs 
or the final chapter, a sudden turn to the soaring metaphor, the far-flung future. 
I had been struck for some time by certain remarkable prophetic and metaphysical 
passages that appeared suddenly in scientific books about evolution, often in their 
last chapters. Though these passages were detached from the official reasoning of 
the books, they seemed to still be presented as science. But they made startling 
suggestions about vast themes such as immortality, human destiny and the 
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meaning of life. These are difficult topics with which philosophical and religious 
thinkers have long wrestled. But the scientific writers did not usually refer to any 
earlier discussions. They simply and confidently laid down their own surprising 
views about them. Their pronouncements seemed to be seriously intended. But it 
was far from clear on what level they were meant to be taken. (Midgley 1985, viii) 
This paragraph occurs in the introduction of Mary Midgley’s Evolution as a Religion, 
which offers, I believe, a bridge from the first part of this chapter across the question of 
just what does all of this have to do with religion? First drawn to the topic through the 
excessive claims she would occasionally encounter at the end of works by scientists, 
Midgley examines what the relationship is between science and faith from a largely 
philosophical view: that is, she is not looking at the role of faith in the lives of scientists or 
at any real sense of compatibility or competition between the two domains. Instead, her 
questions center on how notions taken as scientific can function as a religion in many of 
their aspects. This phrase ends up being key to her consideration, culminating in a 
consideration of what she terms “secular faiths,” where she claims that 
to say that Marxism or evolutionism, or indeed art or science, is serving as a 
religion, can be a useful way of speaking today. It is not like saying that golf is 
someone’s religion, which is probably just a joke, and at most means only that it is 
the most important thing in his life, the thing to which the rest gives place. Here 
there is not likely to be any system of thought arguing that golf ought to take 
precedence, and giving reasons why it should do so. Moreover, devotion to golf is 
likely to have only a negative effect on those parts of life which take place off the 
golf-course. It leads to their being neglected, not to their being differently 
conducted. But the other candidates we are now considering do have those 
thought-systems and that wider impact. They are, not accidentally but by their very 
nature, dominant creeds, explicit faiths by which people live and to which they try 
to convert others. They tend to alter the world. (Midgley 1985, 18) 
This captures nicely the kind of thought Midgley associates with religion: religious 
concepts provide a justification for their existence and expansion, they offer models that 
allow individuals to conduct their lives differently: they alter the world. It’s not a rigorous 
definition of religion and it’s not one likely to pass intensive scrutiny; but it is, like all of 
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Midgley’s thought, clear, concise and, ultimately, quite usable. 
Still, the difficulties of her definition, and what they reveal about a certain level of 
naïveté with regards to the study of religion, do raise their head now and again in Evolution 
As A Religion, most egregiously with her avoidance of the rigorous specificity required to 
think clearly about any actual religious behavior, but also in her lack of engagement with 
the notion of experience and what religious behavior may mean to those who perceive it 
directly. This last underscores her unwavering commitment to rationality: she is not 
interested here in the excesses of mysticism or behavior driven by the throes of a newly 
sparked religious fervor. Indeed, it is the affirmation of rationality that allows us to 
examine the issue at all: 
We need, then, to start by resisting unrealistic skepticism. We do have this general 
capacity for making sense of our moral ideas and for explaining our judgments to 
one another. We are therefore not actually helpless when it comes to evaluating 
faiths and ideologies. We can, for instance, separate the various elements in a faith 
and approve of some of them while disapproving of others. And for this we can 
give our reasons. We are not reduced to the mere legalistic manoeuvre of 
outlawing them wholesale from learned life by saying that they are not science. 
(Midgley 1985, 22) 
Midgley is, above all else, a philosopher and a critical thinker, and the directness of her 
writing, the ability to look at complex issues from a practical and incisive position, provide 
a level of utility in our current explorations that warrant excusing her lack of expressed 
training in anthropology and the history of religions. These contrasts are on display in the 
very first paragraph, where along with a wonderfully cogent summary of why evolution 
itself is more than just a bit of science, she makes a sweeping anthropological claim that is 
at best overly broad: 
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The theory of evolution is not just an inert piece of theoretical science. It is, and 
cannot help being, also a powerful folk-tale about human origins. Any such 
narrative must have symbolic force. We are probably the first culture not to make 
that its main function. Most stories about human origins must have been devised 
purely with a view to symbolic and poetic fittingness. Suggestions about how we 
were made and where we come from are bound to engage our imagination, to 
shape our views of what we now are, and so to affect our lives. Scientists, when 
they find themselves caught up in these webs of symbolism, sometimes complain, 
calling for a sanitary cordon to keep them away from science. But this seems to be 
both psychologically and logically impossible. (Midgley 1985, 1) 
The rest of the text is focused, however, on the final two sentences—the desire of scientists 
themselves (or, better, some scientists at some times) to create an arena that is somehow 
set apart from the symbolic and the poetic and the difficulty, indeed, for Midgley, the 
ultimate impossibility, of doing so. 
Each of these ideas is key: Midgley was drawn to the topic by what seemed to be a 
desire on the part of scientific writers themselves to reach beyond the experimental data 
and into the larger world in their pronouncements about the future; she found that such a 
blurring of domains was not only endemic to the practice of science, but also in the end a 
clear necessity: “science is not just a formless mass of experimental data: it is a system of 
thought in which they are ranged, a system which connects with the rest of our thinking.” 
(Midgley 1985, 19) It is these connections that she finds most disturbing, the ways in 
which a scientific thought is fused into the wider consciousness, often in a deformed and 
ultimately malignant way. 
In this, she is particularly concerned with two themes, two thought-fugues that 
return throughout a disproportionate amount of scientific discourse. “The first is the better 
known and the more obviously pernicious. It is the ‘Social Darwinist’ idea … that life has 
been scientifically proved to be essentially competitive, in some sense which exposes all 
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social feeling as somehow mere humbug and illusion.” This notion persists despite, for 
Midgley, having “often been exposed as nonsense. … But because of its strong dramatic 
force, as well as various political uses, this notion persists through repeated attempts to 
correct it, and often twists up the ideas even of those who think they are helping to get rid 
of it.” The second theme is one that we have already brushed against, that of evolution as 
“a steady, linear upward movement, a single inexorable process of improvement, leading 
… into some superhuman spiritual stratosphere.”(Midgley 1985, 7) 
A key question for Midgley is why these fugues matter? That is, there are 
throughout human history hundreds of thousands of ideas, many of which are grouped 
together under various rubrics that hold sway over significant numbers of people. Yet, at 
this particular moment, she is aiming her concentration here. The answer has to do with a 
specific veneration of science that Midgley sees as holding cultural sway for the past 
century-and-a-half. She attempts to walk a very fine line, maintaining respect for and 
veneration of science where appropriate, but sensitive to those moments where “an element 
of moderate, selective skepticism, which will make us watch out for particular sources of 
error” is warranted. These errors occur at the overlapping of two ideas: first, the extension 
of the rubric of science into “a vast area which has only an imaginative affinity with them, 
… where only the name and trappings of ‘science’ are present;” and second, the 
recognition that “the attitude sometimes called ‘scientism’—a general veneration for the 
idea of science, detached from any real understanding of its methods—is at present 
extremely powerful.” (Midgley 1985, 31) 
So, we have two ideological tropes masquerading as science, one centered on the 
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innate competitive nature of existence, the other a story of eternal progression towards a 
higher good. In dealing with the first, Midgley moves over now-familiar ground, 
examining the transition of nature “red in tooth and claw” to that of the selfish gene, 
arguments that we have largely dealt with above. Later in the text, Midgley reflects on 
Gaia herself as existing well beyond such considerations: 
If she finds her system getting out of kilter because one element in it is insatiably 
greedy, she simply ditches that element as she has done so many others before. She 
is not in the least anthropocentric and has no special interest in intelligence. She is 
in fact impersonal, impartial Nature—not specially red in tooth and claw, but 
resolute to remain in general green and alive, and therefore liable to cross the 
projects of those who are acting so as to turn the green, thriving world into a 
desert. And if this resistance fails, she herself can no doubt be killed with all her 
children. No universal fail-safe mechanism protects either her or us. (Midgley 
1985, 74) 
Throughout Evolution As A Religion, Midgley remains quite sympathetic towards 
Darwin himself, and mentions in several places that he found “the idea of a vast escalator, 
proceeding steadily upwards from lifeless matter through plants and animals to man, and 
inevitably on to higher things,” to be a “baseless piece of theorizing,” something that he 
“utterly distrusted.” (Midgley 1985, 38) This is not a novel or controversial position: while 
perhaps a little harsh in her assessment of Darwin himself, Primavesi makes the same case 
when she writes that “On the whole, [Darwin’s] attempt to keep the metaphorical is/is not 
balance between the aspects of cooperation (dependence) and competition (struggle) can 
be seen as a failure, in that the aspect of competition came to play a dominant, and 
therefore unbalanced, role.” (Primavesi 2000, 53) Certainly, Darwin’s radial bush has little 
in common with Lamarck’s expanding tree and even less with Spencer’s popularization of 
evolution as a social theory; more importantly, according to Midgley, “Darwin saw no 
reason to posit any law guaranteeing the continuation of any of the changes he noted, or to 
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pick out any one of them, such as increase in intelligence, as the core of the whole 
proceeding.” (Midgley 1985, 38) 
Darwinian evolution is, then, essentially arbitrary but explicitly not random. That 
is, there are rules to evolution as a process, and there are predictable patterns to which it 
adheres. But there is no guiding intelligence, no primacy for any particular trait or set of 
traits. This remains a glaring misunderstanding in the popular culture: giraffe’s necks did 
not evolve so they could reach the leaves higher in the tree. Instead, a mutation resulted in 
a longer-necked proto-giraffe. That mutation had a higher survival rate than his shorter-
necked brethren, and so became a dominant species. Over millions of years, this pattern 
played itself out in millions of ways: slightly larger vertebrae here, denser bone 
foundations there, here a beard, there a different kind of fur on the end of the tail. These 
mutations had no purpose. They just happened, a result of genetic combinations. But they 
either contributed to a higher survival rate or—and this is, in some ways, the final nail in 
the coffin of the selfish gene—they had no impact on survival whatsoever, but, through the 
complex web of inter-connectivity that comprises genetic behavior, were carried along in 
the wake of other changes which did. To this day, this idea remains profoundly unsettling 
for some: any individual evolutionary change does not need to be explained teleologically 
and any individual mutation may in fact be detrimental to the individual, but helpful to the 
species as a whole (it is hard to construct a world where the birth pattern of the hyena—
where the urethra is torn and shredded as the cubs emerge—is “good” for the mother at the 
individual level; likewise the relationship in most antelopes between scent markings and 
discomfort: scent glands are often rubbed against trees and flowers because it helps reduce 
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pain and itching, something again that aids the species at the expense of the individual). 
The reason for the unsettling nature of these thoughts is inextricably tied to the 
human tendency to search for meaning in abstract patterns. Without veering too far afield, 
it is worth noting that we are now brushing against, for example, Pascal Boyer’s theory of 
how religion itself evolved and his ideas of why such pattern-matching behavior might 
have been evolutionarily beneficial. However, seeing consciousness itself as an 
evolutionary adaptation is a problematic notion—genetics works best at explaining 
biological conditions; once it turns towards the realm of behavior, all sorts of 
complications ensue that, when combined with the projection of what might have 
happened millions of years ago, lead theorists like Boyer into fascinating territory, but 
territory whose contours are ultimately a series of “just-so” stories. Whether the capacity 
for religious behavior reflects an evolutionary capability or a survival advantage or not, we 
remain left in a situation where certain ideas whose expressions reach their apex in their 
integration into specific religious ideologies, seem to maintain a surprisingly tenacious 
hold on our thoughts. 
One of the attractions of Midgley’s work is that she distrusts the easy way out: 
here, that is the simple tactic of blaming religion and insisting that the centuries-old notion 
of the Great Chain of Being is responsible for this particular misuse of evolution. 
The simplest explanation, no doubt, would be mere force of habit, the still-
surviving toxic effect of Christian conditioning. But that is not a plausible story 
today. The days of really confident Christian education are simply too far behind 
us, and the leading myth-bearers are themselves too rebellious, too critical, too 
consciously and resolutely anti-Christian. … The power of these ideas still remains 
to be accounted for. This indeed is often somewhat uneasily recognized, but the 
explanations given for it tend to be crude and hasty. The matter is too important for 




In considering the situation, Midgley nicely recognizes the complexity of the notion of 
religion and while her analysis may lack novelty for religious scholars, it is an honest 
attempt to recognize the impossibility of laying blame at the feet of such an amorphous and 
protean concept: “religion, like other complex human concerns, seems to be built up out of 
a wide set of natural tendencies which can be variously combined, so that it itself varies 
enormously in character according to the way in which we relate them. … Attempts to 
eliminate any such main grouping merely scatter its component tendencies in their crudest 
form to join other colonies.” (Midgley 1985, 34–5)  
In an interesting move that recalls our initial chapters, Midgley recognizes that, for 
most of the community looking at these issues, it is no longer acceptable to give a central 
place in their thoughts to easily delineated notions of religion or, even worse, God. What, 
then, serves as a central organizer? What is it that gives these scientific models the 
authority to make claims about ultimate truths and the direction of progress? Midgley asks, 
“Is there any deity involved, any supernatural creative being? Officially no, but something 
called Life seems to be filling that role.” (Midgley 1985, 71) 
We have come full circle, then, finding ourselves again in an encounter with 
vitalism, where we seem to be faced with a choice: either we abandon our impulses 
towards transcendence in light of the failure to successfully create such a system that is 
compatible with modern rationality or we engage willingly with such a system, with an 
eagerness to discover its contours and a commitment to maintaining vigilance on the wider 
meanings we can discover. Remember that for Midgley, separating scientific practice from 
such teleological concerns is “both psychologically and logically impossible;” (Midgley 
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1985, 1) her course is clear. There are many destinations if we take that route: 
Canguilhem’s vitalism is one. But there are others, and it is to some of these, and 
specifically to a notion of ecology and what it may offer in our examinations that I will 
turn to in the final chapter.
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Paganisms, Neo and New 
The preceding chapters have meandered across a landscape of American thought 
that may at moments seem highly fragmented—a valley here and a mountain there, but 
with little that connects them into some form of landscape. As we look back, I would claim 
there is a path through the various territories, and gazing over our journey, I hope to reveal 
it in a more distinct form. We began by examining the notion of nature religion, that is, the 
segment of religious expression in North America that was concerned with our interactions 
with and relationship to the external world. This was done first using vitalism as a lens to 
help locate these traditions within broader cultural critiques and then through a more 
traditional grounding in the tradition of scholarship known as history of religions. While 
our focus has been located primarily from the nineteenth century onwards, these ideas have 
been clearly present in easily identifiable forms as far back as the various cultural streams 
that combined in this geography can be traced, whether looking at the anthropological and 
architectural evidence for the practices of people native to this land, to the early ideas 
expressed by the European invaders, or tracing their history back across the ocean to 
notions deeply embedded in medieval Europe. With that grounding, two themes were 
examined, each emerging through considering first a single figure, then another, and then a 
larger, branching and more discontinuous set of ideas. The first of these themes, that of 
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nature and our direct experience of it, began with the nineteenth century, Scottish-born 
American John Muir and the Norwegian Arne Næss; the second theme, that of science and 
how its discourse mediates our perceptions of the world around us, with the contemporary 
British scientist James Lovelock and his long-time collaborator, American Lynn Margulis. 
These are complex and inconsistent subjects, and our goal has never been to claim 
that they adhere to a set of identifiable patterns or tropes: instead, nature has been 
constructed in a multitude of ways with a multitude of forms of expression. The unifying 
factor of this is the subject, not the manner in which the subject is treated, which has 
moved from declarations of the Edenic abundance of our surroundings to fearful anxieties 
of what lurks beyond the edges of our cultivated enclaves in the wilderness. 
Throughout all of this, there has also been a strain of thought that has always 
sought to join a view of the external world of nature with the inner world and with 
constructions of the self. Importantly, nature is very rarely seen as lifeless and dead: it is, 
instead, almost always animated, almost always vibrant and it is the elusive pursuit of 
understanding just how this may work that underpins much of what we’ve examined. What 
is it that is alive? What does that definition of the natural share with humanity? Where in 
the body or the soul or the spirit is such life located? 
These questions form a basis for a close relationship throughout the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries between our explorations and the emerging domains of medicine 
and medical practices that led to the allopathic revolution, a topic discussed in more detail 
in the opening chapter. The ever-growing wave of rationalism—which became 
synonymous with science itself at some point in the last century—threatened to eliminate 
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any notion of vitalism from the theater of thought in the West. The notion of an invisible, 
untraceable spirit that made all the difference in who we are was both easy to ridicule and, 
as important, hearkened uncomfortably to the extravagant notions of ethereal flows of the 
past. Especially as these notions were just recently dismembered as our understanding of 
the very small became very large: the more we learned about molecular interaction, about 
the constant, chaotic movement of chemical compounds all around us, the previously 
hidden mysteries of air and light and energy and even vacuums became less and less 
obscure. 
This left precious little room for vitalism, and what there was often was couched in 
language that spoke of “not yet understanding” the role something like the pineal gland 
played in human development: that is, what was once vital was on the verge of being made 
mechanical and, hence, reproducible, understandable, and controllable. Things have 
changed since then. By the second half of the twentieth century, blind trust in mechanistic 
rationalism had faded significantly, stressed to the point of cracking by both the startling 
and bizarre claims of quantum physics and by the increased understanding that the 
relationship between technology and notions of justice, of progress, of a communal or 
societal good was not at all necessary and, in fact, most variably contingent. 
In the interim, vitalism found its home in American environmentalism, most 
eloquently and spectacularly in the writings of John Muir. It is important not to 
underestimate Muir’s influence: he was one of the inner circle of individuals who founded 
the Sierra Club, an organization that has essentially defined the (more or less, depending 
on your particular perspective) progressive environmental agenda in America for over one 
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hundred years. This is not to say that Muir and the Sierra Club can be conflated: especially 
after the failure to save the Hetch Hetchy valley from development, Muir was quite 
skeptical about political engagement and, in general, about the compromises required when 
individuals banded together in large groups. This was, in a sense, the flip side of his 
continued dedication to direct experience, to the notion of an individual dumbstruck with 
awe in the face of nature’s majesty. While Muir himself was most likely to have 
experienced this state clinging to the side of a glacier in a storm while an avalanche 
pounded away around him, he was more than willing to allow that others could at least 
approach that level of appreciation in a more restrained—and safe—manner, although it is 
hard to envision him approving of passenger ships, replete with rock walls and tennis 
courts, steaming entire villages of three thousand strangers up the Alaskan coast. 
Ultimately, however, Muir and his legacy remain constrained by the excesses of his 
own romanticism: his vision is engaging, moving, and resplendent. But it is hard to build 
policy on such sand, as the ratio of extravagance to hard substance is fairly well skewed. 
As such, as notions of a larger set of environmental concerns increased in their political 
and social importance, a different set of interpretive tools were required to bridge the gap 
between calculated science and a sense of animated wonder at the natural world. Into this 
gap stepped Arne Næss, whose mixture of classically trained philosophic rigor and wide-
ranging understandings of nature combined to form the kind of underpinnings needed for 
what became known as deep ecology to successfully moor itself. 
For our purposes, deep ecology did two things: first, it reopened the questions that 
lead inevitably towards a return in the direction of, if not actually to, vitalism: if we are 
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examining humanity’s role in an interconnected web of related species and environments, 
what is it, exactly, that unites them? In what way are we “like” the trees or the swamp or 
the owl? What makes us alive? The second impact of the movement is less precise, and 
concerns the term “ecology” itself. The concept, of course, is not new: “although the term 
ecology was not coined until the nineteenth century—by Ernst Hæckel (1834-1919) in his 
General Morphology (1866)—it was fundamentally a substitute for the earlier and 
widespread designation the economy of nature. Hæckel himself spoke of ecology as ‘the 
theory of the economy of nature.’” (Livingstone 2002, 345) These roots are important: 
ecology was originally conceived as a plane of analysis akin to a political economy, a 
system in which identifiable exchanges could be isolated and comprehensible market 
forces explained. The invisible hand here was God’s own, and nature was “a well-run 
household under the watchful eye of a beneficent housekeeper.” (Livingstone 2002, 346) 
As with the other analytical systems of exchange, the notion of ecology was 
assumed largely to refer to a series of interlocking, mechanical parts that could be isolated, 
understood, and most of all, improved. Even the connections were commodified: we could 
create terrariums as part of middle-school science projects and insist that genetically 
engineered crops over here would have no impact at all on the heirloom tomatoes over 
there. There was, of course, always a counter-current to these notions, but it is not overly 
incorrect (and given the convenience of its chronological relationship to manned space 
travel, it proves irresistible not) to point to Lynn White Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our 
Ecologic Crisis,” published in Science in 1967, as a key moment in the opening of a new 
understanding of ecology itself. 
338 
 
His claim was that environmental devastation had its roots in the Western marriage 
between science and technology, a union whose intellectual origins predated the 
scientific revolution. During the Middle Ages, he argued, a profound dislocation in 
the understanding of “man and nature” had taken place. Instead of humanity’s 
being thought of as part of nature, the human race was seen as having dominion 
over nature and, thus, as licensed to violate the physical environment. (Livingstone 
2002, 349) 
White’s essay was controversial and misunderstood, but its impact was great, offering a 
widening of the notion of nature that both brought religion directly into the question and 
expanded what could be considered as ecological boundaries.  
In short, according to this view, the Bible and the religions based upon it adopted 
an antinature view of the world, a view of the world that postulates a transcendent 
deity who creates the world but does not invest himself in it in such a way to make 
it holy or sacred. Critics see the Old Testament opposition to the worship of Baal 
as opposition to nature worship by followers of the new biblical deity, who 
transcends nature and is not to be confused with it. Because of this Old Testament 
bias against nature, critics say, Christianity was predisposed to a desacralized view 
of nature that laid the foundation for scientific and technological manipulation of 
nature. (Kinsley 1995, 104) 
This new space was rapidly filled by thinkers like Næss, who were all too eager to find a 
popular voice—remember, Science had a much larger readership in the 1960s than today—
that seemed, even vaguely, supportive of their core notions. 
I want to take a step back and retrace some of our steps, focusing this time on the 
direct relationship with religious thought and practice: it is easy to lose that dimension of 
our explorations, allowing it to slide just below the surface. This may be ascribed to many 
factors, from the general growing secular tide which doesn’t elide religion so much as help 
submerge it into other concerns to the fact that very few of our subjects themselves write 
directly about religion, although many of them express at length various opinions about 
what might be termed spiritual matters. 
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Burning Wicks: The Shadows of 
Religious History and the Light 
of Science 
History is neither a perpetual novelty, nor a perpetual repetition, but the 
unique movement which creates stable forms and breaks them up. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
It is important, I think, to engage seriously with the fact that most of the subjects of 
the preceding chapters would, more or less vehemently, protest against their inclusion 
under an umbrella labeled “religious thought.” For some, religion is seen as a separate 
domain from that of their concern, for others it is more or less explicitly seen as an 
antithetical realm, as that which they are actively working against. Still others make 
somewhat subtle differentiations, isolating “bad religion” from “good.” 
As an example, take Carl Sagan’s The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle 
in the Dark, initially published in 1995, just a year before his death. Sagan has appeared in 
the margins of previous chapters, as Lynn Margulis’ first husband and the father of her 
frequent collaborator, their son, Dorion Sagan and also as a staunch supporter of James 
Lovelock at times when the influence of so large a public figure was desperately needed. 
Published at a time when he was, along with evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, 
perhaps one of the two pre-eminent popular writers on science in America, Demon-
Haunted World was partially co-written with Sagan’s third wife, Anne Druyan. This was 
not unusual: Druyan is listed as a full co-author on two other of Sagan’s publications from 
the latter years of his life, as well as two volumes that appear posthumously. While not a 
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capstone to his career in any sense, it was published in the midst of a multi-year battle with 
myelodysplasia which eventually resulted in Sagan’s death from leukemia, a fight he knew 
he would eventually lose. 
The call to popularizing science rises naturally for Sagan: 
The romance of science remains as appealing and new as it was on that day, more 
than half a century ago, when I was shown the wonders of the 1939 World’s Fair. 
 
Popularizing science—trying to make its methods and findings accessible to non-
scientists—then follows naturally and immediately. Not explaining science seems 
to me perverse. When you’re in love, you want to tell the world. This book is a 
personal statement, reflecting my lifelong love affair with science. (C. Sagan 1996, 
25) 
Sagan’s enemy in Demon-Haunted World is pseudo-science, but religion is always lurking 
on the edges and, while he is careful to “acknowledge at the outset the prodigious diversity 
and complexity of religious thought and practice over the millennia; the growth of liberal 
religion and ecumenical fellowship during the last century; and the fact that—as in the 
Protestant Reformation, the rise of Reform Judaism, Vatican II, and the so-called higher 
criticism of the Bible—religion has fought (with varying degrees of success) its own 
excesses,” (C. Sagan 1996, 20) his allegiances are quite clear. 
Still, the relationship is complicated, as exemplified by a more thorough 
examination of the source of the subtitle of the book itself, which comes from a tract 
published in 1656 by Thomas Ady, a British physician and philosopher. Sagan summarizes 
Ady’s goal as to attack 
the witch hunts then in progress as a scam “to delude the people.” Any illness or 
storm, anything out of the ordinary, was popularly attributed to witchcraft. Witches 
must exist, Ady quoted the “witchmongers” as arguing—“else how should these 
things be, or come to pass?” For much of our history, we were so fearful of the 
outside world, with its unpredictable dangers, that we gladly embraced anything 
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that promised to soften or explain away the terror. Science is an attempt, largely 
successful, to understand the world, to get a grip on things, to get hold of 
ourselves, to steer a safe course. Microbiology and meteorology now explain what 
only a few centuries ago was considered sufficient cause to burn women to death. 
(C. Sagan 1996, 26) 
Ady’s primary concern is that the witch hunts mark a falling away from faith, a moment 
when people are “ascribing the Work of God, to a Witch, or any mean Creature rather than 
to God.” Ady is quick to recognize the reality of witchcraft, stressing that his concern is 
the misinterpretation of events and the radical expansion of the category: for him, the issue 
is not whether or not witchcraft exists, but rather “that Witches are not such as are 
commonly executed for Witches.” (Ady 1656, 2) While Sagan does recognize that Ady’s 
text is “largely Biblically based,” (C. Sagan 1996, 26) this is akin to saying that Sagan’s 
work is “somewhat based on observation.” Ady is most of all concerned with examining 
the question of witchcraft through the correct methodology: “setting aside all such 
unscholar-like way [sic] of arguing, I desire all to argue by the Scriptures, and I will 
answer, or to answer by the Scriptures, and I will argue by the Scriptures.” (Ady 1656, 9) 
At this point, it is useful for a moment to flip back a few pages in Demon Haunted 
World to a moment that stands out in the text. Sagan’s book does not contain all that many 
footnotes, and most are standard fare: explanations, extended quotes, additional context 
and the like. In a few places, he uses the footnotes to add personal anecdotes, and here he 
uses one to challenge a proposed revision to his draft text (and, in so doing, may offer a 
glimpse at the side of his personality that was famously difficult to work with). The 
primary text reads, “To discover that the Universe is some 8 to 15 billion and not 6 to 12 
thousand years old* improves our appreciation of its sweep and grandeur.” (C. Sagan 
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1996, 13) The footnote, in full: 
“No thinking religious person believes this. Old hat,” writes one of the referees of 
this book. But many “scientific creationists” not only believe it, but are making 
increasingly aggressive and successful efforts to have it taught in the schools, 
museums, zoos, and textbooks. Why? Because adding up the “begats,” the ages of 
patriarchs and others in the Bible, gives such a figure, and the Bible is “inerrant.” 
(C. Sagan 1996, 13) 
This is Ady’s exact position: A Candle in the Dark’s substantive text begins with a long, 
enumerated list of twenty concerns regarding witches and witchcraft. A sampling, 
separated by paragraphs for easier reading: 
1 Where is it written in all the old and new Testament, that a Witch is a murtherer, 
or hath power to kill by Witchcraft, or to afflict with any disease or infirmity? 
2 Where is it written, that Witches have Imps sucking of their bodies? 
3 Where is it written, that Witches have biggs for Imps to suck on? 
4 Where is it written, that the Devill setteth privy marks upon Witches, whereby 
they should be known or searched out? or that any man or woman hath any mark 
upon their body any more than natural, or by some disease or hurt, which is 
preternatural? 
5 Where is it written, that the tryall of a Witch should be by sinking or swimming 
in the water? or by biggs or privy marks, or suspition of people, to be signes of a 
Witch? 
6 Where is it written, that Witches can hurt corn or cattell, or transport corn by 
Witchcraft, or can fly in the aire, and do many such strange wonders? 
7 Where is it written, that a Witch is such a man or woman that maketh a league 
with the Devill, written with his or her blood, and by vertue of that covenant to 
have the Devill at command? 
8 Where is it written, that any man or woman was called in the Scripture strix, or 
lamia, or where is any word of such signification or importance, either in the 
Hebrew text, or in the Latin translation, where is a Witch said in the Scriptures to 
be any such kind of person? 
9 What is a witch in the scripture sense, according to Deu.18.10,11 where all sorts 
of witches are nominated by nine terms of description? 
10 Where is it written, that there are any other sorts of Witches than such as are 
there described? Deut.18.10,11. 
11 Where do we read of a he devill, or a she devill, called incubus or succubus, 
that useth generation or copulation with Witches, or Witches with them? (Ady 
1656, 10–11) 
Here, Ady switches tactics: having outlined a set of questions that he claims are not to be 
found in the holy scripture, he moves to examining what is actually put down regarding the 
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subject of witches, and of theodicy in general. A sampling: 
13 It is written, the Lord hateth the hand that sheddeth innocent blood, and the fals 
witness that speaketh lies, and the feet that are swift to do mischief, and a heart that 
deviseth wicked imaginations, Pro.6.17 18,19. 
14 It is written, shall there be evill in a City and the Lord hath not done it? …  
18 It is written, Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thy hand with the 
wicked to be an unrighteous witnesse, Exodus 23.1. 
19 It is written, If ye any way afflict the widdow or the fatherlesse, and they cry at 
all unto me, I will surely hear their cry; and my wrath shal wax hot, and I will kill 
you with the sword, and your wives shall be widdows, and your children 
fatherlesse, Exodus 22.23,24. (Ady 1656, 11–12) 
Ady’s argument is exactly what Sagan refers to in his footnote: the Biblical record 
is the absolute and inerrant truth, and if you are unable to find indication of the specific 
kind of witchcraft you are facing in that record, you are in danger of a most horrible sin, 
that of miscategorizing something as belonging to Man’s domain which really belongs to 
God’s: “how dare ye teach for doctrin, the traditions of Antichrist that are not written in the 
Book of God? Whether do not some preferre the mad imaginations of Cornelius Agrippa 
and others, before the Scriptures, for the defending their opinions?” (Ady 1656, 12) 
The bulk of Ady’s text is a detailed exegetical exercise, working through the 
definition of witchcraft offered in Deuteronomy 18:10-11 bit by bit, a process that requires 
detours through identifying what signs are appropriately open for interpretation when 
foretelling the future; differing between various types of dreams and prophecies in order to 
isolate those sent or approved of by God from those that are human creations from those 
that are the work of diabolical forces; distinguishing between the dangerous and false 
teachings of astrology and appropriate wonder at God’s extra-terrestrial creations, as well 
as the times in the Biblical record where astrological signs are taking as true 
communications from God; examining the notion of falsehood as it relates to prophetic 
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claims or to natural occurrences that remain hard to comprehend which necessitates a 
distinction between a misinterpretation and an intention to deceive; and providing a long 
inventory of common deceptions and scams used by individuals at fairs and public 
gatherings, and then explaining how these behaviors are perfectly harmless and, indeed, 
may be used as part of a methodology of exposing the truly dangerous magicians, the 
“juglers” mentioned throughout the text. 
All of that only brings us through Ady’s fifth Biblical definition of witchcraft. For 
an historian of religion, there is much more of interest, including detailed explanations of 
the evil dangers of both “the secret Impostures of the Popish Religion, which is altogether 
upheld by Witchcraft” (Ady 1656, 46) and “Mahomet, the great Idol of the Turks, who by 
his Juglings and Divinations hath seduced a great part of the World to an Idolatrous 
worship, so absurd and silly, that his Disciples are ashamed to let any Christians come neer 
the place of his supposed Sepulchre at Mecha, lest they should laugh at their folly in 
worshipping an Iron Sepulchre.” (Ady 1656, 47–8) 
And yet, in some ironic methodology, Sagan and Ady remain closer than perhaps 
either of them would be comfortable: there is, in both thinkers, a dogged insistence on 
there being a single, infallible source of truth and a profound level of concern at the effects 
on the world if this source continues to be ignored, misinterpreted, or used inappropriately. 
The fact that the inerrant truth of the Bible is Ady’s foundation, while the scientific method 
provides Sagan his, serves to join the two, not to isolate them. As in previous chapters, we 
are in a position where the insights of David Hess come in handy, with his focus on the 
borderlands where groups negotiate their boundaries and articulate their points of 
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engagement. Drawing heavily on late-twentieth century theories of anthropology and the 
admittedly nebulous “cultural studies,” he insists that these areas serve to co-create a 
shared culture that defines the worlds on all sides of the discussion. Hess claims that, 
beyond the surface of charges and countercharges of pseudoscience, of positions 
staked out and defended as more or less “true” knowledge, and of orthodoxies and 
heterodoxies, they are also forging a shared culture. It is not political and self-
conscious enough to be called a counterculture, but this emergent paranormal 
culture is enough “beyond” (para) the mainstream that I think of it as a 
“paraculture.”(Hess 1993, ix–x) 
The most salient part of Hess’ work for our current consideration is his notion of co-
creation, of the shared responsibility of all engaged parties in the delineation of the 
contours of engagement. In the specifics under consideration, that shaping often takes the 
form of a statement made from the point of view of the defender of science that boils down 
to “I’m scientific, you’re irrational,” (Hess 1993, 32) but the “boundary-work,” a term 
Hess inherits from Thomas Gieryn, remains a collective effort. 
Importantly, this boundary work needs to be envisioned as something mutually 
engaged rather than two sets of contrary forces building fortifications on opposite sides of 
a contested area. Instead, they are often working together, digging tunnels side by side, 
grudgingly or enthusiastically accepting each other’s tools, even changing sides with 
startling swiftness on specific issues. In the specific domain Hess examines, the most 
stringent scientific requirements for the proof of paracultural activity are often offered by 
the side that defends its existence, not the side of conventional science. The distance of 
history makes these complex interactions even more apparent, allowing Sagan, in his 
attacks on pseudoscience and what he sees as the active role of the church in limiting the 
spread of the truth of science, to use thinkers who not only were explicitly supportive of a 
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Biblical interpretation we would not hesitate today to label as literal fundamentalism, but 
were also very suspicious of the same forces of light and truth that Sagan associates with 
the Enlightenment and the expansion of science. 
This is clearly true for Ady: he is arguing directly with an active social movement 
that is engaged in scouring the British countryside, locating, judging, and (usually) killing 
significant numbers of (mostly) women. (The exact numbers are a matter of stiff debate, a 
topic we will return to below. The bottom line is that witch persecutions were a real and 
present danger over much of Europe for several centuries.) A Candle in the Dark is a call 
to return to what he sees as the rational discourse exemplified by Reginald Scot’s The 
Disoverie of Witchcraft which, for Ady, provided a perfect model of contemporary 
rationalism in its use of Biblical precedent to answer nearly all questions combined with an 
assumption of human fallibility and susceptibility to illusion to address the rest: Scot’s 
work methodically isolates what witchcraft really is, that is, what is allowed under that 
rubric Biblically, and then explains the various illusions and manipulations that are used by 
common tricksters in such detail that his text was often plagiarized, excerpted, and 
repackaged as manuals for eighteenth and nineteenth century stage magicians. Ady’s 
devotion to Scot is also reinforced by their shared hatred for Catholicism, seen by Scot as 
the ultimate source of the deceptions involved in the maintenance of superstitious belief. 
Sagan mentions Ady three times in Demon Haunted World. The first, where he 
speaks of the inspiration for the title of the text, we have already discussed; the second is a 
brief footnote where a quote from Ady is presented as a marginal correction to a long list 
of “typical offerings of pseudoscience and superstition;” (C. Sagan 1996, 221) and the final 
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occurs in a chapter, promisingly entitled “Science and Witchcraft.” It is, like much of 
Sagan’s encounters with pseudoscience, less deeply engaged than anticipated, focusing on 
a parallel between the mistakes made in witchcraft persecutions and those made in the Nazi 
regime and closing with a call for scientists to remain ever-vigilant: “the unprecedented 
powers that science now makes available must be accompanied by unprecedented levels of 
ethical focus and concerns by the scientific community—as well as the most broadly based 
public education into the importance of science and democracy.” (C. Sagan 1996, 419) 
Ady here serves a secondary role to Friedrich Spee, whose Cautio Criminalis (1631) is 
quoted at length, covering just over five pages of Sagan’s text. This is unsurprising: Spee’s 
writing is much more friendly to the modern scientist, inventorying as it does the details of 
the treatment of the accused witch at the hands of the church, instead of the theological 
arguments against their being seized in the first place. Still, even Spee’s text opens with an 
affirmation of the existence of witches: he is arguing most vehemently against the violence 
and inhumane treatments inflicted on potentially innocent people. 
The eventual decline of these occurrences is attributed to a notion of progress that 
neatly and explicitly joins science and economics: having explicitly cited Spee, Ady, Scot, 
and a handful of others who wrote and acted in protest of the witchcraft persecutions, 
Sagan writes, “because of the courage of these opponents of the witch mania, its extension 
to the privileged classes, the danger it posed to the growing institution of capitalism, and 
especially the spread of the ideas of the European Enlightenment, witch burnings 
eventually disappeared.” (C. Sagan 1996, 413) In case there is any doubt as to Sagan’s 
analysis, he continues: 
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The witch mania is shameful. How could we do it? How could we be so ignorant 
about ourselves and our weaknesses? How could it have happened in the most 
“advanced,” the most “civilized” nations then on Earth? Why was it resolutely 
supported by conservatives, monarchists, and religious fundamentalists? Why 
opposed by liberals, Quakers, and followers of the Enlightenment? If we’re 
absolutely sure that our beliefs are right, and those of others wrong; that we are 
motivated by good, and others by evil; that the King of the Universe speaks to us, 
and not to adherents of very different faiths; that it is wicked to challenge 
conventional doctrines or to ask searching questions; that our main job is to believe 
and obey—then the witch mania will recur in its infinite variations down to the 
time of the last man. Note Friedrich von [sic] Spee’s very first point, and the 
implication that improved public understanding of superstition and skepticism 
might have helped to short-circuit the whole train of causality. If we fail to 
understand how it worked in the last round, we will not recognize it as it emerges 
in the next. (C. Sagan 1996, 413) 
There are, of course, more sophisticated and complex explorations of the witchcraft 
persecutions, but Sagan’s blurring over the details of the historical analysis is not really the 
point here. In fact, it seems important to note that, in general, Sagan gets it right. He is just 
highly selective about the evidence he accepts and the parts of his sources that he ignores, 
and the mesh of that filter is nowhere so fine as when issues of religion rise to the top. For 
Sagan, despite his protestation to the contrary, religion—at least the historically 
understood, largely Christian phenomenon—is in active opposition to science. Or, more 
properly, was in active opposition: the battle is over and part of his puzzlement is why it 
has taken so long, measured in centuries, not years, for the vanquished foe to skulk off into 
the shadows. As ever, Sagan’s triumphalism is worn proudly on his sleeve: “Science is far 




Holisms and Ecologies: 
Offerings of the New Age 
The specifics differ, but the shape of the argument is consistent across many of the 
subjects we’ve examined: most would protest at some form of the dimensions of our 
analysis. Either they see religion as something foreign to themselves, an “other” that lives 
across some unfathomable chasm; or they see the practice of science, if not the science 
itself, as something that is similarly outside their claims, or even in conflict with their 
teleology or methodology. In briefer treatment than with Sagan, Midgley—for all her 
acceptance of the religious dimension of life and, especially, of certain modern 
manifestations in which she finds hope—remains utterly rational and indisposed to 
engaging deeply with a notion of personal experience or of transcendence; Næss reduces 
religion to a “Level I Ultimate Premise,” a set of “verbalized fundamental … ideas and 
intuitions,” (Næss 1995b, 10–2) that defines the approach to his socio-psychological 
schematic diagramming of human behavior; Lovelock and Margulis, while occasionally 
roped into more friendly sounding language for a review blurb or supportive quote, are at 
their core traditional scientists, fully committed to a stabilizing and predictable rationalism, 
and certainly not particularly open to expressive and expansive forms of mysticism. The 
exception to all of this is Muir. Of the figures we have considered, Muir insisted—
passionately, soaringly, and oftimes excessively insisted—in the unity of it all, in the 
ultimate collapse of everything he experienced into a natural Godhead that manifested 
itself in moments of direct communion with the environment that, for him, never fell into 
conflict with a deeply engaged scientific curiosity. 
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This holism points towards what I mean throughout the rest of this chapter by the 
term ecology. There is a significant point of difference that requires some attention in this 
definition: ecologies are explicitly not undifferentiated. They are zones of diversity, areas 
of complex interaction on both individual and systemic levels: monocultures are, in the 
end, neither sustainable nor ecologies. In this sense, Muir himself remains a problematic 
figure: his detailed observations of the complexity of the environmental milieus in which 
he roamed are strikingly ecological, ranging across scope from the smallest insects to the 
slow movements of glaciers themselves. But when he collapses all of that into a set of 
revelatory insights into God’s natural plan, his vision flattens, threatening to eradicate the 
complexity of what he has observed. 
This is a difficult position, and one whose tension will ultimately remain at least 
partially unresolved. In the presence of traditional religious discourse, there almost always 
seems to be an impulse towards totalizing explanations, towards some form of 
reductionism. Many would argue that not only is this part of religion’s role, it is also a 
desirable and good thing: providing a unified set of explanations for diverse phenomena is 
part of the functional purpose of religious behavior and that the reduction of the minutiae 
of earthly concerns to a set of sacred concerns—whether subsumed under “God’s will” or 
the interaction of a pantheon of benevolent and demonic forces or the unfolding of an 
eternal narrative with yourself as the key player—is a key component of how we are 
supposed to navigate the world in which we live. 
The difficulties with these positions have been exposed above, and are repeated in a 
variety of contexts under a variety of guises. They boil down to a recognition of true 
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diversity, of multiple possibilities, of the presence of complexity that freely spills over into 
chaos, whether this is viewed through the lens of analyses of globalization or that of the 
last century of physics or that of the broad family of theoretical discourses lumped under 
the rubric of the postmodern. In this, of course, lurks the danger of easy apocalypticism: it 
is essentially trite for a generation to insist that, at last, the key to solving the problems of a 
specific domain are here, all that is needed is a revolutionary shift in how we think about 
things. That said, at a minimum, there is something in all of this that presents a strong 
challenge to modes of thought that are unable to embrace the multiplicity that is required 
without collapsing it back into a familiar singularity. 
If this notion of holism is, as I believe, important to successfully understanding and 
responding to scientific, ecological, and spiritual issues in the twenty-first century, it is 
worth spending some time exploring what contemporary movements may have more or 
less successfully negotiated its difficulties. In doing so, we will revisit one group 
introduced in depth in an earlier chapter, and examine two more that are often—quite 
incorrectly—grouped together under a single rubric. 
The first is the deep ecology movement, discussed above with respect to its 
formation under the direct influence of the ideas of Arne Næss, which would seem a 
logical place to look for a continuation of Muir’s ideas. Certainly, deep ecology is heavily 
informed by early American environmentalisms, and, at the level of content, preserved a 
direct continuity with those movements. deep ecology, however, turned very heavily 
towards philosophy and towards the need to construct a way of understanding ultimate 
meaning without resorting to religion itself. This is a rich and valuable set of conversations 
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(which, of course, occasionally move beyond learned debates and into academic 
internecine warfare), and are well worth both scholarly and public attention; they also 
move deep ecology into a different realm, one focused on the reasoning required to join 
environmental concerns both to broader political action and to individual questions of 
behavior and morality. 
In this, they somewhat mirror Anne Primavesi’s treatment of Gaia which similarly 
takes a set of insights as its inspiration and then works on those ideas with a set of 
sophisticated philosophical tools, constructing in the end something that is neither pure 
philosophy nor entirely consistent with the source material. This is admirable and artistic 
and often quite beautiful; but it is not, at least in the sense I am using it, a move towards 
ecology. 
If the turn towards philosophy obscures our search, one place to look would be the 
New Age, never accused of being a movement particularly obsessed with rigor of thought. 
Immediately, there is a difficulty however: the question of what, exactly, constitutes the 
New Age has been an issue of academic study for over thirty years now, with no clear 
consensus in sight. Wouter Hanegraaff, whose encyclopedic New Age Religion and 
Western Culture is required reading for anyone truly interested in this definitional 
question, offers an initial division of an “early, idealistic movement as New Age sensu 
strictu,” (Hanegraaff 1998a, 97) and a later, wider set of practices that he terms the New 
Age sensu lato. This distinction is useful for separating out the utopian apocalypticism that 
marked the New Age sensu strictu, but it proves quite cumbersome especially when—as 
ours is—the interest is on various strains of the New Age within the New Age sensu lato. 
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At its broadest, Mary Farrell Bednarowski provides a representative exemplar when she 
writes that “‘New Age’ has come to refer to an amorphous group of ideas and religious 
movements concerned with an evolving higher consciousness in humankind.” 
(Bednarowski 1989, 15) It serves as a definition, but it fails to provide much meat for deep 
engagement or thick description and, as importantly, does not meet the compelling 
challenge made by Sutcliffe when, considering the same question of defining his subject 
matter, he insists that “some definitions, reconstructions and genealogies are simply more 
plausible than others.” (Sutcliffe 2003, 4) The best attempts have been able to identify loci 
of concern that can be seen as shared among affiliated movements, parabolas of thought 
that connect diverse and disparate practices into loose aggregates that can then be dealt 
with as continuous, similar expressions of concern. This kind of definition, of course, has 
proven attractive as well to a certain understanding of post-modernism which can find 
notions of pastiche, bricolage, and assemblage rife in the universe of the New Age. As an 
emic example, the following extended exchange between a member of the audience and 
David Spangler at a Lindisfarne Association seminar in the summer of 1988 should 
suffice: 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: You mentioned a concise definition of the New Age. 
What is it? 
 
DAVID: You mean this weekend isn’t concise enough? Well, if I had to put my 
definition into a few words, I would say that the New Age is four things. First, it is 
the emergence of a planetary culture. This doesn’t necessarily imply the emergence 
of a world government, by the way, which is something I don’t expect to see or 
particularly desire. However, a greater global awareness, cooperation, and 
coordination on the parts of all people and institutions, with particular mindfulness 
of how we are all interconnected and interdependent, is important. 
 
Secondly, I would say that the New Age is a response to the archetype or myth of 
the sacred planet. It is the desire to create a world in which humanity, nature, and 
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the domain of spirit work together in ways that are mutually empowering and co-
creative. 
 
Thirdly, I would say that the New Age is the gestalt of our technological, 
scientific, political, economic, social, and spiritual responses to both the global 
challenges and global opportunities of our time. It is the spirit behind those 
responses that minimizes or eliminates the danger that we will destroy ourselves 
and our world and maximizes the possibility that through a greater planetary 
awareness and shared planetary culture we will further the emergence of the sacred 
world. 
 
Finally, the New Age is an evolutionary shift within the life and spirit of the Earth 
itself. Just as human puberty brings hormonal shifts, rebalancing, and the 
emergence of new potentialities and capabilities, so there are shiftings, 
rebalancings, and emergences going on within the subtle or spiritual body of the 
Earth. New “energies” and qualities are being taken on, and older ones are being 
let go of. The Earth as a being is forming a new pattern of inner relationships with 
the cosmos. This, of course, is a definition based on my inner perceptions. 
(Spangler and Thompson 1991, 57) 
A note before we continue with the conversation: this definition, while clearly not 
universally accepted, does nicely tie together many of the concerns I have examined so far: 
globalization, Gaia, the relationship with technology and science, and a dollop of oddly 
positioned evolutionary assumptions. I include the follow-up question and response largely 
because of its echo of our earlier discussion of how boundaries are negotiated between and 
among groups that share a common milieu and how various groups frame their own rules 
for inclusion and exclusion. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I notice you did not include anything relating to 
UFOs, psychic phenomena, channeling, or the like in your definition. I take it you 
do not consider these things to be New Age. 
 
DAVID: Not in themselves, no. Exploration and intelligent clarification of our 
psychic abilities, or a genuine connection with deep realms of the personal, 
collective, or planetary soul, can certainly enhance the kind of holistic awareness 
that I associate with the New Age. Psychic phenomena can be experienced within a 
New Age context, but simply pursuing channeling or crystal-ball reading or the 
occult arts of any kind is not what I would call New Age. For one thing, these 
phenomena have been around for centuries. In our culture, we have tended to 
repress or forget them; therefore the so-called occult and esoteric revival going on 
now is more a remembrance than a wave of the future. It is the surfacing of 
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repressed ideas and images, which can be healthy if we don’t just romanticize the 
phenomena or become too credulous. The current interest in occultism can serve a 
purpose, but it can also deflect us from the real work to be done, and at times it can 
be confusing and harmful when experienced outside of a properly prepared cultural 
context. My image of the New Age is not one in which everyone becomes imbued 
with psychic powers but one in which we gain a compassionate and planetary 
awareness. (Spangler and Thompson 1991, 57–8) 
This kind of definition, however, makes it quite difficult to engage more 
specifically with the notion of the New Age at a level that is more generic than a specific 
practice—say crystal healing—but less abstract than the entire umbrella term. Importantly, 
the New Age—as a generic term—is not new. Echoing much of Albanese’s thought 
discussed in chapter two, Leigh Eric Schmidt recognizes in Restless Souls that, “the 
American fascination with mountaintop mysticism and seeker spirituality goes much 
deeper than any generational fixation allows.” (Schmidt 2005, 2) Indeed, the work over the 
past two decades shows a continuity between the commonly understood New Age, which 
dates from sometime in the 1960s in the United States of America and a little later in 
Europe, has easily recognized roots in various other forms of American spirituality 
(Theosophy, Spiritualism, various forms of positive thinking that moved in and out of 
more mainstream religious moments), magic-oriented revival movements in Europe who 
themselves emerge from various Germanic and English Romanticisms, and a host of 
earlier religious trends. A wide variety of individuals are often referenced, with lists 
dominated by Madame Blavatsky and Alice Bailey, but also including—using Sutcliffe’s 
inventory as representative— “Aleister Crowley, Carl Jung, P.D. Ouspensky, Rudolf 
Steiner, and G.I. Gurdjieff.” (Sutcliffe 2003, 53) A step back may be in order: we asked 
this question not to define the New Age, but to offer an evaluation of it in terms of its 
relationship with what we are calling “ecology.” As such, the preceding discussion should 
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suffice to at a minimum help identify the contours of the New Age, especially keeping in 
mind Peter Beyer’s recognition “that few if any of these groups are highly institutionalised 
and therefore clearly identifiable and curcumscribable,” (Beyer 1998, 17) and we may 
safely leave a discussion of the location with respect to its boundaries of this specific 
movement or that particular activity to others. Instead, I would offer two arguments against 
seeing the bulk of the New Age as ecological. 
First, the original New Age (Hanegraaff’s New Age sensu strictu), the movement 
whose roots are explicitly in the Findhorn community in the United Kingdom, and whose 
development since then has remained consistent with those concerns, remains an almost 
entirely mental exercise. As has been noted elsewhere, the brilliant theoretical move made 
here is the relocation of the apocalypse from the external world to the internal: we are no 
longer facing “the destruction of the planet at a fixed point in time, but the death of the 
insensitive, rationalistic ego in an ongoing process of human growth.” (Sutcliffe 2003, 
102) We have shifted from the destruction of humanity through a physical threat of fire or 
ice (or any of their meteorological or biblical variants) to an apocalypse of consciousness, 
a moment when humanity’s self-conception and/or psychic abilities will be reborn into a 
new era. This age of understanding and peace, however, seems located almost entirely 
internally: this New Age, at least, remains largely an otherworldly, transcendent 
movement. Both Sutcliffe and Hanegraaff make much of this tradition, and while such a 
distinction is academically useful, it works against our desire to look more closely at the 
variety of movements that combine into the common understanding of the term. 
At its best, this collection of movements and practices has enabled a long series of 
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moments of personal empowerment, of people finding space and strength to encounter, 
speak of, and claim their own experiences and their own truths in areas that are both 
personally meaningful and where they may have experienced profound moments of 
oppression and silence. The narratives of people being drawn to a collection of New Age 
practices because “there was no room for me in the church,” are endless (and often 
endlessly compelling). Similarly, the insistence in many New Age practices that we are 
each the sole authority on our own experience remains simultaneously liberating and 
problematic. The liberating nature of the claim towards auto-expertise should be obvious; 
the difficulties manifest in two flavors. At the practical level, the New Age community 
does indeed have preferred practices, preferred modes of interaction and preferred 
discursive rules and rituals; as such, our personal experience is often validated not solely 
by our own claim to expertise but also by its conformity with the norms and expectations 
of that community. This may be seen as a reflection of the second level at which this issue 
operates: it is unclear how theoretically to encapsulate any true discourse within a context 
of auto-expertise. In this, the New Age—often with an innocent naïveté that belies its half 
a decade of history and study—is recapitulating an age-old philosophical issue and in 
doing so essentially dismissing any substantive alternative to Descartes: there is little 
difference between cogito ergo sum and I create my own reality. Consider the following 
from David Spangler: 
Whether we should say “I am God” or not depends for me on whether our 
imagination is oriented towards particles or waves. That is, what do I mean to 
myself when I say I am God? If I think of myself in a particulate, separative way, it 
can be a profoundly narcissistic thing to say, affirming my own particlehood at the 
expense of everyone else’s. It can diminish my capacities for compassion and 




I observed this statement emerging in the sixties out of the human-potential 
movement, along with its counterpart, “We each create our own reality.” To me, 
this was an attempt to counterbalance feelings of repression, disempowerment, and 
unworth, often fostered by misapplied religious fundamentalism. Thus, when 
people say they are God, they are not making a theological statement as much as 
they are making a statement about their self-worth and their power by invoking the 
image of that which in our culture is of highest worth and greatest power. They are 
trying to say, it seems to me, that they are safe, they are powerful, they are 
creative, and they can do what they wish in spite of a confining, repressive world 
around them. 
 
My response is that this is like using a nuclear bomb to dig a hole. It will do the 
job, but what a fallout! I can simply affirm that I am a capable, valuable person and 
then take actions that will confirm that image. I can incarnate an image of 
capability more easily than one of being the divinity. In the long run, images of 
being God could lead to disempowerment rather than the other way around as I 
discover that the universe doesn’t always agree that I am el supremo! (Spangler 
and Thompson 1991, 149–50) 
Spangler is clearly sympathetic to these utterances, but his critique still opens the door to a 
set of philosophical tensions that the New Age generally fails to recognize or, as in 
Spangler’s case, fails to address adequately. Hammer summarizes well: 
Contradictions are an inevitable outcome of the pluralism of opinions within the 
New Age. However, the existence of mutually incompatible claims often appears 
to go undetected, or is at least left uncommented. Thus, there are three beliefs 
inherent in common versions of New Age religion that are, if not contradictory, at 
least very hard to reconcile. Firstly, the individual soul is said to choose its future 
rebirth, guided by the principle that each living entity needs certain experiences in 
life. Secondly, New Age writers generally accept the concept of an overarching 
plan, according to which a law of supernature integrates seemingly disparate 
events into a meaningful whole. Thirdly, the strong influence of American positive 
thinking has fostered the belief that we actually create our own realities in the here-
and-now. The tension between personal will, the self-created nature of the universe 
and the existence of a cosmic plan is seldom if ever discussed. When New Age 
writers address the question of inconsistency, one is generally presented with a 
subjective (or pragmatic) conception of truth. The general rule is “believe it if it 
rings true.” If there are two or more mutually incompatible statements, accept the 
one that feels subjectively true. (Hammer 2003, 413) 
This ties directly into both of the most commonly leveled critiques of the New Age, 
its narcissism and its deep entanglement with late industrial capitalism, perhaps most 
succinctly and skillfully summarized in Michael York’s notion of a movement struggling 
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with the tension between “a numinous materialism and a world-denying idealism.” (York 
1994, 16). Both of these have been dealt with in great depth and with great analytic skill 
elsewhere; here I would merely highlight (in addition to flat-out denying readings based, 
for example, on Christoph Bochinger’s claim that the entire movement may be reduced to 
a scheme designed to sell more books) that the intricate commingling of capitalism with 
New Age is not necessarily as severe a critique as, for example, Roof or Carrette and King 
offer. Instead, it is possible to see the New Age as no less complicit with the dangers of the 
globalized, post-industrial world than any other group beyond a certain scale. (Roof 2001; 
Carrette and King 2004; Ezzy 2001; T. G. Foltz 2005). Indeed, if you look at Sutcliffe’s 
following description of the progression of the New Age through a slightly different lens, it 
can be read as, instead of a specific genealogy, more of a general exemplar reflecting the 
mechanisms of late capitalism: 
the spiritual bricolage practiced in the counterculture of the late 1960s and early 
1970s has remained the staple strategy of spiritual seekers up to the present day. 
With certain obvious lifestyle exceptions—drug use …, flamboyant dress, de-
inhibited language and deportment—it is also characteristic of the more ascetic and 
disciplined behavior of the “New Age” pioneers in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
What has changed in each instance is the legitimacy of the cultural identity 
assumed by exponents. To map this crudely, we can say that in the early period, 
this identity was implicitly subcultural … In the middle period, the stance becomes 
countercultural: dissidence is still proclaimed, but the processes of wider cultural 
change … have the effect of removing adherents from social quarantine and 
deploying them on a wider popular front of social and generational resistance to 
the status quo. In the final phase the grand narrative of “alternative” culture as 
distinct, even pure, contestatory force collapses as its rhetoric of difference and 
prescriptions for change are recuperated by popular culture for consumption in the 
self-service cafeteria of contemporary spirituality. (Sutcliffe 2003, 111) 
While the most relevant part is the final sentence, the movement from the isolation of the 
underground to the community of resistance to a commonly available commodification is 
one to preserve as we move forward. Additionally—and against the facile analysis of the 
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New Age as merely (yet another) example of consumerism run rampant—it is important to 
keep in mind that this very process is met with suspicion and downright hostility from 
inside many of the movements and traditions involved. Spangler describes concepts being 
“minced and mulched, largely by a media that predigests ideas for us and turns them into 
sweet, syrupy clichés that hold little nutrition.” (Spangler 1991, 48) This process is later 
explicitly tied to the marketplace when he decries the “endless rounds of weekend 
workshops and seminars, endless trainings, endless preparation and excitement and self-
discovery, but never any self-definition or incarnation. I found myself in an atmosphere 
more suited to an entertainer than a spiritual teacher. Today’s insights always had to 
compete with the newer, brighter, improved insights of the next seminar to come down the 
pike.” (Spangler 1991, 51) And finally, Spangler hones in on the exact phenomenon under 
consideration, going so far as to insist that, to the degree with which late capitalism is 
operative, we are explicitly working in ways that are fundamentally antithetical to the New 
Age itself: 
one of the phenomena of the New Age landscape is the proliferation of 
“prosperity” workshops and seminars that seek to teach us in a quick, painless way 
how we may control our reality and have all the abundance we want. While these 
workshops are filled with what their proponents call New Age concepts and ideas, 
and while they would seem to promise a new life, many of them actually occupy 
very old and familiar territory. They are planted four-square within the same 
consumer mentality that bedevils much of our culture. Their hidden message, 
which in some cases is quite explicit, is that you really can have it all. The New 
Age, it is imagined, is about gaining the power to have whatever you need and 
desire, it is about getting your way, because, after all, it is your reality. Nothing is 
said, though, about reciprocity—that if you can have it all, then the all can have 
you. Instead, in these workshops, you are always the consumer, never the 
consumed. It is as if you have one of those marvelous metabolisms with which you 
can eat anything and everything and never gain a pound or an inch. When your 
attention is on what you can get and not on what you can give, what you really end 




Limitless consumption without consequence or just plain limitlessness without 
boundaries is having a devastating affect [sic] upon our moral, social, and 
ecological landscapes. It is part of the modern attitude that the New Age is trying 
to change; it should not be made an attribute of the New Age itself. When it is, we 
are boldly going back to where we’ve been before. No transformation, no 
metanoia, no emergence, no imagination, no New Age. (Spangler 1991, 53) 
It may indeed be possible to imagine a common ground between the ecological 
concerns discussed above (both in terms of physical ecologies and in terms of the holistic 
mode of thought) and post-industrial capitalism: there is certainly a lot of energy (and 
capital) being poured into that question. It is not so clear that common ground exists 
between the focus on otherworldly consciousness—which is ultimately the source of the 
narcissism—and those same concerns. Indeed, if anything, it is the solipsism of the New 
Age that marks it as ecologically unnatural: ecologies depend on interaction, on the 
engagement across time of divergent and asymmetrically equal forces. 
This hints at the ubiquitous nature of the New Age’s focus—some would say 
obsession—on the self. An obvious current in the description above, this is also present in 
more subtle turns of thought. For example, recall our discussion of health and healing in 
chapter one, where we explored how notions of health and notions of spirituality were 
fused in a specifically American manner by early European colonizers and inherited by 
their future generations, including the New Age, albeit with a significant twist: 
the goal of much New Age spirituality is health and happiness, rather than health 
and happiness being a potential by-product of the religious life. That is to say, 
whilst we have seen that some Christians may become wealthy as a result of the 
Protestant work ethic, health and happiness are not their goals. Indeed, suffering, 
poverty and the lack of worldly success are invested with spiritual significance. 
Arguably, even “prosperity Christianity,” which does prize health and wealth, only 
does so because such material gains are viewed as evidence of God’s pleasure with 
a life lived faithfully. The aim is obedience to God. (Partridge 2004, 1:33) 
Partridge may be accused of letting wealth theology off the hook far too easily—certainly 
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one would imagine that Spangler would think as much—and he is clearly avoiding the 
historical relationships between the New Age and contemporary Christian theologies of 
financial success, but his observation about the New Age is highly relevant: the key turn is 
one where that which once was an effect of religious behavior has instead become its goal. 
In many ways, this is how the New Age sidesteps secularization, by being explicitly 
comfortable with the removal of the trappings of the church—any church—from the 
equation entirely. 
The Slippery Slope of Invented 
History 
She said: What is history? 
And he said: History is an angel being blown backwards into the future 
He said: History is a pile of debris 
And the angel wants to go back and fix things 
To repair the things that have been broken 
But there is a storm blowing from Paradise 
And the storm keeps blowing the angel backwards into the future 
And this storm, this storm is called Progress 
Laurie Anderson, The Dream Before (for Walter Benjamin) 
There is a final critique of the New Age worth considering at this point, one that 
leads us towards the final group we will consider in this study, practitioners loosely 
grouped under the nomenclature of neopagan. Before moving on, however, once again we 
have a definitional argument to navigate. At the level of encyclopedia, Sarah M. Pike 
writes that “the term Neopagan covers a wide variety of traditions that include re-creations 
of ancient Celtic Druidism (a British organization of sun worshippers who gathered in 
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sacred groves), Wicca or Witchcraft, ceremonial magic, and neoshamanism (revivals of 
ecstatic journeys into the spirit world in indigenous and pre-Christian cultures).” (Pike 
2005, 6470) Writing elsewhere, Pike claims four primary contributing traditions to the 
neopagan community: various folk traditions that are re-imagined and recreated by 
contemporary practitioners; traditions of ceremonial magic whose roots stretch from 
medieval alchemy through the Order of the Golden Dawn and its many, many offshoots; 
Albanese’s identified tradition of American nature religion, detailed in chapter two; and 
the inheritance from the 1960s countercultural movements, including the embracing of 
Asian (and, to a much lesser degree, other non-European) traditions. (Pike 2001, xiv–xv) 
Some additional detail: in Europe, the term pagan seems to be preferred, without the 
prefix; many Wiccans (whom we shall turn to in detail momentarily) identify very strongly 
with that term, or with another subgroup identifier; and there remain group identity issues 
with various extreme right-wing religious movements that also claim variants of the term 
pagan. This paper is focused on what may—tongue only slightly in cheek—be referred to 
as mainstream paganism, excluding the various fascist, neo-fascist, and proto-fascist 
movements that also make claim to the term. This is not to dismiss the troubling nature of 
the shared history of these movements: the impact, for example, of late nineteenth century 
Romanticism on both modern witchcraft practices and on various Nordic-inspired white 
supremacy movements points to what are, at the very least, uncomfortable moments of 
shared heritage. That noted, I would confidently claim that an engagement with the neo-
Nazi extreme of the Ásatrú movement or the far right wing factions of various forms of 
Odinism would result in obvious and glaring incompatibilities with the interpretation of 
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neopaganism presented below. 
These are in general practices that have developed primarily in North America and 
Europe over the last fifty to one hundred years, traditions which have grown and stabilized 
to the point where clear broad-based distinctions have emerged (even if the terminology 
has not yet fully settled) between, for example, Wicca and feminist witchcraft as well as 
vertical practices within each tradition (say, Gardnerian versus Alexandrian). Fuller writes 
that “recent studies suggest there may be as many as 200,000 Neo-Pagans in the United 
States. One study found them to be mainly young to middle-aged adults, urbanites, mostly 
white, middle-class, and by slight majority (57%) female. Pagans are, in other words, 
ordinary Americans.” (Fuller 2001, 95) It is important to highlight Fuller’s collapse of 
America into whiteness: we have visited Carl Anthony in an earlier chapter, and his 
critique of the ways in which American alternative spiritual practices continue to reflect an 
endemic lack of diversity rings true here as well. 
Discussions of the history of neopaganism in Europe and North America are 
convoluted things full of truth-claims that lead down rabbits’ warrens of counter-claims 
and denials at both the specific and methodological levels. When seen from a distance, 
Joseph Alter’s work on yoga provides a useful parallel to keep in mind. Alter is faced with 
a similar context, observing that “many authors write as though they are the only person 
writing on the subject with any authority, and that what they are saying is new. Yet if there 
is one single thing that characterizes the literature on Yoga, it is repetition and redundancy 
in the guise of novelty and independent invention.” (Alter 2004, xviii) Substitute 
“neopaganism”—some would say the entirety of the “New Age” would serve just as 
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well—for “yoga” and Alter has described a survey of “authoritative” neopagan texts. It 
may be helpful to retain another of Alter’s concepts as we look at some of these issues, that 
of the “just-past.” 
Essentially the present’s just-past is a time frame of rapid remembering and 
forgetting, compounded by the transmission of knowledge from one generation to 
the next. In other words, the just-past of the present—which I take to be different 
from modern history, even though modern history seeks to deal with this period of 
time as a time period—is when facticity matters a great deal, but when individual 
memories produce competing and contradictory realities. The arguments about 
who was the first to popularize, modernize, and demystify Yoga may be relatively 
less significant than the question of whose sense of holiness defines the Holy 
Land, or how events transpired there in the aftermath of World War I—to choose a 
highly politicized and volatile example—but the dynamic is very much the same. 
Beyond this, however, there is, in the present’s just-past, the seductive sense that 
someone is really right, and that with enough information the truth can be 
established. (Alter 2004, xvi) 
Neopaganism’s just-past offers an additional complication, as it contains within it a deep 
return, a claim that, in the just-past, a tradition that stretches back centuries or thousands of 
years or millennia has re-emerged. Authority is often based on this second chronological 
movement, and we are left with narratives that compete on the accuracy of their recent 
progenitor’s memories of the memories of their distant ancestor’s. This has become so 
prevalent, especially in Wiccan and other magically-focused neopagan traditions that the 
term fam-trad has emerged into common usage. Clearly, much like many of the claims 
about larger historical movements, these long-standing family secrets, passed down from 
generation to generation, many of the fam-trad lineages are recently invented, more an 
exercise in (depending on how charitable the interpretation) self-definition or marketing. 
Clifton is rightfully dismissive of these stories as truth-claims when he writes that “what 
has happened is more of a reinterpretation than a continuation of family-based Witchcraft, 
which is always conveniently undocumented.” (Clifton 2006, 126) However, in a tone that 
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permeates much of his work, he is also deaf to the ways in which these claims of 
community, of family, of tradition serve to provide neopagan practitioners with a context 
within which they can successfully socially situate themselves and how they shape the 
dialog between practitioners as they continue to (re)invent their practices. This seems to be 
more an issue for etic observers (including academics) than practitioners: consider 
Hammer and Lewis’ introduction to their collection The Invention of Sacred Tradition 
where they write that “other religious traditions in the contemporary West have constructed 
even more emphatic ways of questioning authenticity and playfully accepting that one’s 
own religion is a patchwork of human creativity,” to the point where 
the realization that much of their historical background consists of deliberate 
inventions has not prevented these movements from thriving. … Outside observers 
may react with skepticism to the idea that an ancient religion could be revived 
many centuries after it was last practiced. Pagans, however, are usually fully aware 
of the gulf separating the past from the present, to the point of readily accepting 
that they are not recreating but inventing a tradition. (Hammer and Lewis 2007, 
15) 
This collection bears further consideration: of the fourteen chapters ranging from studies of 
authorship in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament to explorations of primal authority 
in traditions focused on dominant leaders (L. Ron Hubbard, Carlos Castaneda, Zoroaster, 
the Reverend Sun Myung Moon), Graham Harvey’s chapter “Inventing Paganism: making 
nature” stands out not only in its relevance to our present considerations, but also in the 
friendliness with which paganisms (neo and other) treat historical invention. 
This is not a simple matter: on the one hand, there is a strongly instinctive reaction 
that making up history is, well, bad: certainly such behavior has been used to justify and 
rationalize all manner of violence. The key differentiator seems to be the fierceness with 
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which the fictions are held: in the case of neopaganism, they end up being held very, very 
loosely. This is almost a requirement: if one of your traditions emerge out of a challenge to 
your college’s rules about mandatory church attendance (the Reformed Druids of North 
America, formed in 1963) or another is inspired by Robert Heinlein’s Stranger in a 
Strange Land (the Church of All Worlds), the fragility of their historical roots is embraced 
almost through necessity. The specific forms of neopaganism that we will address later had 
a harder time of it: even though modern Wicca emerged virtually full-blown from the 
works of Gerald Gardner in the middle of the twentieth century, his own claims of ancient 
fam-trad authority served to muddy the waters for decades. In a deft turn of phrase, Clifton 
observes that “when the new Pagan religion of Wicca arrived in the United States from 
England in the 1960s, it presented itself as the Old Religion, the ancestral Paganism of the 
British Isles, and as a mystery cult of both fertility and magic.” (Clifton 2006, 41) The 
general form of the claim—remember, we are talking about dozens and dozens of different 
and disparate lineages—was that the Old Religion was passed down in secret from person 
to person or group to group, with roots that traced all the way back to a local tradition 
anchored somewhere between the central Asian steppes and the west coast of Ireland, and 
had survived wave after wave of persecution by dominant, usually churched, forms of 
control and authority. However, by the turn of the century, those arguments—at least 
among the more scholarly inclined—had largely been settled, perhaps most eloquently 
through Diane Purkiss’ elegantly titled “A Holocaust of one’s own: the myth of the 
Burning Times,” where she explores the dangers inherent in attempting to establish a 
historical record of the devastation of that specific period, a topic hotly contested in the 
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preceding decades to the point where there were numerous claims that over 500,000—and 
as many as nine million (Andrea Dworkin’s number)—pagan practitioners were put to 
death during centuries of European persecution. (Golden 2001) It is important to note that 
many of the hugely inflated figures exist in arguments where their ultimate truth is in fact 
nearly irrelevant; that is, the execution of witches is seen less as an historical event than as 
a metaphor for the continued violence of patriarchy, or, in Purkiss’ words, the discussion 
of witchcraft “is less a presentation of external events than the story of an internal voyage, 
a metaphorical journey into the heart of patriarchal darkness.” (Purkiss 1996, 13) This 
reclamation of the external into the internal echoes the New Age itself, and serves as one 
of the ways in which neopaganism does indeed fit very comfortably within the confines of 
that movement: history is seen as existing along dual, vaguely parallel planes, one external 
and comprised of a shifting and often hotly contested series of events; the other internal 
and reflective of an individual’s perception of themselves refracted through an imagined 
past. Quoting Anthony Giddens’ maxim that “all traditions … are invented traditions,” 
Charlotte E. Hardman adds that, “although a distinction between authentic ethnographic 
reporting and the fictitious can be made, nevertheless creativity, omission, or distortion is 
inevitable in the description of any culture, tradition, or religion. … Movement, change, 
imagination, and debate are essential in the formation of traditions.” (Hardman 2007, 39) 
Graham Harvey offers an interesting path through the question that we will consider again 
later in this chapter, since it also engages with the question of the role of nature in 
neopaganism. For now, a summary worth considering in full: 
An observer may be tempted to belittle the very idea that an ancient religion can be 
fully revived centuries, if not millennia, after it was last practiced. However, those 
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who make claims about their engagement with the “old religion” of their ancestors, 
or that of the ancestors who lived in a location, may intend something far more 
complex than observers may impute. They are usually fully aware of the 
disjunctions between the past and the present, and they are often explicit that 
museum and literary resources are less than adequate as sources of knowledge 
about religious ideas, performance, and material culture. 
 
In short, while the centrality of nature and ancestral traditions are of inestimable 
importance in understanding Pagan identities, practices, cosmology, and 
religioning, they are not uncontested, undebated, or unexamined among Pagans. 
Just as “observance” is both the center and the dividing point among Jews, and 
“Jesus Christ” both unifies and divides Christians, so nature and tradition are the 
common ground and the contested territory of Paganisms. They are the focus for 
that which inspires and requires continuous creativity or, if need be, invention. 
(Harvey 2007, 279) 
All of this is further problematized by the constant, even manic, levels of 
appropriation that characterize most movements of the New Age, including virtually all 
forms of neopaganism—indeed, even those that don’t conform to this pattern do so as a 
reaction, as an insistence on maintaining a purity of tradition or identity. Appropriation in 
the post-colonial, post-modern, thoroughly globalized world is a complex thing, and a full 
critique of its movements and impacts—even within the narrow world of the New Age or 
neopaganism—falls outside of our current scope. At the same time, I would hearken back 
to our earlier discussion of Gill’s work on the emergence of an Earth Mother as a key 
figure in defining a sense of “indianess,” a concept that was desired into being as much by 
the external community as the insiders. While I would insist that Hammer merely describes 
one of many possible instances of the “historical process by which such an appropriation 
takes place,” his summary should suffice as an archetypical exemplar: 
First, travel narratives are published, or ethnographic or historical accounts become 
available, in which the exotic custom is presented. The descriptions in such books 
are not directly intended to be emulated by a Western audience. Creative 
spokespersons steeped in the Esoteric Tradition read these texts and transform 
them to fit in with culturally predetermined elements of the their own (Western) 
tradition. Then come the first do-it-yourself books, works that transform the new 
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element from a belief to be accepted to a practice to be performed or an experience 
to be sought after. Knowledge that was previously difficult to gain now becomes 
increasingly available to a general readership. A small number of Esoteric 
interpretations commonly become trend-setting templates that structure the 
doctrines presented in later works. 
 
The rapid process of reinterpretation and change soon transforms the originally 
exotic doctrine into an organic part of the new context. Neoshamanism as practiced 
by Harner’s adepts differs significantly from the “traditional” or tribal shamanism 
of Harner’s Shuar and Conibo teachers. Sufism in the west is something quite 
different than Sufism among e.g. the Mourids of Senegal, while the kabbala of the 
occult revival is distinct from the complex kabbalism of medieval Provence. 
Writers will attempt to stress continuity and disregard change, a legitimizing 
process that has its typical elements. (Hammer 2003, 159) 
At a minimum, any claims of continuity with historically disparate sources need to be 
treated with what may be termed a sympathetic skepticism: they are often grounded in a 
fervent belief in their accuracy and a genuine expression of transformative experience. 
That does not legitimize them as truth-claims, but it does expose the fascinating in-
between space we have entered, where etic practitioners walk side-by-side with what 
Susan Mumm, in a fantastic turn of phrase, calls Aspirational Indians. (Mumm 2002) This 
term is so appealing because it attempts to capture the complexity of the situation: 
aspirational goals are often very good things, we need them to move forward, to progress 
and develop. But it also very clearly delineates the fact that—whatever claims to the 
experience of prior lives or to what they feel deep in their heart or soul—this population is 
something other than actual. 
Many pages ago, I mentioned a final critique of the New Age. It centers on the 
difficulty that many of these practices have in encounters with the destructive or the 
deadly, with the common presence of misfortune and cruelty in the lives of millions, and 
with theodicy in general. (In this, we are also harkening back to one of our final critiques 
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of Muir in chapter three.) There are obstacles here for scholars as well: in an exploration of 
issues raised by Eliade, J. Z. Smith observed somewhat offhandedly 
that historians of religion have been weakest in interpreting those myths which do 
not reveal a cosmos in which man finds a place to dwell and on which he found his 
existence, but rather which suggest the problematic nature of existence and 
fundamental tension in the cosmos. I have in mind such traditions as dualistic 
creation myths, Earth-diver traditions, Tricksters, or the complex narratives of 
Corn or Rice Mothers who create by “loathsome” processes (e.g., rubbing the dirt 
off their bodies, by defecation, secretion). Clearly these mythologies, many of 
which are extremely archaic, point to a different spiritual horizon. (Smith 1978, 
100) 
This observation may be less relevant in contemporary scholarship, and may reflect the 
transition from the 1970s to the 2010s as much as anything else. Still, our tendency—as a 
culture, and perhaps as scholars—to be less successful in our encounters with more 
problematic subjects should be kept in mind as we examine the critiques below. As an 
overview, consider the following (somewhat dated in their specifics) remarks from 
William Irwin Thompson: 
New Age parents don’t wish their children to come to terms with the problem of 
evil. In their own condition of being afraid of the world, they have a need for a 
sentimentalized kind of innocence, which they then project onto their children. 
They try to hold their children tightly into these containers of innocence as they 
refuse to allow them to play with guns or Masters of the Universe, those ugly, 
distasteful American dolls from Mattel. 
 
As adults, we inhabit a world that is unconsciously organized around evil and 
pollution and crime and terrorism: jumbo jets get shot down and all kinds of 
terrorizing events are reported to us every day, but we don’t allow our children to 
come to terms with these things. Yet our children hear about these things, or 
actually see them on television. Then, as they begin to act out caricatures of evil as 
their way of playing with incarnation, of toying with the fear of death, we say, 
“No, stop! I need you to be my symbol of innocence. You must play only with 
wooden Anthroposophical toys. You must not have guns. You must live in a world 
that I know to be a lie. I need this of you, and I demand this of you.” The child, of 
course, feels the tyranny, the oppression, and the unfairness of this, and then he or 
she just raises the ante. (Spangler and Thompson 1991, 66) 
Thompson’s focus is on a parental protectiveness, but the underlying discomfort with 
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notions of violence and evil are prevalent throughout much of the New Age corpus. This is 
far from an original observation, and the critique of it is severe and significant, most 
commonly recognizing that, deeply embedded in the assumption that we are able to control 
our external circumstances, is a troubling tendency to blame the victim: if we choose and 
construct our own reality, we choose cancer, we choose abuse, we choose oppression. 
Obviously, the ability to construct a reality is a luxury afforded a very few: for the rest of 
the populace, the sheer weight and power of the structures that shape our lives are often 
overwhelmingly determinative, placing gross limits on the agency that is available. 
There is a response to this critique that refocuses the discussion on our personal 
behavior within those conditions: that is, perhaps we cannot control our external reality, 
but we certainly can control our reactions to it; we can create a new reality by insisting on 
a different perspective, a different emotional engagement with those conditions. The 
problem is that the New Age as a whole places fairly strict limits on those reactions: there 
is often little room for anger outside of a somewhat predictable Freudian structure (or, in 
other circles, a neatly inverted version that amounts to the same thing), little room for 
fierce moments of individual expression, little room for the ultimate amorality of the 
natural world. 
This last brings us back into focus: nature, despite our best efforts to paint her as 
mother or dangerous beast, as caregiver or deadly force, resists any attempt to force her 
into an ethical dimension. The sun rises on the good and the evil; the rain falls on the just 
and the unjust alike. More than that, the impacts of the storm are arbitrary and 
unpredictable. I write this chapter months after the Gulf Coast has witnessed a long series 
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of natural and man-made disasters: oil spills, hurricanes, massive flooding. Of all of it, it 
was the drought of 2010, when we went more than two hundred days without rainfall, that 
has caused the most permanent damage to the ecosystem, killing millions of old and 
medium growth trees. This drought is as natural as the recent rainstorms, and no more or 
less natural than the one hundred and fifty plus mile per hour winds of Hurricane Katrina 
or the more recent devastation of the intriguingly coded “superstorm Sandy.” Of all the 
figures considered, this was a truth most comfortably seen by Muir, for whom the “dark 
side” of nature—the thunderstorms, the damage caused through natural disasters, the risk 
inherent in being exposed to the raw power of the elements—was an exact part of the 
mystery of the phenomenal world: indeed, Muir would protest against any separation of 
nature into light and dark, let alone subjective terms like good and evil. For him, it was all 
light, all part of the same ecology, and working with one part of that system necessarily 
involved entanglements with the rest. This view finds its most clear contemporary 
advocates in neopaganism, and specifically in the various witchcraft movements. 
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Spin Your Partner Round and 
Round: The Spiral Dance as 
Movement Text 
Just as Starhawk operates with two concepts of religion so she assumes, 
simultaneously, two corresponding sign-theories. One is metaphorical, 
nominalist and horizontal, suiting her feminist, post-Romantic symbolic 
programme. The other is magical, realist and vertical, suiting her 
personal-spiritual transformation agenda and occult lineage. 
Jone Salomonsen, Feminist Witchcraft and Holy 
Hermeneutics 
There is a lot of excellent work in print on the history of neopaganism, however 
much of it is hidden in wider studies, or requires inference from related topics (most 
notably, that of magic). (Albanese 1990; Heelas 1996; Purkiss 1996; Hanegraaff 1998a; 
Pearson, Roberts, and Samuel 1998; Patton and Ray 2000; Pearson 2002; Styers 2004; H. 
A. Berger 2005; Clifton 2006; Pike 2006; Albanese 2007) Still, by now the archaeological 
remains of the movement have been well excavated and, out of respect to that work and the 
knowledge that I have little to add to it, instead of attempting a history of neopaganism I 
want to trace the development in thought of one of the early and most influential writers, 
Starhawk (née Miriam Stamos, born 1951), whose The Spiral Dance remains a highly 
influential point of entry for many to neopaganism and Wicca. In selecting The Spiral 
Dance, I have been influenced by Olav Hammer’s discussion of “movement texts,” which 
he sees as works that  
hover in a strange borderland between factual and fictional narratives. Emically, 
they will be marked and perceived as belonging to either category. At the same 
time, movement texts seem to address “typically religious” subjects such as the 
origin of the world, the existence of spiritual beings or the correct performance of 
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rituals. Religious narratives have traditionally been characterized by means of a 
limited number of genre terms: myth, legend, hagiography etc. One could suspect 
that modern movement texts might correspond to specific genres of textual 
material from pre-modern religious movements. However, terms such as myth and 
legend do not appear to be used at all emically to categorize movement texts. 
 
 …  
 
Modern books might be considered mixtures of doctrinal statements, polemic 
tracts, fictional accounts and exegeses superimposed on other religious doctrines. 
Given the fundamentally modern as well as hybrid genres that constitute such 
books in toto, individual ideas expressed therein, single passages as well as larger 
sections of text within such works can nevertheless be seen as functionally similar 
to older genres. (Hammer 2003, 38–40) 
In typically dense fashion, Hammer touches on quite a number of important observations 
here: movement texts are accepted by their emic audience as fact, as fiction, and often 
simultaneously as both; movement texts tend to avoid the troublesome toxa of myth and 
legend, side-stepping them entirely; and while they may resist many of the ready-at-hand 
classificatory systems available to scholars in their entirety, those systems may still prove 
illuminating when applied judiciously and in context. 
First published in 1979, The Spiral Dance moves back and forth between lyrical 
descriptions of religious experience, theoretical and historical narrative, and exercises 
designed to allow individuals to learn and practice what Starhawk at this point refers to as 
Witchcraft (the terms neopaganism and, her preferred later identifier, Wicca, were yet to 
come into common usage). In structure, therefore, the book is a classic self-help text, 
mixing a tone of authoritative popular scholarship with the step by step instructions of a 
practical primer. 
I use the term “popular scholarship” quite intentionally: many of the claims made 
in The Spiral Dance do not stand up to academic examination, an issue that has 
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consistently plagued alternative religious movements. Many of the larger of these issues—
the exaggerated claims related to witch persecutions in Europe, the disputes about the 
existence of either pre-patriarchal or explicitly matriarchal civilizations in several 
geographic locations, the tendency to rationalize cultural appropriation without sufficient 
consideration or context—have been treated elsewhere and have been grappled with quite 
seriously from inside the movement as well, including by Starhawk herself. Indeed, this 
emic engagement with scholarship and with change is part of how these traditions have 
resisted the sort of closed nature present in much of the New Age discussed above. 
At the time of The Spiral Dance, however, the narrative was a highly romanticized 
version of persecution: in ancient times peace and the Goddess had ruled the land, defined 
both explicitly and implicitly as Europe with expansion into North America. An example 
that both makes the geographic bias quite clear and hints at the stylistic consistency with 
Muir’s enthusiasms: 
In the East—Siberia and the Ukraine—the Goddess was Lady of the Mammoths; 
She was carved from stone in great swelling curves that embodied her gifts of 
abundance. In the West, in the great cave temples of southern France and Spain, 
her rites were performed deep in the secret wombs of the earth, where the great 
polar forces were painted as bison and horses, superimposed, emerging from the 
cave walls like spirits out of a dream. (Starhawk 1979, 3) 
This pre-technological utopia held sway for nigh on thirty thousand years. But there was 
trouble brewing in paradise: 
But in other lands, cultures developed that devoted themselves to the arts of war. 
Wave after wave of invasion swept over Europe from the Bronze Age on. Warrior 
gods drove the Goddess peoples out from the fertile lowlands and fine temples, 
into the hills and high mountains where they became known as the Sidhe, the Picts 
or Pixies, the Fair Folk or Faeries. The mythological cycle of Goddess and 
Consort, Mother and Divine Child, which had held sway for 30 thousand years, 




And so the stage is set: a dominant tradition, marked by a female-centered mystic peace, is 
driven underground, surviving in oral traditions and in (largely rural) gatherings. These 
traditions are central to communal life: “healers, teachers, poets, and midwives, they were 
central figures in every community.” (Starhawk 1979, 5) Starhawk’s gaze constricts further 
on Europe as the rate of persecution there increases, peaking in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries with the same horrors that Sagan, through Ady and Spee, (along with Purkiss and 
Golden) examined above. 
Thirty-some years on, this creation myth is disturbing and, thankfully, largely 
adjusted, especially in how clearly the then-potential, but later realized, affiliation between 
neopaganism and various Aryan revival movements reveals itself in this particular 
recasting of history where the peace and purity of Europe fall beneath the brutal onslaught 
of waves of barbarians from the East and the contemporary sacred calling is a restitution of 
that original state. As Hanegraaff points out, “commentators of the contemporary neopagan 
movement(s) usually seem unaware of the fact that the term neopaganism is also used in 
quite different contexts, particularly in connection with certain religious and philosophical 
developments in prewar Germany.” (Hanegraaff 1998a, 77) Indeed, the movement under 
consideration here—which Hanegraaff terms the “New Age variety” of Neopaganism—
would be horrified to learn either of those historical connections or the ways in which their 
own mythos could be construed as supportive of openly fascistic tendencies. (Adler 1986, 
273) 
Interestingly, Starhawk raises this issue in The Spiral Dance, but she does so only 
at the level of the use of magic, not at the level of a set of assumptions serving to mold 
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thought and practice. She is sensitive to the charge “that Witchcraft and occultism are in 
some way a revival of Nazism,” but sees the problem as one of the implementation of a 
specific set of tools: 
There does seem to be evidence that Hitler and other Nazis were occultists—that 
is, they may have practiced some of the same techniques as others who seek to 
expand the horizons of the mind. Magic, like chemistry, is a set of techniques that 
can be put to the service of any philosophy. The rise of the Third Reich played on 
the civilized Germans’ disillusionment with rationalism and tapped a deep longing 
to recover modes of experience Western culture had too long ignored. It is as if we 
had been trained, since infancy, never to use our left arms: The muscles have partly 
atrophied but they cry out to be used. But Hitler perverted this longing and twisted 
it into cruelty and horror. (Starhawk 1979, 13) 
Starhawk is clearly incredulous that the comparison can even be made, closing the 
discussion by claiming that, “To equate Witches with Nazis because neither are Judeo-
Christians and both share magical elements is like saying that swans are really scorpions 
because neither are horses and both have tails.” (Starhawk 1979, 13) It is a good line, but 
not exactly a convincing argument, at least at a structural level deeper than the mere use of 
magic: we know too much about how tools are linked to their uses and how cultural forms 
of thought tend to reappear, intentionally or not, across different disciplines. 
We discussed the term magic in some depth in chapter two; recalling those 
considerations, we can now introduce another twist in magic’s historical development, the 
change of magic from mystery to technology, well revealed through the neopagan 
definition quoted earlier of magic being “the art of changing consciousness at will.” This 
quote is found in numerous places, most often attributed to Dion Fortune although 
sometimes to Robert Anton Wilson. While the quote may just be a meme that found a 
home, there is also at least the possibility that the lack of clear attribution may be due to 
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the long and often twisted shadow of Aleister Crowley. Crowley is a difficult subject for 
many magical traditions: on the one hand, his influence is immense and his technical 
insight into the workings of his craft remain hugely relevant. On the other hand, you have 
the depravity, the egomania, the misogyny, and the rampant disregard for most other 
human beings. Weighing those is beyond our work here, where he only appears as a figure 
of the past, intentionally blurred by much of the present. In one of a series of letters aimed 
at leading a pupil through the initial steps of magical practice, Crowley wrote that (spelling 
and capitalization retained), “Magick is the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in 
conformity with Will.” (A. Crowley 1991, 27) There is no direct recognition of Fortune (or 
Wilson) having this in mind, but Crowley’s writing does predate theirs. In any case, the 
discomfort Crowley causes—independent of his role in the formation of the ubiquitous 
definition of magic—reminds us again of how neopaganism struggles in the presentation 
of its relationship with the more problematic parts of its past. 
Note that I am not attempting to equate neopaganism with Nazism—I believe that 
any even cursory engagement with either set of beliefs will prove sufficient to enumerate 
deeply important differences between the two. I am, however, trying quite intentionally to 
crack some of the foundations upon which the myth of New Age purity is built: oftimes, a 
notion exists that since parts of a tradition are recently invented, or are even being 
expressed creatively in the moment, those behaviors must be excused from any of the 
weight of cultural history. We’re all good people, you know we wouldn’t do anything that 
was bad. This is, of course, nonsense, and like any tradition emerging from the twentieth 




This examination would be much easier if there were an established creed or, 
barring that, some sort of central authority to appeal to. But there is none: 
Witchcraft is not a religion of masses—of any sort. Its structure is cellular, based 
on covens, small groups of up to thirteen members what allow for both communal 
sharing and individual independence. “Solitaries,” Witches who prefer to worship 
alone, are the exception. Covens are autonomous, free to use whatever rituals, 
chants and invocations they prefer. There is no set prayer book or liturgy. 
(Starhawk 1979, 13) 
Given this, it can be quite difficult to pin down exactly what the tenets of neopaganism 
are—indeed, if someone claims to do so with any pretense of universality, it is usually a 
marker of other agendas at play, usually engaged with internecine boundary maintenance. 
The best that we can do is clearly identify and work with what (in our case) Starhawk 
writes at a specific point in time, at a certain moment in her own history and development. 
The cosmology of The Spiral Dance differs from her later work, in ways that we will 
examine shortly. This fluidity is explicit and valued: 
Witchcraft has always been a religion of poetry, not theology. The myths, legends, 
and teachings are recognized as metaphors for “That-Which-Cannot-Be-Told,” the 
absolute reality our limited minds can never completely know. The mysteries of 
the absolute can never be explained—only felt or intuited. Symbols and ritual acts 
are used to trigger altered states of awareness, in which insights that go beyond 
words are revealed. When we speak of “the secrets that cannot be told,” we do not 
mean merely the rules that prevent us from speaking freely. We mean that the 
inner knowledge literally cannot be expressed in words. It can only be conveyed 
by experience, and no one can legislate what insight another person may draw 
from any given experience. (Starhawk 1979, 7) 
This is reinforced on the level of both the individual and the practice as a whole: individual 
experience is seen as unique and truthful, allowing two people to claim widely differing 
insights from a shared experience without those discrepancies necessarily leading to 
conflict. At the level of practice, most practitioners of witchcraft are, to one degree or 
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another, eclectic, “creating their own traditions from many sources.” (Starhawk 1979, 11)  
Maintaining Imbalance: 
Asymmetry and Community 
Engagement as a Corrective 
to Notions of Equality 
Wicca had moved out of the darkness, the occult world of witchery, to 
occupy the moral high ground—environmentalism. To be at one with 
nature in one’s inner self is no longer enough; radical action to preserve 
nature is now important. 
Vivianne Crowley, Wicca as Nature Religion 
There is a set of unbalanced relationships that help give form and structure to 
Starhawk’s world. The first of these concerns the relationship between a professed duality 
of male and female (Goddess and God) and the second focuses on the structure of our 
consciousness, separating it into three parts that Starhawk refers to as Talking Self, 
Younger Self, and High Self. In each case, the focus of neopaganism is explicitly uneven: 
the Goddess has primacy over the God and Younger Self (and, through it, High Self) 
receives more attention than Talking Self. It is easy to dismiss the lack of balance as a 
corrective: that is, in a world dominated both by patriarchy and by a particularly 
aggressively narrow view of masculinity and by a primacy given to the highly logical and 
the hyper-rational, a practice that brands itself as alternative has no choice but to embrace 
some constructed notion of femininity and of the creative imaginal. While this is certainly 
true to some extent, the structural imbalance runs deeper in most forms of neopaganism. 
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The gender dichotomy may be viewed as an imbalanced polarity, where the balance 
point between male and female is most decidedly skewed towards the feminine. “The 
Goddess does not exclude the male; She contains him, as a pregnant woman contains a 
male child. Her own male aspect embodies both the solar light of the intellect and wild, 
untamed animal energy.” (Starhawk 1979, 10) There are many more Dianic covens—that 
is, neopagan practitioners that focus almost exclusively upon the Goddess and what is 
sometimes called “feminist Wicca”—than there are masculine inclined parallels and, 
indeed, a focus on masculinity is often met with a degree of suspicion. This has proven to 
be a locus of both strength and discomfort for neopaganism as a whole: strength in that 
feminist-centered spirituality remains one of the strongest concentrations of practitioners 
and the emic claims of those groups speak to highly powerful, transformational moments 
in the lives of individuals and groups; the discomfort is nicely summarized by Sarah Pike 
when she writes 
Men have accused goddess worshippers of reverse sexism; transgendered people 
disallowed by a few woman-only groups have charged that they are 
discriminatory; some heterosexual women in lesbian-dominated feminist groups 
have felt uncomfortable; archeologists and historians of the ancient world have 
dismissed arguments for ancient goddess-worshiping matriarchies. (Pike 2006, 
128) 
Pike is overly gentle, a corrective is offered by Katherine K. Young and Paul 
Nathanson’s 2010 screed Sanctifying Misandry (being footnoted, well-written, and 
scholarly in tone does not disqualify it from that category). Essentially, and they are all 
about the essentials, Young and Nathanson look upon second wave feminism with horror, 
especially in its adherents who advocate for a feminine-centered spirituality. In this 
category, somehow, they include Dan Brown, whose monstrously successful novel The Da 
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Vinci Code is also seen as proof of a vast, connected network of anti-male media and 
academics who are conspiring to somehow undermine the fair and equal interplay of the 
sexes. Some of what Young and Nathanson have to say is quite valid and, indeed, overlaps 
with ground we have already covered: the looseness with which feminist recreations of the 
past have played with history, the overly simplistic narratives that are offered in place of 
actual research, etc. However, they lump all of their subjects—from Mary Daly to 
Rosemary Reuther, from Riane Eisler to Marija Gimbutas—under the rubric of “goddess 
ideology,” which has as its goal the diabolical notion of the separation of the genders: 
The logical conclusion to goddess ideology is not necessarily for women to 
exterminate men, but for women to separate from men. That might work for gay 
women, some of whom feel no compelling reason at all to mingle with men. But it 
would not work so well for straight women, most of whom want healthy 
relationships with men. Besides, separatism—whether sexual, religious, racial, 
linguistic, or any other kind—presents a profound moral problem to those who, 
like egalitarian feminists, include the fear of “otherness” and the resulting desire to 
exclude “others” among the most fundamental human problems. Even if we could 
engineer two truly separate but equal realms, we could do so only at the cost of a 
truly historic moral defeat. (Young and Nathanson 2011, 267–8) 
This is a claim that can only be made from a position of privileged inclusion: it requires a 
severe ignorance of history—and specifically the history they invoke with the phrase 
“separate but equal”—to miss the strength and possibilities contained within periods of 
exclusion and separation. The question, as always, is cui bono? While openly sympathetic 
to the concerns Pike raises above, to move from those questions to the conclusion that 
goddess ideology—a term Young and Nathanson’s subjects may very well embrace—is, 
necessarily, a profound threat to our moral existence is clearly misreading the situation. 
Most fundamentally, it rests on a conception of the universe as an already-fair, already-
equal, already-balanced context, where everyone is already set on the veritable level 
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playing field.  
Enough: returning our attention to Starhawk, for whom the world is far more 
nuanced, the goal is not balance, but interplay; not equality but interaction. The practitioner 
is supposed to be aware of their own state, and is required to make conscious choices about 
their intentions with regards to both dualities. In this sense, Starhawk’s neopaganism is 
neither a monism (although it drifts quite close to that at points) nor a dualism where two 
forces exist in contradistinction to each other. Instead, there is a struggle towards harmony, 
a struggle that is cognizant of starting from a position of somewhat severe imbalance. 
Appropriately, this is mirrored between the outer and inner worlds: the earth is seen as 
being close to an apocalyptic tipping point in terms of ecological and social ills, requiring 
divine intervention and action. As above, so below. 
Starhawk’s second polarity is actually a triad, but I want to focus initially on the 
distinction between Younger Self and Talking Self before introducing the notion of High 
Self. Her initial descriptions of Younger Self and Talking Self are worth quoting at length 
for both their content and their serving of an exemplar of certain sort of eclecticism 
endemic to neopagan writing. 
It is Younger Self that directly experiences the world, through the holistic 
awareness of the right hemisphere. Sensations, emotions, basic drives, image 
memory, intuition and diffuse perception are functions of Younger Self, which 
corresponds roughly to Freud’s concept of the id, to the personal and collective 
unconscious described by Jung, and to the “Child” mode of Transactional 
Analysis. Younger Self’s verbal understanding is limited; it communicates through 
images, emotions, sensations, dreams, visions, and physical symptoms. Classical 
psychoanalysis developed from attempts to interpret the speech of Younger Self. 
Witchcraft not only interprets, but teaches us how to speak back to Younger Self. 
 
Talking Self organizes the impressions of Younger Self, gives them names, 
classifies them into systems. As its name implies, it functions through the verbal, 
analytic awareness of the left hemisphere and can be compared to the concept of 
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the “ego” in both Jungian and Freudian psychology, although it also includes the 
superego—the set of verbally understood precepts that encourage us to make 
judgements [sic] about right and wrong. In the terms of Transactional Analysis, it 
would include both “Adult” and “Parent.” Talking Self speaks through words, 
abstract concepts, and numbers. (Starhawk 1979, 21) 
Notice how Younger Self and Talking Self approximate authoritative discourse, but not 
quite: they are akin to a concept that is attributed to Freud or Jung or Transactional 
Analysis (remember, The Spiral Dance is published in the late 1970s), but there is little 
done to make the exact correlation specifically and technically understood. This creates an 
opening where neopaganism is free to pick and choose as it wishes from any system of 
analysis it encounters, actively engaging in a bricolage that accretes symbolic meaning 
atop core ideas in a fairly haphazard way. We will return to this notion later, and to a 
discussion of whether this is a strength or a weakness. 
We remain in a position similar to the male/female polarity here (indeed, many 
writers will associate Talking Self with the masculine and Younger Self with the feminine) 
where an argument can be made that the tradition needs to focus primarily on Younger Self 
due to the dominance of Talking Self in our day-to-day reality: our lives are determined by 
words and numbers, and it is only by training ourselves in the language of Younger Self 
that we can hold any hope for altering our current level of conscious perception and action. 
The Spiral Dance moves back and forth between Starhawk’s brand of popular academic 
writing and do-it-yourself exercises, the first several of which are aimed at building the 
skills seen as necessary to increase awareness of and communication with Younger Self, 
specifically increasing sensitivity to perceptual patterns. In “Shadow Play,” we are told to 
draw shadows instead of things, focusing not on objects but on “the play of light and 
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shadow over various forms,” allowing us “to experience another way of seeing, in which 
separate objects disappear and only pattern remains.” A similar set of instructions is 
provided for “Rhythm Play” with regards to sound, where we are encouraged to ignore 
what the sounds represent, focusing instead on “the vast rhythm they create” and “the 
intricate, organic pattern in which each is a separate beat.” (Starhawk 1979, 20) 
Younger Self, then, exists outside of the duality of signs, in the interplay of 
symbols without referents. The noises we hear, the objects we see, are interpreted directly 
as pointing to something—that is the honk of a passing car, that is the bark of the 
neighbor’s dog, that is a coffee cup, that a bag that was given away at a conference. Those 
connections emerge as a web linking signifiers and signified, a web that is the domain of 
Talking Self: it is Talking Self that tells us what things mean. Younger Self lives in the 
space of pure signification, where the sound and the form are divorced from the rest of the 
perceptive network. Or, at least, that is the idea: the difficulty is that, even in pure 
perception, we are required to provide some analytic function and those functions are 
embedded in a certain historic and cultural tableau. Indeed, even Starhawk is willing to 
back away from any desire to engage with an unfettered Younger Self, writing of the 
danger of ignoring “Talking Self’s survival judgment.” (Starhawk 1979, 23) 
While there are hints at this point of the difficulties of engaging with Younger Self, 
the issue is clarified later in a chapter entirely devoted to the notion of “trance.” Here, 
Starhawk introduces 
the Guardian, or the Shadow on the Threshold: the embodiment of all the impulses 
and qualities we have thrust into the unconscious because the conscious mind finds 
them unacceptable. All that we are and feel we should not be—sexual, angry, 
hostile, vulnerable, masochistic, self-hating, guilty, and even, perhaps, powerful or 
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creative—squats in the doorway between Younger Self and Talking Self, refusing 
to let us pass until we have looked it in the face and acknowledged our own 
essential humanness. (Starhawk 1979, 144–5) 
The encounter with the Guardian is clearly witchcraft’s ordeal of passage, a required 
confrontation with not only the darker corners of the self, but also with the defense 
mechanisms created to preserve and protect that self. Starhawk strikes a careful balance 
here: we are certainly not embracing the raw violence of Eliade’s descriptions of various 
forms of shamanism where, in the part that later inheritors often discard, the initiate’s 
“limbs are removed and disjointed with an iron hook; the bones are cleaned, the flesh 
scraped, the body fluids thrown away, and the eyes torn from their sockets” (Eliade 2004, 
36) or where “shamans are believed to have been killed by the spirits of their ancestors, 
who, after ‘cooking’ their bodies, counted their bones and replaced them, fastening them 
together with iron and covering them with new flesh.” (Eliade 2004, 159) While focused 
specifically on the relationship between modern movements and native American 
practices, Hammer summarizes the neopagan ambivalence towards historical shamanism in 
general quite neatly: 
A factor that contributes to the success of neo-shamanic religiosity is the ability of 
cultural stereotypes to mold expectations. Traditional shamanisms, with a near-
ubiquitous emphasis on power and violence, do not conform very well to Western 
images of what Indians are supposed to think and do. Neoshamanisms are almost 
inherently more successful in this respect, since they are created by exponents of 
alternative Western religiosity, principally for adherents of alternative Western 
religiosity. 
 
Although the contrast should not be carried too far, it could be argued that early 
movement texts of neoshamanism such as Castaneda’s and Harner’s books saw 
native Americans as positive Others because they could offer something distinctly 
different, whereas recent movement texts increasingly attempt to assimilate native 
Americans into a perennial philosophy and appreciate them as positive Others 
because they offer yet another version of the same generalized spirituality. 
(Hammer 2003, 137–8) 
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Even in The Spiral Dance, and certainly more and more in later works, Starhawk—while 
still firmly entrenched in the “alternative Western religiosity” that Hammer describes—is 
willing to at least acknowledge the presence of power and violence, both within and 
without spiritual practice: we are not in the utterly positive and peaceful region of the New 
Age, where spiritual progression is simply a matter of letting go or surrendering. Neopagan 
Wicca is initiatory in both senses of the word: there is a mentor relationship that is required 
for a member to fully enter a coven and there is a moment of significant challenge that 
must be confronted and overcome. The purpose of this moment is holism: the specific 
example narrated in The Spiral Dance results in “a deep integration in her personality and 
a flowering of her personal and creative power,” (Starhawk 1979, 146) that leads Starhawk 
to pass on the leadership of her original coven, but this holism is probably best thought of 
as a conduit. By integrating the shadow into ourselves, we open ourselves to 
communication with Younger Self: the doorway between Talking Self and Younger Self is 
cleared, and the two may now fully engage. 
The question of why we would want to engage so deeply with Younger Self—
described by Starhawk as being “as balky and stubborn as the most cantankerous three-
year old” (Starhawk 1979, 22)—remains open at this point. Part of the answer lies simply 
in increasing our capabilities for creative play, seen as absolutely central to witchcraft: “a 
child makes-believe that she is a queen; her chair becomes a throne. A Witch makes-
believe that her wand has magic power, and it becomes a channel for energy.” (Starhawk 
1979, 23) But there is a larger goal here as well. Younger Self is the conduit to “the Divine 
within, the ultimate and original essence, the spirit that exists beyond time, space, and 
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matter.” This is High Self, “our deepest level of wisdom and compassion … conceived of 
as both male and female, two motes of consciousness united as one.” Starhawk writes that, 
“in the esoteric Judaism of the Cabalah, the High Self is named the Neshamah from the 
root Shmh, “to hear or listen”: the Neshamah is She Who Listens, the soul who inspires 
and guides us;” but she also identifies it with “the ‘Spirit Guide,’ … as in John C. Lilly’s 
account of his LSD experiences in an isolation tank, where he reports meeting two helpful 
beings.” (Starhawk 1979, 22) High Self, then, is both the notion of the presence of an inner 
divine, but also the manifestation of that divine on a personal, externalized level. It may be 
useful here to summarize the entire system and for that I will turn to Jone Salomonsen’s 
attempt to map out the hermeneutics of Starhawk’s original coven, Reclaiming. 
Starhawk’s four hermeneutical steps are as follows: (1) she starts in the visible, 
ordinary reality of the Talking Self. Here language has the status of metaphor 
because it can only grasp reality indirectly. This is Starhawk’s nominalist and 
symbolic position. Her Nietzsche-inspired criticism is that metaphor in our culture 
has turned into dogmatic concept, confusing the metaphor with the thing itself. To 
cut loose from this language “trap”, the only way out is to “dive” experientially 
into (2) the source of invisible, extraordinary reality, that is, into the Deep Self and 
the life-generating powers that convey real truth. The path to Deep Self goes 
through Younger Self. It can be found in ritual, and the status of language is now 
magical. This is Starhawk’s magico-empirical, or realist, position. After knowing 
truth from “diving” into the source, she returns to (3) visible reality and Talking 
Self, where language again is metaphorical. She now chooses new metaphors for 
this reality dependent upon the values implicit in names, not because they are true 
in a conceptual sense. 
 
This whole process I place on a vertical axis. At this point Starhawk is ready for 
(4), the horizontal movement in the world to practice the magic of everyday life, 
where “talk” is equivalent to “walk”. In this ordinary reality, she constantly moves 
between an empirical-experiential and a symbolic position. Still, she is not outside 
the realm of the sacred, which is believed to be immanent and ever present. She 
has only changed consciousness. In magical reality the divine encompasses her 
completely; in ordinary reality she carries the divine inside as Deep Self and 
confronts it in “the other”. (Salomonsen 1998, 156) 
And, of course, the fourth step merely sets the stage for the first, reinforcing the spiral and 
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fluidly repetitive nature of Starhawk’s Wiccan practice. 
This accents a core component of neopaganism as well as one of the clear ways in 
which the practice is quite well aligned with the larger New Age phenomena. 
Neopaganism is focused quite strongly on a notion of personal journey, with an equal 
stress on the two terms. We have already touched on the ways in which personal 
experiences are held as the ultimate arbiters of truth; the individuality of that notion is 
reinforced by the sense of motion and quest—even the title of Starhawk’s book implies a 
never-ending movement, turning through a cycle again and again in different ways. 
Importantly as well, this remains a personal journey: it may be undertaken in the company 
of others and they may play an important role in its form and outcome, but High Self 
appears to each person differently and in different forms, a notion further supported by the 
individual eclecticism that is supported in neopaganism, where different members of the 
same coven may claim angelic, animalistic, human, or any other manifestation of their very 
own “spirit guides.”  
I have quite intentionally focused heavily on the opening of The Spiral Dance, 
hoping to clarify the structural cosmology that Starhawk attributes to neopaganism. In 
doing so, I have ignored a constant thread in the book of political action: from the 
beginning, Starhawk was aware of the implications of her religious claims for her political 
life. In The Spiral Dance, this is a view heavily influenced by the heady days of second-
wave feminism and thoroughly convinced of the power of the eternal feminine to save the 
planet. That potential, however, rests on a healthy dose of skepticism, extending even to 




The longing or expanded consciousness has taken many of us on a spiritual 
“journey to the East,” and Hindu, Taoist, and Buddhist concepts are infusing 
Western culture with new understandings. The East-West dialogue has become a 
major influence on the evolution of a new world view. Eastern religions offer a 
radically different approach to spirituality than Judeo-Christian traditions. They are 
experiential rather than intellectual; they offer exercises, practices, and 
meditations, rather than catechisms. The image of God is not the anthropomorphic, 
bearded God-Father in the sky—but the abstract, unknowable ground of 
consciousness itself, the void, the Tao, the flow. Their goal is not to know God, but 
to be God. In many ways, their philosophies are very close to that of Witchcraft. 
 
As women, however, we need to look very closely at these philosophies and ask 
ourselves the hard-headed, critical question, “What’s in it for me? What does this 
spiritual system do for women?” Of course, the gurus, teachers, and ascended 
masters will tell us that, even by asking such a question, we are merely continuing 
in our enslavement to the Lords of Mind; that it is all simply another dodge of the 
ego as it resists dissolutions in the All. The truth is that while men, in our society, 
are encouraged to have strong egos and to function in competitive, aggressive, 
intellectualized modes that may indeed cause them pain, for most women the ego 
is like a fragile African violet, grown in secret from a seed, carefully nursed and 
fertilized and sheltered from too much sun. Before I toss mine out into the 
collective garbage heap, I want to be sure I’m getting something in return. I don’t 
feel qualified to discuss the way Eastern religions function within their own 
cultures. But if we look at women in the West who have embraced these cults, by 
and large we find then in bondage. An ecstatic bondage, perhaps; but bondage 
nevertheless. 
 
Eastern religions may help men become more whole, in touch with the intuitive, 
receptive, gentle feelings they have been conditions to ignore. But women cannot 
become whole by being yet more passive, gentle, and submissive than we already 
are. We become whole through knowing our strength and creativity, our 
aggression, our sexuality, by affirming the Self, not by denying it. We cannot 
achieve enlightenment through identifying with Buddha’s wife or Krishna’s gopi 
groupies. While India has strong Goddess traditions—of tantra, of Kali worship—
these are less easily popularized in the West, because they do not fit our cultural 
expectation that truth is purveyed through male images, by charismatic males. 
(Starhawk 1979, 192–3) 
While noting that she begins by admitting a close parallel with her own tradition, the 
aggressiveness of her attack is particularly striking, especially in the use of the dreaded 
word, “cults.” Paring this away, however, Starhawk has here prefigured much of the 
discourse surrounding feminism and the rise of eastern traditions in the west, especially as 
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it relates to the guru/student relationship. The notion of eastern structures offering insight, 
but only at the cost of replicating certain male-centered and male-dominated structures and 
systems is not original, but it is an important consideration for a feminist witch. This also 
highlights some of how eclecticism works within neopagan traditions: the accretion of 
foreign substances—symbols, rituals, sayings, whatever—is done, at its best, with attention 
being paid to whether or not there is consistency with the core cosmological assumptions 
of Wicca itself.  
The rest of the text is, essentially, a workbook taking the reader through the notion 
of community expressed by a coven, a chapter each on the mysteries of the Goddess and 
the God, and an exploration of the standard stages of wiccan ritual, and ending with a 
paean to the possibilities offered by a future where neopaganism—and specifically, 
feminist neopaganism—plays a larger role in our communities and our politics, a closing 
not terribly different structurally from the tendencies described above in scientific writing. 
Starhawk’s next three books, Truth or Dare (1989), Dreaming the Dark (1997), 
and Webs of Power (2002) mark a progression in her thought that is worth examining. 
While still very embedded in the context of her practice as a witch, these texts are focused 
much more on political action and on her attempts to identify the relationships between 
magic, ritual, and social responsibility. Their content reflects this long arc as well: Truth or 
Dare contains similar exercises to those which populate The Spiral Dance, but as the book 
goes on, they become more and more sets of discussion questions, culminating in her final 




The self-help nature of The Spiral Dance is absent entirely from Dreaming the 
Dark and Webs of Power, with the latter being, essentially an edited expansion of pieces 
published online in various anti-globalization and politically focused discussion forums. 
During the same time period, Starhawk published three novels, The Fifth Sacred Thing 
(1994), Walking to Mercury (1998), and The Last Wild Witch (2009) as well as co-
authored three books: The Pagan Book of Living and Dying with M. Macha Nightmare and 
the Reclaiming Collective (1997), Circle Round: Raising Children in Goddess Traditions 
with Diane Baker and Anne Hill (2000) and Twelve Wild Swans with Hilary Valentine 
(2001). All five of these books fit much more neatly into the “expected” publishing form 
of spirituality and self-help, even the fiction: The Fifth Sacred Thing presents a future 
world where, within the context of a splintered and reconstituted United States, an 
ecologically and Wiccan driven utopia based in San Francisco is facing the threat of attack 
from an evangelically Christian nation to the south while Walking to Mercury is a prelude 
of sorts, covering the events that led to the transformation. (The third work of fiction, The 
Last Wild Witch, is an illustrated book for children.) The world of these novels is explicitly 
magical, and the themes and even the practical implications of The Spiral Dance can be 
easily seen. The other three books can also be seen as more direct continuations of The 
Spiral Dance, focusing in turn on a Wiccan lifecycle of ritual, children and child-rearing 
within the tradition and, finally, what may be seen as an attempt to provide an “advanced” 
class alongside the introductory nature of The Spiral Dance in Twelve Wild Swans, which 
attempts to fuse fiction and instructional practice. 
I mention these five books to reinforce the fact that Starhawk never “left” her 
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writing about and from the neopagan world, even as she was marching in the streets of 
Seattle, Quebec, and Genoa to protest the globalizing agendas of the most powerful nations 
as they gathered under the auspices of the WTO or the G7. At the same time, she can also 
be seen in her writing as clearly wrestling with what the relationships are between the 
different strands of her life, and the choice not to come out with The Spiral Dance Reborn: 
Further Exercises in Spiritual Growth for the Wiccan in You! should, I think, be read as an 
intentional rejection of a relatively easy and stale path forward. This choice almost 
certainly had economic implications for Starhawk as well: none of her later writings come 
close to the success of The Spiral Dance: in early 2011, The Spiral Dance ranked in the top 
33,000 selling books on amazon.com, placing it well within the top one hundred in the 
more specific categories the giant online bookseller maintains (Religion & 
Spirituality/Earth-Based Religions/Witchcraft; Religion & Spirituality/Earth-Based 
Religions/Wicca; and Religion & Spirituality/Religious Studies/Comparative Religion). 
Dreaming the Dark sits just inside the top two hundred thousand, Truth or Dare over three 
hundred thousand places further down, and the most explicitly political and least magically 
instructive text of them all, Webs of Power, lies outside the top million best-selling books. 
These different concerns come together again in 2004 with the publication of The 
Earth Path: Grounding Your Spirit in the Rhythms of Nature, a book that manages to 
combine the workbook-style so beloved by the self-help community with a deep political 
commitment, centered on creating, sustaining, and continually transforming what is seen as 
a deeply troubled relationship with the earth. There is a mix of practical advice on topics 
like creating an urban compost heap from some wire, three old tires, and a plank of wood 
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as well as a constant attempt to explore the webs that tie individual, local choices to global 
issues—The Earth Path is most certainly neither apolitical nor politically “soft” in a we-
all-love-the-earth-so-let’s-recycle way. Indeed, Starhawk has, throughout her work, little 
use for such proclamations—consider this from Twelve Wild Swans: 
The Witch’s law says, “Harm none, and do as you will.” This is a simple saying, 
but incredibly difficult to apply. Do I do harm by smashing the snail eggs in my 
garden, or do I do harm by not smashing them? If I let them live, they will kill my 
seedlings. So which is the harm? The Witch’s worldview comes with tremendous 
responsibility to weigh each action in the wisest possible view of the whole. There 
is no room here for simpleminded innocence: “I would never kill a living thing”; or 
“Don’t cut down trees.” If the trees are the weedy eucalyptuses that Europeans 
brought from Australia and that now threaten the few wild islands of California 
native plants and animals, maybe we need to work hard to cut them down. 
(Starhawk and Valentine 2000, 193) 
The Earth Path does close a cycle opened in The Spiral Dance where, twenty years 
on, Starhawk is able to find a ground that supports her, both magically and politically; a 
space that, from her perspective, is able to hold marching in the streets, meditating on the 
goddess, planting nectarine trees, building yurts, and working in both magical and secular 
communities. In the intervening time, she has been hardened: she has watched protesters 
beaten to death in Italy, she has spent nights in jail herself, and she has maintained through 
it all a deep commitment to finding in neopaganism a container that supports both those 
experiences and what is needed for her to continue to speak and act in politically embodied 
ways. 
I want to close the discussion of Starhawk specifically with a moment from The 
Earth Path that helps bring the contrast with the New Age into stark and personal relief. 
This story is told in a chapter entitled Observation whose focus is on how we see our own 
state of interaction with the world: 
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Magical discipline is about learning to hear, understand, and “speak” to our own 
inner states of consciousness as well as the outer world: the goal is to become 
aware of our current state of awareness and make conscious choices about what 
state we want to be in. And every form of personal change requires our active will 
and participation. (Starhawk 2004, 60) 
Before a trip to Europe, Starhawk was hiking through the woods with some friends as part 
of a goodbye party, when she slipped on some loose gravel, breaking her ankle. 
I spent the next week at home, recovering, waiting for the ankle to be ready for a 
cast, grumbling at my partner and housemates and occasionally tossing the odd 
piece of furniture around the house, while snapping viciously at the parade of well-
meaning friends trying to assure me that this was the Goddess’s way of telling me 
to slow down. (Starhawk 2004, 59) 
The behavior of these friends may be seen as the standard New Age response: all events 
contain a direct message focused on the individual, and are open to an easy interpretation. 
I pointed out to them that if I had a boyfriend who thought I should slow down, 
and communicated that thought by breaking my ankle, they’d be the first ones 
urging me to get out of that abusive relationship and report him to the relevant 
authorities. I give the Goddess every opportunity to communicate with me on a 
daily basis, I assured them, and if she wanted me to slow down, all she had to do 
was say so and reduce the workload a bit, not break my ankle. (Starhawk 2004, 59) 
Note the argument: communication channels with the deity are wide open for Starhawk, 
and she cleanly rejects the notion that a painfully coded message is necessary. Instead, 
nobody is particularly “at fault” for the broken ankle, despite a very powerful urge to 
interpret the event along those lines. Starhawk recognizes that, as she is in Europe in a 
wheelchair, she  
could hear whispers of the stories that shaped my childhood—stories my mother 
told herself about being a victim, being abandoned, never being taken care of, 
always caring for others, and never getting enough herself. Stories I had 
internalized as well. 
 
But I also became aware of something else. When I got caught in the stories, I felt 
abused and misused and unhappy. When I could stay out of those stories, being in 
a wheelchair with a broken ankle was just something new I was dealing with. It 
was interesting, actually—a different sort of trip than I had planned on or hoped 
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for, but a trip that showed me a whole new perspective on a world that I wouldn’t 
otherwise have seen. I had a whole new relationship to sidewalks and curb cuts and 
bathrooms. I understood the need for laws protecting access for the disabled in a 
whole new, visceral way. I look back on it now as an extremely valuable 
experience. (Starhawk 2004, 59–60) 
In one sense, her reaction is an argument directly against the New Age: the narcissistic 
reaction, the reaction that is fascinated with her own stories, with the trans-generational 
patterns at play from her family of origin, with all of the previous moments in her life 
where these feelings had emerged, must be set aside in order to open herself to whatever is 
contained in the current reality. Not only is direct experience given primacy over personal 
history, but that experience is immediately and forcefully expanded into a notion of 
community, into questions around how this same experience might be shared and felt on a 
practical level by others.  
The notion of community is critical to understanding neopaganism. Neopagans 
consistently claim their spiritual practice generates intense and emotionally powerful 
connections that flow in unpredictable and highly fluid ways. Covens—the most central of 
the community structures—form and re-form, some having decades of unbroken history 
with a stable series of leaders, others dissolving either quietly or in a sudden conflagration 
of personalities. This much is, perhaps, to be expected but Starhawk’s commitment to 
groups reaches far beyond the coven structure. Most notably, both as the network of 
offshoot covens from her original group grows exponentially over time and as she 
increasingly engages in various forms of direct political action, she writes more and more 
of “affinity networks,” a way of organizing groups that have overlapping—but by no 
means identical—goals in a productive structure that allows cooperative engagement. 
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Much of Starhawk’s writings after The Spiral Dance are either explicitly focused on, or 
contain significant parts dedicated to the study of interaction patterns in groups, 
culminating in her most recent publication, The Empowerment Manual: A Guide for 
Collaborative Groups (2011). Much as The Earth Path calls on earlier magical writings, 
The Empowerment Manual pulls together the more practical and community organizing 
work of Truth or Dare into a form that is designed to be consumable by, if not a Fortune 
500 board room, the open workspace of a Silicon Valley inspired, groovy start-up near 
you. Its topics—building communication and trust, meeting and process facilitation, 
leadership roles, conflict resolution—are decidedly secular, the focus of thousands of 
corporate improvement workshops, programs, and consultancies before her, but the content 
is reflective of her four decades of deep engagement in various organizations, grass-roots 
and otherwise, and her dedication to discovering new ways for people to support and 
collaborate with each other in those quotidian contexts. The movement from coven to 






This backward order of things—first you write and then you figure out 
what you are writing about—may seem odd, or even perverse, but it is, I 
think, at least most of the time, standard procedure in cultural 
anthropology. 
Clifford Geertz, Preface to the 2000 Edition of The 
Interpretation of Cultures 
Where, then, are we? 
At the end of these five chapters, our course has wandered widely and through 
much varied terrain, tracing the arcs of several sets of loosely-related ideas, and pursuing 
them down not a few rabbit holes. But, to what end? If Muir and Næss are to be believed, 
the walk itself may prove a salve for the soul, but even they had destinations and struggled 
to make sense of what they saw along the way. Bearing this in mind, there are two 
observations with which I would like to close, one academic, one less so. 
The first is an assertion about the nature of neopaganism in North America, really a 
claim that it is a neopaganism of nature. The waves of paganism that arrived on these 
shores from Europe were those of mystery cults, of rituals and rites with thousands of 
years of inherited history. This is the inheritance of Ficino, of Bruno, of Swedenborg, but it 
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is only part of the story. Those traditions broke against the rocks of the New World, 
fracturing into patterns that scattered both across the continent and back across the ocean 
by the end of the nineteenth century, adhering wherever they found sympathetic surfaces. 
The return to Europe is important: neopaganism is more similar than different on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and while the discrepancies show most starkly when the 
contemporary is seen through the lens of historical roots, a practitioner from New England 
is likely to feel comfortable in Old England as well. 
These pools of acceptance were largely marked by the presence of a vitalism that 
was couched in terms of the natural world. Whether the roots of the vitalism were seen as 
internal or external—bodily or worldly—the mystery had moved outside, if perhaps, in 
Muir’s words again, “only to go back in.” This process has resulted in a set of 
neopaganisms recognizable as much for their insistence upon the primacy of a relationship 
with the natural world as for anything else. 
This insight is not original—it builds both upon the general scholarship of Wouter 
Hanegraaff, but also upon an extension of the claims made by Steven J. Sutcliffe and Chas 
S. Clifton. But it is a nuance that is often overlooked both in neopagan accounts of their 
own development in American and in academic assessments of their history. The wide 
expanses of America, Muir’s glaciers and sequoias, were a critical component in their 
survival, especially in the face of the growing dominance of a scientific rationalism that 
threatened to eradicate all forms of mysticism in its wake. 
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The One and the Many or, But 
We Were Promised Hovercars 
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. 
Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the Future 
The final point I wish to make returns us to the metaphor of ecology, and to its 
broader meaning. One of the tensions running through this paper is between the individual 
and the community, whether seen as Muir’s struggle to create a life that supported both his 
need for thousand mile walks and his commitment to a larger public good or as Margulis’ 
work to disprove the notion of the individual—and its evolutionary equivalent, the selfish 
gene—in favor of the bacterial masses that live inside each of us or as Haraway’s railing 
against the reification of the unusual individual by Deleuze and Guattari or as the 
difficulties encountered by the New Age in conquering the narcissism that seems to 
accompany it at every turn.  
This tension is real, and it is one that can be viewed throughout human history in 
almost infinite variety. It has been, and will continue to be, evaluated in many different 
ways, with pronouncements at all points along the continuum it forms. But the notion of 
ecology demands an important transformation where, in photographic terms, the depth of 
field is radically expanded. What was originally a scene dominated by a few figures in the 
foreground, their outlines clearly delineated against the backdrop, flattens out into a 
landscape where it is no longer possible to isolate one figure from another with any 
certainty. Where does the river end and the delta begin? The delta and the sea? 
Muir’s gift was to let Emerson’s invisible eye move through him without 
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refraction, allowing him to expand his view out towards the horizons instead of contracting 
back towards an anthropomorphically reduced suburbia. The radical nature of this move is 
precisely part of what has left it on the fringes of American thought: the notion that nature 
is not there for us, for the taking and the taming, remains fundamentally opposed to the 
continued expansionist triumphalism that has its roots in the colonial moment and its 
current tendrils in the sprawling freewayside mall. These are static structures, dead and 
ultimately untenable precisely because they lack the vital principle, the constant chemical 
churn and change that Lovelock realized denotes the presence of life. We see this in 
abandoned lots quickly grown over with the first wave of hardy weeds, in the never-ending 
construction needed to maintain the concrete and steel arteries of transportation, in the 
staggering dependence of contemporary society on a surprisingly fragile network that 
enables the global flow of information and media. 
Science itself, still hailed as the white knight of a conquering rationalism, is 
struggling to maintain its stability on two fronts. First, internally the sheer complexity of it 
all remains overwhelming. We have glimpses—often important glimpses—into how things 
“really are,” but the dream of a Grand Unified Theory (GUT), the holy grail of theoretical 
work in the 1970s and 1980s, has largely been abandoned or, at least, understood to be put 
off for future generations. Just as the bacteria inside each of us complicate the question of 
individuality and its relationship to the history of the species, the GUT of science is no 
longer filled with objects from the world of Newton, Descartes, and Hume, billiard balls of 
specific weights whose velocity and momentum allow precise, calculated results. Quantum 
uncertainty and genetic complexity rule in their stead and while this does little to 
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undermine the everyday utility of Newton’s brilliance—the Mars rover Curiosity’s current 
explorations of the dusty emptiness of the red planet attest to this—we are left 
understanding that such things may no longer be seen as wholly sufficient for 
understanding the world around and inside of us. 
Second, the role of scientists themselves seems to be undergoing what is best seen 
as another turn of the spiral, a slow and often unwitting return to the recognition that 
expanding the realm of knowledge is work performed on the edge of the unknown and the 
unknowable, and walking the fine line between falsifiability and madness is neither easy 
nor likely to lead one in predictable directions. While the reaction of some—and these are 
the ones that drew Midgley’s attention—is to reverse direction into either the self-
aggrandizing realm of scientism or into flights of fancy that would make Muir proud, 
others are finding that science and complexity are necessary bedfellows, that what we 
know and what we aspire to know interact in surprising ways more reminiscent of 
Newton’s fascination with alchemy—to which he devoted more of his life than physics—
than to his volumes of mathematical formulae. Capra’s physics remain suspect, but his 
recognition of the vital interactions of science and other forms of belief remain highly 
relevant. There is a mysticism in science and without its embrace, we are in all likelihood 
approaching the practical ends of what it can accomplish—in support of this I would offer 
Sagan’s passionate claims to the power of the unknown, to the mysteries yet unsolved as 
he gazed into his oddly pronounced billions and billions of stars in the cosmos. 
The close of the twentieth century has left us profoundly uncomfortable with our 
relationship with technology. We are dependent upon it, even addicted to its fruits, but we 
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are also deeply aware of its dangers despite many attempts to blind ourselves. We resist 
this discomfort in significant ways, from celebrating its various successes to the way we 
structure the boundaries of knowledge itself. As an example of this latter point, consider 
the demographics of those that contribute to the English language version of Wikipedia (by 
far the dominant, and the model used by other linguistically grouped contributors). It is 
trite to recognize that human history has never seen a more efficient gathering of data than 
Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger’s pet project, but it is equally important to note just how 
bereft Wikipedia remains of hermeneutic sophistication. This is data assimilated by the 
privileged for the privileged, and filtered through the fine mesh of an assumed rationalism, 
triumphant in its demands for proof and citations. Which is not to deny the intensely 
utilitarian value of the site, but knowledge without interpretive meaning remains a 
dangerous thing. 
In the end, this is where technology has failed us. For all the spectacular, life-
preserving and survival-enabling successes in medicine and infrastructure, for all the 
progress in the global quality of life that has been seen (and not for one instant losing sight 
of the distance yet to go), it is increasingly clear that turning to technology for our 
happiness leads us down a cul-de-sac of unmet expectations, lined with Likes and tweets, 
poorly lit photos and ubiquitous product placement. This realization has left us a bit bereft 
and can, I would claim, be seen as part of our current structuring of the notion of 
apocalypse as being an absence—explained or not—of the technological utopia that was 
assumed to be well on its way. 
Culturally, we are obsessed with what comes after that event, from the long-
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running television series Lost and Cormac McCarthy’s The Road to S.M. Sterling’s 
“Emberverse” books and the legally-questionably similar television show Revolution to the 
massive phenomenon of Suzanne Collins’ The Hunger Games and their film adaptations to 
the televised version of Robert Kirkman’s graphic novel, The Walking Dead. While simple 
climate change is a more likely cause than a sudden eruption of zombies or an inexplicable 
alteration in the laws of physics that prevents combustion from releasing sufficient energy 
to run an engine or fire a gun, each of these struggle with the question of how to reconcile 
the loss of the modern world with survival in dramatically changed circumstances. 
However we evaluate the New Age, its successful transformation of the idea of 
apocalypse from something dependent on the unpredictable tendency of the world around 
us to intrude into our human routines in devastating ways to something that is held within 
each of us as a psychological structure that must be overcome to further human 
development remains a brilliant achievement with far-reaching implications. While 
enabled by its historical continuity with other parts of Albanese’s American metaphysic, 
this change brought the demons inside to roost in our psyches. The problem is the world is 
still out there, and its destructive nature is still as capricious as ever. Gaia remains 
Margulis’ “tough bitch,” ultimately uncaring about any specific form of life in favor of the 
phenomenon writ large. 
It is this largeness that I hope to have shed a little light on in this thesis, the notion 
that while a single species tends to be irrelevant to the larger story, communities of 
species—ecologies—remain the star of the show. We only exist in the plural, somewhere 
between the postmodern trope of “always already” and Margulis’ bacterial colonies; we 
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only exist in conversation with others, other cultures and other traditions, other 
communities of behavior. This is the learning that neopaganism offers, that after we 
struggle with the complex issues of authenticity and agency that accompany the 
incorporation of others into ourselves, we are left with the possibility of plurality, with the 
intermingling of innumerable single organisms that is at the heart of evolution itself. This 
is the ultimate optimism that guides Starhawk from coven to meeting room, and that makes 
sense of the simultaneous appeals to the Goddess and the meeting agenda. 
Once established, ecologies adapt. Individuals come and go, and the most any can 
do is leave a small mutation that is carried forward. But the community remains, and it is 
only seen through this wider lens that how any of it matters—from the microscopic to the 
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